Abstract
ABSTRACTIn an attempt to solve large-scale environmental problems, government agencies often resort to formal sanctioning systems: market-based incentives or command-and-control regulations, to promote cooperation. The purpose of this study was to investigate how the presence of these formal sanctioning systems impacts informal sanctioning systems for environmental protection. Study 1 used an experimental game to explore the influence of market-based and regulatory programs on informal sanctioning in a laboratory setting. Study 2 was a quasi-experimental field survey that compared informal sanctioning among Massachusetts residents living in towns with voluntary, mandatory, and pay-as-you-throw recycling programs. Results showed that in the presence of a formal sanctioning system, individuals felt guiltier for not engaging in the cooperative behavior and expressed more disapproval for non-cooperators. Combined, these results show that environmental policies can buttress conservation norms.
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