Infantry Units Research Articles

Scrub Typhus Outbreak among Soldiers in Coastal Training Area, Australia, 2022.

A scrub typhus outbreak occurred among 24 soldiers from 2 Australian Defence Force infantry units following separate training events conducted in the same coastal location in tropical North Queensland, Australia, in June 2022. Seven soldiers visited a hospital, 5 requiring admission. Outbreak recognition was hampered by the geographic dispersion of soldiers after the exercise and delayed case identification resulting from such factors as prolonged incubation, cross-reactive serologic responses to other pathogens, the nonspecific symptoms of scrub typhus, and the illness's nonnotifiable status in the state of Queensland. Our investigation focused on personal protective measures in a subanalysis of 41 soldiers, revealing an association between scrub typhus infection and the use of doxycycline chemoprophylaxis and permethrin uniform dipping.

Effectiveness of an Expendable Unmanned Ground Vehicle Stalling a Mechanized Infantry Company's Primary Combat Units—A Virtual Simulation Experiment

ABSTRACTTechnological advancements have spurred the development of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and their innovative military applications and strategies. Such applications include expendable UGVs. However, public research concerning expendable military UGVs remains sparse. Particularly, the unclassified literature does not contain studies regarding their capabilities and effectiveness in combat. This study introduces a new low‐cost expendable UGV called Laykka. Moreover, the study presents a virtual simulation experiment to evaluate Laykkas' operational capabilities and their impact on advancing mechanized infantry units. The experiment involved armored reserve officer students assuming the roles of infantry troops forming an attacking opposing force while staff officers controlled simulated infantry troops operating the UGVs. A total of 16 battle simulations were fought. The simulated UGVs operated by a single soldier were able to stall the advancement of the mechanized infantry company's primary combat units three times out of four and a smaller force 11 out of 12 times. The best stalling effect was observed using a mix of UGVs with different module types. These modules allowed reconnaissance, loitering mine, and anti‐tank operations. The simulation experiment revealed that the UGV was an effective defensive tool due to its self‐destructive capability, causing marked battle damage, disruption, and confusion to the opposing forces.

Changes in the Composition, Equipment and Tactics of the 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment of the French Foreign Legion during the Indochina War

For nearly a hundred years after its creation, the French Foreign Legion consisted exclusively of infantry units, supplemented only temporarily by “mounted” infantry units, depending on the needs of the theatre of operations. These units did not exceed the size of a company, and their members used their mounts (horses, mules, camels) only to move around, and continued to fight their battles on foot. Based on this positive experience, the 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment was created in 1922, and was then successfully deployed in Syria and Morocco between the two World Wars, and with varying effectiveness in France, Tunisia and Germany during the Second World War. The First Indochina War broke out in 1946 and the 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment joined the conflict in Southeast Asia in 1947, only to leave in 1955 as one of the last French units. During the war, the ranks of the troop, composed mainly of foreign nationals, were reinforced within a short time by a significant number of local soldiers to alleviate the permanent shortage. In addition, depending on local geography, the unit was equipped with armoured and amphibious vehicles, and sometimes ships, which were used to develop new tactics and operate effectively in these new and very different circumstances. In view of its successes, the unit was greatly improved, originally consisting of 7 squadrons, and by the end of the conflict it had grown to 18 squadrons.

Laser Weapons as a New Entity to Small Firearms

Laser weapons have long been the subject of debate. The article discusses the potential adoption of laser weapons by infantry units and the future of small firearms. The text analyses these weapons in selected categories that subsequently support the evaluations and the conclusion. If miniaturisation is successfully managed, the comparison reveals an interesting paradox. While laser weapons and firearms do not rival each other as distinct functionalities, given the right conditions, they can actually complement each other and compensate for any disadvantages within their respective categories. Today's complex battlefield is placing ever greater demands on small arms, pushing conventional weapon mechanisms – combined with ammunition that guarantees accuracy and lower recoil, albeit at the expense of penetration – towards the limits of further possible advancement in technology. Improved passive individual protection restricts the wounding potential of pistol ammunition, reducing it to below 150 m for rifle cartridges, while guided ammunition tends to be prohibitively expensive. Under the right conditions, laser weapons could compensate for any of these drawbacks.

Heat Intolerance, Body Size, and Return to Duty.

BACKGROUND: Exertional heatstroke affects athletes and soldiers and can lead to temporary heat intolerance. The heat tolerance test (HTT) was developed to assist in the return-to-duty decisions of military personnel. Although there are several possible causes for heat intolerance, a soldier who fails the test is prevented from returning to serve in a front-line combat unit, regardless of the underlying reason.CASE REPORT: A 19-yr-old special infantry male soldier with unremarkable medical history collapsed during an afternoon hand-to-hand combat training session in the gym. The medic on site promptly initiated inefficient tap water cooling and measured a rectal temperature of 38.7 °C; he returned to duty the same evening. A few weeks later, after intensive physical training, he experienced exhaustion during a stretcher-carrying foot march. He was referred by the unit's physician, who suspected a condition of heat intolerance, to an HTT. The soldier underwent two HTTs, which were found to be positive. Consequently, he was discharged from serving in his infantry unit. No congenital or functional underlying causes could explain the diagnosis of heat intolerance.DISCUSSION: We discuss the possibility that the only explaining cause for the two positive HTTs was the soldier's anthropometric measures, particularly the low body surface area to body weight ratio. We raise the question of whether this soldier could have been returned safely to duty.Rabotin A, Epstein Y, Ketko I. Heat intolerance, body size, and return to duty. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2023; 94(7):546-549.

Brytyjskie formacje konne na półwyspie Gallipoli w 1915 roku

The fighting on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915 was primarily a clash of masses of infantry. The limited area controlled by the allies and difficult terrain basically prevented the effective use of cavalry. Nevertheless, after a few weeks, the first cavalry units landed on the peninsula. Over the following months, their number systematically grew. At its peak, the composition of the British forces included as many as 15 horse brigades. Armament, equipment, and above all, the principles of training allowed it to fight in the same way as infantry. It was used to man field fortifications at the front or to strengthen the most weakened infantry divisions. Sending horse formations to the peninsula was irrational. Using such formations as infantry deprived them of their main advantage, which was mobility. What's more, positional fighting caused significant losses, even in a situation of relative calm on the front. In addition, problems with provisions and hygiene caused increasing non-combat losses. In the fall, these problems only increased. The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Command was aware of these problems. It even attempted to obtain additional infantry units from Egypt to replace the cavalry on the peninsula. Unfortunately, personal animosities, competition and lack of strategic thinking meant that these intentions were not implemented.

Analysis of the development of five generation of anti-armor missile systems

The modern way of conducting combat operations has led to an expansion in the development of various combat systems. Experiences from modern military operations indicate that regardless of the place of combat operations, maneuvering ground or urban space, the systems for counter-attack ATGMs represent a very important weapon that contributes to the success of combat operations and is significantly represented in the arsenal of many armies. The paper presents the development of five generations of anti-armor missile systems, as important weapons whose main task is to destroy and neutralize tanks, combat armored vehicles, MRAP vehicles and non-combat vehicles, fortifications and bunkers at different firing ranges. Different tactical-technical features of the mentioned systems, development of several different types and generations of anti-aircraft missiles and the conditions in which they are used have led to the complexity of the problem of anti-aircraft missile systems research. An analysis of the development of anti-armor missile systems was carried out and a conclusion was drawn on the degree of efficiency of the mentioned systems in combat operations, with a proposal for the implementation of anti-armor missile systems of the third, fourth and fifth generation in infantry units. The paper also shows the requirements for the next generation of anti-armor systems.

НАЧАЛО БОЕВОЙ СЛУЖБЫ 41-ГО ЕГЕРСКОГО ПОЛКА В СОСТАВЕ ОТДЕЛЬНОГО КАВКАЗСКОГО КОРПУСА. 1819–1826 ГГ.

The purpose of the article is to study the military actions of the Russian army in the initial period of the Caucasian War. The author pays attention to topical issues of recruitment and organization of light infantry units of a Separate Caucasian Corps. The information about the contribution of General A.P. Ermolov to the reorganization of troops and their preparation for conducting operations against irregular formations of the enemy is summarized. The problem of establishing a historical connection between the 41st Jaeger regiment and its successors from among the combat units of the Separate Caucasian Corps is considered. The author gives concrete examples of combat operations of the 41st Jaeger Regiment in 1820-1826. As a result, the author concludes that the adaptation of the jaeger units to the specific conditions of the theater of the Caucasus-Mountain war of the 19th century took place in a short time.

Polskie zagony pancerno-motorowe w czasie wojny 1920 roku

During the war with Bolshevik Russia, the Polish Army carried out raids by armored and motorized units three times, in which infantry units transported by trucks and supported by armored cars took part. In the first two raids, which were directed at Zhytomyr and Kovel, complete success was achieved. However, the last incursion, aimed at Lutsk, failed.

Inclusion of women into ground close combat roles: an organisational change perspective

IntroductionWomen have formally been excluded from ground close combat (GCC) roles in the UK military until 2018. The opening of the final roles to all genders has been the result...

ANALISA PENGARUH AERODINAMIKA PADA MARGIN STABILITAS MORTIR LATIH 81 MM DENGAN SISTEM KOMPRESI UDARA

Mortar is one type of weapon used by Infantry units. One type of mortar that is widely used, especially in technical training, is the 81 mm mortar prototype produced by PT. Pindad, which has a 7.62 mm caliber munitions thruster with an average range of 110 meters. However, this mortar still has unstable aerodynamics. Therefore, this study was conducted to design a safe mortar prototype with a stability margin value, so it can determine the range and improve the troop skills. Computational fluid dynamic simulation was conducted through the ANSYS software to simulate important aerodynamic properties in this study. The angle variation of the barrel in firing used is 450,550 and 650 with compression pressure variation of 16,18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32 bar. Meanwhile, the angle modification of the mortar fin is 330,440,550 and the aerodynamic simulation was carried out at 20, 30, 40 m/s speeds. The results showed that the design of an 81 mm mortar prototype which has a fin angle of 330 at a simulated speed of 20,30,40 m/s, an angle of attack of 450,550, 650 has the smallest drag force and lift force and the smallest number of postive pitch moments, but still has a standard margin of stability of about 1.57-1.81 caliber.

제1차 세계대전과 러시아 장교단

World War I raised the need for large-scale recruitment of officers due to the general mobilization, the new formation of military units, and the enormous loss of troops. The Russian authorities mobilized retired or reserve officers, and hastily commissioned military academy cadets as officers. The short courses of military academies was opened and the Ensign School was established. And brave or educated soldiers or non-commissioned officers were promoted to officers. In this way, the Russian authorities were able to increase the number of officers in service approximately from 330,000 to 340,000. It can be said that the war efforts of the czar system were quite successful in this way. However, this rapid expansion of the Russian officers’ corps was coupled with the enormous loss of the officers’ corps. As infantry officers at lower ranks and at the early period of the war experienced the most loss and regular officers were promoted to fill the vacancy in the upper positions, the number of regular officers in the infantry unit sharply decreased. The upper ranks of the Russian officers’ corps were still mostly regular officers, but most infantry regiments were commanded by officers with not much administrative-commanding experience and experienced officers in the regiment was few. Therefore, it was difficult for the hierarchical leadership system within the officer corps to function effectively. On the other hand, wartime officers with low educational background hardly earned respect from the soldiers due to their lack of military knowledge and experience. Therefore it would not be acceptable as a satisfactory explanation to suggest that the large influx of ‘unqualified’ wartime officers was the sole cause of the weakening of officers’ control over their soldiers. The lack of command ability of regular officers who were quickly promoted to major commanding positions and the strategic incapacity of senior generals who took for granted huge human losses should be considered as the another causes. Moreover, the fact that the upper echelons of the Russian army officers consisted mainly of regular officers, while the lower tiers consisted of wartime officers had a negative effect on the unity of the officers. While the number of hereditary aristocrats in the wartime officers declined sharply, the number of peasants increased rapidly. But this tendency was started before the war and only intensified during the war. The majority of hereditary aristocrats before World War I were not ‘landlords’ but ‘service aristocrats’ who made military service their sole or main means of livelihood. Therefore the proposition that the Russian officers represented the “bourgeois-landlord aristocracy” just before World War I cannot be admitted. Finally, as almost educated or brave youngsters who had positive toward war became to serve as officers, soldiers or noncommissioned officers that would have had a potential influence among soldiers were reduced, which would have negatively affected the soldiers’ attitudes and moods toward war. (Chonnam National University / sachpak@jnu.ac.kr)

Deployment of Light Infantry Under Air Mobility Doctrine – A Historical Study of Helicopter-deployed Light Infantry

Can the present learn from the past? Moreover, if so, what lessons can we learn? The Danish Parliament instructed the Armed Forces to create a light infantry unit. What resulted is the Slesvig Regiment of Foot, designed to conduct operations using helicopters and/or navy vessels. This article is an analysis of the lessons that can be learned from three historic cases using light infantry in an air mobile capacity and under an air mobility doctrine. The need for such an analysis comes from the fact that this is a new way of conducting military operations for the Danish Army. The cases are the American insertion at Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam 1965, the Rhodesian Bush War 1974–1980 and the British Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone 2000; all three chosen because they illustrate similarities and differences that will give the analysis the broader perspective needed to provide suitable lessons for a future Danish concept of operations for the light infantry unit. All three cases have a doctrinal background that are applicable in a Danish context. The article argues that there are a number of lessons to be learned, such as the adherence to an air mobile doctrine, command and control measures, the level of training, and the experience and mind-set of the commanders. The elements of surprise, fire support, aggression when needed, flexibility, communication and the units’ organization and equipment also provide valuable lessons.

Future and development direction (21-35) of M&S for building up to the hyper-army in Republic of Korea Army

This study presents the direction of modeling and simulation (M&S) development, which is essential for high-tech armed forces, focusing on the Vision 2030 in Republic of Korea Army. In particular, in preparation for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the army is doing its best to transform itself with cutting-edge science and technology. It is preparing for future warfare by promoting artificial intelligence (AI), a dronebot combat system, the warrior platform, and Army-Tiger 4.0 to increase the mobility, intelligence, and networking of infantry units. M&S is vital for accomplishing this advanced science and technology. In other words, it is an essential element of effective defense management, such as improving defense capabilities, enhancing military power, strengthening combat readiness posture, and training for future science. In particular, M&S is the best solution to overcome the difficult conditions of a limited budget and lack of resources by using more creative thinking methods along with cutting-edge technologies, such as AI, big data, virtual reality, and the Internet of things (IoT). The Republic of Korea Army recognizes its importance and intends to introduce and implement the 21-35 Army M&S development direction to present the vision and direction of the Army M&S for advanced science and technology force and to develop it continuously.

"Among the troops he chose brave warriors, who were battling through ranks...". On Some Peculiar Aspects of Amir Timur's Tactical Art

This article revises the peculiarities of Amir Timur's army tactical peculiarities, as well as their influence on the development of martial art of the Muslim East. It is established that Timur effectively used the mobilization potential of his state. The sedentary population of Chorasa and Transoxiana formed the infantry archery units who were taught to fight under cover of large standing shields - chapars. At the same time, loyal nomad tribes were the source of horse cavalry for the Timur's army. The base of battle formation was represented by a tactical "skeleton" formed of forced kanbuls, powerful advance guard and a reserve (that included elite warriors). Such battle formation allowed Timur to effectively face outflanking and frontal attacks of the enemy. Besides, such battle formation also fit for quick shift from defense to massive counterattack, performed by advance guard and kanbuls projected towards the enemy. The vulnerability of weakened flank corps was partially compensated by using infantry archery units with support of dismounted archers. As a rule, massive archery attack stopped the enemy's attack and provided for counterattack. The organizational and tactical autonomy of kul corps, which could embattle independently even if there was a front breakthrough or encirclement, played an important role. Dismounted, enshielded warriors of the corps could repulse the attacks until the deblocking unit approaches. A fast-moving reserve under Timur's personal command could be used for both repulsing an attack and augmenting the advancing troops.

Integrating Autonomous Systems into Military Units

Autonomous systems are the future of military warfare and must be carefully employed to hold the advantage in technological advances. In an effort to measure the capabilities of autonomous systems within military units, this study analyzes the effects an autonomous system has while integrated into an Army Infantry unit. Using combat modeling software, a constructive reality modeled breaching and fires mission scenarios to determine the effects an autonomous system may have within a unit. Within the model limitations, statistical analysis supported that an autonomous system has a general impact on increasing a unit’s lethality and survivability. These statistically significant conclusions support that autonomous systems should be integrated within military units since these systems have a strong, positive impact on unit effectiveness. Additional data analysis and extending the analysis to other combat scenarios is crucial in applying these conclusions outside of the tested scenarios.

Force structure and counterinsurgency outcome: the case of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959)

ABSTRACT This article examines the Cyprus Emergency (1955–1959) to test the force structure thesis. According to the thesis, armies that deploy more manpower per armored vehicle would succeed in counterinsurgency because they could win people’s trust, secure intelligence from civilians, and use force selectively. Using the congruence method of within-case analysis, I show that the causal process and logic of the force structure argument are not confirmed in the favorable case of Cyprus. Despite its preference for infantry and police units, the British garrison failed to win over the people and persuade civilians to share information about the insurgent; besides, Britain’s intelligence breakthroughs and selective violence did not result from the logic of the force structure thesis, nor did the conflict end as the argument would predict. Political conditions, instead, played a greater role. Ultimately, the case of Cyprus warns against the reassuring belief, inherent in the force structure thesis, that military organizational adjustments in favor of manpower can pave the way to victory against irregular opponents.

SINJANI I CETINJANI – VOJNICI U MLETAČKIM PREKOMORSKIM KOPNENIM POSTROJBAMA (18. STOLJEĆE)

Središnja tema rada usmjerena je na raščlambu udjela Sinjana i Cetinjana u mletačkim prekomorskim kopnenim postrojbama (pješaštvo i konjaništvo) u 18. stoljeću. Rad se zasniva na raščlambi izvornoga arhivskog gradiva pohranjenoga u Archivio di Stato di Venezia, a riječ je o popisima pripadnika pojedinih vojnih postrojbi koje je provodila nadležna državna magistratura Inquisitori sopra l’amministrazione dei pubblici ruoli. U uvodnome dijelu rada ukratko se iznose opći podatci o mletačkim prekojadranskim postrojbama, dočim je središnji dio teksta usmjeren na raščlambu konkretnih primjera prisutnosti Sinjana i Cetinjana u mletačkoj kopnenoj vojsci. Analizira se njihova ukupna brojnost tijekom 18. stoljeća, učestalost spominjanja u izvorima, iznose opći podatci o zapovjednicima postrojbi, mjesta djelovanja te se ukazuje na neka opća obilježja onovremenih vojnika (dob, statura i drugo).
 U prilogu rada donosi se cjelovit pregled svih Sinjana i
 Cetinjana (prema dosadašnjim istraživanjima) zabilježenih
 u mletačkim kopnenim vojnim snagama.

Volley fire in Europe in the mid-16th century

The article explores the application of volley fire in European armies in the mid-16th century. On the basis of Polish sources, the authors established that shooting volleys was applied by Polish infantry in 1558. There was also training in collective loading and shooting conducted by a commander every few days. Fire was conducted in the Turkish manner, i. e. having fired a salvo the rank would kneel and load the weapon in this position. The painting referred to in the article «The Battle of Orsha» (created in the 1530s or 1540s) shows the West European manner of conducting combat by an infantry unit. It involved setting the shooters in three ranks and alternating firing at enemy positions with a simultaneous countermarch. This suggests that the method described for the first time by the Spanish in 1592 was spread half a century earlier. The sources show that in the mid-16th century, volley fire was known in vast Eurasian tracks from remote China, through the Ottoman Empire to the western ends of Europe. The difference lay in the way of conducting the volley fire, and the most effective form of fire applied in battles was invented by the Dutch in the 1590s. As a result of the enlargement of weapon size and the introduction of muskets, the method proposed by Tarnowski of loading firearms in kneeling position became increasingly obsolete.

Organizational transformations of the Crown Army during the war of the Vistula mouth, 1626–1629

The article explores the organizational transformations of the Crown army during the war with Sweden in the years 1626–1629. On the basis of fiscal sources, correspondence, and war accounts, the author established that the number of Sigismund III’s troops increased. In 1629 they were more numerous in Prussia than the combined armies in Prussia and in Ukraine three years earlier. Positional warfare with the Swedes, who had a considerable number of well-trained infantry and perfect artillery, required a change in the structure of the army, over half of which during hostilities consisted of dragoons and infantry formations, especially those of the foreign contingent. Over the course of the war, free companies (freikompanie), which made up a core of the infantry at the beginning of the war, were mostly replaced by large regiments of over three thousand pay rates. Also, successful attempts were made to create infantry units trained and armed in the German manner, commanded by foreigners, but recruited among Sigismund III’s subjects, and the ranks of Polish-Hungarian infantry were reinforced. In the ranks of cavalry, reiters were of more importance than in Ukraine. They grew into a third force in the Polish cavalry, after Polish hussars and Cossacks. Considerably smaller changes occurred for artillery, which despite significant expenses was still inferior to that of the Swedish artillery. Sigismund III’s troops also struggled with the deficiency of experienced engineers and cartographers. Although after the Altmark armistice the king had to reduce the army, from which the infantry disappeared almost entirely, dragoons were preserved in Ukraine thanks to Crown Field Hetman Koniecpolski. From that time on, they would constitute an indispensable part of the wojsko kwarciane (quarter army). The significance of the Prussian war for the development of the Crown military is best illustrated by the fact that in 1633, in the course of preparations for the war with Muscovy for Smolensk, Władysław IV and his advisers organized the army largely in the manner of the years 1626–1629.