Abstract

Can the present learn from the past? Moreover, if so, what lessons can we learn? The Danish Parliament instructed the Armed Forces to create a light infantry unit. What resulted is the Slesvig Regiment of Foot, designed to conduct operations using helicopters and/or navy vessels. This article is an analysis of the lessons that can be learned from three historic cases using light infantry in an air mobile capacity and under an air mobility doctrine. The need for such an analysis comes from the fact that this is a new way of conducting military operations for the Danish Army. The cases are the American insertion at Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam 1965, the Rhodesian Bush War 1974–1980 and the British Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone 2000; all three chosen because they illustrate similarities and differences that will give the analysis the broader perspective needed to provide suitable lessons for a future Danish concept of operations for the light infantry unit. All three cases have a doctrinal background that are applicable in a Danish context. The article argues that there are a number of lessons to be learned, such as the adherence to an air mobile doctrine, command and control measures, the level of training, and the experience and mind-set of the commanders. The elements of surprise, fire support, aggression when needed, flexibility, communication and the units’ organization and equipment also provide valuable lessons.

Highlights

  • As a consequence of the change in the security situation in Eastern Europe, with Russia seen as increasingly challenging and assertive, the Danish Parliament agreed to strengthen the Danish Armed Forces in the Defence Agreement signed in 2018 (Forsvarsministeriet 2018: 1)

  • One of the very tangible elements in the Defence Agreement was the recreation of the Slesvig Regiment of Foot, which had been mothballed in an earlier Defence Agreement in 2000 (Forsvarsministeriet 2000: 2)

  • Light Infantry in air mobile operations can achieve success in its operations, provided it adheres to an air mobility doctrine designed for it

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Summary

Kristian Lindhardt

Can the present learn from the past? if so, what lessons can we learn? The Danish Parliament instructed the Armed Forces to create a light infantry unit. This article is an analysis of the lessons that can be learned from three historic cases using light infantry in an air mobile capacity and under an air mobility doctrine. The need for such an analysis comes from the fact that this is a new way of conducting military operations for the Danish Army. The cases are the American insertion at Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam 1965, the Rhodesian Bush War 1974–1980 and the British Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone 2000; all three chosen because they illustrate similarities and differences that will give the analysis the broader perspective needed to provide suitable lessons for a future Danish concept of operations for the light infantry unit.

Introduction
Analytical Approach
The Development of Air Mobility Doctrines
Sierra Leone
Conclusion
Contemporary context
Full Text
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