India Relations Research Articles

An Asian Triangle: India's Relationship With China and Japan

Many studies of Asia's future have focused on the shifting power relationships in the region, particularly between China, Japan, and India. A prominent part of this debate is India's rise and potential role as a balancer in the evolving strategic relationships in the region. This article examines India's relations with these two Asian powers and argues that India is unlikely to play the role of balancer unless relations between China and Japan deteriorate significantly. Instead, India may be well situated to act as a stabilizer, not only between China and Japan but also between the United States and China, should tension escalate in the region.

INDIA AND SERVICES OUTSOURCING IN ASIA

This paper examines India's role in services outsourcing within Asia. It provides a brief overview of the global as well as Indian services outsourcing industry. The core section examines India's relationship with other Asian countries such as China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia in service outsourcing. It examines the extent to which these countries pose a competitive challenge to India and concludes that at this time, India is far ahead although it is likely to face growing competition as its costs rise. The paper highlights the need to move beyond this comparative paradigm and to examine the complementary and collaborative opportunities that exist between India and other Asian countries in services outsourcing. It concludes that there is considerable scope for such synergies and that India and other Asian countries can form different parts of a larger regional or global delivery model. Regional and bilateral agreements within Asia can also facilitate this process.

India´ s Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security

slowly. The debate on India's rise and its implications for Asian and global balance of power centres around the new expectations and residual scepticism about the sustainability of India's recent impressive economic performance — of around 8 per cent annual growth rates during the first decade of the twenty-first century. If India can maintain this performance, India's political and military weight in Southeast Asia will undoubtedly improve. The last few years have also seen the maturation of India's Look East policy launched in the mid-1990s. The expectations on India's rise have also begun to inject a new dynamism into India's relations with the great powers of Asia — the United States, China, and Japan. As a result, India is no longer marginal to either the regional politics of Southeast Asia nor the great power system that shapes it. For the first time since the mid-1950s, when its economy turned inward and its foreign policy drew closer to the Soviet bloc, India is now becoming an important factor in the security calculus of Southeast Asia.

India's Relations with Iran and Myanmar: “Rogue State” or Responsible Democratic Stakeholder?

India's Relations with Iran and Myanmar: “Rogue State” or Responsible Democratic Stakeholder?

India and the Great Powers

Six propositions drive this article. First, India's relations with the great powers as they evolve over the next two decades are going to be conditioned by India's own emergence as a great power. Second, it will take at least 15 to 20 years for a balance to re-emerge in the contemporary hegemonic system; hence, India's emergence will be simultaneous with the relative decline of the United States (US). Third, Indian policy makers and analysts need to think structurally about India's external relations, especially with the US and China. Fourth, India's relations with the great powers are inseparable from the broader issue of emerging Asian balances and security architectures. Fifth, India needs to keep a keen eye on other major powers, among whom Russia, Japan, the European Union (EU) and Brazil will be particularly important. Finally, while building its capabilities along a broad spectrum, India must not lose sight of the normative component that is inherent in great power status.

Pakistan and China in Indian Strategic Thought

India's relations with Pakistan and China are central to its grand strategic concerns. These two neighbours of India have fought five wars with itIndia and Pakistan fought in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999, India and China in 1962. In addition, India and Pakistan have also come close to war on at least two other occasions-1986-87 during India's military exercise brasstacks, and then again in 2001-02 after the terrorist attack on India's parliament on 13 December 2001. The state of Kashmir remains a central and militarized dispute between the two countries. India and China have not resolved their border differences going back to the 19503, and in addition compete for status and influence in south Asia and Asia more generally. What are India's grand strategic choices with respect to Pakistan and China? How will New Delhi manage its relations with both competitors? One way of answering these questions is through an analysis of Indian strategic thought.Indian strategic thought, which was dominated by the worldview of its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, has been in ferment since the end of the Cold War. At least three different streams of thinking are vying for dominance. These three may be called Nehruvianism, neoliberalism, and hyperrealism. To call them schools is to overstate the case somewhat. Those who hold to the views associated with the three perspectives do not call themselves by the names used here, although the usage of the term Nehruvian is common enough in Indian discourse. A reading of Indian strategic writings, both scholarly and in the English-language press between 1998 and 2001-02, shows that there are these three distinct approaches. This period is crucial as it represents the transition from Cold War thinking to new strategic thinking. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, Indian conceptions of grand strategy, having being shaken loose from the Nehruvian orthodoxies of 1947-89, consolidated and crystallized into three contending bodies of thought on India's internal security, on its relations with its neighbours and the great powers, and on the utility of nuclear weapons.NEHRUVIANISM, NEOLIBERALISM, AND HYPERREALISMWhile Nehruvians, neoliberals, and hyperrealists disagree over grand strategic policy towards Pakistan and China, it is important to note that they proceed from a core set of common assumptions and arguments about international relations.First of all, all three paradigms accept that at the heart of international relations is the notion of the sovereign state that recognizes no higher authority. In such a system, each state is responsible fundamentally for its own security and wellbeing. Above all, states strive to protect their territory and autonomy.Secondly, all three paradigms recognize that interests, power, and violence are staples of international relations. States cannot avoid the responsibility of pursuing the national interest. Nor can they be indifferent to the cultivation of power-their own and that of other states. Moreover, conflict and war are a constant shadow over interstate relations. While the three paradigms differ on the causes of conflict and war and on the ability of states to control and transcend these forces, all three accept that disputes and largescale organized violence are a regular feature of international relations.Thirdly, all three paradigms accept that overall national power consists of both hard and soft power. While proponents of the three differ on the optimum mix and use of these capabilities, they are in agreement that military and economic/cultural strength are vital for security. Beyond this common base, the three paradigms differ.Fundamental to Nehruvianism is the argument that states and peoples can come to understand each other better and thereby make and sustain peace. Nehruvians accept that in the international system, without a supranational authority, the threat of war to settle disputes and rivalries is in some measure inescapable. …

The English Patient's Desert Dream

The English Patient's Desert Dream

The Dynamics of India's Relations with Iran in the Post-Cold War Era: A Geo-Political Analysis

Located at the juncture of South Asia and the Middle Eastern region, Iran for more than a millennium has served as a major conduit for cultural, religious and economic exchanges between India and t...

India and Iran: New Delhi's Balancing Act

India's relationship with Iran is about New Delhi's great-power aspirations and Central Asia, not just energy. But how far can India expand its ties with Tehran while deepening its relations with the United States, Israel, and other states wary of Iran?

China's Rising Profile in Africa

In recent years, China has strengthened its relations with African countries in all spheres—political, economic and military. China's rising profile in Africa is shaped by its desire to garner strategic support against the ‘America hegemony’, promote South-South cooperation, counter Taiwan's inroads in Africa, explore commercial opportunities and finally, and most importantly, the need to feed the rising domestic demand for natural resources. For Africa, China's renewed interest in the continent is a win-win situation. China provides an alternative ‘power direction’ and support of the developing world. The allure of replicating the Chinese model of development is another important factor. India's relations with Africa are quite distinct and it does not need to view Africa through the Chinese prism. Nevertheless, the scale and pace of China's engagement of Africa is way ahead of India's. At this juncture India should provide an alternative model based on promoting skills and technology-based partnership, the hallmark of Indian economic growth.

Peril and promise: a survey of India's strategic relationship with Central Asia

This article outlines the growing importance of India's relations with the Central Asian region. In particular, it explores security, economic, and cultural dimensions of the relationship. Important considerations for India in dealing with Central Asia include terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, energy security, and new export markets. Of equal gravity, however, is the nature of great power competition in the heart of Asia. The argument presented here is that India's relations with Central Asia are calculated to gain strategic depth in the region. However, relationships with Pakistan, the United States, and the Asian great powers tend to constrain these ambitions. The future direction of India's strategic relationships with Central Asia remains fluid.

India in the Asia–Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China

It is almost a conventional wisdom now that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from Europe to the Asia–Pacific in recent years with the rise of China and India, gradual assertion by Japan of its military profile, and a significant shift in the US global force posture in favour of Asia–Pacific. The debate now is whether Asia–Pacific will witness rising tensions and conflicts in the coming years with various powers jockeying for influence in the region or whether the forces of economic globalization and multilateralism will lead to peace and stability. Some have asked the question more directly: Will Asia's future resemble Europe's past?1 It is, of course, difficult to answer this question as of now when major powers in Asia–Pacific such as China, India and Japan are still rising and grappling with a plethora of issues that confront any rising power in the international system. But what is clear is that all major powers are now re-evaluating their policy options vis-à-vis the Pacific. This paper examines India's foreign policy in the Pacific as it has emerged on the last few years. First, the emerging balance of power in Asia–Pacific will be examined in light of the theoretical debate on the issue followed by a broad assessment of the role that India envisages for itself in the region. Subsequently, India's relationship with the three major powers in Asia–Pacific—China, Japan, and the US is analysed. Finally, some observations will be made about the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy in the region.

There Is Deep Realization In Indian Political Circles of The Enduring Value Of India's Relations With Russia

There Is Deep Realization In Indian Political Circles of The Enduring Value Of India's Relations With Russia

‘British to the bootstraps?’

Australian policy-makers gave considerable attention to the question of India's relationship to the British Commonwealth in the years following the Second World War. Australia's Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, was eager to retain India in the Commonwealth, but insisted that the Indians, who were committed to a republican constitution, be required to give some recognition to the royal prerogative. While Evatt's notion of dominion status was consistent with the aspirations and national identities of some of the old dominions, and Australia in particular, it was ill-suited to the ‘new’ Asian members of the Commonwealth in a period of rapid decolonisation in their region. Ultimately, it was only after Australian Prime Minister J.B. Chifley took control of Australia's policy in this field, and adopted a more flexible and less legalistic approach, that a resolution of the difficulty began to emerge. Ultimately, Australian policy contributed to a recasting of the Commonwealth in the late 1940s that can be seen as an effort to extend the life of British Australia.

American grand strategy and the assassination of the third world

Peter Gowan's brilliant analysis of U.S. primacy provokes this discussion on the role of the Third World since the 1940s. One cannot think of the cold war epoch without the constant pressure from the Third World on the two major camps, and one cannot conceive of the post-cold war alignment by sections of the Third World without a class assessment of the regimes and programs in the darker nations. This essay attempts to supplement Gowan's framework with the addition of the Third World, at the same time as it offers a synoptic study of India's relationship with the United States as an example.

The Evolution of ‘Homegrown Conditionality’ in India: IMF Relations

This article explores the historical relationship between the Government of India (GOI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a successful model for the ways in which a developing country can learn to work with and through multilateral organisations to promote economic and political development while sustaining democratic institutions and relative international political autonomy. In the mid-1960s, India's relations with the USA, IMF, and World Bank were strained after an attempt by these institutions to exert ‘leverage’ over Indian economic policies was exposed to parliamentary debate and the scrutiny of a free press. By the late 1970s, the GOI charted a new course in its interaction with the IMF. In 1981, India was awarded the largest IMF loan to a developing country up to that time. This article will evaluate India's economic reform strategy in the early 1980s and explain the development of the concept of ‘homegrown conditionality’ within the GOI.

SCOTT C. LEVI, The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and Its Trade, 1550–1900 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002). Pp. 319. $93.00.

This fine book provides the first comprehensive account of the Indian merchant communities that arose in Central Asia in the 16th century and continued to occupy an important niche in the local economy until the turn of the 20th century. The subject of India's relations with Central Asia and Russia has often been addressed, but it has usually fallen afoul of methodological and linguistic boundaries that divide the historiographies of the two regions. This is the first work that is equally at home in both Indian and Central Asian history. Levi's greatest contribution is to bring Central Asian sources to bear fully on his argument. He uses Persian-language narrative and documentary sources from Central Asia (housed in the manuscript collections of the Beruni Institute of Oriental Studies in Tashkent) and the state archives of Uzbekistan to glean useful new information about life in the diaspora and the activities of its members. He backs these up with accounts of European travelers, which he has mined with great thoroughness for all references to Indian merchants.

India and Southeast Asia: Revisited

Introduction: Post-Cold War Globalization The end of Cold War, globalization of national economies, and Asian financial crisis were some of key factors that have established an ecologically conducive environment for India to enhance its linkages with Southeast Asian region. The demise of Soviet Union, India's main trading partner, and India's economic crisis of 1991 and subsequent economic reforms created a momentum for India to strengthen its trading links with Southeast Asia. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said that the Cold War moulds have been broken and this has enabled us to strengthen our links without ideological barrier. (1) India's engagement with Southeast Asia has spanned two millennia, based on trade, migration, language, culture, and religion.2 India has also been observing with concern that China's influence in Southeast Asia has grown. China's growing role in Southeast Asia contrasts with India's inability to strengthen its economic relations with countries of South Asia despite creation o f South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). (3) China's strategic links with Pakistan also irks India because of China's indirect interference in South Asia. This article will differ from previous works on India and ASEAN by focusing on India's relations with later entrants of regional grouping, namely, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam (CMLV). These newer ASEAN states are strategically very important to India because of their proximity not only to India but also to other Asian giant, China. In this context, article will also examine India's economic ties with Thailand, which has closer bilateral interests to CMLV states than other ASEAN member states. These five ASEAN members are also noted as riparian states of Mekong and are involved in framework of Mekong-Ganga Co-operation (MGC). The MGC ministers in Vientiane Declaration had identified several areas for co-operation; they include culture, education, tourism, transport, and communications. (4) India's focus on Thailand and CMLV states highlights fact that geographical proximity has a large influence in India's Look East policy because Southeast Asian states, in particular those along Mekong River, are also strategically important to China. When Myanmar became a member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997, India came to share a 1,500-kilometre contiguous border with ASEAN. In this context, India's engagement with ASEAN states has assumed a different strategic perspective. At onset of India's 1991 economic reforms, engagement with ASEAN was to accelerate expansion and modernization of Indian infrastructure in form of communications, roads, ports, and power. (5) This meant attracting foreign investments and collaboration with more advanced ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Singapore. Though still very important, engagement policy of India with ASEAN states has assumed an added strategic dimension in form of riparian stat es along Mekong River. From a regional perspective, Look East policy also demonstrated that India has little faith in development of its own South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation. According to Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha, the development of ASEAN, during last three decades, is only successful experiment in regionalism. (6) India believes that enhancing level of its economic partnership with ASEAN is an important part of its strategy to increase its share in world trade which stands at a mere 0.4 per cent at end of 2001. (7) The ASEAN region encompasses about 500 million people, with a combined total of US$737 billion in income and US$720 billion in external trade. India and ASEAN states are located in a geographically contiguous market that has 1.5 billion people with 300 million middle-class consumers in India alone. …

Book Review: India's Missed Opportunity: India's Relationship with Non-Resident Indians

Book Review: India's Missed Opportunity: India's Relationship with Non-Resident Indians

India's Fine Balance

THE POST-9/11 AGENDA WHEN SEPTEMBER 11 CAME, India responded rapidly and deci sively. On learning of the terrorist attacks on the United States, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee convened his key advisers and they quickly decided that India would offer its full support for the U.S. war on terrorism. Their decision was driven in part by India's own problems with ter rorism. For a decade, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (isi) had been orchestrating a nasty proxy war against India in Kashmir. Although the insurgency there was rooted in Kashmiri opposition to Indian rule, the isi helped militant groups train, equip, and movejihadis, or freedom fighters, across the Line of Control, which separates Indianand Pakistani-held Kashmir. In joining with Washington, New Delhi hoped to transform this latest and bloodiest chapter of 50 years of Indo-Pakistani conflict into part of the global war against terrorism-with Pakistan's isi cast in the role of al Qaeda and India as the victim. Seizing an opportunity to outmaneuver Pakistan while improving India's relationship with the United States, however, is not the only item on Vajpayee's post-g/hl agenda. He and his government must also handle domestic political crises and deadly communal violence while recharging India's faltering economy. Failure to balance these various challenges could risk the government's electoral mandate and slow India's rise to great-power status.