Inconsistent Triad Research Articles

Epistemic normativity without epistemic teleology

AbstractThis article is concerned with a puzzle that arises from three initially plausible assumptions that form an inconsistent triad: (i) Epistemic reasons are normative reasons (normativism); (ii) reasons are normative only if conformity with them is good (the reasons/value‐link); (iii) conformity with epistemic reasons need not be good (the nihilist assumption). I start by defending the reasons/value‐link, arguing that normativists need to reject the nihilist assumption. I then argue that the most familiar view that denies the nihilist assumption—epistemic teleology—is untenable. Finally, I consider two alternative ways of accounting for the goodness of conformity with epistemic reasons: it may be good because it accords with the virtue of reasons‐responsiveness, and it may be good because it is good to conform with normative reasons as such. I argue that both of these conceptions avoid the problems of epistemic teleology and merit serious consideration as potential solutions to the puzzle.

A lexicographically optimal completion for pairwise comparison matrices with missing entries

Estimating missing judgements is a key component in many multi-criteria decision making techniques, especially in the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Inspired by the Koczkodaj inconsistency index and a widely used solution concept of cooperative game theory called the nucleolus, the current study proposes a new algorithm for this purpose. In particular, the missing values are substituted by variables, and the inconsistency of the most inconsistent triad is reduced first, followed by the inconsistency of the second most inconsistent triad, and so on. The necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the suggested lexicographically optimal completion is proved to be a simple graph-theoretic notion: the undirected graph associated with the pairwise comparisons, where the edges represent the known elements, should be connected. Crucially, our method does not depend on an arbitrarily chosen measure of inconsistency as there exists essentially one reasonable triad inconsistency index.

The case for more NHS funding: the inconsistent triad

British Journal of Healthcare ManagementVol. 29, No. 6 EditorialThe case for more NHS funding: the inconsistent triadSteve BojakowskiSteve BojakowskiCorrespondence to: Steve Bojakowski; E-mail Address: [email protected]GenSight Biologics SA, Paris, FranceSearch for more papers by this authorSteve BojakowskiPublished Online:13 Jun 2023https://doi.org/10.12968/bjhc.2023.0056AboutSectionsView articleView Full TextPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissions ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail View article References Mackie JL. Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin Books; 1977 Google ScholarOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Hospital beds (indicator). 2023a. https://doi.org/10.1787/0191328e-en (accessed on 17 May 2023) Google ScholarOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Gross domestic product (GDP) (indicator). 2023b. https://doi.org/10.1787/dc2f7aec-en (accessed on 17 May 2023) Google ScholarSeely A, Foster D. Health and social care levy. 2022. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2021-0139/#:∼:text=In%20its%20Economic%20and%20Fiscal,%2F23%20to%202024%2F25. (accessed 17 May 2023) Google ScholarTidman Z, Carding N. Cost of government's promised ‘40 new hospitals’ revealed. 2023. https://www.hsj.co.uk/finance-and-efficiency/exclusive-cost-of-governments-promised-40-new-hospitals-revealed/7034583.article (accessed 17 May 2023) Google ScholarWeale A. Rationing of healthcare, a logical solution to an inconsistent trade. BMJ Volumes. 1998;316:410 Crossref, Google Scholar FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails 2 June 2023Volume 29Issue 6ISSN (print): 1358-0574ISSN (online): 1759-7382 Metrics History Published online 13 June 2023 Published in print 2 June 2023 Information© MA Healthcare LimitedPDF download

Positive Predictive Value of Endoscopic Findings to Diagnose Vocal Fold Paresis.

Laryngoscopy corresponding with laryngeal electromyography (LEMG) is essential in diagnosing vocal fold paresis. However, baseline asymmetry or other diseases oftentimes confound the exam, making diagnosis difficult. There is currently no agreed upon endoscopic criteria proven to reliably correlate with LEMG findings. We define a set of endoscopic findings termed "paresis triad" that, when present together, reliably correlate with LEMG. The paresis triad consists of (1) hypocontraction of the weak side of the larynx with increased ventricular show, (2) hypercontraction of the intact side with bulging of the false fold covering the ventricle, and (3) tilting of the interarytenoid cleft to the weak side. We performed a retrospective review of patients with laryngeal asymmetry on laryngoscopy. Patients were divided into two groups: those with consistent paresis triad findings across all pitches and intensities, and those without. All patients underwent LEMG by a neurolaryngologist blinded to the laryngoscopic findings. The endoscopies were then rereviewed in a blinded manner by a second laryngologist to assess inter- and intrarater reliability for identification of the triad. Twelve patients met inclusion criteria (age 50 +/-15, 7F:5M). Nine had the paresis triad. Three had an inconsistent triad. All patients with the paresis triad had LEMG findings consistent with neurologic injury on the suspected side. All patients with inconsistent triad findings had normal LEMG. Our findings suggest the proposed laryngoscopic paresis triad may be useful objective criteria to diagnose paresis without the need for LEMG. Further prospective studies should examine a larger series of patients. 4 Laryngoscope, 133:1712-1716, 2023.

Avicenna on the problem of God’s knowledge of multiple things

ABSTRACT (i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any two propositions, P1 and P2, God knows both that P1 and P2. (ii) If God knows multiple things, then God is not simple. (iii) But, God is supposed to be a simple being. As is clear, propositions (i)–(iii) form an inconsistent triad. This is the general form of one of the problems, which I call the Problem of Plurality (PP), with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God’s knowledge and especially God’s knowledge of particulars. In the secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars PP has not been scrutinized. But, in this paper, without discussing Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, I will explain exactly what this problem is.

Seeming incomparability and rational choice

We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and possible reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it.

Paraphrasability and the Causal Status of Types

AbstractSome are attracted to the view that repeatable artworks, such as films, novels, plays, symphonies, photographs, and the like, are a particular kind of abstracta – namely, types. This view, however, is not unproblematic. One of the most serious problems it faces is the so‐called "creation problem." The core idea behind this problem is that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, but, on the other hand, these claims form an inconsistent triad. A popular solution to the creation problem is that (2) can be rejected because the justification for (2) is based on a false assumption – that no type can stand in causal relations. Although this solution looks promising, it can be accepted only if its proponent can refute what might be called the "paraphrasability argument." On this argument, types are not to be regarded as capable of standing in causal relations because any discourse implying the causality of types should be paraphrased into discourse that does not imply this. My aim in this essay is to show that there is good reason to consider the paraphrasability argument sound and, hence, that the foregoing solution to the creation problem fails.

Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?

AbstractWhen a belief has been influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer's own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed proposition, we can say that the belief has been, in a sense, arbitrarily formed. Can such beliefs ever be rational? It might seem obvious that they can't. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” But many epistemologists have come to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, indeed, be rational. In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I want to show that the claim that arbitrary beliefs can be rational is inconsistent with the conjunction of two other attractive claims: one saying that rationality requires a certain kind of epistemic immodesty, and one saying that rationality forbids certain kinds of self-ascriptions of epistemic luck. Second, I want to evaluate different ways one might respond to this inconsistent triad. I won't defend any response in particular, but I'll draw out some notable costs and benefits of each response, which may help shed light on the question of whether arbitrary beliefs can be rational.

Information and explanation: an inconsistent triad and solution

An important strand in philosophy of science takes scientific explanation to consist in the conveyance of some kind of information (e.g., Lewis, 1986; Railton, Synthese, 48, 233–56, 1981). Here I argue that this idea is also implicit in some core arguments of mechanists, some of whom (e.g., Craver, 2014) are proponents of an ontic conception of explanation that might be thought inconsistent with it (Piccinini & Craver, Synthese, 183, 283–311, 2011; Zednik, 2015). However, informational accounts seem to conflict with some lay and scientific commonsense judgments and a central goal of the theory of explanation, because information is relative to the background knowledge of agents (Dretske, 1981). Sometimes we make lay judgments about whether a model is an explanation simpliciter, not just an explanation relative to some particular agent. And as philosophers of explanation, we would like a philosophical account to tell us when a model is an explanation simpliciter, not just when a model is an explanation relative to some particular agent. Thus, even if one’s account of explanation is not concerned with explanation qua communicative or speech act, the account’s reliance on the concept of information generates a prima facie conflict between the claims that 1) explanation is the conveyance of information, 2) information is relative to the background knowledge of an agent, and 3) some models are explanations not relative to the background knowledge of any particular agent. I sketch a solution to this puzzle by distinguishing informationally what I call “explanation simpliciter” from what I call “explanation-to,” relativizing the latter to an individual’s background knowledge and the former to what I call “total scientific background knowledge”.

Hume on Nonhuman Animals, Causal Reasoning, and General Thoughts

AbstractIn both the Treatise and the Enquiry, as a naturalist philosopher Hume is committed to recognizing continuity between humans’ and other animals’ cognitive capacities. In particular, Hume maintains that humans share with other intelligent animals the basic psychological mechanism that underlies their capacities for causal reasoning. In this article, I will address the question whether Hume’s philosophical system can coherently attribute to animals the ability to engage in causal reasoning as he intends. First, I formulate an apparent problem for Hume that his views on causal reasoning and general thinking may seem to yield the following inconsistent triad: (1) causal reasoning requires general thinking; (2) general thinking requires language; (3) nonhuman animals lack language but can engage in causal reasoning. Then, I will develop a Humean solution to the problem by distinguishing two kinds of general thinking, which I call “level‐1” and “level‐2” general thinking, respectively. Level‐1 general thinking does not require language and must play the foundational role in Hume’s account of causal reasoning, as well as his account of language acquisition. Level‐2 general thinking, on the other hand, requires language, and it presupposes the capacity for level‐1 general thinking in several important ways.

De Se Attitudes and Computation

AbstractThere has been debate between those who maintain that indexical expressions are not essential and those who maintain that such indexicals cannot be dispensed with without an important loss of content. This version of the essentialist view holds that thoughts must also have indexical elements. Indexical thoughts appear to be in tension with the computational theory of mind (CTM). In this case we have the following inconsistent triad: (i) De se thoughts are essential. (ii) De se thoughts are indexical, they have a (Kaplanian) character. (iii) Computations can only take the syntactic type into account, they cannot take tokens into account. If (iii) is correct, then it seems we cannot make sense of a thought which uses a character such that its referent could vary from tokening to tokening. I argue that (iii) need not cause a problem, while maintaining the CTM. I claim that computations need not be sensitive to the features of a tokened symbol in the way that character demands. This job may be performed by a non‐modular part of the mind. Resolving the triad in this way provides a reason to accept that indexicals in thought are possible.

An Inconsistent Triad: Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism and (the Possibility of) Gunky Time

AbstractPriority pluralism, perdurantism and that temporal gunk – where some interval of time is gunky iff every interval of it has a proper subinterval – is at least metaphysically possible, are three commonly held views in contemporary metaphysics. However, there cannot be a temporally gunky world where objects perdure, and where there are mereological simples. Given that – as I will argue – pluralists should be committed to atomism, and cannot plausibly revise their view to accommodate temporal gunk if they are perdurantists, pluralism is incompatible with the combination of temporal gunk and perdurantism. Therefore, priority pluralism, perdurantism and the possibility of temporal gunk are jointly incompatible, and at least one of these views must be false. Subsequently, it means that at least one of the following views must be true: priority monism or metaphysical infinitism; endurantism; and/or that time is atomistic. The triad's inconsistency, then, has some interesting metaphysical implications.

Does God Know that the Flower in My Hand Is Red? Avicenna and the Problem of God’s Perceptual Knowledge

(i) God is omniscient; therefore, He knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red.’ (ii) If God knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red,’ then He knows it perceptually (i.e., His knowledge is explained by the theory of perception). (iii) God does not know anything perceptually. It is clear that the set of propositions (i)–(iii) form an inconsistent triad. This is one of four problems with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God's knowledge of particulars, which I call the problem of perceptual knowledge (PPK). In order to solve PPK and three other problems, Avicenna has developed a theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. Secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has mostly directed its attention to give an account of Avicenna’s positive theory rather than the problems which that theory was designed to solve. But this paper will not do the same thing as this secondary literature. In contrast, in this paper, I will concentrate on the characterization of one of the problems, i.e., PPK, because of which Avicenna has presented his positive theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. In short, this paper aims to show why Avicenna deems explaining God’s knowledge of, say, the redness of a flower, via his accepted theory of perception as problematic. In this regard, I will extract three versions of PPK based on Avicenna's philosophy and through it will shed some light on Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars.

Two notions of metaphysical modality

The paper explores the project of an ambitious modal epistemology that attempts to combine the a priori methods of Chalmers’ 2D semantics with Kripke’s modal metaphysics. I argue that such a project is not viable. The ambitious modal epistemology involves an inconsistent triad composed of (1) Modal Monism, (2) Two-Dimensionalism, and what I call (3) “Metaphysical Kripkeanism”. I present the three theses and show how only two of those can be true at a time. There is a fundamental incompatibility between Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism and Kripke’s modal metaphysics. Specifically, Chalmers’ conceivability entails possibilities that a Kripkean rejects as genuinely metaphysical. However, three positive stances in modal epistemology emerge from the combinations that the triad allows. One of those offers a promising way forward for 2D modal epistemologies. But it comes with a cost, as it requires abandoning modal monism and reshaping the scope of what a priori conceivability can give us access to.

The individuality thesis (3 ways)

I spell out and update the individuality thesis, that species are individuals, and not classes, sets, or kinds. I offer three complementary presentations of this thesis. First, as a way of resolving an inconsistent triad about natural kinds; second, as a phylogenetic systematics theoretical perspective; and, finally, as a novel recursive account of an evolved character (individuality). These approaches do different sorts of work, serving different interests. Presenting them together produces a taxonomy of the debates over the thesis, and isolates ways it has been (and may continue to be) productive. This goes to the larger point of this paper: a defense of the individuality thesis in terms of its utility, and an update of it in light of recent theoretical developments and empirical work in biology.

The Developmental Challenge to the Paradox of Pain

People seem to perceive and locate pains in bodily locations, but also seem to conceive of pains as mental states that can be introspected. However, pains cannot be both bodily and mental, at least according to most conceptions of these two categories: mental states are not the kind of entities that inhabit body parts. How are we to resolve this paradox of pain (Aydede in Pain: new papers on its nature and the methodology of its study. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006a; Hill in Pain: new papers on its nature and the methodology of its study. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006)? In this paper, I put forward what I call the ‘Developmental Challenge’, tackling the second pillar of this paradox, i.e. the introspectionist (or mental-state) view of pain according to which (A) genuine pain reports are introspective reports. This view forms an inconsistent triad with two other widely held positions: (B) young children make genuine pain reports, and (C) young children do not make introspective reports. After introducing the paradox and the introspectionist view of pain in part 1, I present the developmental challenge, and defend both (B) and (C). I conclude that the inconsistent triad can only be resolved by reconsidering the introspectionist view of pain. In discussing three potential factors that lead to the puzzling intricacies of our concept of pain, I argue that the concept of pain might not be paradoxical after all.

The Four Levels of Free Will

The problem of free will is expressed in a seemingly inconsistent triad arising because, as moral agents we consider ourselves unique among the creatures of the world and yet, as scientists (and more importantly cognitive neuroscientists), we study cognitive mechanisms in human beings as we do any other natural phenomena. The Free Will triad is as follows: 1. Free will is the link between the soul (or psyche) and human action. 2. The soul is the aspect of a human being that cannot be explained in terms of physical or biological sciences. 3. Human existence and action occurs within a natural world subject to explanations grounded in the physical and biological sciences. Cognitive neuroscience does its work at the centre of this problem and therefore it is useful to construct an account of human action in which free (and morally significant) action can be understood in a way that embodies an interpretation of the Free Will triad within an orthodox construal of natural science. The philosophical debate, is often metaphysical structured by absolute dogmata about nature and what happens within it, and that does not always help but an Aristotelian theoretical framework supplemented by the evolutionary neurology of John Hughlings-Jackson and recent work in embodied cognition offers a different analysis in which cognitive neuroscience and the ethology of human adaptation to an objective, reflective, normative domain of activity suggest a way ahead.

There’s No Need to Rethink Desert: A Reply to Pummer

Pummer (Philosophical Review 123(1): 43–77, 2014) ingeniously wraps together issues from the personal identity literature with issues from the literature on desert. However, I wish to take issue with the main conclusion that he draws, namely, that we need to rethink the following principle: Desert.: When people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they deserve punishment in the following sense: at least other things being equal they ought to be made worse off, simply in virtue of the fact that they culpably did wrong—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. (Pummer Philosophical Review 123(1):43–77, 2014: 43–44) Pummer offers an argument that is intended to show that this principle, along with widely-held views about personal identity, entails an inconsistent triad of propositions. I agree. But I think Pummer's argument attacks a straw man. I believe that no-one holds Desert, at least as it is stated, and that once the principle is stated correctly it is easy to see that no inconsistent triad follows from it. So, Desert does not need rethinking. It just needs to be stated correctly.

Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms

The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between (1) Woodward’s popular interventionist theory of causation, (2) Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for (3) the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. I propose to explain inter-level relations without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves the problem.

THE EVIL GOD CHALLENGE – A RESPONSE

I argue that the co-existence of omnipotence, omniscience, and total evil forms an inconsistent triad. An omniscient being will know what it is like for anyone to feel pain, and since pain is undesirable, will not freely create pains which it would have to share. An omnipotent being would choose to be rational, and a purely rational being would choose what it believes to be good. It would in fact choose to be of supreme value, and thus would necessarily contain all compossible values, including those of friendship and love. Therefore an omnipotent omniscient being cannot be evil.