Abstract
ABSTRACT (i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any two propositions, P1 and P2, God knows both that P1 and P2. (ii) If God knows multiple things, then God is not simple. (iii) But, God is supposed to be a simple being. As is clear, propositions (i)–(iii) form an inconsistent triad. This is the general form of one of the problems, which I call the Problem of Plurality (PP), with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God’s knowledge and especially God’s knowledge of particulars. In the secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars PP has not been scrutinized. But, in this paper, without discussing Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, I will explain exactly what this problem is.
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