Does God Know that the Flower in My Hand Is Red? Avicenna and the Problem of God’s Perceptual Knowledge

Abstract

(i) God is omniscient; therefore, He knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red.’ (ii) If God knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red,’ then He knows it perceptually (i.e., His knowledge is explained by the theory of perception). (iii) God does not know anything perceptually. It is clear that the set of propositions (i)–(iii) form an inconsistent triad. This is one of four problems with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God's knowledge of particulars, which I call the problem of perceptual knowledge (PPK). In order to solve PPK and three other problems, Avicenna has developed a theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. Secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has mostly directed its attention to give an account of Avicenna’s positive theory rather than the problems which that theory was designed to solve. But this paper will not do the same thing as this secondary literature. In contrast, in this paper, I will concentrate on the characterization of one of the problems, i.e., PPK, because of which Avicenna has presented his positive theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. In short, this paper aims to show why Avicenna deems explaining God’s knowledge of, say, the redness of a flower, via his accepted theory of perception as problematic. In this regard, I will extract three versions of PPK based on Avicenna's philosophy and through it will shed some light on Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars.