Epistemic normativity without epistemic teleology

Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reasons. In this case, a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons if facts and claims about morality entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons. And, as I explain, there is a good case that facts and claims about morality do entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons.

According to a widely held view, epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief – much like prudential or moral reasons are normative reasons for action. In recent years, however, an increasing number of authors have questioned the normativity of epistemic reasons. In this article, I discuss an important challenge for anti‐normativism about epistemic reasons and present a series of arguments in support of normativism. The challenge for anti‐normativism is to say what kind of reasons epistemic reasons are if they are not normative reasons. I discuss various answers to this challenge and find them all wanting. The arguments for normativism each stress a certain analogy between epistemic reasons and normative reasons for action. Just like normative reasons for action, epistemic reasons provide partial justification; they provide premises for correct reasoning; they constitute good bases for the responses they are reasons for; and they are reasonsfor whichagents can show these responses without committing a mistake. In each case, I argue that the relevant condition is plausibly sufficient for the normativity of a reason, and that normativism is in any case in a much better position to explain the analogy than anti‐normativism.

I will consider some of the differences between epistemic reasons and reasons for action, and use these differences to illuminate a major division between types of normative reasons, which I will call ‘adaptive’ and ‘practical’ reasons. A few clarifications of some aspects of the concept of epistemic reasons will lead to a distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (section 1). Some differences between epistemic and practical reasons will be described and explained in section 2, paving the way to generalising the contrast and explaining the difference between adaptive and practical reasons (section 3). sections 4 and 5 further explain and defend the views of the preceding sections. My ultimate goal is an explanation of normativity. But the present essay does more to explain a difficulty such an explanation faces than to resolve it. STANDARD AND NON-STANDARD REASONS Reasons for action, I will assume, are facts which constitute a case for (or against) the performance of an action. Epistemic reasons are reasons for believing in a proposition through being facts which are part of a case for (belief in) its truth (call such considerations ‘truth-related’). These maxims (as I shall call them) have proved controversial. Confining myself to the epistemic maxim, two clarifications and one argument may help. The first clarification concerns the question of what determines whether available epistemic reasons are sufficient to warrant belief. It is not my view that only truth-related considerations figure among those determining the sufficiency of the case.

This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative (i.e., good) epistemic reasons. After making some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of normative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states, and concluding that they are not mental states. In §3, I examine the distinction between normative epistemic reasons there are and normative epistemic reasons we possess. I offer a novel account of this distinction and argue that we in fact ought to acknowledge a threefold distinction between objective, possessed, and apparent normative epistemic reasons. In §4, I discuss the question of which normative reasons for doxastic attitudes are the epistemic ones, evaluating reasons against a simple evidentialist answer. Finally, in §5, I look at the role of reasons in epistemology, considering challenges to viewing reasons as the building blocks of epistemic normativity and maintaining that the challenges recommend a novel bi‐level epistemology rather than a marginalization of reasons in epistemology.

Instrumentalist and teleologist views in metaepistemology hold that epistemic reasons are goal-relative or value-relative. In the face of counterexamples involving apparently pointless or counterproductive beliefs that are nonetheless supported by excellent epistemic reasons, some have retreated to the following view: while even pointless or counterproductive beliefs can be supported by excellent epistemic reasons in a not-genuinely-normative sense, we can have genuinely normative epistemic reasons only for beliefs that do serve some goal or value. In this chapter doubts are raised about the distinction between genuinely normative and not-genuinely-normative epistemic reasons employed here. It is suggested that there’s no real need or intuitive motivation for the distinction, beyond the ad hoc need of salvaging instrumentalist and teleologist views from counterexamples. The sense in which all epistemic reasons—even reasons for apparently pointless or counterproductive beliefs—seem to be equally normative is explained; and the implications for instrumentalists and teleologists are outlined.

Pursuit and inquisitive reasons

This paper address two related topics regarding reasons, rational guidance, and epistemic capacities. First, the paper draws a parallel between the publicity condition on the rule of law and legal normativity, and an internal guidance constraint on genuine epistemic reasons and justification: just as the rule of law requires that laws must be available to the people to whom they apply, genuine epistemic reasons must also be available to the people to whom they apply. The parallel supports a kind of qualified internalism about epistemic reasons, motivated by a “Guidance” constraint on normative reasons. Second, the paper addresses the relation between epistemic rights and epistemic capacities. Lani Watson has recently argued that epistemic rights do not depend on epistemic capacities. In particular, she argues that in order to have a right to know, it’s not necessary that you have a capacity to know. If her view is correct, it poses a threat to the general applicability of Guidance constraints across normative domains. Although I largely agree with Watson’s approach to epistemic rights, I argue that this particular aspect of her view is mistaken: while negative epistemic rights (typically) do not depend on having any particular capacities, positive epistemic rights to know things do depend on a capacity to know those things.

This paper connects the traditional epistemological topic of justification with recent views focusing on epistemic reasons. In particular, I show that Conee and Feldman’s mentalism about justification can profitably be spelled out in terms of subjective normative reasons. I begin by motivating the claim that it is important not just to ask what kind of entities epistemic reasons are, but also reasons in which sense are fundamental to justification. I then argue that mentalism should be spelled out by appeal to normative rather than deliberative or explanatory reasons and discuss how exactly the resulting view should be elaborated. I conclude by suggesting a way in which this view ties in with an epistemological disjunctivism, so as to ensure a close connection between justification and truth.

Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error theory draw the Parity Conclusion that if there are no irreducibly normative reasons, there are no moral reasons and no epistemic reasons. From the Parity Conclusion and Epistemic Realism (the view that there are epistemic reasons), it follows that it is false that there are no irreducibly normative reasons. In this chapter, it is argued that the Parity Premise and the Parity Conclusion can both plausibly be rejected.

There is an important disagreement in contemporary epistemology over the possibility of non-epistemic reasons for belief. Many epistemologists argue that non-epistemic reasons cannot be good or normative reasons for holding beliefs: non-epistemic reasons might be good reasons for a subject to bring herself to hold a belief, the argument goes, but they do not offer any normative support for the belief itself. Non-epistemic reasons, as they say, are just the wrong kind of reason for belief. Other epistemologists, however, argue that there can be cases where non-epistemic reasons directly offer normative support for the beliefs a subject holds. My aim in this paper is to remove an apparent obstacle for the view that there can be non-epistemic normative reasons for belief, by showing that the existence of non-epistemic reasons for belief does not conflict with epistemic standards for the assessment of inferences. More specifically, I aim to show that the following principles are compatible. Epistemic norm of inference (ENI): necessarily, for all subjects S and inferences I: I is a good inference for S only if S can gain a (doxastically) epistemically justified belief in I’s conclusion on the basis of I’s premises. Non-epistemic reasons for belief (NERB): possibly, for some subject S, reason R, and belief B: R is a good (i.e., normative) reason for S to hold B, and R is not an epistemic reason for B. Guidance: for all subjects S, potential reasons R, and beliefs/actions φ: In order for R to count as a normative reason for S to φ, it must be possible for S to take R into account as relevant to the determination of whether S ought to φ. One might naturally think that these principles conflict, for if there are non-epistemic reasons for belief, then they must guide deliberation, and in guiding deliberation, they would violate epistemic standards. The aim of this paper is to show that no such conflict need arise. Section 2 of the paper sets out the concept of an inference, and sketches an epistemic framework for the assessment of inferences and arguments. Section 3 sets out the distinction between normative and motivating reasons, discusses motivational internalism about reasons, and briefly defends the view that there can be non-epistemic reasons for beliefs. Section 4 shows that non-epistemic reasons for belief are compatible with epistemic standards for inference and with a deliberative guidance constraint on normative reasons, because any time a reason R is a good non-epistemic reason for a subject S to hold a belief B, there is an epistemically good inference available to S which takes R as a premise and which concludes with the meta-belief that S ought to hold B. So the paper employs an indirect level-connecting principle between normative reasons for φ-ing and epistemic reasons for believing that one ought to φ. The paper ends with clarifications of that level-connecting principle, and responses to three objections.

Chater & Loewenstein argue that i-frame research has been coopted by private interests opposed to system-level reform, leading to ineffective interventions. They recommend that behavioural scientists refocus on system-level interventions. We suggest that the influence of private interests on research is problematic for wider normative and epistemic reasons. A system-level intervention to shield research from private influence is needed.

ABSTRACTA good account of normative reasons should explain not only what makes practical and epistemic reasons a unified kind of thing, but also why practical and epistemic reasons are substantively different kinds of reasons that underlie significant categories of normative assessment and exhibit different weighing behaviours. I argue that a disjunctive account of normative reasons, according to which practical and epistemic reasons have very different grounds (what I call the Different Source View), can do both of these jobs, unlike some prominent unified alternative accounts. And the viability of this view has significant implications for metanormative theorizing: it implies that the answer to certain metanormative questions may differ between the practical and epistemic domains.

A formalization of the Protagoras court paradox in a temporal logic of epistemic and normative reasons

This article examines the relations between trade, faith, and textual traditions in early modern Indian Ocean region and the birth of Arabi-Malayalam, a new system of writing which has facilitated the growth of a vernacular Islamic textual tradition in Malabar since the seventeenth century. As a transliterated scriptorial-literary tradition, Arabi-Malayalam emerged out of the polyglossic lingual sphere of the Malabar Coast, and remains as one of the important legacies of social and religious interactions in precolonial south Asia. The first part of this article examines the social, epistemic and normative reasons that led to the scriptorial birth of Arabi-Malayalam, moving beyond a handful of Malayalam writings that locate its origin in the social and economic necessities of Arab traders in the early centuries of Islam. The second part looks at the complex relationship between Muslim scribes and their vernacular audience in the aftermath of Portuguese violence and destruction of Calicut—one of the largest Indian Ocean ports before the sixteenth century. This part focuses on Qadi Muhammed bin Abdul Aziz and hisMuhiyuddinmala, the first identifiable text in Arabi-Malayalam, examining how theMuhiyuddinmalarepresents a transition from classical Arabic theological episteme to the vernacular-popular poetic discourse which changed the pietistic behaviour of the Mappila Muslims of Malabar.

Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model of practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. This chapter argues that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provides normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account becomes available that delivers the correct epistemic verdicts. On this account, epistemic permissibility can be understood on the model of the wide-scope instrumental norm for instrumental rationality, while normative evidential reasons for belief can be understood in terms of instrumental transmission.