Incompleteness Theorem Research Articles

Relativity Tied to Repulsion Gravity

This article refutes the Time Dilation Equation and Length Contraction that are derived in the Special Theory of Relativity. The conclusion reached in this article is that Time Dilation and Length Contraction cannot be characterized by simple equations due to repulsion gravity. The conclusion follows from gravity being a natural force of repulsion rather than the assumption that gravity is an attraction force. That gravity is a repulsion force follows from the Sir Arthur Eddington experiment designed to prove that gravity affects light. Few looked at that experiment as anything other than proving Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity that suggested gravity would affect light. The experiment went beyond what most imagined it accomplished. It surely verified that gravity affects light. But it did more than that. The experiment showed that gravity is a force of repulsion and not attraction as most believed. That gravity is repulsion and not an attraction force indicates that the relativity time dilation equation derived in the Special Theory of Relativity is intractably undecidable likely subject to Godels Incompleteness theorems

Strategic coalitions in stochastic games

AbstractThe article compares two different approaches of incorporating probability into coalition logics. One is based on the semantics of games with stochastic transitions and the other on games with the stochastic failures. The work gives an example of a non-trivial property of coalition power for the first approach and a complete axiomatization for the second approach. It turns out that the logical properties of the coalition power modality under the second approach depend on whether the modal language allows the empty coalition. The main technical results for the games with stochastic failures are a strong completeness theorem for the logical system without the empty coalition and an incompleteness theorem which shows that there is no strongly complete logical system in the language with the empty coalition.

Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem and the Diagonal Lemma

Abstract We prove the equivalence of the semantic version of Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth with the semantic version of the diagonal lemma and also show the equivalence of a syntactic version of Tarski’s undefinability theorem with a weak syntactic diagonal lemma. We outline two seemingly diagonal-free proofs for these theorems from the literature and show that the syntactic version of Tarski’s theorem can deliver Gödel–Rosser’s incompleteness theorem.

Incompleteness and the Halting Problem

We present an abstract framework in which we give simple proofs for Godel’s First and Second Incompleteness Theorems and obtain, as consequences, Davis’, Chaitin’s and Kritchman-Raz’s Theorems.

Once Again on Misinterpretations of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem

A response is given to the paper by A. M. Izmailova (Izmailova A. M. O kritike teoremy K. Gedelya o nepolnote A. V. Bessonovym [On A. V. Bessonov’s criticism of K. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem]. Studencheskii nauchnyi zhurnal “Grani nauki” [Student Scientific Journal "Facets of Science"], 2018, no. 1, p. 7-9. (in Russ.)) allegedly indicating a «serious error» in my analysis of K. Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. It is shown that her criticism is based on gross logical errors, as well as on a misunderstanding of both the second incompleteness theorem and my results. Such a widespread misinterpretation is based on the inadmissible confusion of the proof of the consistency of formal arithmetic with the proof in it of a formula expressing its consistency. It is argued that Gödel's second theorem is not directly related to the proof of the consistency of formal arithmetic. It is proved that this theorem cannot be used in argumentation against feasibility of D. Hilbert’s finitistic program.

The Fuzzy Completeness Theory

The Two Incompleteness Theorems of Kurt Friedrich Gödel and the Impossibility Theorem of Kenneth Arrow claim that logic, the most reliable of human knowledge, is incomplete or can be inconsistent. The Fuzzy Completeness Theory states that the Fuzzy Logic of Lotfi A. Zadeh has resolved the incompleteness and impossibility in logic and made logic complete and knowledge reliable with the new concept of Range of Tolerance, within which logic is still complete and knowledge, valid. In the Age of Reason about 300 years ago just prior to the Age of Science, reasoning is free for all, without the constraint of the laws of nature, which would be discovered in the Age of Science. However, the Scientific Method of reasoning by empirical verification depends so much on faith that it is logically and empirically dismissed by mathematicians and logicians, especially, after the exposure by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend that a scientific advancement is akin to a religious conversion. On the other hand, mathematicians and logicians have been working steadily to find the limit of reliable knowledge. In the current state of knowledge, Kurt Gödel has the last word with his Two Incompleteness Theorems, which conclude that the most reliable of human knowledge, logic, is incomplete, casting doubt whether knowledge is completely reliable. Gödel’s view is further supported by the Impossibility Theorem of Kenneth Arrow. However, Zadeh and the author of this paper extend Zadeh’s concept of Range of Value in Fuzzy Logic to that of Range of Tolerance. Accordingly, Fuzzy Logic deals with the sacrifice of precision in the process of expanding the Range of Tolerance of a creation in order for the creation to survive and flourish for all the possibility of an uncertain future. In knowledge, incompleteness in logic can be resolved by the Range of Tolerance covering the incomplete part or ignoring the infrequent impossibilities, and, thus, making logic valid, again. Knowledge is derived generally from reason. Technically, the Fuzzy Completeness Theory classifies 16 Methods of Reason. The 16 Methods are the combination of the 4 basic Methods of Reason: 1) Logic, 2) Mathematics, 3) Empirical Verification, and 4) Others, each of which has 2 forms: 1) Fuzzy and 2) Exact and two types: 1) Complete and 2) Incomplete. Gödel, Arrow, and the Author agree that no matter how rigorous is the Method of Reason the reason cannot be complete, when the reason is Exact. When a solution is newly defined as an answer within the Range of Tolerance of the solution, Fuzzy Logic resolves the incompleteness in logic and becomes the new foundation of knowledge, replacing Exact Logic. With this definition of a solution, Fuzzy Logic covers the incomplete or the impossible parts of the solution by expanding sufficiently the Range of Tolerance to make reason complete and knowledge reliable, but only within the Range of Tolerance. To summarize, even though the world’s leading intellectuals have proven, directly, that logic is incomplete and, indirectly, that knowledge is invalid, reality is still operating smoothly, and science has even demonstrated the power of knowledge. The conflict between the most reliable knowledge, namely, logic and the real world is resolved by Fuzzy Logic, which introduces the new concept of Range of Tolerance, within which reality can still operate in accordance with the laws discovered by knowledge. In sum, reality is fuzzy, not exact. The breakthrough impact of this paper centers around completeness theory and Fuzzy Logic. In the early 21st century, the mainstream knowledge is still not aware that the supply and demand model is incomplete, and that the DNA-protein system resembles computer science based on logic more than science based on experimentation. The current computer is based on exact logic and is designed for temporary existence, while the living system is design for permanent existence and must depend on the Range of Tolerance based on Fuzzy Logic to survive permanently in an uncertain future. Financial crises will be caused by the unstable investment return, which is the incomplete part in the supply demand model. Complexity crises will be caused by the lack of the requirement of permanence or complete automation, which is the ultimate solution to unlimited complexity. The 16 Methods of Reason correspond roughly to Culture Level Quotient (CLQ), which is a non-technical measure of a person, a people or a nation.

There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences†

AbstractWe argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about the Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel’s theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.

Proving Gödel's Completeness and Incompleteness theorems (in restricted cases) using Sd - Topology over the theory of a Model

Proving Gödel's Completeness and Incompleteness theorems (in restricted cases) using Sd - Topology over the theory of a Model

Proving Gödel's Completeness and Incompleteness theorems (in restricted cases) using Sd - Topology over the theory of a Model

Proving Gödel's Completeness and Incompleteness theorems (in restricted cases) using Sd - Topology over the theory of a Model

What he could have said (but did not say) about Gödel’s second theorem: A note on Floyd-Putnam’s Wittgenstein

Abstract In several publications, Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam have argued that the so-called ‘notorious paragraph’ of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics contains a valuable philosophical insight about Gödel’s informal proof of the first incompleteness theorem – in a nutshell, the idea they attribute to Wittgenstein is that if the Gödel sentence of a system is refutable, then, because of the resulting ω-inconsistency of the system, we should give up the translation of Gödel’s sentence by the English sentence “I am unprovable”. I will argue against Floyd and Putnam’s use of the idea, and I will indirectly question its attribution to Wittgenstein. First, I will point out that the idea is inefficient in the context of the first incompleteness theorem because there is an explicit assumption of soundness in Gödel’s informal discussion of that theorem. Secondly, I will argue that of he who makes the observation that Floyd and Putnam think Wittgenstein has made about the first theorem, one will expect to see an analogous observation (concerning the ‘consistency’ statement of systems) about Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem – yet we see nothing to that effect in Wittgenstein’s remarks. Incidentally, that never-made remark on the import of the second theorem is of genuine logical significance. ‏ ‎This short paper is a by-product of the lecture I gave, as an invited speaker, at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Iranian Association for Logic, 2016. I am grateful to Saeed Salehi for an ongoing and productive discussion on different aspects of Gödel’s 1931 paper, and to Ali Masoudi and Mousa Mohammadian for all the friendly and brotherly support. I’d like to dedicate this paper to the memory of my teacher, John V. Canfield (1934 – 2017).

Kurt Gödels onvolledigheidsstellingen en de grenzen van de kennis

Abstract Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and the limits of knowledge In this paper a presentation is given of Kurt Gödel’s pathbreaking results on the incompleteness of formal arithmetic. Some biographical details are provided but the main focus is on the analysis of the theorems themselves. An intermediate level between informal and formal has been sought that allows the reader to get a sufficient taste of the technicalities involved and not lose sight of the philosophical importance of the results. Connections are established with the work of Alan Turing and Hao Wang to show the present-day relevance of Gödel’s research and how it relates to the limitations of human knowledge, mathematical knowledge in particular.

CURRENT RESEARCH ON GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS

AbstractWe give a survey of current research on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems from the following three aspects: classifications of different proofs of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.

Revisiting Chaitin’s Incompleteness Theorem

In the mid-1970s, Gregory Chaitin proved a novel incompleteness theorem, formulated in terms of Kolmogorov complexity, a measure of complexity that features prominently in algorithmic information theory. Chaitin further claimed that his theorem provides insight into both the source and scope of incompleteness, a claim that has been subject to much criticism. In this article, I consider a new strategy for vindicating Chaitin’s claims, one informed by recent work of Bienvenu, Romashchenko, Shen, Taveneaux, and Vermeeren that extends and refines Chaitin’s incompleteness theorem. As I argue, this strategy, though more promising than previous attempts, fails to vindicate Chaitin’s claims. Lastly, I will suggest an alternative interpretation of Chaitin’s theorem, according to which the theorem indicates a trade-off that comes from working with a sufficiently strong definition of randomness—namely, that we lose the ability to certify randomness.

The Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in Light of Zubiri’s Noology

Rapid advances in computer technology and what is termed ‘Artificial Intelligence’ in the past 70 years have led to speculation about the ultimate capabilities of electronic devices, including speculation about whether they will make humans obsolete at some future time. Zubiri’s distinction between sensible intelligence and sentient intelligence can be applied to understanding of the limitations of AI. Machines can only operate on the sensible intelligence paradigm, which entails limits. Sentient intelligence allows humans to carry out functions that sensible intelligence-based devices can never do. Sensible intelligence-based devices, including AI, will therefore be restricted to amplifying human (i.e. sentient intelligence) capabilities, but never replacing them. Historically, extravagant claims for AI have not been borne out, despite many orders of magnitude increase in computation speed and memory capacity. Theoretical arguments, based on Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, also confirm this.

Mathematical developments of the incompleteness theorems

Mathematical developments of the incompleteness theorems

About the characterization of a fine line that separates generalizations and boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem under semantic tableau deduction

AbstractOur previous research showed that the semantic tableau deductive methodology of Fitting and Smullyan permits boundary-case exceptions to the second incompleteness theorem, if multiplication is viewed as a 3-way relation (rather than as a total function). It is known that tableau methodologies prove a schema of theorems verifying all instances of the law of the excluded middle. But if one promotes this schema of theorems into formalized logical axioms, then the meaning of the pronoun of ‘I’, used by our self-referencing engine, changes quite sharply. Our partial evasions of the second incompleteness theorem shall then come to a complete halt.

FINDING THE LIMIT OF INCOMPLETENESS I

AbstractIn this paper, we examine the limit of applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem ($\textsf {G1}$ for short). We first define the notion “$\textsf {G1}$ holds for the theory $T$”. This paper is motivated by the following question: can we find a theory with a minimal degree of interpretation for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds. To approach this question, we first examine the following question: is there a theory T such that Robinson’s $\mathbf {R}$ interprets T but T does not interpret $\mathbf {R}$ (i.e., T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation) and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T? In this paper, we show that there are many such theories based on Jeřábek’s work using some model theory. We prove that for each recursively inseparable pair $\langle A,B\rangle $, we can construct a r.e. theory $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ such that $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$. As a corollary, we answer a question from Albert Visser. Moreover, we prove that for any Turing degree $\mathbf {0}< \mathbf {d}<\mathbf {0}^{\prime }$, there is a theory T with Turing degree $\mathbf {d}$ such that $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T and T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. Turing reducibility. As a corollary, based on Shoenfield’s work using some recursion theory, we show that there is no theory with a minimal degree of Turing reducibility for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds.

‘Sometime a paradox’, now proof: Yablo is not first order

Abstract Interesting as they are by themselves in philosophy and mathematics, paradoxes can be made even more fascinating when turned into proofs and theorems. For example, Russell’s paradox, which overthrew Frege’s logical edifice, is now a classical theorem in set theory, to the effect that no set contains all sets. Paradoxes can be used in proofs of some other theorems—thus Liar’s paradox has been used in the classical proof of Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth in sufficiently rich languages. This paradox (as well as Richard’s paradox) appears implicitly in Gödel’s proof of his celebrated first incompleteness theorem. In this paper, we study Yablo’s paradox from the viewpoint of first- and second-order logics. We prove that a formalization of Yablo’s paradox (which is second order in nature) is non-first-orderizable in the sense of George Boolos (1984).

Succès et opportunisme dans les réflexions méthodologiques d’Hilbert et von Neumann

Although there does not seem to be a direct influence of utilitarianism on David Hilbert and his School, there are some pragmatic aspects in the foundational investigations of the father of modern axiomatics and of some of his scholars that can be read in utilitarian terms. In this article, I detail these aspects, focusing on the foundational research of Hilbert throughout his career and the later methodological reflections of John von Neumann on the mathematical sciences. As for research on Hilbert, much attention is paid to the role played by the notion of success as an alternative epistemological criterion for the introduction of powerful conceptual tools within axiomatic theories, as well as for the justification of these theories in the case where consistency proofs were not available. Ironically, after the discovery of Godel’s incompleteness theorems, success became a plain epistemological criterion for the justification of axiomatized sciences, together with all the conceptual tools contained therein. In his later foundational reflections, von Neumann, in particular, a former mathematician of Hilbert’s School, subscribed to an opportunistic methodology of science, i.e. a methodology that tried to coherently develop Hilbert’s thought on success, as well as his axiomatic reform of mathematical sciences. There seems to be, therefore, a clear evolutionary line that can be traced from Hilbert to von Neumann, which also reveals utilitarian aspects (broadly conceived) not only in science, but in axiomatics as well.

A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof

In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy, where the notion of informal proof is at work. G. Priest developed an argument, grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias. In this paper, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with Gödel’s conception, superseding the criticisms against the usual notion of naïve proof used by real working mathematicians. We explore the connection between Gödel’s theorem and naïve proof so understood, both from a classical and a dialetheic perspective.