Abstract

Abstract We prove the equivalence of the semantic version of Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth with the semantic version of the diagonal lemma and also show the equivalence of a syntactic version of Tarski’s undefinability theorem with a weak syntactic diagonal lemma. We outline two seemingly diagonal-free proofs for these theorems from the literature and show that the syntactic version of Tarski’s theorem can deliver Gödel–Rosser’s incompleteness theorem.

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