This paper analyzes implied volatilities (IVs), which are computed from trading records of the KOSPI 200 index option market from January 2005 to December 2014, to examine major characteristics of the market pricing behavior. The data includes only daily closing prices of option transactions for which the daily trading volume is larger than 300 contracts. The IV is computed using the Black-Scholes option pricing model. The empirical findings are as follows; Firstly, daily averages of IVs have shown very similar behavior to historical volatilities computed from 60-day returns of the KOSPI 200 index. The correlation coefficient of IV of the ATM call options to historical volatility is 0.8679 and that of the ATM put options is 0.8479. Secondly, when moneyness, which is measured by the ratio of the strike price to the spot price, is very large or very small, IVs of call and put options decrease days to maturity gets longer. This is partial evidence of the jump risk inherent in the stochastic process of the spot price. Thirdly, the moneyness pattern showed heavily skewed shapes of volatility smiles, which was more apparent during the global financial crises period from 2007 to 2009. Behavioral reasons can explain the volatility smiles. When the moneyness is very small, the deep OTM puts are priced relatively higher due to investors’ crash phobia and the deep ITM calls are valued higher due to investors’ overconfidence and confirmation biases. When the moneyness is very large, the deep OTM calls are priced higher due to investors’ hike expectation and the deep ITM puts are valued higher due to overconfidence and confirmation biases. Fourthly, for almost all moneyness classes and for all sub-periods, the IVs of puts are larger than the IVs of calls. Also, the differences of IVs of deep OTM put ranges minus IVs of deep OTM calls, which is known to be a measure of crash phobia or hike expectation, shows consistent positive values for all sub-periods. The difference in the financial crisis period is much bigger than in other periods. This suggests that option traders had a stronger crash phobia in the financial crisis.
Read full abstract