Hypothetical Imperatives Research Articles

Philippa Foot on Hypothetical Imperatives

Philippa Foot on hypothetical imperatives Robert L. Holmes Robert L. Holmes University of Rochester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 36, Issue 4, June 1976, Pages 199–200, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/36.4.199 Published: 01 June 1976

A Reply to Professor Frankena

Professor Frankena finds himself in a state of bewilderment about my opinions, particularly about those expressed in two recent articles, ‘Morality and Art’ and ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, which he discusses in an article pointedly entitled ‘The Philosopher's Attack on Morality’. To say, as he himself does, that he finds these articles ‘somewhat unclear’ seems on the internal evidence to be something of an understatement; he finds them full of uncertainties, contradictions, ambiguities and qualifications, and I do not know how he thinks anyone could have written such stuff.

Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives

'Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?' A Reply to Mr. Holmes

'Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?' A Reply to Mr. Holmes

'Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?' A Reply to Mr. Holmes

'Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?' A Reply to Mr. Holmes

Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?

Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?

Obligation and Guilt in a Morality of Hypothetical Imperatives

Obligation and Guilt in a Morality of Hypothetical Imperatives

Is morality a system of hypothetical imperatives?

Is morality a system of hypothetical imperatives?

Reason-Giving and Action-Guiding in Morality

How exactly are moral considerations reasons for acting? Kant answered by saying that moral considerations are a matter of duty, of a law which commands action. Philosophers have not alwaays felt satisfied with this answer, and some of them, such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Mill, have even raised specific objections to it. Recently, Philippa Foot has held that the fact that moral considerations are reasons for acting cannot be accounted for unless it is admitted that morality consists of hypothetical imperatives.1 In her opinion, Kanťs view that morality gives reasons for acting precisely because it consists of categorical imperatives is unintelligible,2 even, perhaps, a kind of fraud.3 In Part I of this paper I want to make three distinctions in terms of which the sort of claim Foot makes can be clearly stated. In Part II, I want to defend Kant against this sort of claim.

Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives

Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives

VII.—Kant's Distinction Between Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives

VII.—Kant's Distinction Between Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives