Hypothetical Imperatives Research Articles

O Conceito de Klugheit em Kant

This paper aims to analyze Kant’s concept of Klugheit and how it relates to morality. For Kant, this concept does not belong to the field of morality as it is, according to him, an interested act, therefore only capable of hypothetical imperatives. In this sense, prudence generates at most one’s own happiness, but not necessarily goodness. On the other hand, we reason that prudence plays an important role in promoting man’s moral improvement towards the exercise of virtue. Prudence only holds good, therefore, if understood from a Kantian anthropological point of view.

Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?

Abstract: Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be ‘backed up’ by a prior categorical imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both as an interpretation of Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a premise within the reasoning. An alternative to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it is incoherent.

Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and Planning

There are many deep and difficult questions concerning the role of narratives in our lives. In an effort to provide answers to these questions, positions can get rather polarized. At one extreme, one finds the view that our lives are, in some sense, lived narratives of which we are the authors; lives are somehow inescapably narrative in structure and bear close similarities to literary narratives. At the other extreme, there are the skeptics, who hold that narrative neither does, nor should, play any significant part in our understanding of our lives, or in living a life.1 Between these two extremes, however, much is possible, and in this article I want to try to outline a realistic role for narrative in the way we think about, and respond to, past and future episodes in our lives. In doing this, I will not claim that this is the only way in which we can think about our past and future; nor will I claim that this is the only way in which we ought to think. In spite of this apparent modesty in aim, though, the role of narrative will turn out to be quite substantial. It is something of a commonplace that much of our lives is taken up with thinking about our past, about how our lives might have gone differently, and about our plans for the future and how things might turn out, and my idea is that much of this thinking is what I call 'narrative thinking.' The term I use for these past and future events is 'non-actual episodes,' and the modest ambitionbut still substantial in contentis to reveal the role of narrative thinking in our engagement with these episodes. To begin with, I will say what I mean by these two terms, first, 'non-actual episodes,' and second, 'narrative thinking.'2 I then go on to discuss how emotions, actual and imagined, can be involved in narrative thinking, and then apply this to narrative th nking in planning, including the roles of counterfactual thinking and thinking about hypothetical imperatives. Finally, I briefly discuss how our engagement with literary narratives can help us to develop and refine narrative thinking about our own lives.

Toward a Serresian Reconceptualization of Kantian Respect

For Immanuel Kant the most basic phenomenon of moral life, the categorical imperative, is ineluctably bound up with an essential difference between the sensible and the intelligible, across which practical subjectivity is constituted. More specifically, the moral imperative can be experienced only by a finite rational subject whose faculty of desire is divided into lower and higher stems. The lower faculty of desire is determined pathologically, i.e., by the feelings of pleasure and pain, and thus concerns the sensible side of practical subjectivity.1 The higher faculty of desire, on the other hand, is determined exclusively by the pure moral law, and thus concerns the intelligible side of practical subjectivity. For Kant, imperatives are expressed through an ought and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which in its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by that law (a necessitation).2 For a being whose will is determined exclusively by the moral law, i.e., without any contribution whatever from sensibility, the element of necessitation or of command that is essential to the experience of the imperative would be entirely out of place. Such a being would act in accordance with the moral law as certainly as natural objects act in accordance with the laws of nature, so that a command to do so would be superfluous. On the other hand, a being whose will is determined exclusively by the feelings of pleasure and pain would be unable even to conceive of the objective law of reason to which it would be commanded to submit itself. In sum, only a being whose practical subjectivity is extended across this essential difference could feel an imperative weighing on its sensibility and experience it as referring beyond its own inclinations to the objective and impersonal moral law. It is enormously important within the context of Kantian moral philosophy to maintain the sharp distinction between the two sides of our practical nature. This is because our acts, in order to acquire that kind of worth that is uniquely moral, must be governed entirely by the intelligibly determined higher faculty of desire, and not at all by the sensibly determined lower faculty. The moral law, for Kant, is characterized most essentially as unconditional and as objective. The lower faculty of desire, which requires as its incentive an object that promises the subject some degree of pleasure, can give rise at best to hypothetical imperatives, which are conditional and subjective. Principles arising from the lower faculty of desire are conditional because they depend on contingent circumstances for their imperative force. I would, for example, feel compelled to get myself a cup of coffee only on the condition that I actually enjoyed coffee, and moreover, that I would enjoy a cup of coffee at that particular moment. Principles of this kind are subjective in that the pleasure that serves as their incentive refers only to particular subjects, and not to the object. That coffee would be pleasurable to me at that moment, for example, is a fact about me, and not about coffee. The kind of compulsion that Kant thinks of as uniquely moral, on the other hand, is experienced as an unconditional command, indifferent or even opposed to our particular inclinations. I respond to the command of the moral imperative not as the particular person I am, with my particular likes and dislikes, but rather as a rational subject, the same as any other. I recognize, for example, that I must not defraud the other party to a financial transaction, even though doing so would be to my advantage. This prohibition has nothing to do with me in particular or with the circumstances of this particular transaction. My being destitute, for example, and the other party's being fabulously wealthy do not affect the moral command in the least. Rather, I recognize in this prohibition an impersonal duty that applies universally and unconditionally. …

Reconciling Themes in Neo-Aristotelian Meta-ethics

1. Morality, Reason, and Human Nature Reading the whole of Philippa Foots work reveals that the view advanced in her widely reprinted essay, ‘‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,’’ is an exception to her otherwise consistent attempts to defend the universal application of correct moral judgments on the basis of sound practical reasoning. In Natural Goodness, Foot returns again to defend the claim that everybody has reason to be moral, yoking together ideas about moral evaluation, practical reason, and natural teleology into her novel and distinct form of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism. 1 While her view has recently received some critical attention, little has been done either in its defense or further development. 2 Indeed, there is a certain irony to the fact that Rosalind Hursthouse, who has done more than anyone toward a systematic development of Foots recent naturalism, also champions a fundamental objection to the prospect of its success, its promise of providing an account resting on facts of nature as to why everybody has ‘‘reason to aim at those things at which a good human being must aim’’ independently of their self-interest or desires. 3 Hursthouses objection rests on the understanding of practical reason she adopts from John McDowell: the facility for reasoning well is an acquired and normatively autonomous second nature. 4 Another prominent neo-Aristotelian, McDowell has articulated his own objections to Foots recent work, specifically, to the idea that natural facts about species-typical needs play a significant role in accounting for the rational appeal of a life of virtue. 5 Together, McDowell and Hursthouse present serious problems that must be addressed before any defense of morality along the lines Foot has established can be pursued further. Still, it is well known that Hursthouse is not entirely critical of Foot. It is with significant optimism that she develops Foots basic model of naturalistic evaluation and concludes that the approach does indeed show

Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason

Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason

Might Intentions be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives?

I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of instrumentalism. According to the position I defend, genuine practical deliberation and genuine practical imperatives take as their starting point the agent's intentions and only the agent's intentions.

Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives

Abstract Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, second, if Binmore’s own theory of moral practice and its evolution is correct, then the actual moral practice does-and in fact must-incorporate norms, which have the form of a categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives are part of social reality and, therefore, any (normative) moral theory that adequately reflects moral practice must also include categorical imperatives.

The hypothetical imperative?

According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don't-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some—those who have an end.

Reasons, practical reason, and practical reasoning

AbstractThe concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capacity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. This paper provides a brief account of each. Several kinds of reason for action are distinguished. Practical reason is characterized both as a capacity whose exercise is largely constituted by a kind of responsiveness to reasons and as governed by certain normative principles; and practical reasoning is described as a kind of mental process in which reasons figure as premises and, from those premises, a practical conclusion is drawn. Much of the paper undertakes two related tasks: to distinguish the main kinds of practical reasoning and the associated criteria of assessment and to formulate some important substantive principles of practical reason. These principles yield criteria of several sorts: logical, inferential, epistemic, and material. On the theory presented, although any (non‐basic) intentional act can be grounded in practical reasoning, the same acts can be performed for the relevant reason(s) without being so grounded, and in either case their rationality depends on adequate support by the reason(s). One kind of reason is commonly thought to be captured by Kantian hypothetical imperatives. The final sections explore what constitutes a hypothetical imperative and what other principles are needed to account for practical rationality. A major conclusion is that in the domain of practical reason, if there are no categorical imperatives, there are no hypothetical imperatives either.

Explaining the Rules

There is a class of speech-acts employing expressions such as ‘can't, ‘must’, and ‘meant to’, which have a paradigm role in stating the rules that govern a practice. Elizabeth Anscombe called such expressions stopping (or forcing) modals. Although “You can't phi”, etc., are not implicit hypothetical imperatives, it nevertheless makes prima facie sense to ask of a given practice why we go in for it, what the point of it is. Various questions are discussed in connection with these facts, e.g. What distinguishes a rule's applying to someone from its having force (for that person)? Where the practice at issue is a ‘language-game’, does the question “Why do we do this?” still makes sense?

What's really wrong with Laudan's normative naturalism

The article presents a critical discussion of Larry Laudan's naturalistic metamethodological theory known as normative naturalism (NN). I examine the strongest extant objection to NN, and, with reference to ideas in Freedman ( Philosophy of Science , 66 (Proceedings), pp. S526-S537, 1999), show how NN survives it. I then go on to outline two problems that really do compromise NN. The first revolves around Laudan's conception of the relationship between scientific values and the history of science. Laudan argues we can make sense of progress in science without seeing great scientists in the past as having held the cognitive values and methodological rules we hold today as important for science. I argue this is extremely implausible, and moreover that Laudan must see our values today as justified by reference to the values of past scientists if he is to avoid a pernicious form of relativism. The second problem with NN is that its conception of methodological rules--as hypothetical imperatives linking cognitive means to ends--is untenable. Such rules would not be needed in a scientific community; moreover it is doubtful whether they should class as rules at all. I conclude by suggesting that the distinction between cognitive means and ends which undergirds Laudan's view is intuitively not well founded, and in any case does not provide sufficient materials for a viable normative naturalized epistemology.

Discussion: Are Methodological Rules Hypothetical Imperatives?

This discussion adjudicates a dispute between Larry Laudan and Gerald Doppelt over the nature of methodological rules. Laudan holds that all methodological rules are hypothetical imperatives, while Doppelt argues that a subset of those rules, basic methodological standards, are not hypothetical imperatives. I argue that neither writer offers a satisfactory account of methodological rules and that their reliance on the hypothetical/nonhypothetical distinction does not advance our understanding of methodological rules. I propose that we dispense with this dubious distinction and develop an alternative account of scientific norms.

Necessitation and Justification in Kant’s Ethics

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant claims that hypothetical imperatives are analytic and that categorical imperatives are synthetic. This claim plays a crucial role in Kant’s attempt to establish moral ‘oughts’ as categorically binding on all rational agents, for by classifying moral statements according to this distinction, Kant hopes to uncover the sort of justification required to establish such statements. However, Kant’s application of the analytic/ synthetic distinction to imperatives is problematic. For one thing, this distinction was developed by Kant in connection with indicative, subject-predicate statements, which would seem to cast doubt on the idea that imperatives can be either analytic or synthetic. Moreover, Kant’s claim that hypothetical imperatives are analytic and categorical imperatives are synthetic seems to conflict with other claims in his moral works. For example, in the Groundwork, Kant claims that hypothetical imperatives are (compared to categorical imperatives) unproblematic since they can be established on the basis of experience (G, 419-20, 49-50). But this is incompatible with the idea that hypothetical imperatives are analytic, since presumably all analytic statements are a priori — established independently of experience.

McDowell, Hypothetical Imperatives and Natural Law

McDowell, Hypothetical Imperatives and Natural Law

The Naturalist Conception of Methodological Standards in Science: A Critique

In this essay, I criticize Laudan's view that methodological rules in science are best understood as hypothetical imperatives, for example, to realize cognitive aim A, follow method B. I criticize his idea that such rules are best evaluated by a naturalized philosophy of science which collects the empirical evidence bearing on the soundness of these rules. My claim is that this view yields a poor explanation of (1) the role of methodological rules in establishing the rationality of scientific practices, (2) the debates scientists have over rival methodological rules, and (3) the reasons on the basis of which scientists actually embrace, challenge, or transform methodological rules. A better explanation is provided by treating at least some methodological rules as foundational standards of theory-appraisal which define the criteria of scientific truth, knowledge, evidence, proof, explanations, etc., for a certain tradition or community of scientific practice. Such standards are in turn grounded or challenged on the basis of their coherence or incoherence with a wider body of scientific judgments. This view leads away from a naturalized philosophy of science back to its more classical epistemological conception.

Hypothetical imperatives and conditional obligations

This essay attempts to answer a number of logical puzzles about conditional obligations by analysing the nature and structure of hypothetical imperatives. It is suggested that hypothetical imperatives can typically be understood in analogy with conditional bets. This proposal has interesting consequences to questions about the logical form of dyadic deontic sentences and about the acceptable principles of detachment for deontic logic. It also suggests a more general conclusion: to gain proper understanding of various syntactical and semantical treatments of deontic logic, one has to pay serious attention to the ways in which obligations, duties, permissions, and prohibitions arise. In other words, if there are syntactically and semantically different kinds of obligations, their existence has to be grounded on differences in the conditions and practices through which they emerge.1 Therefore, the study of deontic logic should be based upon deontic pragmatics. 1. COMMANDING

Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?

Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?

Categorical Imperatives--A Defense

IN her paper, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,' Mrs. Foot argues against the view that moral considerations provide reasons for acting for any man, which she takes be at the heart of the claim that moral judgments are categorical imperatives (I shall follow her in referring this view as the view that moral judgments are categorical imperatives). Her own position is that whether or not moral considerations provide any individual with reason act depends on whether or not he happens care for moral ends (p. 315), and she attributes the feeling that moral requirements are somehow inescapable the relative stringency with which morality is taught (p. 310). I will argue that the view that moral judgments are in fact categorical imperatives is untouched by her attack. Having concluded that what is meant by those who hold that moral judgments are categorical imperatives is that moral considerations give reasons for acting any man, unlike others which only provide one with reasons act if one has certain interests and desires, Mrs. Foot says that the difficulty is to defend this proposition which is more often repeated than explained (p. 309). She says,

Philippa Foot on hypothetical imperatives

Philippa Foot on hypothetical imperatives