Hypothetical Imperatives Research Articles

Was sind literarische Praktiken?

Against the background of a boom in praxeological research approaches in the social and textual sciences, the article attempts (a) to clarify relevant concepts such as ›social practice‹, ›social institution‹, ›rule‹ or ›convention‹, (b) to characterize a particular type of social practice, literary practices, in more detail, and (c) explain their basic mode of operation. According to the picture sketched out, literary practices are asymmetrical practices that consist of mutually interrelated production practices and reading practices and are characterized by a complex interplay of literary standards, hypothetical imperatives, conventions in the sense of David Lewis, as well as non-coordinating conventions.

SYSTEM-PARAMETRIC IMPERATIVES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AQUACULTURE IN THE UKRAINIAN BLACK SEA REGION

Topicality. Modern socio-economic development is characterized by a steady growth of resource-ecological, economic, political and other crisis problems. These factors create a high level of threats to food security both at the national and international levels. For Ukraine, this problem is actualized as a result of russia's military aggression. This situation determines the need for comprehensive knowledge of the specified problems in the interests of sustainable development of Ukraine.
 Aim and tasks. The purpose of the article is a scientific and methodological search for promising directions and effective solutions to the problems of sustainable food security in Ukraine over a fairly long time scale. At the same time, the task of scientific substantiation of the mobilization strategy for the development of domestic (within the territory of Ukraine) natural resource potential of aquaculture is set.
 Materials and methods. Regulatory and legal materials, including the Law of Ukraine "On Aquaculture", the report of the State Fisheries Agency of Ukraine, etc., which determine state policy in the field of fisheries and aquaculture development, were used as the information base of the research. The methodology and methods of the theory of complex systems, the principles of nonlinear and synergistic interpretations, etc. are used as tools for solving the tasks in the work.
 Research results. The scientific and economic foundations of the development of the aquaculture development program based on the natural resource potential of the Ukrainian Black Sea region have been developed. The work presents the results of research related to the formation of a conceptual basis for the development of a program-oriented direction of aquaculture development in relation to the conditions of Ukraine. Based on the high level of uncertainty of the studied problems in the work, the field of aquaculture of the state (region) is considered as a complex (non-linear) socio-ecological-economic system (SEES). Particular importance in the work is given to the question of the methodology of forming a system of imperatives for the development of complex objects, which is considered according to such directions as actual, categorical, modal and hypothetical imperatives. The specified system of imperatives is considered in connection with other development factors as one of the important elements of the driving forces of the development of the SEES, in relation to the conditions of development of the Ukrainian Black Sea region.
 Conclusion. Methodological and methodological approaches to the system-parametric understanding of complex socio-ecological-economic objects discussed in the work are an important basis for substantiating effective directions of development and ways of solving problems of sustainable development of natural and economic systems. The development of aquaculture in the Ukrainian Black Sea region is considered as a problem of solving the issues of ensuring national food security, improving the quality of life of the country's population and a factor in the revival of Ukraine as a maritime state.

Ethics and Banking: Do Banks Divest Their Kind?

A growing group of institutional investors use divestment strategically to deter misconducts that are harmful for the climate and society. Based on Kantian ethics, we propose that divestment represents investors’ universal and absolute moral commitment to socially responsible investing (SRI). Following categorical and hypothetical imperatives and reciprocity as a norm, we hypothesize how institutional investors’ commit to SRI through a divestment strategy against ethically reprehensible behaviour of banks, especially when these investors represent banks themselves. Using a hand-collected database of the revelation dates of enforcement actions on banks, we find evidence that banks are less likely to divest equity holding on banks with misconduct (fined banks) than their non-bank institutional investors peers. Banks that commit to invest responsibly by signing for the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) are not significantly more likely to divest on fined banks stocks than non-signatory banks. Moreover, divestment of fined banks whose own legitimacy to operate is in question is not significantly different from non-fined banks divestment. We find that European banks are more inclined to sell their holdings permanently on fined banks than their United States peers. Therefore, bank’s moral commitment to SRI via divestments is influenced more by cultural and reciprocity norms than their moral commitment to participate in the PRI.

Категорические моральные требования

This paper defends the doctrine that moral requirements are categorical in nature. My point of departure is John McDowell’s 1978 essay, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, in which McDowell argues, against Philippa Foot, that moral reasons are not conditional upon agents’ desires and are, in a certain sense, inescapable. After expounding McDowell’s view, exploring his idea that moral requirements “silence” other considerations and discussing its particularist ethos, I address an objection that moral reasons, as McDowell conceives them, are fundamentally incomplete in ways only a full-bloodedly Kantian appeal to pure practical reason can remedy. I conclude that the objection fails: ordinary moral reasons do not stand in need of a grounding in Reason. There is no prospect of deriving them from a supreme principle of morality or other canons of rationality. Ordinary reasons are sufficient in themselves, though their significance can be elucidated and illuminated by various strategies — some broadly Aristotelian, some drawing inspiration from Kant’s formula of humanity — in ways that can strengthen and vindicate them. Notwithstanding the failure of the objection, I conclude by reflecting on how Kantian insights can yet play a significant role in a McDowellian view of moral deliberation and moral education.

К вопросу о пути выхода из кризиса в образовании: Назад к Канту!

The authors of the article are trying to identify the signs of a crisis of our time as a consequence of the refusal from the philosophical justification of the goals and objectives of scientific pedagogy, which as a chain reaction entail ignoring the results of sciences related to pedagogy: neurobiology and psychology. The reproductive approach in education selectively takes into account the results of the empirical sciences, as they serve to justify it. The result is a shift in emphasis: being driven by the hypothetical imperatives of competitiveness in the labor market, teachers and other adults feel the need for the achievements of the pupils, for their effectiveness. As a consequence, the child's psyche does not develop properly which manifests itself in the inability to see the subjects of interaction in the vis-a-vis, in an effort to objectify what is not subject to objectification - a person. The authors of the article see the solution to the problem in the appeal in the philosophical and pedagogical system of I. Kant, that may be reconstructed from his works. The authors of the article conclude that I. Kant may rightfully be considered the founder of a productive approach to education.

Problematika Moralitas Anak pada Masa Pandemi Covid-19 Perspektif Immanuel Kant: Studi Kasus Di Kampung Cikaso Desa Sukamukti Kecamatan Cisompet Kabupaten Garut

The purpose of this study was to analyze the problems of children's morality during the Covid-19 pandemic from the perspective of Immanuel Kant. This research is a qualitative research using descriptive methods of phenomenology and moral philosophy for a case study in Cikaso Village, Sukamukti Village, Cisompet District, Garut Regency. The findings in this research show that the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic does not only affect the health sector, but the education sector is also affected where character education and morality of children receive less attention from the policy makers. As for the point of view of Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy, explaining that morality is divided into two parts, namely hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. This study concludes that the morality of children in Cikaso Village is mostly included in the hypothetical imperative. This study recommends for further and in-depth research on studies of morality, especially in the perspective of Immanuel Kant.

Constitutivism and the virtues

In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are “constitutive standards” of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomously efficacious, and the categorical and hypothetical imperatives arise from those two attributes. These principles are also “constitutive” of agency in two more specific ways. First, they meet the “constitution requirement”: the object must meet the standard in question, at least to some extent, in order to be the kind of object that it is. Second, they meet the “self-constitution requirement”: the object makes itself into the kind of object that it is by conforming to the standard. That is, the agent makes herself into an agent, and into the particular agent who she is, by conforming to those standards. Some neo-Aristotelians believe that Aristotelian virtues are constitutive standards. In this paper, I first ask why moral philosophers should focus on the virtues at all, considering the views of David Hume, Philippa Foot, and Aristotle. I then ask whether Aristotelian virtues meet the constitution requirement, and suggest that there are grounds for this view in the Nicomachean Ethics. But Aristotelian virtues do not meet the self-constitution requirement, which leaves Aristotle unable to explain moral responsibility. I end by examining the role that Aristotelian virtues could play in a Kantian ethic.

An unrealistic account of moral reasons

In this paper I will analyze John McDowell’s broad account of practical rationality and moral reasons, which he mainly puts forward in his articles “Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?” (1978) and “Might there be external reasons?” (1995). My main aim is to argue that from a philosophical perspective, no less than from an empirical one, McDowell’s account of practical rationality is not a realistic one. From a philosophical point of view, I will argue that his intellectualist account is not convincing; and if we consider his virtue-ethical ideal of practical rationality in light of the model of human cognition, we also realize that moral behavior is not immune to cognitive biases and does not always flow from robust traits of character like virtues. At the same time, this puts at stake his strong thesis of moral autonomy – the idea that with the ‘onset of reason’ moral beings are no longer determined by ‘first nature’ features.

Axiological approach to law in I. Kant’s doctrine

This article outlines the views of the founder of the German classical philosophy of Immanuel Kant on the nature and essence of the state and law, namely, studies the concept of the state as a “night watchman”, analyzes the draft of the jural state, reveals the concepts of categorical and hypothetical imperatives, from which the thinker deduces morality and legality of people’s actions. Kant is first to draw attention to the need to comply with a number of conditions (basic and preliminaries) when concluding peace treaties between the states. Kant became the founder of the value approach to law. The concept of law is interpreted by the thinker exclusively as a combination of coercion with the freedom of the person: “law is a set of conditions under which the arbitrariness of one person is compatible with the arbitrariness of another in terms of the general law of freedom”. Thus, the law of Kant is reduced to the system of laws, i.e. to the objective law. In this case, natural law is called by the thinker as private law, and positive law as public law.

The Analytic Proposition Underlying Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract:Kant maintains that it is easy to see how hypothetical imperatives are possible, because the following proposition is analytic: “Whoever wills the end also wills (in so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that is within his control” (GMS, AA 04: 417). I distinguish three readings of the analytic proposition, which correspond to three ways of understanding how it reveals hypothetical imperatives to be possible. The first reads it as a theoretical proposition about constitutive features of an ideal agent. I argue that this fails to do justice to the first-personal character of the analytic proposition, as a proposition about the general practical concept ‘I will’ (or more generally, ‘I intend’). The second reading extracts actual imperatives from the concept of ‘willing an end’ by means of analysis. Against this, I argue that the derivation of an imperative from an act of willing an end is an act of synthesis, and that analysis of the concept of ‘my willing an end’ merely yields the

Quality Assurance: The Standards for Teaching and Learning in Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan

This paper analyzes and evaluates the hypothetical imperatives, suggested by the educators, educationists and others about the quality of teaching and learning in higher education so that asset of standards to ascertain the quality may be developed. In this paper special attention has been given to the strategies for translating the imperatives into valid and reliable instruments and procedures for making judgments about the quality referred above. Besides, the paper reviews the efforts of higher education commission to change and stream line the method and materials of private and public institutions of higher education with special reference to teaching and learning. Since many of the recognized public and private universities of Pakistan give affiliation to the private colleges who offer undergraduate and graduate programs of studies, their affiliation policies and procedures have also been discussed and debated in the paper with a view to suggest ideas to check and streamline the classroom activities and procedures of such institutions. A very important feature of the paper is the role of the raters of teaching learning and the influence of their personal and professional characteristics on their judgments. In the end a set of standards and associated procedures to evaluate the teaching and learning situation of the universities and degree awarding institutions of Pakistan have been proposed.

Quality Assurance: The Standards for Teaching and Learning in Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan

This paper analyzes and evaluates the hypothetical imperatives, suggested by the educators, educationists and others about the quality of teaching and learning in higher education so that asset of standards to ascertain the quality may be developed. In this paper special attention has been given to the strategies for translating the imperatives into valid and reliable instruments and procedures for making judgments about the quality referred above. Besides, the paper reviews the efforts of higher education commission to change and stream line the method and materials of private and public institutions of higher education with special reference to teaching and learning. Since many of the recognized public and private universities of Pakistan give affiliation to the private colleges who offer undergraduate and graduate programs of studies, their affiliation policies and procedures have also been discussed and debated in the paper with a view to suggest ideas to check and streamline the classroom activities and procedures of such institutions. A very important feature of the paper is the role of the raters of teaching learning and the influence of their personal and professional characteristics on their judgments. In the end a set of standards and associated procedures to evaluate the teaching and learning situation of the universities and degree awarding institutions of Pakistan have been proposed.

Korsgaard v. Gewirth on Universalization: Why Gewirthians are Kantians and Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians

Christine Korsgaard claims that Gewirth’s argument for morality fails to demonstrate that there is a categorically binding principle on action because it operates with the assumption that reasons for action are essentially private. This attribution is unfounded and Korsgaard’s own argument for moral obligation, in its appeal to Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument to establish that reasons for action are essentially public, is misdirected and unnecessary. Gewirth’s attempt to demonstrate a strictly a priori connection between a moral principle and the concept of being an agent as such is essentially Kantian, and recognizing that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding requires Kantians to accept that Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency is the supreme practical principle.

Preference‐Conditioned Necessities: Detachment and Practical Reasoning

AbstractThis article is about conditionalized modal statements whose antecedents concern a preferential attitude of an agent. The focus is on anankastic conditionals or, as they are known in the philosophical literature, hypothetical imperatives. We present a linguistically‐motivated analysis of anankastic and related conditionals and use it to address challenges for semantic theories of natural language conditionals motivated by certain philosophical concerns about practical reasoning and the requirements of rationality.

Morality for skeptics? Morality for Humans Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science Mark Johnson University of Chicago Press, 2014. 273 pp.

Morality for skeptics? <b>Morality for Humans</b> Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science <i>Mark Johnson</i> University of Chicago Press, 2014. 273 pp.

Were Kant's Hypothetical Imperatives Wide-Scope Oughts?

I defend the claim that Kant held a wide-scope view of hypothetical imperatives, against objections raised by Mark Schroeder [2005]. There is an important objection, now commonly known as the ‘bootstrapping’ problem, to the alternative, narrow-scope, view which Schroeder attributes to Kant. Schroeder argues that Kant has sufficient resources to reply to the bootstrapping problem, and claims that this leaves us with no good reason to attribute to Kant the wide-scope view. I show that Schroeder's Kantian reply to the bootstrapping problem cannot fully answer it. Schroeder also offers three main textual arguments for attributing to Kant the narrow-scope view: from Kant's claim that the moral imperative is unique in virtue of its categoricity, from Kant's distinction between ‘problematic’ and ‘assertoric’ hypothetical imperatives, and from Kant's conception of analyticity together with his claim that hypothetical imperatives are analytic. I argue that each of these views can be understood as cohering with the more plausible wide-scope view of hypothetical imperatives.

The Conditionality of Hypothetical Imperatives

AbstractKant famously distinguishes between the categorical imperative (CI) – the fundamental principle of morality – and hypothetical imperatives (HIs), which are instrumental norms. On the standard reading, Kant subscribes to the ‘disjunctive reading’ of HIs, which takes HIs to be consistency requirements that bind agents in exactly the same way whether or not agents are subject to CI and whether or not they conform their choices to CI. I argue that this reading cannot be squared with Kant's account of an agent's disposition, in particular his claim that cognition of CI is a necessary condition of willing a maxim. I further argue that Kant could not accept an account of HIs as consistency requirements. Finally, I outline Kant's conception of HIs as non-disjunctive requirements that arise when and only when agents will permissible ends. This account can help recapture Kant's conception of the unity of rational norms.

Our Brain “Kant” Tell Us? A Kantian Perspective of how Neuroscience Challenges our Notions of Moral Responsibility and the Legal Implications

Neuroscientific research has not only proved to be vital in our increasing understanding of human nature, but has also led to much normative discourse revolving around morality and law. There has been much work done regarding how neuroscience should inform us on issues regarding moral responsibility. In this paper, I propose to employ a Kantian moral framework to consider these issues more carefully. I argue that generally, neuroscience cannot undermine the concept that rational beings are morally responsible for their actions. However, within the same Kantian moral philosophical framework, I will consider how it is that certain individuals can be excused for their actions or have their responsibility mitigated. This will be done by focusing on the interaction between neuroscientific evidence and the capacity of certain individuals to engage with categorical and hypothetical imperatives. I will consider how it is that neuroscientific evidence can serve as an a priori excusing condition for moral responsibility, and equally importantly, when it cannot. I then go on to explore how our understanding of the workings of the brain can improve legal doctrine. I suggest that neuroscience can help to demonstrate that certain psychological criteria underlying particular legal doctrine might be inaccurate, and to improve our sentencing policies in order to better fulfil both retributive and rehabilitative aims and the criminal law.

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.

TWO OBJECTIONS TO WIDE-SCOPING

Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.