Husserl's Concept Research Articles

Phenomenology and ontology in the thought of Edmund Husserl

In this paper I examine Husserlian phenomenology and its relations with a possible ontology that the great German philosopher cultivated as a project, an undeclared ontology. Husserl's expression of the “ultimately and truly absolute” as a “primeval source” is not explained by a declared ontology and the concept of the “continuum” is in the same situation. Claiming that the roots of all ontologies seem to belong in phenomenology, Husserl appears to proclaim the uselessness of developing any ontology. The analysis of the possible development of the Husserlian concepts of “absolute” and “continuum” shows that it would have led Husserl either to an ontology or to the overcoming and dismantling of the phenomenology, because the Husserlian phenomenology and the ontology are actually incompatible. Perhaps that is exactly what he wanted to avoid. The guiding thread of the text is that Husserlian phenomenology is not fully realized as an authentic philosophy without a declared ontology or a clear statement about the relations between phenomenology and ontology.

Politicizing belonging: Community formation at the Late Preclassic Maya hamlet of Dos Ceibas

Abstract People are often assumed to expand existing mechanisms—kinship in particular—to include others when they form communities. These models (con)fuse similarity with sameness, as we argue based on Husserl's concept of empathy. People recognize others without overlooking differences. They form community by negotiating belonging. We ask how individuals materialize community, how they create unity in a political process, and how they employ bordering and bonding social interactions. Our case study is Dos Ceibas, a Late Preclassic (350 b.c. to a.d. 250) Maya hamlet in the Petexbatun region. The North Plaza originated as a residential group—possibly of the hamlet's founder—and was transformed over multiple construction episodes into a public and ceremonial place. By a.d. 250, Dos Ceibas consisted of a small pyramid overlooking a plaza and two likely residential buildings. Its growth pattern sets the North Plaza apart from nearby Group MP16 and magnified internal differences. At the same time, Dos Ceibas's pyramid and plaza were likely communal constructions that project a shared community identity. The comparison with contemporary settlements nearby identifies distinct settlement layouts and suggests localized community identities.

Edith Stein über Species Sensibilis und Transzendentalen Idealismus

Abstract This paper offers an assessment of some of the central aspects of Edith Stein’s conception of intentional acts proposed in Potency and Act. Studies Towards a Philosophy of Being. Her account hinges upon a combination of Thomistic and Husserlian concepts. She borrows from Aquinas two conceptual pairs that are central to his metaphysics and theory of knowledge: the actuality-potency dichotomy; and the distinction between sensible and intelligible species. The distinction and relevant articulation between sensible and intelligible species provide Stein with the basis to present her own conception of intentionality (with special focus on perception): the sensible species is regarded as the correlate of the object’s Gestalt; by contrast, the intelligible species is mobilised to account for what Husserl labels noesis-noema correlation. But Stein’s ambition is also to inscribe her account of the species sensibilis within an overall (critical) interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, financing the project “Intentionality and Person in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology” (GAČR 21-08256S).

Pendekatan Fenomenologi Husserl dan Kontribusinya bagi Pengembangan Dakwah di Indonesia

Religious practices and community social interactions give birth to many events that have different meanings for each person. Revealing the hidden meaning of an event, especially from the perspective of the person experiencing it, can be done with a phenomenological approach. The purpose of this research is to explain the contribution of Husserl's phenomenological approach to the development of Islamic da'wah.. This research is a literature research on Husserl's phenomenological concept and how to apply it in da'wah. Data were collected from various documents related to the main topic, both from print and electronic sources. Miles & Huberman's qualitative interactive analysis was used to analyze the data through the stages of data presentation, data reduction, and conclusion drawing. The results showed that basically phenomenological studies attempt to find the meaning or value of a phenomenon with two main things in focus, namely textural description and structural description. Textural description is about what is experienced, while structural description is related to how the context influences the subject in experiencing and interpreting the phenomenon. Husserl's phenomenological approach is one of the right approaches in examining social and religious phenomena and then conveying the content of da'wah in accordance with existing phenomena in the perspective of Islamic teachings so as to provide a holistic understanding of the phenomenon.

The Application of Husserlian Phenomenology to the Examination of the Translatability of Criminal Law Practices Across American and Italian Culture in the Prosecution and Acquittal of Amanda Knox

AbstractThis Article uses various concepts of Husserlian phenomenology to explain the disparate opinion between the North American and Italian public in response to the prosecution and ultimate acquittal of Amanda Knox. This Article argues that the comparative difference in public opinion is due to an extensive shift in culture that is necessarily accompanied by a shift in spatial-temporal location. In this Article, the Husserlian concepts of intentionality, the Self, the Other-I, and empathy overlay the judicial opinions and media releases critical to shaping North American and Italian public perceptions of Amanda Knox. As applied, these Husserlian concepts function as interpretive lenses, providing the reader with a novel framework for analyzing the cause of interpretive difference across cultures.

The origins of sedimentation inHusserl's phenomenology

AbstractHusserl is the philosopher who transformed the geological metaphor of sedimentation into a philosophical concept. While tracing the development of Husserl's reflections on sedimentation, I argue that the distinctive feature of Husserl's approach lies in his preoccupation with the question concerning the origins of sedimentations. The paper demonstrates that in different frameworks of analysis, Husserl understood these origins in significantly different ways. In the works concerned with the phenomenology of time consciousness, Husserl searched for the origins of sedimentation in the field of subjective experience, and more precisely, in impressional consciousness. By contrast, in the later works concerned with history, he maintained that the origins of sedimentations lie in the field of historical past that stretches beyond the reach of individual experience. Building on the basis of these resources, I argue that the Husserlian concept of sedimentation has three distinct components of senses: static, genetic, and generative. In the static sense, sedimentations are modifications of retentions and necessary conditions of recollection. In the genetic sense, sedimentations are necessary for the formation of types, habits and moods, and as such, they shape present experiences. In the generative sense, sedimentations refer to what consciousness inherits from the historical tradition.

Enactivism and Heidegger: a Complicated Theoretical Union

This article shows what difficulties are connected with the enactivist interpretation of Heidegger and what options can be found to overcome them. First of all, the epistemological attitude of enactivism is outlined. This attitued forced the enactivist theoreticians (i.e. Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson) to turn to the “cognitive” understanding of Heidegger. The rejection of cognitivism and connectionism as equally “disembodied” ways of understanding consciousness in favor of an “embodied” approach led enactivist theorists to turn to the phenomenological tradition and, in particular, to the cognitive interpretations of Heidegger. Secondly, the reasons for disappointment in the Heideggerian heritage, expressed by the theorists of enactivism, are considered. It is shown that the main reason for this disappointment was the basic incompatibility of the enactivist approach to consciousness, based on the Husserlian concept of intentionality, with Heidegger's approach. Natalie Depraz' non-intentional approach based on her interpretation of the concept of Gelassenheit is named as an example of overcoming the contradictions that arise in enactivism.

Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Sedimentations

Abstract The paper explores the meaning of the phenomenological concept of sedimentation in the framework of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. The analysis I offer suggests that Merleau-Ponty initiates a transition from the constitutional problematic of sedimentations that we come across in Husserl’s phenomenology to the analysis of existential sedimentations. Merleau-Ponty accomplishes this transformation by binding the Husserlian conception of sedimentations with the Heideggerian conception of facticity. The distinction Merleau-Ponty draws between originary sedimentations and secondary sedimentations is especially important, for it allows one to claim that Merleau-Ponty recognizes all experiences as sedimented. Against the background of this realization, I offer a reevaluation of Merleau-Ponty’s cryptic remarks in the Phenomenology of Perception regarding the “original past,” also described as “a past that has never been a present.” I argue that these are metaphors for originary sedimentations. In place of a conclusion, I suggest that especially when the concept of sedimentation is universalized, we come to recognize its inherently paradoxical nature. In the final analysis, besides being a genetic concept, sedimentation is also a limit problem and a limit phenomenon.

Tradisi Muludan serta Implikasinya terhadap Kehidupan Sosial dan Keagamaan Perspektif Fenomenologi Edmund Husserl

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe the implementation of the muludan sholawatan tradition for 12 nights in the villages of Kaliwuluh, Kebakkramat, Karanganyar and its implications for the development of social and religious life from Edmund Husserl's point of view for the people of Kaliwuluh village. Methodology/approach: This research includes qualitative field research. then using observation and interview methods in obtaining data. Next, to analyze the data using data reduction techniques. the findings of this study indicate that the muludan tradition in Kliwuluh village is carried out by increasing remembrance and prayer for 12 consecutive nights. Judging from Edmund Husserl's phenomenological concept, the 12-night muludan tradition has implications for the social and religious development of the Kaliwuluh village community. Results/findings: Social development has implications for the value of sulaturrahmi and mutual cooperation (phenomenology and phenomenological reduction), the value of togetherness (awareness and Labenswelt), and the value of caring (eiditic and transcendental reduction). Then towards religious development it has implications for the value of mahabbah or love for God, the Prophet and the scholars (intentionality), the value of alms (apoche and eiditic reduction) and the value of tholabul 'ilmi or seeking religious knowledge (labenswelt).

Fare Terra. Istituzione ed espressione in Maurice Merleau-Ponty


 
 
 In this article, we aim to focus on the notion of Earth in Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the concept of nature and his reinterpretation of the Husserlian Umsturz. In doing so, we will use the expression “Earth-making” to describe a particular instituting dynamic, where by the term “institution” we wish to refer to the Husserlian concept of Stiftung and its original reworking by Merleau-Ponty during his 1954-55 course at the Collège de France: L’institution - La Passivité.
 We will therefore identify the concept of institution as a privileged way to describe our relationship with the Earth, understood as Boden [soil], envisaging in the instituting dynamic as something close to art. Finally, we will try to illustrate what Merleau-Ponty means by transcendental geology, namely the capacity to grasp the original relationship between space and time and a new way of conceptualizing the Earth as a
 
 

LA LIMITE SANS LIMITES QUELQUES RREMARQUES SUE LE PRINCIPE PHENOMENOLOGIQUE DE LA GEGEBENHEIT A L’EPREUVE DU NEOKANTISME

Abstract What, if any, are the limits of the Husserlian concept of Gegebenheit? Is there a limit beyond which nothing can be seen by the phenomenologist? In asking these questions, we allude to a distinction typical of Kantian criticism: “Grenze” or “Schranke”, limit or boundary? These same questions are reformulated in a famous review of Ideen I by Paul Natorp, a Marburg neo-Kantian who directly attacks the unlimited scope Husserl gives to the phenomenological principle of intuition. From a phenomenological point of view, however, the Achilles’ heel of the critical method lies in the impossibility of accessing by intuition, beyond phenomena, the thing-in-itself. A major consequence is that the phenomenological dissolution of the “Grenze” prescribes a limitless opening to the horizon of phenomena. But if we can speak of a limitless openness, it is because in a certain way everything gives itself to be seen. What kind of vision is this? And what kind of Gegebenheit is at work here? The Husserlian answer lies in the recovery of a concept, the “idea in the Kantian sense”, without its counterpart, the “limit”, whereas for Kant as well as for Natorp it is precisely the concept of “limit” that characterizes the gnoseological status of the “idea”.

DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY IN THE DISCOURSE OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

The main problematic background of the article is the nature, prospects and obligations associated with the borrowing of philosophical concepts and ideas by psychology. Reasons are expressed for introductory interventions in psychology from the side of philosophy. An exemplification of such an intervention is presented in the form of an analysis of psychological approaches to the interpretation of E. Husserl's concept of intentionality. R. May's interpretation of intentionality is considered in more detail. It is suggested that his version of the concept of intentionality uses the implicit connotations of the phenomenological interpretation of intentionality with Freud's theory of drive.

THE PROBLEM OF THE CATEGORIAL IN THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION: HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

The article aims to show that the task of grounding categorial constituents in the specific founded acts of perception yields the problem field of phenomenological inquiry, within the framework of which remains Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology. To achieve this goal the article reconstructs, first, the problem of the possibility of a priori correspondence between meaning and intuition of the intentional act; second, the phenomenological justification of extension of the traditional concept of truth, as a result of which truth characteristic expands to intentional acts structured in a certain way, namely acts of total agreement between meaning and intuition (identification acts); third, the problem of the “categorial” in the phenomenological analysis of perception, which includes the extension of the concept of perception, limited in transcendental philosophy to the area of sensible intuitions, and justification of the specific categorial acts. On this basis, the article demonstrates that (1) phenomenology in a certain sense continues the project of transcendental philosophy, but the idea of a priori correspondence between notion and intuition within the framework of structural analysis of intentionality forms a new research problem. (2) The phenomenological understanding of truth in terms of the dynamics of empty and filled meaning intention is significant for the concept of truth presented by Heidegger in Being and Time. Heidegger explicates the concept of the truth in fundamental ontology based on the idea of identification. (3) The extension of the concept of object to its categorial constitution justified by Husserl provides fundamental ontology with the research subject. Heidegger interprets the categories, phenomenally represented in acts of categorial intuition, as a priori structures of the being of beings. The study also ascertains that new concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology saturate the conceptual framework of fundamental ontology. However, Heidegger also rethinks the key concepts of phenomenology in accordance with objectives which are different from the original objectives of the project of phenomenology designed by Husserl.

УЛОГА ФЕНОМЕНОЛОШКОГ СТАВА У ПРОБЛЕМУ ДРУШТВЕНЕ СТВАРНОСТИ АЛФРЕДА ШИЦА

In this paper, the thought of the Austrian-born theorist Alfred Schutz, presented in the articles published in the first volume of his collected papers, is examined from the perspective of the role that Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological attitude plays in it. Advocating the importance of analyzing the structure of the world of everyday life in his phenomenology of the natural attitude, Schutz uses various aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology, without paying special attention to the phenomenological attitude itself. Therefore, the paper discusses the extent to which Schitz’s understanding of the natural attitude and its world depends on this concept of Husserl’s philosophy, with special reference to Shutz’s theory in his article “On Multiple Realities”. After showing that Husserl’s phenomenological attitude cannot be compared to the “attitude of scientific theory” discussed in the article on multiple realities, the paper additionally analyzes the absence of the phenomenological attitude in Schutz’s thought while turning to Maurice Natanson’s critique of Schutz’s theory.

On the «unconscious» nature of Because motives. Some considerations on the Unconscious in Alfred Schutz

This paper is divided into two parts. The first traces the conceptual development of because motives, while simultaneously endeavouring to grasp the notion of the unconscious revealed in Schutz's analysis. The author refers to Leibniz's theory of petites perceptions and Freud's theory of the unconscious; theories whose respective characteristics are somehow compared, integrated and thus juxtaposed with the characteristics of because motives. The second part of the paper raises the question why Schutz, in his analysis of motives and unconscious behaviour, does not refer to Husserl's conception of the unconscious

Kulturkritik e fenomenologia nell’epoca della crisi ecologica

The emergence of ecology as a fundamental horizon not only of politics, but also of contemporary philosophy, pushes us to rethink the relationship that currents of thought such as Kuturkritik and phenomenology, especially the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, can maintain with it. After a preliminary consideration of post-structuralist and postmodern positions from this perspective, the essay focuses on the French philosopher, and in particular on his courses on Nature and on his elaboration of the Husserlian concept of Stiftung. This results in Merleau-Ponty’s original position on the Kultur – Civilization alternative: critique of unlimited productivism, respect for the environment, and, at the same time, defense of the variety of cultures and traditions from a homogenizing globalization are valuable tools that his philosophy offers to the debates of our time.

Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this?

The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to introduce this term in the classification of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriateness of building the model of “Kantianism - Neo-Kantianism - Neo-Neo-Kantianism - Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's “Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early (classical) and late (“correct”). Neo-Kantianism shows the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or Hans-Michael Baumgartner.

Husserl on the overlap of pure and empirical concepts

AbstractThis essay clarifies Edmund Husserl's view of “pure” concepts, with a view to its contemporary metaphilosophical significance. It is argued that Husserl's conception of pure concepts is unique in that he allows overlap between pure and empirical concepts. This overlap leads to a potential for confusion between pure and empirical concepts which I label “amphiboly,” following Kant's use of the term. The essay begins by clarifying Husserl's view of the divergence in concept formation between empirical and pure concepts, and then articulates the specific properties of pure concepts that allow an empirical overlap. These properties include the modality and range of the extension of the concepts, the ordering of objects under the concept, and the mental faculty required to identify an object under the concept. Once we see the source of amphiboly in Husserl's view, it can be observed that many concepts of interest to philosophy, even outside phenomenology proper, are potentially subject to amphibolous uses. Thus, Husserl's view can be a general hermeneutical resource for clarifying the nature of philosophical concepts.

Husserlian empathy and embodied simulation

In this article, I show that Husserl’s account of empathy supports embodied simulation theory. Both Husserl and embodied simulation accounts of intersubjectivity face the difficulty of accounting for the relations of similarity and difference between self and other, but there is ample neurological data available to the simulationist to establish the relations of similarity and difference, and Husserlian concepts provide a useful interpretive framework for this data. I then respond to the criticism that the theory of embodied simulation involves imitation and is therefore indirect and nonperceptual. Yet, some extra process must distinguish perceptual intersubjectivity from nonsocial perception, and the most direct additional process possible is the interbodily resonances of the kinaesthetic system endorsed by both simulationists and Husserl. Husserl gives an account of kinaesthetic sensations amounting to a phenomenological description of embodied simulation. This article exemplifies phenomenological correlationism whereby cognitive science and phenomenology serve to enlighten one another.

Génesis del nóema: un análisis noemático a partir de la constitución del cuerpo adolorido

The objective of this work is to carry out a genetic study on the Husserlian concept of noema based in the givenness of the real body in the passive experience of pain. The development focuses, either, on the delimitation of the painful body given in its physical sphere in attention to its material properties, and in the eventual integration of this passively given body in the so-called noetic-noematic structure regarding the intentional revelation that pain implies. To do this, pain will first be briefly examined in light of "original" passivity. Secondly, the way in which the body is given in its real disposition and its understanding as a bodily ego in experiencing pain will be contemplated. Thirdly, considering the “original” constitution of the body in pain in a broad sense, emphasis will be placed on its correspondence with intentionality, a matter that only confirms that pain is a form of perception. Finally, the deployment of the genetically viewed noema is given on the basis of the determination of the real body as a noematic object.