Abstract
The main problematic background of the article is the nature, prospects and obligations associated with the borrowing of philosophical concepts and ideas by psychology. Reasons are expressed for introductory interventions in psychology from the side of philosophy. An exemplification of such an intervention is presented in the form of an analysis of psychological approaches to the interpretation of E. Husserl's concept of intentionality. R. May's interpretation of intentionality is considered in more detail. It is suggested that his version of the concept of intentionality uses the implicit connotations of the phenomenological interpretation of intentionality with Freud's theory of drive.
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