Human Factors Problems Research Articles

Cognitive Task Analysis: What is it? Why Do It?

Cognitive task analysis (CTA) is increasingly being used to effectively address a wide variety of human factors problems. However, different researchers are using significantly different methods. In many cases, a particular method is used solely by its originators. Therefore, there are significant issues that must be worked through before CTA becomes a widely accepted and easily transferable human factors tool. The objectives of this symposium are to: bring CTA to the attention of a wider audience; develop a better understanding of the differences and similarities between different CTA methods; and demonstrate the practical advantages of CTA.

Understanding adverse events: human factors.

(1) Human rather than technical failures now represent the greatest threat to complex and potentially hazardous systems. This includes healthcare systems. (2) Managing the human risks will never be 100% effective. Human fallibility can be moderated, but it cannot be eliminated. (3) Different error types have different underlying mechanisms, occur in different parts of the organisation, and require different methods of risk management. The basic distinctions are between: Slips, lapses, trips, and fumbles (execution failures) and mistakes (planning or problem solving failures). Mistakes are divided into rule based mistakes and knowledge based mistakes. Errors (information-handling problems) and violations (motivational problems) Active versus latent failures. Active failures are committed by those in direct contact with the patient, latent failures arise in organisational and managerial spheres and their adverse effects may take a long time to become evident. (4) Safety significant errors occur at all levels of the system, not just at the sharp end. Decisions made in the upper echelons of the organisation create the conditions in the workplace that subsequently promote individual errors and violations. Latent failures are present long before an accident and are hence prime candidates for principled risk management. (5) Measures that involve sanctions and exhortations (that is, moralistic measures directed to those at the sharp end) have only very limited effectiveness, especially so in the case of highly trained professionals. (6) Human factors problems are a product of a chain of causes in which the individual psychological factors (that is, momentary inattention, forgetting, etc) are the last and least manageable links. Attentional "capture" (preoccupation or distraction) is a necessary condition for the commission of slips and lapses. Yet, its occurrence is almost impossible to predict or control effectively. The same is true of the factors associated with forgetting. States of mind contributing to error are thus extremely difficult to manage; they can happen to the best of people at any time. (7) People do not act in isolation. Their behaviour is shaped by circumstances. The same is true for errors and violations. The likelihood of an unsafe act being committed is heavily influenced by the nature of the task and by the local workplace conditions. These, in turn, are the product of "upstream" organisational factors. Great gains in safety can ve achieved through relatively small modifications of equipment and workplaces. (8) Automation and increasing advanced equipment do not cure human factors problems, they merely relocate them. In contrast, training people to work effectively in teams costs little, but has achieved significant enhancements of human performance in aviation. (9) Effective risk management depends critically on a confidential and preferable anonymous incident monitoring system that records the individual, task, situational, and organisational factors associated with incidents and near misses. (10) Effective risk management means the simultaneous and targeted deployment of limited remedial resources at different levels of the system: the individual or team, the task, the situation, and the organisation as a whole.

The Appearance of Poor Quality Works for Human Factors Problems

The Appearance of Poor Quality Works for Human Factors Problems

Methods for Correlating Visual Scene Elements with Simulator Sickness Incidence

Simulator sickness occurs in a large number of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps simulators, and is most prevalent in moving-base, rotary-wing devices which employ cathode ray tube (CRT) video displays as opposed to fixed-wing, dome-display trainers with no motion base. Based on data from a factor analysis of over 1000 Navy and Marine Corps pilot simulation exposures, a new scoring procedure was applied to two helicopter simulators with similar rates of simulator sickness incidence. Based on the factor analytic scoring key, the two simulators showed slightly different sickness profiles. Preliminary work was begun to record the visual scene by video frame-by-frame decomposition and automated scoring algorithms were developed. The findings are discussed from the standpoints of (1) recommendations for future design and use of simulators, and (2) the metric advantages and other merits of the “field experiment” methodology to address human factors problems with simulator sickness.

Operational and human factor problems in the design of a crewmember negative [formula omitted] restraint : Zenobi, TProc 29th Ann Symp SAFE Assoc, Las Vegas, Nevada, 11–13 November, 1991. SAFE Association, Yoncalla, Oregon, USA (1991) pp 144–148 (0 refs)

Operational and human factor problems in the design of a crewmember negative [formula omitted] restraint : Zenobi, TProc 29th Ann Symp SAFE Assoc, Las Vegas, Nevada, 11–13 November, 1991. SAFE Association, Yoncalla, Oregon, USA (1991) pp 144–148 (0 refs)

Human Factors Problems in Interactive Voice Response (IVR) Applications: Do we Need a Guideline/Standard?

The purpose of this paper is to present a case for the development of a user interface design guideline or standard for interactive voice response applications, to be widely disseminated throughout business and industry. A number of sample problems are cited, based on the author's consulting experience in this area, which serve to demonstrate that many of the problems encountered in IVR application development, particularly in scripting/dialogue design and use of automated speech recognition as a front-end, are not only solvable, but easily avoidable, given the current human factors knowledge base. The paper also discusses the Specification Document developed by the Voice Messaging User Interface Forum (1990, April), and the reasons why it cannot be applied, as written, to the user interface design of more complex IVR applications. Finally, the author proposes an approach to developing the proposed guideline/standard.

Human Factors Challenges in Aviation Maintenance

The FAA Office of Aviation Medicine has been conducting a research program for the past two years dealing with human factors issues in aircraft maintenance and inspection. As part of this program a series of workshops have been held with participation of a broad spectrum of air carrier industry representatives. These representatives, ranging from hanger floor technicians to vice - presidents, have identified a series of issues or challenges which present their most formidable human factors problems. The FAA research program has been designed to address these challenges. This paper describes five of these challenges and offers guidance on methods for dealing with them.

Human factors research needs for an aging population : Czaja, S.J. (Ed) National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1990, 85pp, 156 refs

This book describes the demographic, sociological, and ecological background of the aging society, identifies human factors problems associated with aging, summarizes currently relevant information, and recommends directions for research. It suggests a program of research and technology development for the purpose of ameliorating the effects of functional changes that accompany the aging process and provides a basis for additional research and application of human factors engineering data to the design of environments in which aging people must function.

Time and mass perception in non-terrestrial environments

This paper summarizes the results of five separate experiments conducted in space (microgravity) and on a human centrifuge (macrogravity). The experiments involved both time and mass perception of humans in these non-terrestrial environments. In the time perception experiments, subjects were asked to judge the arrival time of an object moving across a video screen; the task difficulty included obscuring a portion of the display and changing object speeds. In the mass perception experiments, subjects were given a set of objects of identical size but differing mass and asked to compare the weight of one object at a time against a standard. It was found that both time and mass perception are impaired in non-terrestrial environments. Time perception is significantly impaired in microgravity as well as macrogravity (3 and 5 Gz). Microgravity was found to be more detrimental to mass discrimination than macrogravity at least up to 4 Gz. The time and mass perception behaviors observed in this research may be implicated in human factors problems observed in both space and aircraft operations.

Nuclear Power Plant Alarm Systems: Problems and Issues

Despite the incorporation of advanced technology into nuclear power plant alarm systems, human factors problems remain. This paper identifies issues to be addressed in order to allow advanced technology to be used effectively in the design of nuclear power plant alarm systems. The operator's use and processing of alarm system information will be considered. Based upon a review of alarm system research, issues related to general system design, alarm processing, display and control are discussed. It is concluded that the design of effective alarm systems depends on an understanding of the information processing capabilities and limitations of the operator.

Human factors in large-scale technological systems' accidents: Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Chernobyl

Many serious large-scale technological systems' accidents, having grave conse quences, such as those of Three Mile Island, Bhopal and Chernobyl, have pri marily been attributed to "operator error." However, further investigation has revealed that a large majority of these incidents are caused by a combination of many factors whose roots can be found in the lack of human factors (micro- and macro-ergonomics) considerations. Relevant human factor considera tions, the causes of human error, and commonalities of human factor problems in major disasters are briefly reviewed. We concluded that system accidents are caused by the way the (system) parts — engineered and human — fit together and interact. Also, on many occasions, the error and the resultant failures are both the attribute and effect of such factors as complicated operational pro cesses, ineffective training, non-responsive managerial systems, non-adaptive organizational designs, haphazard response systems, and sudden environmen tal disturbances, rather than being their cause. Recommendations for preven tion of such accidents are provided.

Human Performance and Systems Safety Considerations in Aviation Mishaps

This article provides an overview of (a) accident generation, (b) the ensuing investigation process, and (c) the types of prevention measures that will be employed to ultimately decrease the probability of similar mishaps. The stages of the accident generation process include ubiquitous hazards which lead to occasional incidents that in turn result in less frequent accidents. Steps in the investigation process included fact finding, information analysis, and authority review. The use of comparison data sources and mishap data bases are important collateral-investigation activities. The basic classes of accident-prevention measures included environmental-hazard exposure limitations, equipment safety features and/or warning device, and establishing procedural safeguards. Human factors problems are associated with 50% to 90% of all accidents, whereas system safety principles provide the logical framework for deciding which type of countermeasures to apply in ameliorating such problems. This article describes...

Requirements for An Aircraft Mishap Analysis System

As a result of long-standing, systematic mishap investigation and analysis practices, the U.S. Air Force has been able to achieve and maintain a consistently low level of aircraft mishaps. However, up to 90 percent of these mishaps are associated with human factors problems. In recognition of the need for better tools to identify the complex nature of human contributions to mishaps, the Air Force has established an Aircraft Mishap Prevention program to develop the capability to apply information gathering processes, sophisticated analysis techniques, and hypothesis generation support tools to help recognize and correct deficiencies in equipment design, training, and operational practices which contribute to mishaps. This presentation provides information on the scope, content, and approach to providing the expected full capability by 1993. One challenge in the design of the program features was the need to accommodate a range of analysts skilled in mishap investigation practices but naive with respect to human factors considerations in analysis. This will be met by incorporation of supporting skilled staff and special purpose software which will aid these analysts to identify and evaluate human factors considerations in individual mishaps and across all mishaps. This presentation reviews human factors considerations in the software support features which will assist the analysts perform analyses and develop and evaluate countermeasures. Considerations and cautions in developing selected human-computer interaction is reviewed, with attention given to features to be incorporated to lead the analyst and to provide him with questions and considerations which must be resolved before a workable hypothesis can be developed or evaluated.

Field of View Effects on a Simulated Flight Task with Head-Down and Head-Up Sensor Imagery Displays

When pilots fly an aircraft with sensor imagery rather than direct vision, their instantaneous field of view (FOV) is restricted severely. This limitation has been identified as a major human factors problem in aviation and has fostered efforts to develop displays with much wider FOVs than are currently available. Two experiments are reported investigating FOV effects in simulated flights with sensor imagery appearing on a Head-Down Display (HDD) and a Head-Up Display (HUD). The outside world was viewed via a simulated sensor image with a 25, 40, or 55 deg FOV, while the surrounding world was dark and provided no additional information. The subjects' task was to fly a slalom course without hitting the pylons or missing the intervals between pylons. The results indicate significant effects of FOV on both hits and misses for both the HDD and the HUD. In addition, performance was significantly affected by the speed of flying and the level of training. With the narrow FOV, subjects flew closer to the pylons than with the wide FOV and hit the pylons more often. These results are interpreted as an indication that subjects perceived the sensor display as the entire world rather than as a window into the world. This effect was somewhat smaller with the HUD than with the HDD, possibly because the HUD better represented a window into the world. The differences between the HUD and the HDD, however, did not reach statistical significance.

Ergonomic factors and student learning

AbstractThe author reports a survey of computer users in a department of business studies in a college of further education. The survey addressed the human factors problems attendant on computer usage and revealed that 80% of students had experienced problems. Follow‐up discussions with students and teachers highlighted a general lack of understanding of the pertinent human factors issues and of realistic preventive measures. These findings are a source of concern since human factors aspects are central to such business courses. Moreover, such findings may have more widespread significance: there may be implications for all teachers involved with computers and for the content of computer‐based education curricula. The results show that ergonomic problems are more common than might be imagined, that ergonomic principles are not understood by teachers or students, and the subject is seldom properly emphasised in the syllabus.

The FDA's new procedures for the use of investigational drugs in treatment

Serious errors can occur with many medical devices (eg, infusion pumps, ventilators, anesthesia machines), and even highly trained professionals can make critical errors. The FDA now requires that manufacturers consider the user when designing medical equipment and has issued a guidance document describing human factor (HF) problems and the HF design process.4 The Association for Advancement of Medical Instrumentation has also published guidelines,5 and the American Medical Association's National Patient Safety Foundation has selected reduction of medical errors as their mission.6 It is important that the medical community reinforce the patient-safety initiative by evaluating user-interface design and instructional manuals when purchasing such equipment. The payoff will be fewer incidents and less time required in device training.The FDA actively solicits help in identifying and reporting adverse events associated with medical devices. Health care practitioners employed by facilities subject to the FDA's user-facility reporting requirements should follow the user-reporting procedures established by their facility. Practitioners and users may want to directly report an incident to the MedWatch Program, the FDA's voluntary Medical Products Reporting Program. Reports can be submitted by telephone (800-FDA-1088); by fax (800-FDA-0178); by mail to MedWatch, Food and Drug Administration, HF-2, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20857; or by Internet (http://www.fda.gov). Menu-driven instructions on the Internet can guide potential reports to the MedWatch report forms (No. 3500 for voluntary reports, No. 35000A for mandatory reports). There are also instructions for completing the forms, and a separate coding manual that is used to convert patient and device problems into specific codes on the report form.

Human interface with logging operation optimization programs

This paper presents a case study involving the comparison of two programs which were designed for use in the logging industry. Of particular interest in this comparison are the human factors problems likely to arise during field use of such programs. This paper discusses the need for application of consistent sets of human factors design principles. A specific major conclusion related to the field use of these programs is that it is advisable to provide effective redundancy techniques against catastrophic loss of data in an environment where the user has multiple taks to perform. This paper also discusses the consequences of "good" as well as "poor" examples of menu design, display design, data entry error checking, and handling of erroneous keystroke and keystroke sequences.

A Systematic Method for the Selection of Independent Variables in the Investigation of Complex Systems

This paper describes a systematic methodology for selecting independent variables to be considered in large-scale research problems. Five specific procedures including brainstorming, prototype interface representation, feasibility/relevance analyses, structured literature reviews, and user subjective ratings are evaluated and incorporated into an integrated strategy. This methodology is demonstrated in the context of designing the user interface for a telephone-based information inquiry system. The procedure was successful in reducing an initial set of 95 independent variables to a subset of 19 factors that warrant subsequent detailed analysis. These results are discussed in terms of a comprehensive sequential research methodology useful for investigating human factors problems.

Human factors problems of an airline reservation system: Brown, M.R., and Innes, L.G In: Proc 19th ann meeting Human Factors Assoc of Canada, Richmond (Vancouver), British Columbia, 22–23 Aug 1986. The Association, Rexdale, Ontario, 1986, pp65–66

Human factors problems of an airline reservation system: Brown, M.R., and Innes, L.G In: Proc 19th ann meeting Human Factors Assoc of Canada, Richmond (Vancouver), British Columbia, 22–23 Aug 1986. The Association, Rexdale, Ontario, 1986, pp65–66

Translatability: Understandability and usability by others

The United States version of the English language, sometimes referred to as “Americanese” is a lively, still developing language. It is frequently interspersed with slang, acronyms, and abbreviations. In daily use, people often employ catch phrases from advertising, television, and “one-liners” voiced by entertainers and other public figures. While this may make for a colorful version of English (deplored by some), it causes untold problems for translators whenever the “colorful” or inconsistent variations creep into documents that must be translated for use in a world market. That language problem is a problem in usability, a human factors problem; not always recognized as such by the computer industry. Akin to the sometimes thoughtless use of idiomatic English, is the bland assumption that what is designed and developed for the U.S. market is satisfactory for other countries. This assumption ignores significant differences in form, format, economic and financial factors, as well as acculturation differences. These are some of the elements that contribute to difficulties experienced by U.S. companies in getting computer programs and other products accepted outside the United States. This article discusses these matters, and four basic steps for alleviating some of the problems.