During the Maoist period, urban development was limited. The regime fostered anti-urban sentiment and cities were designed for production. With the reforms, things changed. Surplus labour in the countryside migrated to the cities to work in the new areas of economic activity: in twenty-five years, the urban population tripled, exceeding the half billion mark by 2003. Over the period, there were marked changes in living conditions for urban households. Their purchasing power was reduced, apart- ments became more spacious and comfortable and the con- sumption of energy rose sharply.Urban development can cause a city to emit more or less green- house gases according to the energy intensity of two specific consumption areas: thermal comfort and transport. The energy efficiency of these two urban systems, which represent a signif- icant proportion of total energy consumption, is a key element in achieving the Sustainable City in China-as it is, moreover, in other countries where rapid urbanisation is in process. So the initial phase, the building of the city, is crucial. In effect, it fixes the city in a particular model of energy dependence.Over twenty years, China has managed big reductions in the energy intensity of its industry. But how energy efficient is China's urbanisation? Are its housing conditions and trans- port energy efficient, or do they threaten adverse effects on the climate for decades to come?In this article, we shall look first at the extent of urban de- velopment before going on to estimate the consumption of fossil energy in building the cities. Then we shall examine the energy dependence that develops at the same time as the cities are erected, focusing on consumption related to housing conditions and transport.Demographic explosion in the citiesThe urbanisation of populations is statistically difficult to es- timate, in China even more than elsewhere. The designation criteria for the urban population have been modified several times over since the start of the reforms, and one has to ac- cept some margin of error. Here we take as our source the United Nations data, which have been adjusted to present- day criteria((1).According to these statistics, the rate of urbanisation has of- ficially increased from 17.9% in 1978 to 36% in 2000 and 40.5% in 2005. Thus, the urban population has tripled in twenty-five years, between 1978 and 2003, reaching a total of 520 million city dwellers. According to the UN, by 2030 the number will have risen to 870 million (see figure 1). So between 10 and 16 million newcomers are expected in the cities every year.While these figures do allow us to estimate the urban demo- graphic explosion, they do not give us a precise picture. There are elements within the urbanisation process that can- not be effectively estimated. First of all, there is the float- ing population, those people from the countryside who have arrived in the cities without residential permits: they are estimated at 20% of the urban population((2).Then, one cannot ignore latent urbanisation, the industrialisation of rural counties in the east of the country that have not yet ac- quired the status of towns((3).Indeed, town status requires official approval. Towns, once designated as such, are entitled to financial grants from government, funding for investment, and for the improve- ment and maintenance of the infrastructure. The designa- tion of new towns or the downgrading of old ones is thus a means whereby the state can accelerate or slow down urban development. In the mid 1980s, the central govern- ment relaxed its control over designating towns. Numerous rural counties or prefectures were then upgraded into towns((4).These changes of administrative status were facili- tated by the new development strategy favouring the cities (SEZs and open coastal cities) and industrialisation in rural areas((5).Faced with the rapidly increasing numbers of towns and cities, Beijing resumed control from 1997 onwards of the re-designation of rural counties. …
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Sep 30, 2022
Vishal Sharma 
Open Access
