ABSTRACT The present study delves into the complex interplay of decentralization, patronage, and rent seeking within the context of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA, Act) in Uttar Pradesh (UP). It addresses some pertinent questions: How does decentralization promote corruption? What tactics and strategies does the local implementer (pradhan) adopt to manipulate this Act? Have these manipulations benefited the pradhan? How have these strategies affected poor households? Drawing on data collected through household surveys, and semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats, sitting pradhans, and local power holders, I investigate whether decentralization has enabled marginalized communities to access employment opportunities or has facilitated patronage and rent seeking practices. The findings suggest that political actors and power brokers exploit decentralized structures for personal gains, manipulating resource allocation and beneficiary selection. Such practices of rent seeking can dilute the demand-driven principles of the Act and defeat the objective of equitable development.