In science studies, history and philosophy of science, and history of science, scientific controversies are supposed to reveal how science works. Controversy, in this sense, is not primarily a research object but a conceptual tool developed to model current or past events in the sciences with the aim of capturing the very nature of science. Treating controversy as a conceptual tool, I discuss which aspects of scientific disagreements are highlighted by this tool, which aspects are relegated into the background, and what remains unconsidered or ignored. I present my observations through the example of the discussion of color vision in fish and bees between physiologist Carl von Heß and zoologist Karl von Frisch in the 1910s and early 1920s. I discuss four points, each of which plays a particular role in controversy research: (1) the interest in the end and not the beginning of controversies, (2) the typical presentation of a controversy as a clearly defined confrontation of positions, (3) the assumption that controversies follow rules, and (4) the idea that controversies must begin almost automatically when certain conditions are met. As Helga Nowotny emphasized, in case of disagreement, non-controversy seems just as plausible as open contradiction.
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