High-value Reward Research Articles

Change in delay discounting and substance reward value following a brief alcohol and drug use intervention.

The present study examined (1) the impact of a brief substance use intervention on delay discounting and indices of substance reward value (RV), and (2) whether baseline values and posttreatment change in these behavioral economic variables predict substance use outcomes. Participants were 97 heavy drinking college students (58.8% female, 41.2% male) who completed a brief motivational intervention (BMI) and then were randomized to one of two conditions: a supplemental behavioral economic intervention that attempted to increase engagement in substance-free activities associated with delayed rewards (SFAS) or an Education control (EDU). Demand intensity, and Omax, decreased and elasticity significantly increased after treatment, but there was no effect for condition. Both baseline values and change in RV, but not discounting, predicted substance use outcomes at 6-month follow-up. Students with high RV who used marijuana were more likely to reduce their use after the SFAS intervention. These results suggest that brief interventions may reduce substance reward value, and that changes in reward value are associated with subsequent drinking and drug use reductions. High RV marijuana users may benefit from intervention elements that enhance future time orientation and substance-free activity participation.

Acute stress enhances sensitivity to a highly attractive food reward without affecting judgement bias in laying hens

Affective states can be evaluated by assessing shifts in the animal's expectation of a positive and negative outcome in response to ambiguous cues, also known as judgement bias (JB). The aim of this study was to use a JB methodology, using a go/go type of task where animals are required to make an active choice, to assess the effects of acute stress on affective states in hens. Thirty ISA-Brown hens were trained in a two-choice (left–right) test in an arena to associate a high-value (H) reward (four mealworms) with a 100% black and a low-value (L) reward (one mealworm) with 5% black (visually white) cues. Twenty hens that learnt the tasks were randomly allocated to either a control (C) or stress (S; 5min social isolation in a novel environment) group. During testing, hens were presented with H and L (rewarded) and three novel ambiguous (un-rewarded) cues: 75%, 50% and 25% black. Order of cue presentation was balanced between treatments to either having ambiguous cues always preceded by L cues (L-Ambiguous) or by H cues (H-Ambiguous). Latency to approach a reward and active choice made (i.e. reaching side associated with either H or L reward) were recorded. Data are log-transformed least square mean (LSmean) latencies(s)±SEM with back-transformed LSmean in parentheses. Latency data showed that S-hens were faster to approach a reward cue than C-hens (S 0.8 (2.3)±0.04 vs C 0.9 (2.6)±0.04 (s), P<0.05). Hens were faster to approach H and 75% than 25% and L cues (H=0.7 (2.0)±0.04 and 75%=0.7 (2.0)±0.07 (s) vs 25%=1.1 (2.9)±0.07 and L=1.1 (3.1)±0.04 (s), P<0.05) with intermediate responses to 50% cues (50%=0.8 (2.3)±0.07 (s)). S-hens were faster to approach ambiguous cues preceded by an H reward compared to C-hens (S H-Ambiguous=0.7 (1.9)±0.06, S L-Ambiguous=1.0 (2.7)±0.06, C H-Ambiguous=0.9 (2.4)±0.06 and C L-Ambiguous=1.0 (2.7)±0.06 (s), P<0.05). Active choice was not affected by treatment. These results show that acute stress enhances sensitivity to a previously rewarding outcome without affecting judgement bias in laying hens. Hens are sensitive to events occurring immediately before the test and the order in which cues are presented and these issues should be considered in future studies.

Dopamine-associated cached values are not sufficient as the basis for action selection.

Phasic dopamine transmission is posited to act as a critical teaching signal that updates the stored (or "cached") values assigned to reward-predictive stimuli and actions. It is widely hypothesized that these cached values determine the selection among multiple courses of action, a premise that has provided a foundation for contemporary theories of decision making. In the current work we used fast-scan cyclic voltammetry to probe dopamine-associated cached values from cue-evoked dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens of rats performing cost-benefit decision-making paradigms to evaluate critically the relationship between dopamine-associated cached values and preferences. By manipulating the amount of effort required to obtain rewards of different sizes, we were able to bias rats toward preferring an option yielding a high-value reward in some sessions and toward instead preferring an option yielding a low-value reward in others. Therefore, this approach permitted the investigation of dopamine-associated cached values in a context in which reward magnitude and subjective preference were dissociated. We observed greater cue-evoked mesolimbic dopamine release to options yielding the high-value reward even when rats preferred the option yielding the low-value reward. This result identifies a clear mismatch between the ordinal utility of the available options and the rank ordering of their cached values, thereby providing robust evidence that dopamine-associated cached values cannot be the sole determinant of choices in simple economic decision making.

Influence of supraliminal reward information on unconsciously triggered response inhibition.

Although executive functions (e.g., response inhibition) are often thought to interact consciously with reward, recent studies have demonstrated that they can also be triggered by unconscious stimuli. Further research has suggested a close relationship between consciously and unconsciously triggered response inhibition. To date, however, the effect of reward on unconsciously triggered response inhibition has not been explored. To address this issue, participants in this study performed runs of a modified Go/No-Go task during which they were exposed to both high and low value monetary rewards presented both supraliminally and subliminally. Participants were informed that they would earn the reward displayed if they responded correctly to each trial of the run. According to the results, when rewards were presented supraliminally, a greater unconsciously triggered response inhibition was observed for high-value rewards than for low-value rewards. In contrast, when rewards were presented subliminally, no enhanced unconsciously triggered response inhibition was observed. Results revealed that supraliminal and subliminal rewards have distinct effects on unconsciously triggered response inhibition. These findings have important implications for extending our understanding of the relationship between reward and response inhibition.

Role of contingency in striatal response to incentive in adolescents with anxiety.

This study examines the effect of contingency on reward function in anxiety. We define contingency as the aspect of a situation in which the outcome is determined by one's action-that is, when there is a direct link between one's action and the outcome of the action. Past findings in adolescents with anxiety or at risk for anxiety have revealed hypersensitive behavioral and neural responses to higher value rewards with correct performance. This hypersensitivity to highly valued (salient) actions suggests that the value of actions is determined not only by outcome magnitude, but also by the degree to which the outcome is contingent on correct performance. Thus, contingency and incentive value might each modulate reward responses in unique ways in anxiety. Using fMRI with a monetary reward task, striatal response to cue anticipation is compared in 18 clinically anxious and 20 healthy adolescents. This task manipulates orthogonally reward contingency and incentive value. Findings suggest that contingency modulates the neural response to incentive magnitude differently in the two groups. Specifically, during the contingent condition, right-striatal response tracks incentive value in anxious, but not healthy, adolescents. During the noncontingent condition, striatal response is bilaterally stronger to low than to high incentive in anxious adolescents, while healthy adolescents exhibit the expected opposite pattern. Both contingency and reward magnitude differentiate striatal activation in anxious versus healthy adolescents. These findings may reflect exaggerated concern about performance and/or alterations of striatal coding of reward value in anxious adolescents. Abnormalities in reward function in anxiety may have treatment implications.

Super-size me: self biases increase to larger stimuli.

Prior work has shown that simple perceptual match responses to pairings of shapes and labels are more efficient if the pairing is associated with the participant (e.g., circle-you) than if it is associated with another familiar person (e.g., square-friend). There is a similar advantage for matching associations with high-value rewards (circle-£9) versus low-value rewards (square-£1) (Sui, He, & Humphreys Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 38, 1105-1117, 2012). Here we evaluated the relations between the self- and reward-bias effects by introducing occasional trials in which the size of a shape was varied unexpectedly (large or small vs. a standard medium). Participants favored stimuli that were larger than the standard when stimuli were associated with the self, and this enhancement of self bias was predicted by the degree of self bias that participants showed to standard (medium) sized stimuli. Although we observed a correlation between the magnitudes of the self and reward biases over participants, reward-bias effects were not increased to large stimuli. The data suggest both overlapping and independent components of the self and reward biases, and that self biases are uniquely enhanced when stimuli increase in size, consistent with previously reported motivational biases favoring large stimuli.

Orbitofrontal cortex volume in area 11/13 predicts reward devaluation, but not reversal learning performance, in young and aged monkeys.

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and amygdala are both necessary for decisions based on expected outcomes. Although behavioral and imaging data suggest that these brain regions are affected by advanced age, the extent to which aging alters appetitive processes coordinated by the OFC and the amygdala is unknown. In the current experiment, young and aged bonnet macaques were trained on OFC- and amygdala-dependent tasks that test the degree to which response selection is guided by reward value and can be adapted when expected outcomes change. To assess whether the structural integrity of these regions varies with levels of performance on reward devaluation and object reversal tasks, volumes of areas 11/13 and 14 of the OFC, central/medial (CM), and basolateral (BL) nuclei of the amygdala were determined from high-resolution anatomical MRIs. With age, there were significant reductions in OFC, but not CM and BL, volume. Moreover, the aged monkeys showed impairments in the ability to associate an object with a higher value reward, and to reverse a previously learned association. Interestingly, greater OFC volume of area 11/13, but not 14, was significantly correlated with an animal's ability to anticipate the reward outcome associated with an object, and smaller BL volume was predictive of an animal's tendency to choose a higher value reward, but volume of neither region correlated with reversal learning. Together, these data indicate that OFC volume has an impact on monkeys' ability to guide choice behavior based on reward value but does not impact ability to reverse a previously learned association.

Distinct neural responses to conscious versus unconscious monetary reward cues.

Human reward pursuit is often assumed to involve conscious processing of reward information. However, recent research revealed that reward cues enhance cognitive performance even when perceived without awareness. Building on this discovery, the present functional MRI study tested two hypotheses using a rewarded mental‐rotation task. First, we examined whether subliminal rewards engage the ventral striatum (VS), an area implicated in reward anticipation. Second, we examined differences in neural responses to supraliminal versus subliminal rewards. Results indicated that supraliminal, but not subliminal, high‐value reward cues engaged brain areas involved in reward processing (VS) and task performance (supplementary motor area, motor cortex, and superior temporal gyrus). This pattern of findings is striking given that subliminal rewards improved performance to the same extent as supraliminal rewards. So, the neural substrates of conscious versus unconscious reward pursuit are vastly different—but despite their differences, conscious and unconscious reward pursuit may still produce the same behavioral outcomes. Hum Brain Mapp 35:5578–5586, 2014. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Novelty enhances visual salience independently of reward in the parietal lobe.

Novelty modulates sensory and reward processes, but it remains unknown how these effects interact, i.e., how the visual effects of novelty are related to its motivational effects. A widespread hypothesis, based on findings that novelty activates reward-related structures, is that all the effects of novelty are explained in terms of reward. According to this idea, a novel stimulus is by default assigned high reward value and hence high salience, but this salience rapidly decreases if the stimulus signals a negative outcome. Here we show that, contrary to this idea, novelty affects visual salience in the monkey lateral intraparietal area (LIP) in ways that are independent of expected reward. Monkeys viewed peripheral visual cues that were novel or familiar (received few or many exposures) and predicted whether the trial will have a positive or a negative outcome--i.e., end in a reward or a lack of reward. We used a saccade-based assay to detect whether the cues automatically attracted or repelled attention from their visual field location. We show that salience--measured in saccades and LIP responses--was enhanced by both novelty and positive reward associations, but these factors were dissociable and habituated on different timescales. The monkeys rapidly recognized that a novel stimulus signaled a negative outcome (and withheld anticipatory licking within the first few presentations), but the salience of that stimulus remained high for multiple subsequent presentations. Therefore, novelty can provide an intrinsic bonus for attention that extends beyond the first presentation and is independent of physical rewards.

Reward speeds up and increases consistency of visual selective attention: a lifespan comparison.

Children and older adults often show less favorable reward-based learning and decision making, relative to younger adults. It is unknown, however, whether reward-based processes that influence relatively early perceptual and attentional processes show similar lifespan differences. In this study, we investigated whether stimulus-reward associations affect selective visual attention differently across the human lifespan. Children, adolescents, younger adults, and older adults performed a visual search task in which the target colors were associated with either high or low monetary rewards. We discovered that high reward value speeded up response times across all four age groups, indicating that reward modulates attentional selection across the lifespan. This speed-up in response time was largest in younger adults, relative to the other three age groups. Furthermore, only younger adults benefited from high reward value in increasing response consistency (i.e., reduction of trial-by-trial reaction time variability). Our findings suggest that reward-based modulations of relatively early and implicit perceptual and attentional processes are operative across the lifespan, and the effects appear to be greater in adulthood. The age-specific effect of reward on reducing intraindividual response variability in younger adults likely reflects mechanisms underlying the development and aging of reward processing, such as lifespan age differences in the efficacy of dopaminergic modulation. Overall, the present results indicate that reward shapes visual perception across different age groups by biasing attention to motivationally salient events.

Coherent Neuron Activity in Frontal Cortex, n. Accumbens and dorsomedial Striatum during Impulsive and Self-control Behavior in Cats

Cats placed in the situation of a choosing between a high-value time-delayed and a low-value immediate food rewards elected to wait for the preferred reward or to obtain the worse reward quickly. On the basis of the selected behavior strategy the cats were classified into three groups - self-control ones, choosing predominantly a delayed high-value food reward, impulsive, choosing predominantly an immediate low-value food reward, and ambivalent - with mixed types of reactions. The correlated firing between simultaneously recorded neurons in prefrontal cortex (PFC), n. accumbens (NAcb) and dorsomedial striatum (DMStr) during choice behavior task was studied. It was revealed that a total number of NAcb functional neuron interactions at cats showing self-control reactions exceeded that of observed at ambivalent and impulsive cats. The number of PFC and DMStr functional correlated firing at impulsive and ambivalent cats was more significant than at cats capable to self-control. Observed correlated firing between PFC and NAcb neurons (fronto-accumbal interactions) progressively increased with the shift of behavior to impulsiveness and decreased with self-control behavior. Our results demonstrate that performance of impulsive and self-control behavior alters the correlation structure of neural firing in PFC, NAcb, DMStr and suggest the key role of local PFC, NAcb, DMStr networks in realization of choice behavior.

Cocaine-associated odor cue re-exposure increases blood oxygenation level dependent signal in memory and reward regions of the maternal rat brain

BackgroundCue triggered relapse during the postpartum period can negatively impact maternal care. Given the high reward value of pups in maternal rats, we designed an fMRI experiment to test whether offspring presence reduces the neural response to a cocaine associated olfactory cue. MethodsCocaine conditioned place preference was carried out before pregnancy in the presence of two distinct odors that were paired with cocaine or saline (+Cue and −Cue). The BOLD response to +Cue and −Cue was measured in dams on postpartum days 2–4. Odor cues were delivered to dams in the absence and then the presence of pups. ResultsOur data indicate that several limbic and cognitive regions of the maternal rat brain show a greater BOLD signal response to a +Cue versus −Cue. These include dorsal striatum, prelimbic cortex, parietal cortex, habenula, bed nucleus of stria terminalis, lateral septum and the mediodorsal and the anterior thalamic nucleus. Of the aforementioned brain regions, only the parietal cortex of cocaine treated dams showed a significant modulatory effect of pup presence. In this area of the cortex, cocaine exposed maternal rats showed a greater BOLD activation in response to the +Cue in the presence than in the absence of pups. ConclusionsSpecific regions of the cocaine exposed maternal rat brain are strongly reactive to drug associated cues. The regions implicated in cue reactivity have been previously reported in clinical imaging work, and previous work supports their role in various motivational and cognitive functions.

When given the opportunity, chimpanzees maximize personal gain rather than “level the playing field”

We provided chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with the ability to improve the quality of food rewards they received in a dyadic test of inequity. We were interested to see if this provision influenced their responses and, if so, whether it was mediated by a social partner’s outcomes. We tested eight dyads using an exchange paradigm in which, depending on the condition, the chimpanzees were rewarded with either high-value (a grape) or low-value (a piece of celery) food rewards for each completed exchange. We included four conditions. In the first, “Different” condition, the subject received different, less-preferred, rewards than their partner for each exchange made (a test of inequity). In the “Unavailable” condition, high-value rewards were shown, but not given, to both chimpanzees prior to each exchange and the chimpanzees were rewarded equally with low-value rewards (a test of individual contrast). The final two conditions created equity. In these High-value and Low-value “Same” conditions both chimpanzees received the same food rewards for each exchange. Within each condition, the chimpanzees first completed ten trials in the Baseline Phase, in which the experimenter determined the rewards they received, and then ten trials in the Test Phase. In the Test Phase, the chimpanzees could exchange tokens through the aperture of a small wooden picture frame hung on their cage mesh in order to receive the high-value reward. Thus, in the Test Phase, the chimpanzees were provided with an opportunity to improve the quality of the rewards they received, either absolutely or relative to what their partner received. The chimpanzees responded in a targeted manner; in the Test Phase they attempted to maximize their returns in all conditions in which they had received low-value rewards during the Baseline Phase. Thus, the chimpanzees were apparently motivated to increase their reward regardless of their partners’, but they only used the mechanism provided when it afforded the opportunity for them to increase their rewards. We also found evidence that the chimpanzees’ responses were enhanced by social facilitation. Specifically, the chimpanzees were more likely to exchange their tokens through the frame when their test partner also did so, even in circumstances in which their reward value could not be improved. Our paradigm provided the chimpanzees with the possibility to improve the quality of rewards they received in the Test Phase. We found that refusals – to exchange tokens or to eat rewards – decreased significantly in the Test Phase compared to the Baseline Phase, where no such opportunity for improvement of outcomes existed. Thus, the chimpanzees participated more when they could improve the rewards they received.

Context specificity of inhibitory control in dogs

Across three experiments, we explored whether a dog's capacity for inhibitory control is stable or variable across decision-making contexts. In the social task, dogs were first exposed to the reputations of a stingy experimenter that never shared food and a generous experimenter who always shared food. In subsequent test trials, dogs were required to avoid approaching the stingy experimenter when this individual offered (but withheld) a higher-value reward than the generous experimenter did. In the A-not-B task, dogs were required to inhibit searching for food in a previously rewarded location after witnessing the food being moved from this location to a novel hiding place. In the cylinder task, dogs were required to resist approaching visible food directly (because it was behind a transparent barrier), in favor of a detour reaching response. Overall, dogs exhibited inhibitory control in all three tasks. However, individual scores were not correlated between tasks, suggesting that context has a large effect on dogs' behavior. This result mirrors studies of humans, which have highlighted intra-individual variation in inhibitory control as a function of the decision-making context. Lastly, we observed a correlation between a subject's age and performance on the cylinder task, corroborating previous observations of age-related decline in dogs' executive function.

Attention as foraging for information and value

What is the purpose of attention? One avenue of research has led to the proposal that attention might be crucial for gathering information about the environment, while other lines of study have demonstrated how attention may play a role in guiding behavior to rewarded options. Many experiments that study attention require participants to make a decision based on information acquired discretely at one point in time. In real-world situations, however, we are usually not presented with information about which option to select in such a manner. Rather we must initially search for information, weighing up reward values of options before we commit to a decision. Here, we propose that attention plays a role in both foraging for information and foraging for value. When foraging for information, attention is guided toward the unknown. When foraging for reward, attention is guided toward high reward values, allowing decision-making to proceed by accept-or-reject decisions on the currently attended option. According to this account, attention can be regarded as a low-cost alternative to moving around and physically interacting with the environment—“teleforaging”—before a decision is made to interact physically with the world. To track the timecourse of attention, we asked participants to seek out and acquire information about two gambles by directing their gaze, before choosing one of them. Participants often made multiple refixations on items before making a decision. Their eye movements revealed that early in the trial, attention was guided toward information, i.e., toward locations that reduced uncertainty about value. In contrast, late in the trial, attention was guided by expected value of the options. At the end of the decision period, participants were generally attending to the item they eventually chose. We suggest that attentional foraging shifts from an uncertainty-driven to a reward-driven mode during the evolution of a decision, permitting decisions to be made by an engage-or-search strategy.

The effects of juvenile stress on anxiety, cognitive bias and decision making in adulthood: a rat model.

Stress experienced in childhood is associated with an increased risk of developing psychiatric disorders in adulthood. These disorders are particularly characterized by disturbances to emotional and cognitive processes, which are not currently fully modeled in animals. Assays of cognitive bias have recently been used with animals to give an indication of their emotional/cognitive state. We used a cognitive bias test, alongside a traditional measure of anxiety (elevated plus maze), to investigate the effects of juvenile stress (JS) on adulthood behaviour using a rodent model. During the cognitive bias test, animals were trained to discriminate between two reward bowls based on a stimulus (rough/smooth sandpaper) encountered before they reached the bowls. One stimulus (e.g. rough) was associated with a lower value reward than the other (e.g. smooth). Once rats were trained, their cognitive bias was explored through the presentation of an ambiguous stimulus (intermediate grade sandpaper): a rat was classed as optimistic if it chose the bowl ordinarily associated with the high value reward. JS animals were lighter than controls, exhibited increased anxiety-like behaviour in the elevated plus maze and were more optimistic in the cognitive bias test. This increased optimism may represent an optimal foraging strategy for these underweight animals. JS animals were also faster than controls to make a decision when presented with an ambiguous stimulus, suggesting altered decision making. These results demonstrate that stress in the juvenile phase can increase anxiety-like behaviour and alter cognitive bias and decision making in adulthood in a rat model.

Are cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, inequity averse?

Inequity aversion (IA), a willingness to incur temporary costs to prevent unequal outcomes, is common in humans and thought to be beneficial in the context of cooperative relationships with nonkin, since it might allow individuals to regulate contributions to cooperative activities. Attempts to address whether nonhuman animals also show IA have produced mixed results: some studies found that cooperative species are more likely to show IA while others did not. This ambiguity may arise because animals are typically tested for an aversion to working for differential food rewards, even though most tested species do not regularly cooperate to access food. We used the interspecific mutualism between cleaner fish and their reef-fish ‘clients’ to investigate whether IA exists in a species that regularly cooperates with unrelated individuals in the food domain. Cleaners were tested in pairs of actors and recipients. Actors had to perform a task to provide a food reward to both actor and recipient. Cleaners show consistent food preferences in the wild and under laboratory conditions, allowing us to vary the value of the food reward offered to actor and recipient to test whether actors were less likely to work when recipients received higher value rewards. We performed two experiments: actors worked either for their opposite-sex partner or for a same-sex competitor. We found no evidence that cleaners were sensitive to inequity: actors were equally likely to perform the task in all experimental conditions. We discuss these results in light of theories of the evolution of IA.

Reward Prediction Error Signaling in Posterior Dorsomedial Striatum Is Action Specific

Neural correlates of reward prediction errors (RPEs) have been found in dorsal striatum. Such signals may be important for updating associative action representations within striatum. In order that the appropriate representations can be updated, it might be important for the RPE signal to be specific for the action that led to that error. However, RPEs signaled by midbrain dopamine neurons, which project heavily to striatum, are not action-specific. Here we tested whether RPE-like activity in dorsal striatum is action-specific; we recorded single-unit activity in posterior dorsomedial and dorsolateral striatum as rats performed a task in which the reward predictions associated with two different actions were repeatedly violated, thereby eliciting RPEs. We separately analyzed fast firing neurons (FFNs) and phasically firing neurons (total n = 1076). Only among FFNs recorded in posterior dorsomedial striatum did we find a population with RPE-like characteristics (19 of all 196 FFNs, 10%). This population showed a phasic increase in activity during unexpected rewards, a phasic decrease in activity during unexpected omission of rewards, and a phasic increase in activity during cues when they predicted high-value reward. However, unlike a classical RPE signal, this signal was linked to the action that elicited the prediction error, in that neurons tended to signal RPEs only after their anti-preferred action. This action-specific RPE-like signal could provide a mechanism for updating specific associative action representations in posterior dorsomedial striatum.

Rhesus monkeys lack a consistent peak-end effect

In humans, the order of receiving sequential rewards can significantly influence the overall subjective utility of an outcome. For example, people subjectively rate receiving a large reward by itself significantly higher than receiving the same large reward followed by a smaller one (Do, Rupert, & Wolford, 2008). This result is called the peak-end effect. A comparative analysis of order effects can help determine the generality of such effects across primates, and we therefore examined the influence of reward-quality order on decision making in three rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta). When given the choice between a high-low reward sequence and a low-high sequence, all three monkeys preferred receiving the high-value reward first. Follow-up experiments showed that for two of the three monkeys their choices depended specifically on reward-quality order and could not be accounted for by delay discounting. These results provide evidence for the influence of outcome order on decision making in rhesus monkeys. Unlike humans, who usually discount choices when a low-value reward comes last, rhesus monkeys show no such peak-end effect.

The Effects Of Non-Monetary Incentives Upon Survey Refusal Tendencies Of The Affluent Consumer Population

This study examined the refusal to respond phenomenon in survey research. The effects of various non-monetary incentives upon response rates of upscale consumers were tested. High value probabilistic and low value reward incentives were administered, in conjunction with a control group. Chi Square analysis indicated a significant difference between response rates for the control and probabilistic executions. These results suggest that the high value probabilistic incentive actually decrease response rates in the affluent population.