Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Research Articles

Pigs are highly susceptible to but do not transmit mink-derived highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b

ABSTRACT Rapid evolution of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) is driven by antigenic drift but also by reassortment, which might result in robust replication in and transmission to mammals. Recently, spillover of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV to mammals including humans, and their transmission between mammalian species has been reported. This study aimed to evaluate the pathogenicity and transmissibility of a mink-derived clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV isolate from Spain in pigs. Experimental infection caused interstitial pneumonia with necrotizing bronchiolitis with high titers of virus present in the lower respiratory tract and 100% seroconversion. Infected pigs shed limited amount of virus, and importantly, there was no transmission to contact pigs. Notably, critical mammalian-like adaptations such as PB2-E627 K and HA-Q222L emerged at low frequencies in principal-infected pigs. It is concluded that pigs are highly susceptible to infection with the mink-derived clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV and provide a favorable environment for HPAIV to acquire mammalian-like adaptations.

Blowflies are potential vector for avian influenza virus at enzootic area in Japan

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) poses a significant threat to both domestic and wild birds globally. The avian influenza virus, known for environmental contamination and subsequent oral infection in birds, necessitates careful consideration of alternative introduction routes during HPAI outbreaks. This study focuses on blowflies (genus Calliphora), in particular Calliphora nigribarbis, attracted to decaying animals and feces, which migrate to lowland areas of Japan from northern or mountainous regions in early winter, coinciding with HPAI season. Our investigation aims to delineate the role of blowflies as HPAI vectors by conducting a virus prevalence survey in a wild bird HPAI-enzootic area. In December 2022, 648 Calliphora nigribarbis were collected. Influenza virus RT-PCR testing identified 14 virus-positive samples (2.2% prevalence), with the highest occurrence observed near the crane colony (14.9%). Subtyping revealed the presence of H5N1 and HxN1 in some samples. Subsequent collections in December 2023 identified one HPAI virus-positive specimen from 608 collected flies in total, underscoring the potential involvement of blowflies in HPAI transmission. Our observations suggest C. nigribarbis may acquire the HPAI virus from deceased wild birds directly or from fecal materials from infected birds, highlighting the need to add blowflies as a target of HPAI vector control.

Novel Genotype of HA Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 Subtype High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Emerged at a Wintering Site of Migratory Birds in Japan, 2021/22 Winter.

Surveillance of avian influenza virus (AIV) was conducted in the 2021-2022 winter season at a wintering site of migratory Anatidae in Japan. An H5N8 subtype high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV) with a unique gene constellation and four low pathogenicity AIVs (LPAIVs) were isolated from environmental samples. The genetic origin of the HPAIV (NK1201) was determined with whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analyses. Six of NK1201's eight genes were closely related to HA clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 subtype HPAIVs, belonging to the G2a group, which was responsible for outbreaks in poultry farms in November 2021 in Japan. However, the remaining two genes, PB1 and NP, most closely matched those of the LPAIVs H7N7 and H1N8, which were isolated at the same place in the same 2021-2022 winter. No virus of the NK1201 genotype had been detected prior to the 2021-2022 winter, indicating that it emerged via genetic reassortment among HPAIV and LPAIVs, which were prevalent at the same wintering site. In addition, experimental infection in chickens indicated that NK1201 had slightly different infectivity compared to the reported infectivity of the representative G2a group H5N8 HPAIV, suggesting that the PB1 and NP genes derived from LPAIVs might have affected the pathogenicity of the virus in chickens. Our results directly demonstrate the emergence of a novel genotype of H5N8 HPAIV through gene reassortment at a wintering site. Analyses of AIVs at wintering sites can help to identify the emergence of novel HPAIVs, which pose risks to poultry, livestock, and humans.

Iceland: an underestimated hub for the spread of high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in the North Atlantic.

High-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the goose/Guangdong lineage are enzootically circulating in wild bird populations worldwide. This increases the risk of entry into poultry production and spill-over to mammalian species, including humans. Better understanding of the ecological and epizootiological networks of these viruses is essential to optimize mitigation measures. Based on full genome sequences of 26 HPAIV samples from Iceland, which were collected between spring and autumn 2022, as well as 1 sample from the 2023 summer period, we show that 3 different genotypes of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b were circulating within the wild bird population in Iceland in 2022. Furthermore, in 2023 we observed a novel introduction of HPAIV H5N5 of the same clade to Iceland. The data support the role of Iceland as an utmost northwestern distribution area in Europe that might act also as a potential bridging point for intercontinental spread of HPAIV across the North Atlantic.

The virus is out of the barn: the emergence of HPAI as a pathogen of avian and mammalian wildlife around the globe.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has persisted as a One Health threat whose current circulation and impact are addressed in the companion Currents in One Health by Puryear and Runstadler, JAVMA, May 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza emerged as a by-product of agricultural practices and adapted to endemic circulation in wild bird species. Over more than 20 years, continued evolution in a complex ecology involving multiple hosts has produced a lineage that expanded globally over the last 2 years. Understanding the continued evolution and movement of HPAI relies on understanding how the virus is infecting different hosts in different contexts. This includes understanding the environmental factors and the natural ecology of viral transmission that impact host exposure and ultimately evolutionary trajectories. Particularly with the rapid host expansion, increased spillover to mammalian hosts, and novel clinical phenotypes in infected hosts, despite progress in understanding the impact of specific mutations to HPAI viruses that are associated with spillover potential, the threat to public health is poorly understood. Active research is focusing on new approaches to understanding the relationship of viral genotype to phenotype and the implementation of research and surveillance pipelines to make sense of the enormous potential for diverse HPAI viruses to emerge from wild reservoirs amid global circulation.

High-pathogenicity avian influenza in wildlife: a changing disease dynamic that is expanding in wild birds and having an increasing impact on a growing number of mammals.

While diverse strains of low-pathogenicity avian influenza have circulated in wild birds for a long period of time, there has previously been little pathology in wild birds, ducks have been the primary and largely asymptomatic wild reservoir, and spillover into mammals has been limited and rare. In recent years, a high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) virus has emerged on the global scene and shifted the previously established dogmas for influenza infection. High-pathogenicity avian influenza has expanded into wildlife in unprecedented numbers and species diversity, with unmatched disease severity for influenza in wildlife. As the disease ecology of influenza has shifted with this new variant, significant efforts are underway to understand disease course, pathology, and species susceptibility. Here we focus primarily on the impact that HPAI has had in wild mammals while framing these novel spillovers within the context of significantly expanding disease in avian species and geography. The clinical and pathology presentations of HPAI in these atypical hosts are discussed, as well as prognosis and risk for continued spillover. The companion Currents in One Health by Runstadler and Puryear, AJVR, May 2024, provides further context on viral reservoirs and possible routes of direct or environmental transmission and risk assessment of viral variants that are emerging within wildlife.

Surveillance for highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) in a raptor rehabilitation center-2022.

An ongoing, severe outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAI) A H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b has been circulating in wild and domestic bird populations throughout the world, reaching North America in 2021. This HPAI outbreak has exhibited unique characteristics when compared to previous outbreaks. The global distribution of disease, prolonged duration, extensive number of species and individual wild birds affected, and the large impact on the global poultry industry have all exceeded historical impacts of previous outbreaks in North America. In this study, we describe the results of HPAI surveillance conducted at The Raptor Center, a wildlife rehabilitation hospital at University of Minnesota (Saint Paul, MN, U.S.A.), from March 28th-December 31, 2022. All wild raptors admitted to the facility were tested for avian influenza viruses using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. All non-negative samples were submitted to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) National Veterinary Services Laboratories for confirmatory HPAI testing and genetic sequencing. During the study period, 996 individual birds representing 20 different species were tested for avian influenza, and 213 birds were confirmed HPAI positive. Highly pathogenic avian influenza surveillance conducted at The Raptor Center contributed 75% of the HPAI positive raptor detections within the state of Minnesota, located within the Mississippi flyway, significantly augmenting state wildlife surveillance efforts. The viral genotypes observed in birds sampled at The Raptor Center were representative of what was seen in wild bird surveillance within the Mississippi flyway during the same time frame. Wildlife rehabilitation centers provide an opportune situation to augment disease surveillance at the human, wildlife and domestic animal interface during ongoing infectious disease outbreaks.

A multi-species, multi-pathogen avian viral disease outbreak event: Investigating potential for virus transmission at the wild bird – poultry interface

ABSTRACT A free-range organic broiler (Gallus gallus domesticus) premises in Staffordshire was infected by high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N8 during the 2020–2021 epizootic in the United Kingdom (UK). Following initial confirmation of the infection in poultry, multiple wild bird species were seen scavenging on chicken carcasses. Detected dead wild birds were subsequently demonstrated to have been infected and succumbed to HPAIV H5N8. Initially, scavenging species, magpie (Pica pica) and raven (Corvus corax) were found dead on the premises but over the following days, buzzards (Buteo buteo) were also found dead within the local area with positive detection of HPAIV in submitted carcasses. The subacute nature of microscopic lesions within a buzzard was consistent with the timeframe of infection. Finally, a considerable number of free-living pheasants (Phasianus colchicus) were also found dead in the surrounding area, with carcasses having higher viral antigen loads compared to infected chickens. Limited virus dissemination was observed in the carcasses of the magpie, raven, and buzzard. Further, an avirulent avian paramyxovirus type 1 (APMV-1) was detected within poultry samples as well as in the viscera of a magpie infected with HPAIV. Immunohistochemistry did not reveal colocalization of avian paramyxovirus antigens with lesions, supporting an avirulent APMV-1 infection. Overall, this case highlights scenarios in which bi-directional transmission of avian viral diseases between commercial and wild bird species may occur. It also underlines the importance of bio separation and reduced access when infection pressure from HPAIV is high.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in a common bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) in Florida.

Since late 2021, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (H5N1) lineage have caused widespread mortality in wild birds and poultry in the United States. Concomitant with the spread of HPAI viruses in birds are increasing numbers of mammalian infections, including wild and captive mesocarnivores and carnivores with central nervous system involvement. Here we report HPAI, A(H5N1) of clade 2.3.4.4b, in a common bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) from Florida, United States. Pathological findings include neuronal necrosis and inflammation of the brain and meninges, and quantitative real time RT-PCR reveal the brain carried the highest viral load. Virus isolated from the brain contains a S246N neuraminidase substitution which leads to reduced inhibition by neuraminidase inhibitor oseltamivir. The increased prevalence of A(H5N1) viruses in atypical avian hosts and its cross-species transmission into mammalian species highlights the public health importance of continued disease surveillance and biosecurity protocols.

Isolation and genetic characterization of multiple genotypes of both H5 and H7 avian influenza viruses from environmental water in the Izumi plain, Kagoshima prefecture, Japan during the 2021/22 winter season

In the 2021/22 winter, one H5N1 and nine H5N8 high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of clade 2.3.3.4b were isolated from the water in crane roosts on the Izumi plain, Japan. Additionally, we isolated low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs) of five subtypes: H1N1, H4N2, H4N6, H7N7, and H10N4. H5N8 HPAIVs belonging to the G2a group were isolated throughout winter, whereas H5N1 HPAIV belonging to the G2b group were isolated only in early winter. These findings suggest co-circulation of both G2a and G2b HPAIVs in early winter. Although two H7N7 LPAIVs were isolated from cranes’ roost water collected on the same day, the gene constellations of the two isolates were clearly different, indicating the contemporary invasion of at least two different genotypes of H7N7 LPAIVs in the Izumi plain. This study underscores the importance of monitoring both HPAIVs and LPAIVs to understand avian influenza virus ecology in migratory waterfowl populations.

Stranding and mass mortality in humboldt penguins (Spheniscus humboldti), associated to HPAIV H5N1 outbreak in Chile

The highly pathogenic Avian Influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 has caused a global outbreak affecting both wild and domestic animals, predominantly avian species. To date, cases of the HPAIV H5 Clade 2.3.4.4b in penguins have exclusively been reported in African Penguins. In Chile, the virus was confirmed in pelicans in December 2022 and subsequently spread across the country, affecting several species, including Humboldt penguins. This study aims to provide an overview of the incidents involving stranded and deceased Humboldt penguins and establish a connection between these events and HPAIV H5N1. Historical data about strandings between 2009 and 2023 was collected, and samples from suspected cases in 2023 were obtained to confirm the presence of HPAIV H5N1. Between January and August 2023, 2,788 cases of stranded and deceased penguins were recorded. Out of these, a total of 2,712 penguins deceased, evidencing a significative increase in mortality starting in early 2023 coinciding with the introduction and spreading of HPAIV H5N1 in the country. Thirty-seven events were categorized as mass mortality events, with the number of deceased penguins varying from 11 to 98. Most cases (97 %) were observed in the North of Chile. One hundred and eighty-one specimens were subjected to HPAIV diagnosis, four of which tested positive for HPAIV H5N1. Spatial analysis validates the correlation between mass mortality events and outbreaks of HPAIV in Chile. However, the limited rate of HPAIV H5N1 detection, which can be attributed to the type and quality of the samples, requiring further exploration.

Avian Influenza Virus and Avian Paramyxoviruses in Wild Waterfowl of the Western Coast of the Caspian Sea (2017-2020).

The flyways of many different wild waterfowl pass through the Caspian Sea region. The western coast of the middle Caspian Sea is an area with many wetlands, where wintering grounds with large concentrations of birds are located. It is known that wild waterfowl are a natural reservoir of the influenza A virus. In the mid-2000s, in the north of this region, the mass deaths of swans, gulls, and pelicans from high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) were noted. At present, there is still little known about the presence of avian influenza virus (AIVs) and different avian paramyxoviruses (APMVs) in the region's waterfowl bird populations. Here, we report the results of monitoring these viruses in the wild waterfowl of the western coast of the middle Caspian Sea from 2017 to 2020. Samples from 1438 individuals of 26 bird species of 7 orders were collected, from which 21 strains of AIV were isolated, amounting to a 1.46% isolation rate of the total number of samples analyzed (none of these birds exhibited external signs of disease). The following subtypes were determined and whole-genome nucleotide sequences of the isolated strains were obtained: H1N1 (n = 2), H3N8 (n = 8), H4N6 (n = 2), H7N3 (n = 2), H8N4 (n = 1), H10N5 (n = 1), and H12N5 (n = 1). No high pathogenicity influenza virus H5 subtype was detected. Phylogenetic analysis of AIV genomes did not reveal any specific pattern for viruses in the Caspian Sea region, showing that all segments belong to the Eurasian clades of classic avian-like influenza viruses. We also did not find the amino acid substitutions in the polymerase complex (PA, PB1, and PB2) that are critical for the increase in virulence or adaptation to mammals. In total, 23 hemagglutinating viruses not related to influenza A virus were also isolated, of which 15 belonged to avian paramyxoviruses. We were able to sequence 12 avian paramyxoviruses of three species, as follows: Newcastle disease virus (n = 4); Avian paramyxovirus 4 (n = 5); and Avian paramyxovirus 6 (n = 3). In the Russian Federation, the Newcastle disease virus of the VII.1.1 sub-genotype was first isolated from a wild bird (common pheasant) in the Caspian Sea region. The five avian paramyxovirus 4 isolates obtained belonged to the common clade in Genotype I, whereas phylogenetic analysis of three isolates of Avian paramyxovirus 6 showed that two isolates, isolated in 2017, belonged to Genotype I and that an isolate identified in 2020 belonged to Genotype II. The continued regular monitoring of AIVs and APMVs, the obtaining of data on the biological properties of isolated strains, and the accumulation of information on virus host species will allow for the adequate planning of epidemiological measures, suggest the most likely routes of spread of the virus, and assist in the prediction of the introduction of the viruses in the western coastal region of the middle Caspian Sea.

High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe-Why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict.

Since 2016, A(H5Nx) high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of clade 2.3.4.4b has become one of the most serious global threats not only to wild and domestic birds, but also to public health. In recent years, important changes in the ecology, epidemiology, and evolution of this virus have been reported, with an unprecedented global diffusion and variety of affected birds and mammalian species. After the two consecutive and devastating epidemic waves in Europe in 2020-2021 and 2021-2022, with the second one recognized as one of the largest epidemics recorded so far, this clade has begun to circulate endemically in European wild bird populations. This study used the complete genomes of 1,956 European HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses to investigate the virus evolution during this varying epidemiological outline. We investigated the spatiotemporal patterns of A(H5Nx) virus diffusion to/from and within Europe during the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 epidemic waves, providing evidence of ongoing changes in transmission dynamics and disease epidemiology. We demonstrated the high genetic diversity of the circulating viruses, which have undergone frequent reassortment events, providing for the first time a complete overview and a proposed nomenclature of the multiple genotypes circulating in Europe in 2020-2022. We described the emergence of a new genotype with gull adapted genes, which offered the virus the opportunity to occupy new ecological niches, driving the disease endemicity in the European wild bird population. The high propensity of the virus for reassortment, its jumps to a progressively wider number of host species, including mammals, and the rapid acquisition of adaptive mutations make the trend of virus evolution and spread difficult to predict in this unfailing evolving scenario.

In Ovo Models to Predict Virulence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5-Viruses for Chickens and Ducks.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5-viruses are circulating in wild birds and are repeatedly introduced to poultry causing outbreaks in the Netherlands since 2014. The largest epizootic ever recorded in Europe was caused by HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses in the period 2021-2022. The recent H5-clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were found to differ in their virulence for chickens and ducks. Viruses causing only mild disease may remain undetected, increasing the risk of virus spread to other farms, wild birds and mammals. We developed in ovo models to determine the virulence of HPAI viruses for chickens and ducks, which are fast and have low costs. The virulence of five contemporary H5-viruses was compared studying replication rate, average time to death and virus spread in the embryo. Remarkable differences in virulence were observed between H5-viruses and between poultry species. The H5N1-2021 virus was found to have a fast replication rate in both the chicken and duck in ovo models, but a slower systemic virus dissemination compared to three other H5-clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. The results show the potential of in ovo models to quickly determine the virulence of novel HPAI viruses, and study potential virulence factors which can help to better guide the surveillance in poultry.

Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - Part 2. Surveillance and mitigation measures.

Selecting appropriate diagnostic methods that take account of the type of vaccine used is important when implementing a vaccination programme against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). If vaccination is effective, a decreased viral load is expected in the samples used for diagnosis, making molecular methods with high sensitivity the best choice. Although serological methods can be reasonably sensitive, they may produce results that are difficult to interpret. In addition to routine molecular monitoring, it is recommended to conduct viral isolation, genetic sequencing and phenotypic characterisation of any HPAI virus detected in vaccinated flocks to detect escape mutants early. Following emergency vaccination, various surveillance options based on virological testing of dead birds ('bucket sampling') at defined intervals were assessed to be effective for early detection of HPAIV and prove disease freedom in vaccinated populations. For ducks, virological or serological testing of live birds was assessed as an effective strategy. This surveillance could be also applied in the peri-vaccination zone on vaccinated establishments, while maintaining passive surveillance in unvaccinated chicken layers and turkeys, and weekly bucket sampling in unvaccinated ducks. To demonstrate disease freedom with > 99% confidence and to detect HPAI virus sufficiently early following preventive vaccination, monthly virological testing of all dead birds up to 15 per flock, coupled with passive surveillance in both vaccinated and unvaccinated flocks, is recommended. Reducing the sampling intervals increases the sensitivity of early detection up to 100%. To enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry during emergency vaccination, laboratory examinations in the 72 h prior to the movement can be considered as a risk mitigation measure, in addition to clinical inspection; sampling results from existing surveillance activities carried out in these 72 h could be used. In this Opinion, several schemes are recommended to enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry following preventive vaccination.

Divergent Pathogenesis and Transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in Swine.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have potential to cross species barriers and cause pandemics. Since 2022, HPAI A(H5N1) belonging to the goose/Guangdong 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin phylogenetic clade have infected poultry, wild birds, and mammals across North America. Continued circulation in birds and infection of multiple mammalian species with strains possessing adaptation mutations increase the risk for infection and subsequent reassortment with influenza A viruses endemic in swine. We assessed the susceptibility of swine to avian and mammalian HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strains using a pathogenesis and transmission model. All strains replicated in the lung of pigs and caused lesions consistent with influenza A infection. However, viral replication in the nasal cavity and transmission was only observed with mammalian isolates. Mammalian adaptation and reassortment may increase the risk for incursion and transmission of HPAI viruses in feral, backyard, or commercial swine.

Update of the target list of wild bird species for passive surveillance of H5 HPAI viruses in the EU

Update of the target list of wild bird species for passive surveillance of H5 HPAI viruses in the EU

Genetic insertion of mouse Myxovirus-resistance gene 1 increases innate resistance against both high and low pathogenic avian influenza virus by significantly decreasing replication in chicken DF1 cell line

Avian influenza virus (AIV) is a constant threat to animal health with recent global outbreaks resulting in the death of hundreds of millions of birds with spillover into mammals. Myxovirus-resistance (Mx) proteins are key mediators of the antiviral response that block virus replication. Mouse (Mu) Mx (Mx1) is a strong antiviral protein that interacts with the viral nucleoprotein to inhibit polymerase function. The ability of avian Mx1 to inhibit AIV is unclear. In these studies, Mu Mx1 was stably introduced into chicken DF1 cells to enhance the immune response against AIV. Following infection, titers of AIV were significantly decreased in cells expressing Mu Mx1. In addition, considerably less cytopathic effect (CPE) and matrix protein staining was observed in gene-edited cells expressing Mu Mx1, suggesting Mu Mx1 is broadly effective against multiple AIV subtypes. This work provides foundational studies for use of gene-editing to enhance innate disease resistance against AIV.

Continuous Introduction of H5 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses in Hokkaido, Japan: Characterization of Viruses Isolated in Winter 2022–2023 and Early Winter 2023–2024

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) has impacted poultry and wild birds globally. The number of H5 HPAI virus (HPAIV) infection cases in wild birds in Hokkaido (Northern Japan) was high in the last two seasons, contributing to virus spillover to resident birds and poultry. Therefore, H5 HPAIVs in birds and mammals in Hokkaido in winter 2022–2023 and 2023–2024 were monitored and viruses were phylogenetically, antigenically, and pathogenetically characterized. Thirty HPAIV isolates were subtyped and pathotyped by sequencing the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of viruses. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA gene revealed that all isolated HPAIVs were categorized into clade 2.3.4.4b and divided into three groups (G2b, G2c, and G2d). Most isolates belonging to subgroup G2d clustered with isolates in winter 2021–2022 in Hokkaido. The other isolates were categorized into two subgroups, G2b and G2c, mainly composed of isolates in Honshu Island in winter 2021–2022 and 2022–2023, respectively. Two H5 HPAIVs isolated in Eastern Russia in spring and autumn 2022 were genetically close to most Hokkaido isolates (G2d), and a virus isolated in Hokkaido in November 2023 was also grouped in subgroup G2d. Further analysis of all eight gene segments identified six types of gene constellations. Cross-hemagglutination inhibition test indicated that the antigenicity of H5 HPAIVs isolated in the last several seasons was similar within them but slightly different from that in the 2010s. Three chicken breeds were intranasally challenged with four representative isolates to assess their pathogenicity. All chickens except one broiler chicken were dead until 5-day postchallenge with different pathogenicity of these viruses. The pathogenicity of one HPAIV strain was significantly lower in broiler chickens than in layer chickens. The mixture of multiple characteristics of HPAIVs in Hokkaido was confirmed by bird migration routes. Thus, many HPAIVs can be brought and scattered anywhere on Earth.

H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in migratory birds exhibiting low pathogenicity in mallards increases its risk of transmission and spread in poultry

In 2020, an H5N1 avian influenza virus of clade 2.3.4.4b was detected in Europe for the first time and was spread throughout the world by wild migratory birds, resulting in the culling of an unprecedented number of wild birds and poultry due to the epidemic. In February 2023, we isolated and identified a strain of H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus from a swab sample from a grey crane in Ningxia, China. Phylogenetic analysis of the Hemagglutinin (HA) gene showed that the virus belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b, and several gene segments were closely related to H5N1 viruses infecting humans in China. Analysis of key amino acid sites revealed that the virus contained multiple amino acid substitutions that facilitate enhanced viral replication and mammalian pathogenicity. The results of animal challenge experiments showed that the virus is highly pathogenic to chickens, moderately pathogenic to BALB/c mice, and highly infectious but not lethal to mallards. Moreover, the virus exhibited minor antigenic drift compared with the H5-Re14 vaccine strain. To this end, we need to pay more attention to the monitoring of wild birds to prevent further spread of viruses to poultry and mammals, including humans.