Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Research Articles

Stranding and mass mortality in humboldt penguins (Spheniscus humboldti), associated to HPAIV H5N1 outbreak in Chile

The highly pathogenic Avian Influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 has caused a global outbreak affecting both wild and domestic animals, predominantly avian species. To date, cases of the HPAIV H5 Clade 2.3.4.4b in penguins have exclusively been reported in African Penguins. In Chile, the virus was confirmed in pelicans in December 2022 and subsequently spread across the country, affecting several species, including Humboldt penguins. This study aims to provide an overview of the incidents involving stranded and deceased Humboldt penguins and establish a connection between these events and HPAIV H5N1. Historical data about strandings between 2009 and 2023 was collected, and samples from suspected cases in 2023 were obtained to confirm the presence of HPAIV H5N1. Between January and August 2023, 2,788 cases of stranded and deceased penguins were recorded. Out of these, a total of 2,712 penguins deceased, evidencing a significative increase in mortality starting in early 2023 coinciding with the introduction and spreading of HPAIV H5N1 in the country. Thirty-seven events were categorized as mass mortality events, with the number of deceased penguins varying from 11 to 98. Most cases (97 %) were observed in the North of Chile. One hundred and eighty-one specimens were subjected to HPAIV diagnosis, four of which tested positive for HPAIV H5N1. Spatial analysis validates the correlation between mass mortality events and outbreaks of HPAIV in Chile. However, the limited rate of HPAIV H5N1 detection, which can be attributed to the type and quality of the samples, requiring further exploration.

Avian Influenza Virus and Avian Paramyxoviruses in Wild Waterfowl of the Western Coast of the Caspian Sea (2017-2020).

The flyways of many different wild waterfowl pass through the Caspian Sea region. The western coast of the middle Caspian Sea is an area with many wetlands, where wintering grounds with large concentrations of birds are located. It is known that wild waterfowl are a natural reservoir of the influenza A virus. In the mid-2000s, in the north of this region, the mass deaths of swans, gulls, and pelicans from high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) were noted. At present, there is still little known about the presence of avian influenza virus (AIVs) and different avian paramyxoviruses (APMVs) in the region's waterfowl bird populations. Here, we report the results of monitoring these viruses in the wild waterfowl of the western coast of the middle Caspian Sea from 2017 to 2020. Samples from 1438 individuals of 26 bird species of 7 orders were collected, from which 21 strains of AIV were isolated, amounting to a 1.46% isolation rate of the total number of samples analyzed (none of these birds exhibited external signs of disease). The following subtypes were determined and whole-genome nucleotide sequences of the isolated strains were obtained: H1N1 (n = 2), H3N8 (n = 8), H4N6 (n = 2), H7N3 (n = 2), H8N4 (n = 1), H10N5 (n = 1), and H12N5 (n = 1). No high pathogenicity influenza virus H5 subtype was detected. Phylogenetic analysis of AIV genomes did not reveal any specific pattern for viruses in the Caspian Sea region, showing that all segments belong to the Eurasian clades of classic avian-like influenza viruses. We also did not find the amino acid substitutions in the polymerase complex (PA, PB1, and PB2) that are critical for the increase in virulence or adaptation to mammals. In total, 23 hemagglutinating viruses not related to influenza A virus were also isolated, of which 15 belonged to avian paramyxoviruses. We were able to sequence 12 avian paramyxoviruses of three species, as follows: Newcastle disease virus (n = 4); Avian paramyxovirus 4 (n = 5); and Avian paramyxovirus 6 (n = 3). In the Russian Federation, the Newcastle disease virus of the VII.1.1 sub-genotype was first isolated from a wild bird (common pheasant) in the Caspian Sea region. The five avian paramyxovirus 4 isolates obtained belonged to the common clade in Genotype I, whereas phylogenetic analysis of three isolates of Avian paramyxovirus 6 showed that two isolates, isolated in 2017, belonged to Genotype I and that an isolate identified in 2020 belonged to Genotype II. The continued regular monitoring of AIVs and APMVs, the obtaining of data on the biological properties of isolated strains, and the accumulation of information on virus host species will allow for the adequate planning of epidemiological measures, suggest the most likely routes of spread of the virus, and assist in the prediction of the introduction of the viruses in the western coastal region of the middle Caspian Sea.

High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe-Why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict.

Since 2016, A(H5Nx) high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of clade 2.3.4.4b has become one of the most serious global threats not only to wild and domestic birds, but also to public health. In recent years, important changes in the ecology, epidemiology, and evolution of this virus have been reported, with an unprecedented global diffusion and variety of affected birds and mammalian species. After the two consecutive and devastating epidemic waves in Europe in 2020-2021 and 2021-2022, with the second one recognized as one of the largest epidemics recorded so far, this clade has begun to circulate endemically in European wild bird populations. This study used the complete genomes of 1,956 European HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses to investigate the virus evolution during this varying epidemiological outline. We investigated the spatiotemporal patterns of A(H5Nx) virus diffusion to/from and within Europe during the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 epidemic waves, providing evidence of ongoing changes in transmission dynamics and disease epidemiology. We demonstrated the high genetic diversity of the circulating viruses, which have undergone frequent reassortment events, providing for the first time a complete overview and a proposed nomenclature of the multiple genotypes circulating in Europe in 2020-2022. We described the emergence of a new genotype with gull adapted genes, which offered the virus the opportunity to occupy new ecological niches, driving the disease endemicity in the European wild bird population. The high propensity of the virus for reassortment, its jumps to a progressively wider number of host species, including mammals, and the rapid acquisition of adaptive mutations make the trend of virus evolution and spread difficult to predict in this unfailing evolving scenario.

In Ovo Models to Predict Virulence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5-Viruses for Chickens and Ducks.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5-viruses are circulating in wild birds and are repeatedly introduced to poultry causing outbreaks in the Netherlands since 2014. The largest epizootic ever recorded in Europe was caused by HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses in the period 2021-2022. The recent H5-clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were found to differ in their virulence for chickens and ducks. Viruses causing only mild disease may remain undetected, increasing the risk of virus spread to other farms, wild birds and mammals. We developed in ovo models to determine the virulence of HPAI viruses for chickens and ducks, which are fast and have low costs. The virulence of five contemporary H5-viruses was compared studying replication rate, average time to death and virus spread in the embryo. Remarkable differences in virulence were observed between H5-viruses and between poultry species. The H5N1-2021 virus was found to have a fast replication rate in both the chicken and duck in ovo models, but a slower systemic virus dissemination compared to three other H5-clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. The results show the potential of in ovo models to quickly determine the virulence of novel HPAI viruses, and study potential virulence factors which can help to better guide the surveillance in poultry.

Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - Part 2. Surveillance and mitigation measures.

Selecting appropriate diagnostic methods that take account of the type of vaccine used is important when implementing a vaccination programme against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). If vaccination is effective, a decreased viral load is expected in the samples used for diagnosis, making molecular methods with high sensitivity the best choice. Although serological methods can be reasonably sensitive, they may produce results that are difficult to interpret. In addition to routine molecular monitoring, it is recommended to conduct viral isolation, genetic sequencing and phenotypic characterisation of any HPAI virus detected in vaccinated flocks to detect escape mutants early. Following emergency vaccination, various surveillance options based on virological testing of dead birds ('bucket sampling') at defined intervals were assessed to be effective for early detection of HPAIV and prove disease freedom in vaccinated populations. For ducks, virological or serological testing of live birds was assessed as an effective strategy. This surveillance could be also applied in the peri-vaccination zone on vaccinated establishments, while maintaining passive surveillance in unvaccinated chicken layers and turkeys, and weekly bucket sampling in unvaccinated ducks. To demonstrate disease freedom with > 99% confidence and to detect HPAI virus sufficiently early following preventive vaccination, monthly virological testing of all dead birds up to 15 per flock, coupled with passive surveillance in both vaccinated and unvaccinated flocks, is recommended. Reducing the sampling intervals increases the sensitivity of early detection up to 100%. To enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry during emergency vaccination, laboratory examinations in the 72 h prior to the movement can be considered as a risk mitigation measure, in addition to clinical inspection; sampling results from existing surveillance activities carried out in these 72 h could be used. In this Opinion, several schemes are recommended to enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry following preventive vaccination.

Divergent Pathogenesis and Transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in Swine.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have potential to cross species barriers and cause pandemics. Since 2022, HPAI A(H5N1) belonging to the goose/Guangdong 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin phylogenetic clade have infected poultry, wild birds, and mammals across North America. Continued circulation in birds and infection of multiple mammalian species with strains possessing adaptation mutations increase the risk for infection and subsequent reassortment with influenza A viruses endemic in swine. We assessed the susceptibility of swine to avian and mammalian HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strains using a pathogenesis and transmission model. All strains replicated in the lung of pigs and caused lesions consistent with influenza A infection. However, viral replication in the nasal cavity and transmission was only observed with mammalian isolates. Mammalian adaptation and reassortment may increase the risk for incursion and transmission of HPAI viruses in feral, backyard, or commercial swine.

Update of the target list of wild bird species for passive surveillance of H5 HPAI viruses in the EU

Update of the target list of wild bird species for passive surveillance of H5 HPAI viruses in the EU

Genetic insertion of mouse Myxovirus-resistance gene 1 increases innate resistance against both high and low pathogenic avian influenza virus by significantly decreasing replication in chicken DF1 cell line

Avian influenza virus (AIV) is a constant threat to animal health with recent global outbreaks resulting in the death of hundreds of millions of birds with spillover into mammals. Myxovirus-resistance (Mx) proteins are key mediators of the antiviral response that block virus replication. Mouse (Mu) Mx (Mx1) is a strong antiviral protein that interacts with the viral nucleoprotein to inhibit polymerase function. The ability of avian Mx1 to inhibit AIV is unclear. In these studies, Mu Mx1 was stably introduced into chicken DF1 cells to enhance the immune response against AIV. Following infection, titers of AIV were significantly decreased in cells expressing Mu Mx1. In addition, considerably less cytopathic effect (CPE) and matrix protein staining was observed in gene-edited cells expressing Mu Mx1, suggesting Mu Mx1 is broadly effective against multiple AIV subtypes. This work provides foundational studies for use of gene-editing to enhance innate disease resistance against AIV.

Continuous Introduction of H5 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses in Hokkaido, Japan: Characterization of Viruses Isolated in Winter 2022–2023 and Early Winter 2023–2024

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) has impacted poultry and wild birds globally. The number of H5 HPAI virus (HPAIV) infection cases in wild birds in Hokkaido (Northern Japan) was high in the last two seasons, contributing to virus spillover to resident birds and poultry. Therefore, H5 HPAIVs in birds and mammals in Hokkaido in winter 2022–2023 and 2023–2024 were monitored and viruses were phylogenetically, antigenically, and pathogenetically characterized. Thirty HPAIV isolates were subtyped and pathotyped by sequencing the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of viruses. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA gene revealed that all isolated HPAIVs were categorized into clade 2.3.4.4b and divided into three groups (G2b, G2c, and G2d). Most isolates belonging to subgroup G2d clustered with isolates in winter 2021–2022 in Hokkaido. The other isolates were categorized into two subgroups, G2b and G2c, mainly composed of isolates in Honshu Island in winter 2021–2022 and 2022–2023, respectively. Two H5 HPAIVs isolated in Eastern Russia in spring and autumn 2022 were genetically close to most Hokkaido isolates (G2d), and a virus isolated in Hokkaido in November 2023 was also grouped in subgroup G2d. Further analysis of all eight gene segments identified six types of gene constellations. Cross-hemagglutination inhibition test indicated that the antigenicity of H5 HPAIVs isolated in the last several seasons was similar within them but slightly different from that in the 2010s. Three chicken breeds were intranasally challenged with four representative isolates to assess their pathogenicity. All chickens except one broiler chicken were dead until 5-day postchallenge with different pathogenicity of these viruses. The pathogenicity of one HPAIV strain was significantly lower in broiler chickens than in layer chickens. The mixture of multiple characteristics of HPAIVs in Hokkaido was confirmed by bird migration routes. Thus, many HPAIVs can be brought and scattered anywhere on Earth.

H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in migratory birds exhibiting low pathogenicity in mallards increases its risk of transmission and spread in poultry

In 2020, an H5N1 avian influenza virus of clade 2.3.4.4b was detected in Europe for the first time and was spread throughout the world by wild migratory birds, resulting in the culling of an unprecedented number of wild birds and poultry due to the epidemic. In February 2023, we isolated and identified a strain of H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus from a swab sample from a grey crane in Ningxia, China. Phylogenetic analysis of the Hemagglutinin (HA) gene showed that the virus belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b, and several gene segments were closely related to H5N1 viruses infecting humans in China. Analysis of key amino acid sites revealed that the virus contained multiple amino acid substitutions that facilitate enhanced viral replication and mammalian pathogenicity. The results of animal challenge experiments showed that the virus is highly pathogenic to chickens, moderately pathogenic to BALB/c mice, and highly infectious but not lethal to mallards. Moreover, the virus exhibited minor antigenic drift compared with the H5-Re14 vaccine strain. To this end, we need to pay more attention to the monitoring of wild birds to prevent further spread of viruses to poultry and mammals, including humans.

Avian influenza overview December 2023-March 2024.

Between 2 December 2023 and 15 March 2024, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (227) and wild (414) birds across 26 countries in Europe. Compared to previous years, although still widespread, the overall number of HPAI virus detections in birds was significantly lower, among other reasons, possibly due to some level of flock immunity in previously affected wild bird species, resulting in reduced contamination of the environment, and a different composition of circulating A(H5N1) genotypes. Most HPAI outbreaks reported in poultry were primary outbreaks following the introduction of the virus by wild birds. Outside Europe, the majority of outbreaks in poultry were still clustered in North America, while the spread of A(H5) to more naïve wild bird populations on mainland Antarctica is of particular concern. For mammals, A(H5N5) was reported for the first time in Europe, while goat kids in the United States of America represented the first natural A(H5N1) infection in ruminants. Since the last report and as of 12 March 2024, five human avian influenza A(H5N1) infections, including one death, three of which were clade 2.3.2.1c viruses, have been reported by Cambodia. China has reported two human infections, including one fatal case, with avian influenza A(H5N6), four human infections with avian influenza A(H9N2) and one fatal case with co-infection of seasonal influenza A(H3N2) and avian influenza A(H10N5). The latter case was the first documented human infection with avian influenza A(H10N5). Human infections with avian influenza remain rare and no sustained human-to-human infection has been observed. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals.

Descriptive Epidemiology and Phylodynamics of the “First Wave” of an Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b) in British Columbia and the Yukon, Canada, April to September 2022

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a viral disease that causes significant rates of morbidity and mortality in domestic poultry and wild birds, with occasional spillover into mammals, including humans. Beginning in November 2021, Canada experienced its longest and largest outbreak of HPAI in history. A portion of this outbreak (H5N1, clade 2.3.4.4b) occurred in western Canada, specifically in British Columbia (B.C.) and the Yukon, between April 12 and September 11, 2022, which was classified as the “first wave” in this region. Wild birds and mammals identified through passive surveillance and suspect domestic poultry flocks were screened for avian influenza virus (AIV), typed H5 by qPCR, and positive cases were whole genome sequenced. Descriptive epidemiological and phylodynamic analyses were performed to: (1) understand the taxonomic and geographic extent of wild species involved; and (2) examine the origins and probable transmission networks of HPAI viruses introduced into B.C./Yukon by comparing local viruses with those circulating elsewhere in North America. This outbreak included 21 species of wild birds, 2 species of wild mammals, 4 commercial, and 12 domestic small flock infected premises. Canada geese (Branta canadensis) and bald eagles (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) were the most common wild species detected. We demonstrate that north-south avian migration via the Pacific Flyway is the probable route of multiple incursions into this region. Phylogenetic analysis of the hemagglutinin (HA) segment revealed that the B.C./Yukon viruses detected formed five distinct genetic clusters which were maintained across the whole genome. Although, the genome segments were predominantly Eurasian in origin, NP and PB2 segments from all samples, as well as NS and PB1 segments from Cluster 3, had North American origins. Overall, we demonstrate the utility of genomic epidemiology to inform HPAI transmission dynamics across Western Canada and discuss potential knowledge gaps that exist in passive surveillance strategies for HPAI.

Genome sequences of haemagglutinin cleavage site predict the pathogenicity phenotype of avian influenza virus: statistically validated data for facilitating rapid declarations and reducing reliance on in vivo testing

ABSTRACT Based on the pathogenicity in chickens, most H1–H16 avian influenza viruses (AIV) cause mild diseases, whereas some of the H5 and H7 AI viruses cause severe, systemic disease. The number of basic amino acids in the haemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site of AIV plays a critical role in pathogenicity. As we gain a greater understanding of the molecular mechanisms of pathogenicity, genome sequencing of the HA0 cleavage site has assumed a greater role in assessment of the potential pathogenicity of H5 and H7 viruses. We validated the use of HA cleavage site motif analysis by comparing molecular pathotyping data against experimental in vivo (intravenous pathogenicity index [IVPI] and lethality) data for determination of both low pathogenicity and high pathogenicity AI virus declaration with the goal of expediting pathotype confirmation and further reducing the reliance on in vivo testing. Our data provide statistical support to the continued use of molecular determination of pathotype for AI viruses based on the HA cleavage site sequence in the absence of an in vivo study determination. This approach not only expedites the declaration process of highly pathogenic AIV (HPAIV) but also reduces the need for experimental in vivo testing of H5 and H7 viruses.

Species-specific emergence of H7 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus is driven by intrahost selection differences between chickens and ducks.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) cause severe hemorrhagic disease in terrestrial poultry and are a threat to the poultry industry, wild life, and human health. HPAIVs arise from low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs), which circulate in wild aquatic birds. HPAIV emergence is thought to occur in poultry and not wild aquatic birds, but the reason for this species-restriction is not known. We hypothesized that, due to species-specific tropism and replication, intrahost HPAIV selection is favored in poultry and disfavored in wild aquatic birds. We tested this hypothesis by co-inoculating chickens, representative of poultry, and ducks, representative of wild aquatic birds, with a mixture of H7N7 HPAIV and LPAIV, mimicking HPAIV emergence in an experimental setting. Virus selection was monitored in swabs and tissues by RT-qPCR and immunostaining of differential N-terminal epitope tags that were added to the hemagglutinin protein. HPAIV was selected in four of six co-inoculated chickens, whereas LPAIV remained the major population in co-inoculated ducks on the long-term, despite detection of infectious HPAIV in tissues at early time points. Collectively, our data support the hypothesis that HPAIVs are more likely to be selected at the intrahost level in poultry than in wild aquatic birds and point towards species-specific differences in HPAIV and LPAIV tropism and replication levels as possible explanations.

Genetics of H5N1 and H5N8 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated in Japan in Winter 2021-2022.

In winter 2021-2022, H5N1 and H5N8 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses (HPAIVs) caused serious outbreaks in Japan: 25 outbreaks of HPAI at poultry farms and 107 cases in wild birds or in the environment. Phylogenetic analyses divided H5 HPAIVs isolated in Japan in the winter of 2021-2022 into three groups-G2a, G2b, and G2d-which were disseminated at different locations and times. Full-genome sequencing analyses of these HPAIVs revealed a strong relationship of multiple genes between Japan and Siberia, suggesting that they arose from reassortment events with avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in Siberia. The results emphasize the complex of dissemination and reassortment events with the movement of migratory birds, and the importance of continual monitoring of AIVs in Japan and Siberia for early alerts to the intrusion of HPAIVs.

Caught Right on the Spot: Isolation and Characterization of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus from a Common Pochard (Aythya ferina) Being Attacked by a Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus).

We isolated a high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) virus from a common pochard (Aythya ferina) that was being attacked by a bird of prey in South Korea in December 2020. Genetic analyses indicated that the isolate was closely related to the clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 HPAI viruses found in South Korea and Japan during the winter season of 2020-2021. The histopathological examination revealed multifocal necrotizing inflammation in the liver, kidney, and spleen. Viral antigens were detected in the liver, kidney, spleen, trachea, intestine, and pancreas, indicating the HPAI virus caused a systemic infection. The presence of immunoreactivity for the viral antigen was observed in the cells involved in multifocal necrotic inflammation. Notably, epitheliotropic-positive patterns were identified in the epithelial cells of the trachea, mucosal epithelium of the intestine, and ductular epithelium of the pancreas. These findings provide direct evidence supporting the possibility of HPAI transmission from infected waterfowl to predators.

Spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 avian influenza viruses contributed to H5N1 emergence in 2021/2022 panzootic.

Since 2020, clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 and H5N1 viruses have swept through continents, posing serious threats to the world. Through comprehensive analyses of epidemiological, genetic, and bird migration data, we found that the dominant genotype replacement of the H5N8 viruses in 2020 contributed to the H5N1 outbreak in the 2021/2022 wave. The 2020 outbreak of the H5N8 G1 genotype instead of the G0 genotype produced reassortment opportunities and led to the emergence of a new H5N1 virus with G1's HA and MP genes. Despite extensive reassortments in the 2021/2022 wave, the H5N1 virus retained the HA and MP genes, causing a significant outbreak in Europe and North America. Furtherly, through the wild bird migration flyways investigation, we found that the temporal-spatial coincidence between the outbreak of the H5N8 G1 virus and the bird autumn migration may have expanded the H5 viral spread, which may be one of the main drivers of the emergence of the 2020-2022 H5 panzootic.IMPORTANCESince 2020, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 subtype variants of clade 2.3.4.4b have spread across continents, posing unprecedented threats globally. However, the factors promoting the genesis and spread of H5 HPAI viruses remain unclear. Here, we found that the spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 HPAI viruses contributed to the emergence of the H5N1 variant that caused the 2021/2022 panzootic, and the viral evolution in poultry of Egypt and surrounding area and autumn bird migration from the Russia-Kazakhstan region to Europe are important drivers of the emergence of the 2020-2022 H5 panzootic. These findings provide important targets for early warning and could help control the current and future HPAI epidemics.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b from Peru forms a monophyletic group with Chilean isolates in South America

Highly pathogenic avian Influenza virus (HPAIV) has spread in an unprecedented extent globally in recent years. Despite the large reports of cases in Asia, Europe, and North America, little is known about its circulation in South America. Here, we describe the isolation, and whole genome characterization of HPAIV obtained from sampling 26 wild bird species in Peru, representing one of the largest studies in our region following the latest HPAIV introduction in South America. Out of 147 samples analyzed, 22 were positive for detection of avian influenza virus using a qRT-PCR-based assay. Following inoculation into embryonated chicken eggs, fourteen viral isolates were obtained from which nine isolates were selected for genome characterization, based on their host relevance. Our results identified the presence of HPAIV H5N1 subtype in a highly diverse wild bird species. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that these isolates correspond to the clade 2.3.4.4b, sharing a common ancestor with North American isolates and forming a monophyletic group along with isolates from Chile. Altogether, changes at the amino acid levels compared to their closest relatives indicates the virus is evolving locally, highlighting the need for constant genomic surveillance. This data evidence the chances for spillover events increases as the virus spreads into large populations of immunologically naïve avian species and adding conditions for cross species transmission.

HPAIV outbreak triggers short-term colony connectivity in a seabird metapopulation

Disease outbreaks can drastically disturb the environment of surviving animals, but the behavioural, ecological, and epidemiological consequences of disease-driven disturbance are poorly understood. Here, we show that an outbreak of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus (HPAIV) coincided with unprecedented short-term behavioural changes in Northern gannets (Morus bassanus). Breeding gannets show characteristically strong fidelity to their nest sites and foraging areas (2015–2019; n = 120), but during the 2022 HPAIV outbreak, GPS-tagged gannets instigated long-distance movements beyond well-documented previous ranges and the first ever recorded visits of GPS-tagged adults to other gannet breeding colonies. Our findings suggest that the HPAIV outbreak triggered changes in space use patterns of exposed individuals that amplified the epidemiological connectivity among colonies and may generate super-spreader events that accelerate disease transmission across the metapopulation. Such self-propagating transmission from and towards high density animal aggregations may explain the unexpectedly rapid pan-European spread of HPAIV in the gannet.

Genomic epidemiology of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in wild birds in South Korea during 2021-2022: Changes in viral epidemic patterns.

Clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) viruses have been detected in wild birds worldwide, causing recurrent outbreaks since 2016. During the winter of 2021-2022, we detected one H5N8 and forty-three H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI viruses from wild birds in South Korea. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that HA gene of H5N1 viruses was divided into two genetically distinct groups (N1.G1 and N1.G2). Bayesian phylodynamic analysis demonstrated that wild birds play a vital role in viral transmission and long-term maintenance. We identified five genotypes (N1.G1.1, N1.G2, N1.G2.1, N1.G2.2, and N1.G2.2.1) having distinct gene segment constellations most probably produced by reassortments with low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Our results suggest that clade 2.3.4.4b persists in wild birds for a long time, causing continuous outbreaks, compared with previous clades of H5 HPAI viruses. Our study emphasizes the need for enhancing control measures in response to the changing viral epidemiology.