Hegemonic Transition Research Articles

Latin American regionalism and integration in the ongoing process of hegemonic transition

When observing the critical balance of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in the 21st century, caught between the withdrawal of the United States and the rise of China in the global and regional political and economic stage, one cannot but wonder on what course the processes of regional integration and regionalism will follow in Latin America and the Caribbean in this context. Our hypothesis is that regionalism and the processes of regional integration cannot be understood as “autonomist” processes—that is, as mere processes of facilitating consensus between different regional political actors—but must rather be perceived as a convergence with extraregional hegemonic powers, even amidst an absolute ideological diversity. Therefore, this work looks into the changes taking place within regionalism and the schemes of regional integration led by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in the face of the ongoing anomalous and interstitial process of hegemonic transition from the United States to China that appears to be taking place; these are, undoubtedly, the extraregional references shaping LAC regionalism in the 21st century.

Order, Disorder, Reorder: Can The Liberal International Order “Survive” the Sino-American Competition?

The future of international politics today hinges on how the Sino-American rivalry unfolds. Views vary from expectations of peaceful evolution to hegemonic transition, but many fail to recognize the significant role the liberal international order (LIO) can play in shaping the course of events. Thanks to its structure and adaptability, the LIO is more than the mere environment surrounding this rivalry and may be the primary determinant of American and Chinese choices, steering relations toward cooperation. The success of the LIO during the post-WWII era is notably the product of the environment it has managed to create, characterized by mutual gains, as well as considerable costs in the event of a revisionist disruption. Moreover, the LIO has a structural character that enables it to exert influence on state behavior. This article, drawing on liberal internationalist theory, contends that the LIO demonstrates the substantial potential to emerge as the ultimate “victor” amidst the intensifying rivalry between the two major actors. By evaluating multiple arguments, the analysis concludes that a reformed version of the LIO, which accommodates both American and Chinese aspirations, includes a dual leadership mechanism in decision-making, and reflects the newly shaped power dynamics, offers a viable solution to the Sino-American competition.

The Slippery Pearl: A World-Systems Assessment of China’s Economic Hegemony in the United Arab Emirates

: Despite Washington successfully arresting Beijing’s plan to construct a military base in the UAE, trade between Abu Dhabi and Beijing has grown to such an extent that China is now the UAE’s top source of imports and enjoys a trade surplus larger than Washington’s. Meanwhile, the UAE has received sizable investment for the Belt and Road Initiative and cooperates on promoting the renminbi. Meanwhile, bifurcation theory holds that, contrary to previous hegemonic transitions, US hegemony will split into military hegemony retained by Washington and economic hegemony to be seized by Beijing. Drawing on world-systems analysis, this paper seeks to determine whether the above gains by China are translating into economic hegemony, examining its three components of production, trade, and financial dominance in the UAE. The article argues that, while Beijing has bested Washington in production and trade dominance, several factors—such as the petrodollar—obstruct China’s attainment of financial dominance, thereby preventing bifurcation.

From Minnow to Mighty: A hegemonic analysis of social accountability in BRAC - the world’s largest development NGO

• NGO growth reflects political-ideological shifts that redefine civil-state relations. • A timeline analysis of the world’s largest and number one ranked NGO, BRAC. • Hegemonic transition has proved difficult for BRAC. • NGOs dependent on hegemonic groups are unlikely to advocate radical change. • Cultural and moral leadership produce hegemony that may shift the focus of accountability. • Growth leading to large size and commercialisation pursued to fund and aid social goals brings greater functional accountability and, paradoxically, can inhibit desired social accountability. Based on fieldwork in Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the world’s largest Non-Governmental Organization in Bangladesh, focusing on a Gramscian perspective of hegemony and Gramsci’s military metaphors, this paper examines whether and how BRAC’s cultural and moral leadership helped build a counter-hegemony through a ‘war of position’ and extended its functional accountability into social accountability. We found that BRAC endeavored to disseminate an ‘alternative’ hegemony and develop a ‘historic bloc’ for waging a ‘war of position’. Our approach informs the difficulty large hybrid NGOs such as BRAC face in effectively combining functional and social accountability and pursuing their financial and social goals simultaneously given the political, cultural, and ethical factors paradoxically confronting them. While functional accountability survives through changing regulations and directions of state apparatuses demanding to see NGO’s accounts for legitimacy purposes and appearing to enact regulation within the dominant hegemony, BRAC has become large conglomerates, and their more effective delivery of social and economic welfare programs give them an appearance of an ‘alterative state’ and reinforces their advocacy. To this end, they involve beneficiaries through continuous social accountability practices, but due to their desire to be financially independent, they maintain a commercial orientation based on neoliberal ideals being propagated in LDCs.

From Partnership to Rivalry: China and the USA in the Early Twenty-First Century

Two unconnected crises in the 1970s, a crisis of profitability of global capitalism and a deep crisis of political legitimacy in China, led to creation of a formidable alliance between corporate/financial-led US capital and the Chinese state that sought to resolve both crises by opening China for corporate exploitation. The solution, however, masked different objectives. Transnational corporations moved to China in search of cheap labour to counter falling profits and Beijing sought to use foreign capital to develop the Chinese economy and gain access to technology. Over time China’s interests and those of the USA diverged, as US deindustrialisation became the obverse of China’s dynamic industrialisation. Factions within the US elite began to promote a different approach towards China than that of alliance and accommodation and were able to grab the upper hand during Donald Trump’s presidency, advocating an aggressive approach towards China. This posture consolidated under the Biden administration. These developments set up a struggle for hegemony to which China and the USA bring differing advantages and disadvantages. While a hegemonic transition is one possible outcome of this conflict, the possibility of a hegemonic stalemate or hegemonic vacuum cannot be discounted.

Theories of Antifascism in the Interwar Mediterranean Part II

The current proliferation of authoritarianism across both core and periphery is one political articulation of the current crisis of the capitalist world-system. Authoritarianism similarly proliferated in previous periods of crisis, in the 1970s and 1980s in the peripheries, and in the 1930s and 1940s in the core. In Part I of this essay, I detail how world-systems analysts have long been attuned to describing and analyzing chaotic moments in between systemic cycles of hegemony, but less attention has been given to the rise of authoritarianism in these chaotic phases. The multiple crises of hegemonic transition engenders an ideological contestation between Fascism and Communism revealing the limitations of Liberalism, the foundational ideology of the world-system. In such periods of hegemonic breakdown, anarchists developed autonomous strategies of resisting authoritarian rule at both the point of production (the worker-occupied and self-managed workplace) and at the point of leisure (the autonomous zone of the infoshop or café as resources and interventions in the joint struggle against capitalism and authoritarianism. These theories are important to recover for the contemporary fight against a resurgent authoritarianism across the world-system in the current conjuncture.

Theories of Antifascism in the Interwar Mediterranean Part I

The current proliferation of authoritarianism across both core and periphery is one political articulation of the current crisis of the capitalist world-system. Authoritarianism similarly proliferated in previous periods of crisis, in the 1970s and 80s in the peripheries, and in the 1930s and 40s in the core. In Part I of this essay, I detail how world-systems analysts have long been attuned to describing and analyzing chaotic moments in between systemic cycles of hegemony, but less attention has been given to the rise of authoritarianism in these chaotic phases. The multiple crises of hegemonic transition engenders an ideological contestation between Fascism and Communism revealing the limitations of Liberalism, the foundational ideology of the world-system. In such periods of hegemonic breakdown, anarchists developed autonomous strategies of resisting authoritarian rule at both the point of production (the worker-occupied and self-managed workplace) and at the point of leisure (the autonomous zone of the infoshop or café as resources and interventions in the joint struggle against capitalism and authoritarianism. These theories are important to recover for the contemporary fight against a resurgent authoritarianism across the world-system in the current conjuncture.

Brazil’s Lost Pathway to Regional Hegemony: Structural Changes in the South American Regional System (1810-2010s)

Objective/Context: This article addresses the systemic and macro-historical meaning of the position of Brazil in South America. We argue that the Brazilian predominance was an outcome of structural changes in the regional system. Methodology: We trace the process of formation of the South American regional system in the post-independence period, identifying four intervals of regional structural transformation: 1) anarchical system formation (1810-1870s); 2) anarchical stability (1880-1930s); 3) hegemonic transition (1940-2000s); and 4) hegemonic stabilization (2000-2010s). Process tracing and historical-comparative methods help to organize the corresponding causal chains. Conclusions: Our findings show that Brazil’s role in the region is the result of an ongoing process of regional hegemonic stabilization, characterized by (i) a unipolar distribution of power, (ii) a regional governance order, and (iii) a hegemonic ordering principle. Despite the existence of structural conditions for the configuration of a hegemonic structure, the country did not embrace its position as a regional hegemon. Originality: While the literature on the topic mainly focuses on foreign policy and interactional dynamics, this study proposes an explanation focused on regional structural changes, presenting: (i) a theory of systemic complexity and macro-historical changes, and (ii) a theory of systemic structure types, addressing relations between distinct structural elements at the regional level of analysis.

Theorizing Law, Social Movements, and State Formation in India

Abstract With the rise of Hindu nationalist statecraft under the Modi regime, India finds itself at a perilous conjuncture that compels a critical rethinking of the political economy of the world's largest democracy. In this article, we propose a conceptual framework for doing so, centered on a Gramscian rethinking of the relationship among law, social movements, and state formation in the longue durée of Indian democracy. Working across three hegemonic transitions in Indian democracy, we argue that social movements and the state have constituted each other across this longue durée, and that this co-constitution has been both mediated by and inscribed in law. Crucially, we focus on the making and unmaking of compromise equilibriums between dominant and subaltern social forces in state-society relations in and through law and legal formations from the transition to independence, via the unravelling of the Nehruvian state, to the present moment of neoliberalization and authoritarian populism. The article is organized around three analytical concerns—law and hegemony, state formation as a hegemonic process, and the dialectic of power and resistance in passive revolution. In the conclusion, we bring our reflections to bear on the current conjuncture in Indian democracy.

Pandemic: Invisibility and silence

ABSTRACT Can the COVID pandemic be understood in any other than ecocritical and decolonial terms? It has brought nothing new except perhaps a certain fatalism in politics, borrowed from eco-catastrophism. Apocalyptic visions of migration, the Anthropocene, pestilence, and neo-populism exacerbate longer-term trends. Religious fanatics with machine guns take whips to outsiders whose gender or skin colour they despise at the behest of billionaire warlords from the Texas border to Kabul. But COVID-19 coincides with some intriguing cultural novelties, most of all a plague of visibility traced here through Ana Lily Amirpour’s film A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, paired with a simultaneous mode of disappearance associated with the video image. Hegemonic transitions, the rise of financialization, and extractive postcolonization tie pandemic to fading (and therefore vengeful) American individualism and the rising (and therefore aggressive) Chinese command economy. The virus is occasion for profit: only a new and ecologically scaled cosmopolitanism can save us.

Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony and Geoeconomics

If successfully realised, the Belt and Road Initiative will be the most ambitious and expansive developmental project the world has ever seen. It is not, however, unprecedented. In the aftermath of the Second World War the United States developed what was then an equally unprecedented and ambitious initiative designed to simultaneously facilitate the (re)development of some of the world’s key economies and reinforce its own position as the leader of the western world. Both the American Marshall Plan and China’s BRI are important expressions of geoeconomic influence and power. This paper compares the two projects from the perspectives of ‘hegemonic transitions’ and ‘comparative hegemony’ in order to highlight some striking similarities and noteworthy differences, and gauge the prospects for the BRI and its possible scenarios. Comparatively speaking, the BRI does not have the same sort of compelling geopolitical imperatives and narrative that the emerging Cold War provided for American hegemonic leadership. The Chinese project also lacks the comprehensive global institutional architecture developed in the aftermath of the Second World War that facilitated American influence. Consequently, it may prove more difficult for China to utilise the BRI to translate potential geoeconomic leverage into the sort of hegemonic influence that the US enjoyed during the Cold War, despite its unparalleled ambitions.

Technological transition and technological dependency: Latin America–China relations in a changing international order

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework of the relationship between technological transitions and hegemonic transitions in the international system from a historical perspective and discuss its consequences for technologically dependent countries and regions.Design/methodology/approachThis paper analyzes the relationship between technological transitions and hegemonic transitions in the international system from a historical perspective. It then constructs four possible transition scenarios for China's international order and the USA's central role in defining the international order. IT closes with a discussion of how changes in ICT and global health public goods can impact China's position in the international order and opportunities for Latin America–China technology partnerships.FindingsHistorically, technological transitions and hegemonic transitions in the international system simultaneously occur, with the country winning the technological dispute emerging as the international system's hegemon. The USA and China are currently involved in technological races in several next-generation technologies. The outcome of these technological races will define each country's position in the international system in the coming decades and the transformations in the international order.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper is limited to discussing the technologies/sectors: ICT, specifically 5G, and AI technologies, and medical technologies with the potential of global public health goods. Research on other technologies/sectors will provide a deeper understanding of the likely outcomes of the current technological transition and its implications for the balance of power in the international system.Practical implicationsThis paper makes a case for Latin American countries to (1) engage in a pragmatic bargain with China and the USA to establish technological partnerships in emerging technologies and (2) to develop national technology strategies aimed at promoting autonomous technology development capabilities.Social implicationsThis paper addresses the need for Latin America to take a strong stance for technological autonomy, stressing the differences in buying technology and making technology.Originality/valueThis paper presents an original framework of the relationship between technological transitions and hegemonic transitions in the international system. It discusses how technological leadership impacts the international order by establishing relations of technological dominance and technological dependency.

WTO Crisis through the Lens of Hegemony Theories: When International Trade Law and Geopolitics Collide

Abstract The liberal trade order that prevailed after World War II is shifting to an order where major powers increasingly intervene to secure political, economic, and technological gains – in a dynamic that results in a deep crisis of the WTO and the retreat of globalization. Whereas International Trade Law-centered analysis points out that this phenomenon occurs due to faults in the WTO legal framework, the assessment of the issue through the lens of Hegemony Theories indicate that the roots of the crisis stand in the ongoing process of hegemonic transition since the U.S. – the traditional patron of free trade, perceive such order as beneficial to China, which is the emerging power that has been grasping huge advantages from international trade. International regimes and the institutions that govern it are forged by the hegemons’ leadership and largely reflect their preferences. Consequently, the emergence of a new challenger and the hegemon declining power tend to cause disruptions in the prevailing order. Policy recommendations to overcome the WTO crisis must benefit from the insights from Hegemony Theories.

The Hegemony’s Contest in the South China Sea

Constantly analyzed in scientific, theoretical, and empirical studies, the “ Asian Mediterranean” region has received renewed attention as a consequence of the rise of China. China’s emergence combines its strong economic dynamic with increased confidence, positioning it as a potential regional hegemony. On that conceptual basis, this study aims to answer whether a power transition has already occurred in the South China Sea and how the process of a regional hegemonic transition took place. Through an examination of the instruments used by the United States and China to exercise power, articulated with the power transition theory, it establishes that a transition in the South China Sea dispute could have already occurred. However, the study disclaims that Beijing’s evolution and sudden change of behavior aim to overthrow the U.S. global leadership but rather intends to reclaim its position of regional hegemony.

Northern Firms, Standard-Setting Bodies, and Rising Powers

How does a standard-setting body based in the United States influence domestic regulatory contests in rising powers like China and India? And why might it be more successful in imposing its norms in one country or another? This paper answers these questions through a comparative analysis of domestic regulatory contention over pesticide residue standards for soft drinks in India and over nutritional standards for infant formula in China. Drawing together insights from science and technology studies, political economic approaches to standards and science, and the institutional approach to hegemonic transitions, I make three arguments. First, standard-setting bodies are increasingly available for hire by transnational firms; however, as their authority is not automatic, they are strategically cultivating scientific and policy networks in rising powers. Second, states in rising powers respond differently to the advocacy of standard-setting bodies, depending on distinct patterns of inter-firm and inter-state competition across the sectors to be regulated. Finally, because both standard-setting bodies and states in rising powers are compelled to build new coalitions of scientific and political actors to wield influence, these struggles are recasting the geographies of institutional power over standards in new ways.

Great Power Competition and Chinese Assertiveness in the Covid World Order

The current trends in world politics are primarily a manifestation of the hegemonic transition in which China’s ascent simultaneously accompanies US retrenchment. This paper contributed to the growing scholarly attention on various aspects of the COVID world order and the domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy behavior. China’s international reputation has been undermined by allegations of perfidy and opaqueness in its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak from a dominant section of the international community led by the US. The COVID-19 outbreak has exacerbated populist demands in various countries, particularly in the Global North, to “decouple” and reduce their interdependence with China. The post-COVID hostility towards China has exacerbated the broader anti-globalization sentiment in the major Western nations that had been building over the past few years. This protectionist shift in the West includes Brexit, the withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the rapid deterioration of the relationship of major Anglo-Saxon powers with China. Besides, significant regional actors like Japan and India are seriously reexamining their relationship with China.

Unravelling the Thucydides’ Trap: Inadvertent Escalation or War of Choice?

Abstract No other text in the intellectual history of International Relations has become as frequent a victim of confirmation bias and selective presentism as has Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. Most recently, misinterpretations of the classical treatise have engendered the popular catchphrase, “the Thucydides’ Trap”, and thinkers and politicians’ resultant drawing of erroneous parallels between the Peloponnesian War and current Sino-US relations. This article seeks to deconstruct the Thucydides’ Trap core thematic of inadvertent escalation, and to outline the logic of hegemonic transition as it is actually expounded by Thucydides. Although Thucydides is the first thinker in the West clearly to identify the significance of structure in interstate affairs, his hegemonic transition theory is complex rather than purely systemic. Thucydides thus dedicates most of his work to assessing the strategic decisions made in fervid political debates, evidencing his perception of polity and politics as key elements that dynamically interact with structural conditions to effectuate strategic choice. Consequently, the Peloponnesian War was not an outcome of inadvertent escalation, but of premeditated strategic choices made by adversaries with clashing policy objectives. Therefore, within the structural constraints, it is on leadership and strategy that Thucydides puts a premium, and hence prioritizes prudence (Sophrosyne/Σωφροσύνη) as the most consequential virtue of statesmanship. Building on the Thucydidean logic of hegemonic transition, we conclude by presenting six strategic corollaries of contemporary Sino-US relations, remaining attentively cognizant at all times of the limitations of historical analogies, and abiding by ex antiquis et novissimis optima.

The United States, China, and the Politics of Hegemonic Ordering in East Asia

Abstract China's rise has raised important questions about the durability of US hegemony in East Asia. Much of the debate, however, has generally been cast in fairly simplistic terms, suggesting the durability or end of US regional hegemony. Such framings nevertheless fail to fully capture regional dynamics and complexity. Advancing an English School conception of hegemony, this paper examines the politics, contestation, and renegotiation of the post–Cold War US hegemonic order in East Asia. It maps out four logics of hegemonic ordering in the existing literature, outlines their shortfalls and advances a twofold argument. First, although regional order will not disintegrate into binary “order versus disorder” or “US versus Chinese hegemony” scenarios, the politics of hegemonic ordering—the interactive discourses, processes, relations, and practices that underpin hegemony—will intensify as the United States and China continue to both cooperate and compete for power, position, and influence in East Asia. Second, I argue that the East Asian regional order will evolve in ways that resemble hybrid forms of hegemony in a complex hierarchy. Specifically, I develop a new logic—“coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy”—that is anchored in assertiveness, fluidity, and compartmentalization. It demonstrates that Washington and Beijing will not only form coalitional hegemonies, seeking legitimation from multiple and often overlapping constituencies, but also engage in a collaborative hegemony on shared interests. This better reflects evolving regional dynamics and yields theoretical insights into examining hegemonic transitions less as clearly delineated transitions from one distinct hegemonic order to the next, and more as partial and hybrid ones.

The Winding Paths of Hegemony: Giovanni Arrighi and the Limits of the Theory of Hegemonic Transitions

ABSTRACT As many commentators highlighted, a distinguishing feature of Arrighi’s notion of hegemony lays in its Gramscian background. However, an in-depth analysis of the uses and problems of the Gramscian concept of hegemony in the work of Arrighi is still missing. The aim of this contribution is thus to fill this gap, by showing how the interpretation and use of Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony by Arrighi looks far more problematic than himself admitted. The main argument here defended is that the Gramscian definition of hegemony constitutes at the same time a veritable cornerstone and the weakest point in Arrighi’s general theory.

China’s expansion and the construction of an argument: Exploring international theory with regard to a new era of strategic containment

This article attempts to build a rational case about China’s burgeoning expansion, revisiting the interrelated questions of the long cycles, hegemonic transitions and the so-called “Thucydides’s Trap” among other analytical dimensions, drawing mainly upon some of the most important theoretical propositions from Thucydides, Kautilya, Organski, Modelski, Gilpin, and G. Allison. The conclusion points to the idea that the current international system already reveals a new phase of strategic containment.