Release Of Hazardous Materials Research Articles

Hospital response to chemical terrorism: Personal protective equipment, training, and operations planning

Hospitals distant from the immediate site of an incident involving a hazardous materials (HAZMATs) release which could include chemical warfare agents, must develop emergency response plans (ERPs) to protect healthcare professionals if they receive potentially contaminated victims. The ERP must address OSHA, EPA, and JCAHO requirements. The VHA convened groups to develop a hazard and exposure assessment, identify actions for compliance with existing regulatory standards, and review site and operational planning issues. Exposure modeling results were used to derive relationships between operational parameters (time and distance from sites/sources) and potential exposure for healthcare workers. According to exposure modeling, level C personal protective equipment is adequate to protect hospital staff distant from the chemical release site. Decontamination runoff and contaminated clothing should also be controlled to limit exposure. Development and coordination of ERPs must include the local emergency planning committee, with clear assignment of tasks, locations, and training in order to prevent exposures to healthcare workers.

Brief Report: Exposure to Tear Gas from a Theft-Deterrent Device on a Safe—Wisconsin, December 2003

On December 4, 2003, a hazardous materials (HazMat) release occurred at a jewelry store in Beloit, Wisconsin, when the store owner tightened a screw on the door of an old safe outfitted with a chemical theft-deterrent device. The device included a metal housing containing a glass vial of liquid, which cracked as the screw tightened, releasing approximately 4 ounces of tear gas. The store owner sustained eye and skin irritation and was treated at a hospital and released. Twelve persons in the building and persons in adjacent businesses were evacuated for 3 hours while a certified Level A HazMat team*, city firefighters, and emergency medical technicians responded to the release. This report summarizes the response to this event and underscores the need for persons who use old safes and vaults to know how to identify these devices and avoid tampering with them.

An Approach to Hospital Decontamination Team Development at a University Hospital

Three years after the World Trade Center terrorist event, hospitals are still under increased pressure to ensure an adequate level of disaster preparedness. One facet of this preparedness is the ability to respond to the release of hazardous materials appropriately. While the threat of terrorism has led to an increase in public attention, the need for such capability extends well beyond the realm of defence against intentional release of a hazardous substance. Accidental exposures also require an adequate response plan. One key element in such a plan is the development, training and use of hospital decontamination teams. This paper will discuss a novel approach to the development of a hospital decontamination team at an urban university hospital.

Methodology for prediction and estimation of consequences of possible atmospheric releases of hazardous matter: "Kursk" submarine study

Abstract. There are objects with some periods of higher than normal levels of risk of accidental atmospheric releases (nuclear, chemical, biological, etc.). Such accidents or events may occur due to natural hazards, human errors, terror acts, and during transportation of waste or various operations at high risk. A methodology for risk assessment is suggested and it includes two approaches: 1) probabilistic analysis of possible atmospheric transport patterns using long-term trajectory and dispersion modelling, and 2) forecast and evaluation of possible contamination and consequences for the environment and population using operational dispersion modelling. The first approach could be applied during the preparation stage, and the second - during the operation stage. The suggested methodology is applied on an example of the most important phases (lifting, transportation, and decommissioning) of the ``Kursk" nuclear submarine operation. It is found that the temporal variability of several probabilistic indicators (fast transport probability fields, maximum reaching distance, maximum possible impact zone, and average integral concentration of 137Cs) showed that the fall of 2001 was the most appropriate time for the beginning of the operation. These indicators allowed to identify the hypothetically impacted geographical regions and territories. In cases of atmospheric transport toward the most populated areas, the forecasts of possible consequences during phases of the high and medium potential risk levels based on a unit hypothetical release (e.g. 1 Bq) are performed. The analysis showed that the possible deposition fractions of 10-11 (Bq/m2) over the Kola Peninsula, and 10-12 - 10-13 (Bq/m2) for the remote areas of the Scandinavia and Northwest Russia could be observed. The suggested methodology may be used successfully for any potentially dangerous object involving risk of atmospheric release of hazardous materials of nuclear, chemical or biological nature.

Materials Release Reporting Synergism for Emergency Planning Priorities: An Evaluation of Data from Three Regulatory Programs

Environmental regulations have evolved and expanded in a variety of directions since the 1960s, and now include preventative measures such as Clean Air Act 112r Catastrophic Release Planning, and, under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, State Emergency Response Commissions that have emergency planning responsibilities that address air contaminant releases through toxic chemical contingency and response plans. Information is available from many existing programs, both state and federal, that can be used to evaluate potential air releases, including the Toxics Release Inventory, Risk Management Plans, and spill reporting requirements. A study was conducted to evaluate whether there is any regulatory consensus that can be used by the Connecticut State Emergency Response Commission for hazardous materials release response planning and control strategies. Three distinct regulatory programs were evaluated to determine whether one group of chemicals, industry sector, or geographic area exhibited a greater magnitude of, or similar types of, air contaminant releases. Based on 1998 Envirofacts data, it was concluded that for Connecticut: (1) there were no predominant chemicals reported under the various regulations studied; (2) most air emissions of concern are permitted; and (3) there appear to be no regulatory redundancies regarding the chemicals reported. This may not be true for other states, however, and an assessment, by state, of air pollution regulations affecting industrial facilities can be useful for evaluating reporting requirements and eliminating duplicative efforts. Although significant trends were not identified in this study, the emergency response planning database has been increased, and Connecticut emergency planning professionals will be better able to define the potential effects of chemical releases.

Methodology for evaluation of possible consequences of accidental atmospheric releases of hazardous matter.

Sites exist with high levels of risk of accidental atmospheric releases. These releases can be hazardous nuclear, chemical, and biological matter. Such accidents may occur during transport of waste, or they may be due to natural hazards, human errors, terror acts or various operations at high risk. Considering the operation of lifting and transport of the sunken Kursk nuclear submarine as an example, a methodology for risk assessment is described. This methodology includes two approaches: (1) probabilistic analysis of possible atmospheric transport pathways using trajectory modelling, and (2) evaluation of possible contamination and consequences using real-time operational atmospheric dispersion modelling. The first approach can be applied in advance of an operation during the preparation stage, the second in real time during the operation stage. For the cases considered in this study, the results of trajectory modelling are supported by the operational dispersion modelling, i.e., the westerly flow is dominant during fall occurring 79% of the time. Hence, September-October 2001 was more appropriate for the lifting and transport of the Kursk nuclear submarine in comparison with summer months, when atmospheric transport toward the populated regions of the Kola and Scandinavian Peninsulas was dominant. The suggested methodology may be applied to any potentially dangerous object involving a risk of atmospheric release of hazardous material of nuclear, chemical or biological nature.

Railroad Derailment Factors Affecting Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk

U.S. freight railroad accident and hazardous materials release rates have declined substantially since 1980. Ironically, this trend has made the identification and implementation of further safety improvement options more challenging because less empirical information exists on which accident causes present the greatest risks. Consequently, more sophisticated methods are needed to identify the best options for transportation risk reduction. Of particular interest is identifying the principal causes of accidents that can result in a tank car release of hazardous materials, which can harm people, property, and the environment. Because large hazardous materials release accidents are relatively rare, railroads cannot effectively manage safety improvement efforts solely in response to the causes of specific accidents. Instead, a risk-based approach is needed to better understand predictive factors for conditions that can cause a release. Railroad derailment data were analyzed to identify the conditions most likely to lead to a release accident. The objective was to identify proxy variables that can be used as performance measures. The speed of derailment and number of derailed cars highly correlated with hazardous materials releases. Some accident causes are much more likely to lead to release conditions than others. Accident prevention efforts to reduce these causes are more likely to reduce the risk of major railroad hazardous materials release accidents.

Assessing risks from threats to process plants: Threat and vulnerability analysis

AbstractProcess security management addresses threats from terrorist and criminal acts against plants that may result in the release of hazardous materials. The risk of such threats must be assessed to determine if existing security measures and safeguards are adequate or need improvement. Risk assessment is the heart of a process security program. Process plants need straight forward and easily applied methods to assess security risks using techniques that can be employed in a variety of situations and at varying levels of detail. This paper describes an approach that accomplishes these objectives.Threat analysis is the first step. It is used to identify the sources and types of threats and their likelihood. The approach described in this paper involves the consideration of motivations and capabilities of adversaries and the rating of facility security factors to develop a threat profile. Once specific threats have been identified, process vulnerability analysis is used to identify threat scenarios, i.e., how threats could be realized. Plants and processes are divided into sectors, and each credible threat within each sector is considered. Vulnerabilities are identified by brainstorming the ways barriers can be penetrated and process containment breached. Checklists are used to guide the brainstorming, and scenario consequences are recorded. Existing security measures and safeguards are listed, and any recommendations for improvements to reduce the likelihood and severity of terrorist and criminal acts are made for consideration by management based on the nature of the threat, process vulnerabilities, possible consequences, and existing security measures and safeguards. Risk rankings are performed as part of the analyses.

Development of a potential initiator impacts table for ITER safety analyses

ITER safety studies have included the systematic identification of postulated initiating events (PIEs) that could start event sequences leading to potentially hazardous conditions. A transparent presentation is required to show the potential impact that each PIE may have on the plant. The PIE-potential impacts table (PIE–PIT) has been developed as an approach to this. An important aspect of the development is the determination of a set of Plant States that encompass all conceivable conditions in which a significant release of hazardous material to the environment can be postulated. This has been done for the ITER tokamak, leading to a set of 10 representative Plant States. Event sequences leading to such states generally require the independent failure of two or more confinement barriers, and are thus of very low frequency. A further set of 16 Plant States have been identified in which there is no significant release, but in which an ITER confinement function is challenged. The PIE–PIT can be used to find the most significant challenges, and eventually to lead to a new definition of a set of bounding events for future safety analyses.

Bad Policy: CERCLA's Amended Liability for New Purchasers

I. INTRODUCTION One of the most significant environmental issues facing the United States today is the abandonment or underutilization of land feared to be contaminated by hazardous materials. Such sites, known as brownfields, are blamed for a variety of ills. Beyond posing risks to human health, their disuse also contributes to the loss of municipal tax bases and helps fuel both urban sprawl and the destruction of open space. (1) A number of people and institutions have sought to identify ways to encourage the clean-up of brownfields and return them to productive use. (2) Many commentators have concluded that one of the most significant impediments to brownfield redevelopment has been the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), (3) commonly called Superfund. (4) Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to address the consequences of decades of careless hazardous waste disposal practices. CERCLA aimed to: (1) prevent further contamination and release of hazardous material by requiring prompt clean-up of existing hazardous sites and (2) deter future hazardous materials releases by imposing high liability costs on careless waste management practices. (5) Congress advanced these two aims by creating a broad class of jointly and severally liable parties. Liability attached not only to those who were directly involved in the production, transportation, or management of the waste released; it also attached to the owner of the property from which a release of hazardous materials was taking place or at least threatened. Thus, a property owner would be liable even if the hazardous materials were deposited on the site long before he took title to the property. (6) This broad CERCLA liability alone would have deterred the purchase of any property potentially subject to CERCLA. But reality proved even worse for prospective brownfields purchasers. Cleaning up a given CERCLA site turned out to take more time and money than most people expected. Predictably, this further deterred acquisition and development of brownfields. Some commentators and policy makers argued that amending CERCLA was the only way to render brownfields attractive to developers. Among other things, they contended that the Act should be amended to relieve prospective property purchasers from liability. (7) The reasoning was straightforward enough: if developers shied away from brownfields because of fear of CERCLA liability, remove that liability. Only then would significant brownfield development take place. Congress eventually endorsed the idea. In early 2002, President Bush signed the Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001 (8) (BRERA) into law. Among other things, BRERA amended CERCLA to relieve a certain class of property owners from liability under the Act (the Amendment), namely those owners who were not otherwise liable under the Act (as operators, arrangers, etc.) and who took title after January 11, 2002. (9) This article challenges the Congressional and commentator wisdom that changing CERCLA to relieve prospective property purchasers from liability is good policy. I will argue that the Amendment is actually bad policy. Previous commentators have touched on earlier proposals to free prospective purchasers from CERCLA liability. (10) Instead, this article offers the first focused and sustained analysis of the current liability relief. Rather than addressing the subject as a proposal in the abstract, this article analyzes liability relief as it has now been enacted into law. Amending CERCLA to shield prospective purchasers from liability was a mistake. The Amendment removed an important disincentive to the release of hazardous materials. It gave a windfall to property owners who acquired title with knowledge of their potential liability after CERCLA's 1980 enactment. This windfall is unfair because it is arbitrary. It is also potentially inefficient. …

Identifying Hurricane-Induced Hazardous Material Release Scenarios in a Petroleum Refinery

Hurricanes and other natural disasters can induce hazardous material (hazmat) releases. However, researchers generally treat natural and technological disasters as separate entities rather than as conjoint events. This paper investigates hurricane-induced hazardous material (hurmat) releases in a petroleum refinery. The information developed in this study indicates the need to develop emergency response plans, mitigation measures, and design criteria to minimize health risks and property damage from conjoint disasters at industrial facilities. This paper identifies possible hurmat release scenarios in a refinery, and assesses the type of release that might result. Four hurricane threats are considered: high winds, tornadoes, flooding, and lightning. These hazards can lead to hazmat releases caused by damage to equipment, damage to pipes and connections, short circuits and/or power failures, punctured tanks and vessels, and structural damage to buildings and facilities. Hazmats can be released in fires and/or explosions, toxic gas emissions, and spills. The multiple consequences of each hazard scenario are analyzed, and the relationships between the different hazard types are illustrated. The present paper concludes that refineries are susceptible to all four hurricane threats and that these threats could serve as triggering mechanisms for hazardous chemical releases. For public policy application, risk quantification of the scenarios presented should be undertaken; the authors recommend that a strategy of expert elicitation be adopted for this purpose.

The Use of Scenarios in Contingency Planning

ABSTRACT Prior to the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), predesignated On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) prepared local contingency plans (LCPs) with little opportunity for participation outside the OSC's staff by affected stakeholders. OPA 90 changed the fundamental structure of this vitally important planning tool used to articulate the policies and arrangements for oil spill and hazardous material release in a geographic area. A new plan, called an Area Contingency Plan (ACP), was envisioned to be developed by Area Committees that generally include the principle stakeholders in an area. By and large, the ACP process is working, although the quality of plans varies greatly around the United States. A new planning concept, however, currently in use by some of the leading and most successful businesses in the world, has yet to find its way into planning for oil spills and hazardous substance releases. That new concept, scenario planning, creates the means for capturing the potential for a variety of futures without attempting to predict the future. The Julian N spill in Portland, Maine in 1996 was considered a success in large measure because the incident followed on the heels of a scenario-driven area exercise. Scenario planning formalizes that process in such a way as to make the ACP reflect the consensus—what incidents might occur, what are the critical areas of concern, and how might they be dealt with in an efficient way. It brings together the response community and others in a way that ensures participation, understanding, and cooperation in the planning process when it is most needed—before an incident occurs.

Westley Tire Fire, Stanislaus County, California

ABSTRACT This is a case study of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emergency response actions taken at one of the largest tire fires in California. The site was an illegal scrap tire dump known as the Filbin Tire Pile. There was an estimated 7 million tires in the pile. The site was located in a canyon in the rolling hills above the San Joaquin Valley near the Town of Westley, California. This tire fire was considered a major environmental disaster where large populations were affected and there was a potential for severe environmental damage. Responders with past experience recognized that the tire fire would be a unique multi-category event containing the elements of a major fire: hazardous materials release and oil spill discharge combined into one event. Shortly after the fire ignited the tires began to pyrolyze, producing a steady stream of oil that discharged to an unnamed drainage in the hills above the valley. The oil in the drainage flashed sending great plumes of thick black smoke into the valley. The oil and tire fires quickly overwhelmed the resources of the local fire departments. The EPA On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) immediately responded using federal authority to respond to and, if necessary, remove a discharge of oil or a hazardous substance under the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1321(c)) as amended by the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Some of the most difficult problems that were encountered included making decisions on fire suppression tactics; conducting safe operations in extremely hot and unstable fire conditions; maneuvering heavy equipment on steep slopes, and deep and spongy tire piles; controlling massive volumes of oil and water runoff; coordinating with local and state governmental agencies; forming a fully integrated and effective Incident Command System led by a Unified Command (ICS/UC); and recycling of pyrolytic oil under current California hazardous waste regulations.

Comparison of atmospheric transport calculations over complex terrain using a mobile profiling system and rawinsondes

AbstractA comparison of atmospheric transport and dispersion calculations over complex terrain was investigated using a mobile profiling system (MPS) versus standard meteorological balloons. Meteorological and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) concentration data were collected and used to evaluate the performance of a transport and diffusion model coupled with a mass consistency wind field model. Meteorological data were collected throughout April 1995, and parts of August 1995. Both meteorological and concentration data were measured in December 1995. Once the models were validated, the comparison of performance with different upper‐air data were accomplished. The models used included the SCIPUFF (Second‐order Closure Integrated Puff) transport and diffusion model and the MINERVE mass consistency wind model. Evaluation of the models was focused primarily on their effectiveness as a short‐term (one to four hours) predictive tool. These studies showed how the combination of weather and transport models could be used to help direct emergency response following a hazardous material release. The models were used in tandem to direct the deployment of mobile sensors intended to intercept and measure tracer clouds. The MINERVE model was validated for the specific terrain of interest using April 1995 data. The capability of SCIPUFF driven by realistic three‐dimensional wind fields generated by MINERVE is demonstrated using data collected in December 1995. Copyright © 2000 Royal Meteorological Society

Poison center planning for mass gatherings: the Georgia Poison Center experience with the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games.

The host city for the Olympic Games needs to prepare for "the world" to visit. This article is the first published report describing the impact of an event such as the Olympics on poison center services. We evaluated our operations and identified potential new demands. Operational aspects reviewed included: staffing; communication with foreign language callers; knowledge of international drug products; telephone access; procedures for disaster response and recovery; poison treatment protocols; and handling of hazardous material releases. We collaborated with local, state, and federal planners to delineate the poison center role and to develop protocols for use in a poisoning, including a hazardous material's release at a densely populated site. We enhanced our capability to respond to unusual incidents by forming new alliances. Fortunately, no such events occurred; these plans were therefore not tested. The Georgia Poison Center developed and implemented new capabilities for the Centennial Olympic Games. Immediate access to poison center resources would have facilitated the care of poisoned patients at multiple hospitals if this had become necessary. Communities preparing for mass gatherings should capitalize on the common interests of poison centers, hazardous materials specialists, and public safety agencies. Preparations should emphasize the most likely events, while recognizing the possibility of the unexpected. Planning an integrated response allows the talents and resources of participating agencies to be maximally utilized.

The explosion blast prediction model in the revised CPR 14E (yellow book)

AbstractThe well‐known Yellow Book, nickname for the publication by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and the Environment contains a number of models for prediction of the effects following an accidenial release of hazardous materials. TNO was involved in a complete revision of this Yellow Book. One of the models that has been completely revised is the blast prediction model for vapor cloud explosions. The Multy‐Energy model was selected as the new model to be incorporated in the revision. The concept of the Multy‐Energy model is widely accepted as a better alternative to TNT equivalence methods although a practical application is hampered by a lack of guidance for application in practice. Guidance for application is given in the revision, though it still leads to conservative solutions.This paper describes how the method should be applied according to the revised Yellow Book. The motivation for the guidance for application given is discussed by comparison with guidance given in other publications and with experimental results obtained from some large scale experimental programs. Present efforts in an ongoing research program by TNO to obtain more detailed and sound guidance is presented as well.

ON EXERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

Environmental problems span a continuously growing range of pollutants, hazards and eco-system degradation factors that affect areas ranging from local through regional to global. Some of these problems may arise from observable, chronic effects on, for instance, human health, while others may stem from the perceived risk of a possible accidental release of hazardous materials. A significant number of these environmental issues are caused by or relate to the production, transformation and end use of energy. In this regard, energy and environment studies which lead to increased energy efficiency can reduce environmental impact by reducing energy losses. Within the scope of exergy methods, such activities lead to increased exergy efficiency, which is of great importance for practical applications. In this study, the main relationships between energy and environmental impact are identified. Historical and modern examples are used to illustrate some of the concepts. The relationships introduced are: order-destruction/chaos-creation, resource degradation and waste exergy emissions. Some examples are given demonstrating the use of exergy analysis in addressing and solving environmental problems. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Emergency response to environmental toxic incidents: the role of the occupational physician.

A survey of accidental environmental releases of hazardous chemicals conducted by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry indicates that fixed facility events accounted for 77% of the episodes whereas 23% of the releases were related to transportation activities, such as loading or unloading materials. In nearly all the events (88%) only one chemical was released. Volatile organic compounds, chlorine, herbicides, acids and ammonia were the most common substances involved. In nearly one out of six reported events, an injury occurred. To prepare for emergencies associated with the accidental release of hazardous materials, the federal government, industry and professional organizations including the medical community have all been involved. In the United States, the Superfund Amendment Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title III passed in 1986 addresses the need to establish local emergency planning committees, to report and collect data, and a number of other matters. Professional societies, including the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine (ACOEM), and the American Industrial Hygiene Association, have all attempted to ensure proper education and training of those professionals called to assist in such emergencies. The occupational physician can assume numerous roles in the challenge related to emergency response, by becoming familiar with computerized information available to promptly determine the type of hazard released and its appropriate antidote, advising on the proper personal protective equipment, awareness of secondary contamination and participation on local emergency planning committees among many others. Emergency release of hazardous materials continues to occur with a frequency in the United States that deserves active vigilance and planning.

Lessons in emergency evacuation from the Miamisburg train derailment.

Hazardous materials incidents result from the release of materials considered to be harmful or potentially harmful to human beings or the environment. This article describes a train derailment and subsequent hazardous materials release with the evacuation of approximately 50,000 citizens. The hazardous materials release took five days to control and resulted in 561 patient visits to local emergency departments for symptoms related to chemical exposure. The evacuation and emergency medical operations are described and serve as a model for developing community emergency preparedness plans and managing victims involved in hazardous materials incidents.

Removal of carbon dioxide in closed loop off‐gas treatment systems

Abstract A combustor with a closed loop off‐gas recirculation system has been constructed to demonstrate a gas treatment and purification system that can be installed on hazardous and mixed‐waste incineration and vitrification equipment to virtually eliminate the potential for release of hazardous or radioactive materials to the environment. In initial tests, a 250,000 BTU/h (75 kW thermal) combustor was operated in an open loop to demonstrate the removal of combustion product CO2 in a fluidized bed of CaO (lime), and particulates were removed with hot gas candle filters. An absorbent solution treatment (AST) process is now being developed for removal of CO2 from a side loop. High CO2 concentrations can be maintained in the recirculating gases, and this improves the performance of commercially available processes used to purify gases and produce CO2. Incineration systems with closed loop off‐gas treatment can have a high throughput and accommodate more hazardous and more radioactive waste streams than wha...