Hazardous Incidents Research Articles

Development of Multi-Hazard Contingency Plans and Tools for the National Marine Sanctuary System1

ABSTRACT In the last few years, incidents such as the crash of Alaska Air Flight #261, the M/V Cape Mohican and SS Jacob Luckenbach spills and over 600 groundings a year in the Florida Keys have highlighted the need for coordinated, multi-hazard contingency planning to safeguard the marine, historical and cultural resources protected by the National Marine Sanctuary System. American waterways are a critical component of heightened homeland security; including the waters encompassed by marine protected areas. The challenge has been to develop consistent contingency plans that address a broad range of hazards from oil spills to hurricanes across 13 sites that are widely divergent in size, geographic location and type of resources. Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary is larger than Yellowstone National Park and protects habitat ranging from coastal dunes to deep-ocean trenches while Fagatele Bay in American Samoa encompasses a coral reef inlet less than one square mile in size. Thunder Bay in Lake Huron and the U.S.S. Monitor sites focus on historical and cultural resources while habitat of humpback whales is the primary concern for the Hawaiian Islands sanctuary. Because of site diversity, regulations and prohibited activities vary widely. Jurisdictional issues are complex with nearly half of the sites incorporating state waters and shorelines. In 2001, NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration and the Office of National Marine Sanctuaries initiated a project to develop and build a suite of contingency plans and tools. This web-based contingency plan and tool set, hosted on a secure Intranet, is called Sanctuaries Hazardous Incident Emergency Logistics Database System (SHIELDS). SHIELDS gives resource managers efficient access to numerous NOAA databases, GIS systems, charts and images providing on-demand information for making critical decisions about environmental tradeoffs during a response.

Software‐implemented safety logic

AbstractProcess industries rely on various safeguards to minimize the potential and consequence of hazardous incidents. Active safeguards, such as safety instrumented systems (SIS), fire and gas systems, and emergency vents, use sensors to detect process upsets, then take action to bring it to a safe state.Many users implement active safeguards using programmable logic controllers (PLCs). The PLC uses a combination of hardware and software to respond to inputs (process variables) by generating outputs (safety actions). The execution of the safe state logic is dependent on the application program integrity, which may be developed by the PES vendor, engineering contractor, system integrator, or the user. Successful implementation and thorough verification of the application program is essential for correct SIS operation.This paper will first discuss the various types of SIS software, including full variability, limited variability, and fixed programming languages. It will then look at proposed application program requirements, and guidelines in the international process industry sector standard, draft IEC 61511.

Fault management analysis

AbstractIn the chemical process industries, intrinsically safe operations must be the process engineer's goal, but, in reality, it is often not feasible, either technically or economically. In these cases, safety instrumented systems (SIS) are often used to detect and respond to process risk. SISs have many components that must work as designed in order to mitigate potential hazardous incidents. Over the years, many of these components have evolved from simple electro‐mechanical devices to complex mechanical, electrical, and programmable devices. What makes these devices fail must be examined in order to understand how each component failure can propagate into fail‐safe and fail‐dangerous conditions.This paper proposes the use of fault management analysis (FMA) for the assessment of proposed SIS designs. An FMA identifies not only the failure modes of each component, but also determines how to appropriately manage the identified failure. This paper demonstrates how proposed design, diagnostics, inspection, maintenance, and testing programs should be modified to improve the SIS performance.

ALASKA INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (AIMS) GUIDE FOR OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE RESPONSE

ABSTRACT In January 2000, the ad hoc Alaska Statewide Oil and Hazardous Substance Incident Management System workgroup submitted standardized spill response management guidelines (Alaska Incident Management System, AIMS #1) to the Alaska Regional Response Team (ARRT) for their review, use, and feedback. These guidelines are a landmark step in response management systems because they merge the concepts of the National Contingency Plan (NCP#2) with NIIMS #3, received acceptance by both government and industry users in Alaska, have been customized to meet Alaska's unique needs, are consistent with the latest update being prepared by the States/British Columbia Task Force FOG #4 update workgroup, and will yield substantial savings to all users by providing guidelines for adoption and maintenance of a single system for the Alaska spill response community.

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's Response Training Program

ABSTRACT In January 2000, the Alaska Statewide Oil and Hazardous Substance Incident Management System workgroup, convened under the auspices of the Alaska Regional Response Team (ARRT), submitted standardized spill response management guidelines to the ARRT These guidelines lay out minimum training needs of personnel in a variety of spill response positions including both those in the field and the Incident Management Team. These guidelines were established after extensive workgroup actions designed to comprehensively and accurately capture response information. This paper will examine these guidelines through a look at Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's Ship Escort Response Vessel System (SERVS) training standards and preparedness. It will show how SERVS and other Alyeska training requirements meet and/or exceed the recommendations of the ARRT-sponsored guidelines. The paper will explore the various avenues of training offered by Alyeska, including classroom instruction, on-the-job training opportunities available for employee development, and outside training classes/courses to which Alyeska has sent its employees. The paper will frame these discussions within a description of the minimum qualifications required for each position. As a key contributor to the guidelines, Alyeska Valdez Business Unit has used the guide to streamline its response training program. The training program set up by the Alyeska Business Unit compares very favorably to the statewide ARRT-recommended training levels by function and management level after an exhaustive review of our training processes. The paper will review how this training review process factors in prior work and training equivalencies into the Alyeska Valdez Business Unit program, promoting personnel assignment flexibility and efficiency. Through this discussion of the elements of the Alyeska Valdez Business Unit training program and a comparison of the program to the ARRT guidelines, the reader will have a better understanding of the tools required to develop a comprehensive spill prevention and response training program, while considering the inevitable pressures of resource and time constraints on that program.

Mature landfill leachate treatment from an abandoned municipal waste disposal site

We investigated treatment techniques for the leachates derived from an abandoned waste disposal landfill facility known as Nan Ji Do in Seoul, Korea. To this end, the general characteristics of those leachates were carefully examined. The feasibility of leachate handling techniques was then examined through an application of both offand on-site processes as a combination of direct treatment methods and/or pretreatment options. They include operation of such systems or methods as: (1) activated sludge process, (2) adsorption-flocculation methods, and (3) anaerobic digestion. When the fundamental factors associated with the operation of an activated sludge process were tested by a simulated system in the laboratory, those applications were found to be efficient at leachate addition of up to 1%. Application of adsorption/precipitation method was also tested as the pretreatment option for leachates by using both powdered activated carbon (PAC) as adsorbent and aluminum sulfate (alum) as flocculant. Results of this test indicated that the removal of chemical oxygen demand (COD) was optimized at PAC and alum contents of 100 to 300 mg/L, respectively. In addition, an anaerobic digester also examined the effect of leachate components on the rate of anaerobic digestion. According to our study, treatment and pretreatment options investigated were, in general, effective enough to reduce the rate of organic loading and the occurrences of hazardous incidents.

Spill behaviour using REACTPOOL: Part II. Results for accidental releases of silicon tetrachloride (SiCl 4)

Silicon tetrachloride is a toxic, corrosive water reactive substance that is used widely in the process industries. On spillage from containment it creates liquid pools that can either boil or evaporate. The main feature of the pool behaviour is the exothermic reaction with water. There are three sources of water available for reaction: free ground water, substrate water and atmospheric moisture. Hydrogen chloride gas and ortho-silicic acid solid (or silica gel) are produced by the hydrolysis reaction. The purpose of this paper is to describe the dangers involved in cases of accidental releases of silicon tetrachloride, to report its properties, referring to toxicity data, major accidents and mitigation tests. It also describes pool behaviour using REACTPOOL [1]. Model results indicate that the pool behaviour is governed mainly by the amount of water available for reaction. Surface roughness and wind speed also have a significant effect on the results. Results are compared with those for other water reactive chemicals in Part III of this series of papers [3]. The generated cloud will initially contain silicon tetrachloride and hydrogen chloride with numerous processes taking place. Although silicon tetrachloride has been involved in many major hazard incidents, there are no experimental data relevant to the modelling requirements.

Spill behaviour using REACTPOOL: Part I. Results for accidental releases of chlorosulphonic acid (HSO 3Cl)

Chlorosulphonic acid is a toxic, highly reactive and corrosive substance that exists in its liquid form at ambient conditions. Its major hazardous potential comes from the clouds of hydrogen chloride and sulphuric acid mist produced whenever this chemical escapes from containment and is exposed to moisture. It decomposes violently and sometimes explosively in the presence of water, liberating heat. On spillage it creates liquid pools that can either boil or evaporate. There are three sources of water available for reaction: free ground water, substrate water and atmospheric moisture. Hydrogen chloride gas or aqueous solution and sulphuric acid liquid are produced by the hydrolysis reaction. This paper describes the dangers involved in cases of accidental releases of chlorosulphonic acid, referring to its properties, toxicity data and mitigation tests. It also reports results of pool behaviour using REACTPOOL [T. Kapias, R.F. Griffiths, C. Stefanidis, J. Haz. Mat., submitted for publication]. These results indicate that the pool behaviour is governed mainly by the amount of water available for reaction. Surface roughness and wind speed also have a significant effect on the results. A discussion of the results in comparison with those for other water reactive substances is presented in Part III of this series of papers [T. Kapias, R.F. Griffiths, J. Haz. Mat., submitted for publication]. The generated cloud will initially contain chlorosulphonic acid, hydrogen chloride and sulphuric acid with numerous processes taking place. Initially, it is usually denser than air. Although chlorosulphonic acid has been involved in major hazard incidents, there are no experimental data relevant to the modelling requirements. Use of REACTPOOL provides insights into the major hazard role of this substance.

The Influence of Negative Information on Purchase Behaviour

This was a longitudinal study that examined consumer reactions to hazardous product incidents. The purpose of this study was to examine consumer responses to product safety hazard incidents over time, and to identify demographic groups that are either most resistant or most affected by hazard incidents. The results suggest that in the first year after an incident, the crisis managers had only limited control over adverse effects to negative information. In the longer term, consumer reactions were still rather uniform and severe in most of the cases. The effects are examined in the context of key market segments for each product, and with regard to company responses to the incidents. Managers should expect strong negative reactions from some demographic subgroups over time and are advised to closely monitor the impact of hazardous incidents on their target markets.

Spill of National Significance Exercise 1997: Testing a New Organizational Concept1

ABSTRACT Following the Exxon Valdez spill, the need for an effective organization to manage a spill of such magnitude was readily apparent. The publication of a revised NC? reflected this need by defining a Spill of National Significance (SONS) as a spill that, because of its severity, size, location, or actual or potential impact on the public health and welfare or the environment, the necessary response effort is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party (RP) resources to contain and clean up the discharge. The U.S. Coast Guard adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) as the response management organization for oil and hazardous substance incidents in 1996. An integral part of ICS is the Area Command concept, which provides a level of strategic management and support for the existing Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) response organization. This concept was evaluated for its suitability at a SONS exercise held on 16–18 September 1997 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. The exercise was also designed to assess interagency policy and cooperation with regard to emergency response by having the participants deliberate on critical issues in a collegial setting, as opposed to a stress-elevating, oil spill equipment deployment and command center organization drill. This paper examines the makeup of the unique design of the exercise and discusses several issues that arose during the exercise.

How Federal Authorities inform the media and the public / Wie Bundesbehörden die Medien und die Öffentlichkeit informieren

The Federal Ministry of Environment. Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety attaches great importance to informing the public in the event of hazardous incidents in nuclear installations that may affect the public. Since most of the relevant data and information comes together in the Ministry, one of the Ministry's main focuses of action is to pass on information in the event of a crisis. The success of a sound information process depends on various factors that can only be partially influenced by the provider of the information. In conjunction with the Radiological Protection in Emergencies working group of the Commission on Radiological Protection, the Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety has drawn up text modules for press releases in the event of a crisis. An example of such a press release forms part of this contribution. Handling representatives of the media requires certain experience. That is why this contribution will provide a few tips on how one should behave vis-a-vis journalists during a crisis.

Trends in major industrial accidents in Germany

Abstract Lessons learnt from accidents are essential sources for updating state-of-the-art requirements in process safety. To improve this input in the Federal Republic of Germany in a systematic way, a central body for collecting and evaluating major accident and near miss events (ZEMA) was established in 1993. ZEMA is part of the Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA). All events which are to be notified due to the German regulation on major accidents (Hazardous Incident Ordinance) are centrally collected, evaluated and documented by ZEMA. The bureau is also responsible for the dissemination of the lessons learnt to all stakeholders. This work is done in co-operation with the German Hazardous Incident Commission (Storfallkommission) and other national and international bodies. At the time being over 200 events from 1980–1997 are registered. For each event a separate data-sheet is published in annual reports, first started in 1993. In this paper, a summary evaluation on the events from 1993 to 1996 is presented and some basic lessons learnt are shown. The results from root cause analysis underline the importance of maintenance, detailed knowledge of chemical properties, human factor issues and the role of safety organisation, especially connected with sub-contractors. Keeping in mind that collecting information from major accidents is only a small amount compared with that from all the events which might be interesting to learn from, the recent plans for collecting minor accidents in Germany are reported.

Does a Collateral Duty Require Less Protection: Workers, Hazardous Materials Emergency Response, and OSHA's Failure to Protect

Waste management activities are widespread throughout most industrial sectors, and hazardous materials are a component of the waste of almost every aspect of industry. Workers with a collateral duty to engage in emergency response activities to a hazardous materials incident require health and safety protection. OSHA has failed to appropriately acknowledge this threat to workers and has been confusing and inconsistent in the interpretation and enforcement of its regulatory requirement for training workers with such a collateral duty. This article will discuss efforts on a national level to secure these protections, and provides an example of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) training program for workers with such a collateral duty in Toledo, Ohio. This evidence suggests that the provision of training to a majority of workers and supervisors involved in municipal waste management can greatly improve both worker and community health and safety. OSHA should revise 29 CFR 1910.120 and make its interpretation and enforcement of the standard consistent, in order to better protect workers with a collateral duty to respond to hazardous materials emergency incidents.

Organizational factors affecting the incident reporting of train drivers

The under-reporting of accidents and incidents is well established as a substantial problem across industries; however, few studies have specifically examined employees' reasons for failing to report. This study investigates the factors affecting incident reporting by train drivers (n = 128) in three different areas of British Rail (the company that operated the railway network in Britain, prior to its privatization in 1994). Drivers completed a questionnaire rating their likelihood of reporting a number of hazardous incidents and giving their reasons for not reporting them. Intention not to report incidents was predicted by ‘managers take no notice’ of reports and the interaction between ‘just part of the day's work’ and ‘nothing would get done’. It is concluded that incident reporting is most influenced by the way that drivers perceive managers' reactions to reports. In addition, the three areas differed significantly in their likelihood of reporting incidents, suggesting that the local subculture has an important influence on intentions to report, with negative perceptions of managers' attitudes suppressing the reporting of incidents.

A scheme of hazardous chemical identification for transportation incidents

Because of the unexpectedness, the chemical involved in a hazardous incident is often not known immediately and can hardly be derived directly from the information at the scene. This situation is especially true for transportation incidents. As the result, hazardous chemical incidents can generate additional property damage and human injuries. Therefore, identification of the hazardous chemical should be an important step, to be made before any subsequent decisions. The present paper proposes a scheme for chemical identification in transportation hazards. In the scheme, all possible kinds of information from the scene are considered, including general information, shipment documents, observable properties of the hazard and the chemical, and clinical manifestations. With a practical example, it is shown to be possible, in a successive and interactive manner, to establish a computer module for such an identification.

No good deed goes unpunished: Case studies of incidents and potential incidents caused by protective systems

AbstractIn the course of chemical process and plant design, engineers identify potential hazardous incidents. These potential incidents may be identified through special hazard analysis reviews and procedures, or by the design team in the course of design activities. To manage and control those hazards, the team will modify the initial design, often by adding on additional protective devices and systems—alarms, interlocks or active protective systems. However, any change in a system, even a change intended to prevent or mitigate a potential hazardous incident, also has the potential to introduce new hazards, or new mechanisms by which existing hazards can result in an incident. A number of case studies illustrating this point are reviewed. The examples illustrate the importance of a management of change program, which must consider all changes including the addition of safety devices and systems, and which must throughly consider all potential effects on the system.

Boiler incident directly attributable to PSM issues

AbstractProcess Safety Management (PSM) programs are expected to reduce the probability and severity of hazardous incidents. This paper presents a real life incident that occurred in a plan before a PSM program was put in place. A detailed description of the incident is provided with appropriate discussions of noncompliance with the PSM rule. Finally, the paper provides a theoretical scenario where a fully operational PSM program would have prevented the incident. The case history and discussion provided in this paper also reinforces the concept of maintaining process and equipment integrity through multiple barriers of safety. A fully operational PSM program represents such a multiple barrier safety systems.The incident occurred in a high temperature boiler in a process plant. The incident was caused by a sequence of four occurrences that combined to cause the boiler to lose water level and have serious internal and tube damage. The problem was not detected until a mechanic who was going to work on the feed pump realized that there was flames coming out of the boiler stack. The mechanic told the operator about the problem and the boiler was manually tripped. The boiler feedwater pump was not blocked in until 30 minutes after the incident was over. If this pump was started during or directly after the incident, the addition of boiler feedwater to the over‐heated boiler would have caused an explosion. At the time the incident was reported there were 8–10 employees in the area of the boilers.

Implementation of the Seveso directive in Germany — An evaluation of hazardous incident information

According to the recently implemented German Hazardous Incident Ordinance (Störfallverordnung), chemical companies to which that ordinance applies are obliged to inform the public about risks of a plant and appropriate emergency behaviour by providing hazardous incident information. For an evaluation study a prototype hazardous incident information (HII) package was designed and evaluated in a telephone survey by using a standardized questionnaire. The questionnaire covered reception and assessment (e.g., comprehensibility, credibility) of the HII, risk perception, trust, and knowledge about hazardous incident warnings and emergency behaviour. One week after having distributed the HII among the residents of the pharmaceutical plant, 204 residents who had been provided with the HII answered the questionnaire in a telephone interview. Four weeks later 154 of these residents again answered the questionnaire. At that time, a control group of 101 residents who did not receive the HII also answered the questionnaire. The results show that, in general, subjects rated the HII positively. Informed subjects had significantly more knowledge about hazardous incident warnings and emergency behaviour. The HII did not influence risk perception but led to a significant increase in trust in the company. Finally, no time effects were found with regard to hazardous incident knowledge.

Major hazards in the chemical industry. Part III. A retrospective view

The contents of Parts I and II, published 14 years ago, are briefly reviewed. Development of knowledge and procedures for the control of major hazard incidents, plus some significant lessons during the intervening period, are discussed. Trends in legislation are summarised and consideration is given to the concept of environmental, transport, and off-shore major hazards. Quantitative hazard and risk assessment techniques are referred to. The purpose of the paper is to contribute through the journal to the ongoing debate on Major Hazards; it is not intended to be a criticism of progress that has been made to-date, or of work in hand. Illustrative cameo case histories are included to relate theory and practice.

Accidental injuries of hospitalized patients. A prospective cohort study.

Eight hundred and six medical and surgical patients who were hospitalized via the emergency ward were followed over their entire impairment stays and rated in anterograde, double-blind fashion for inpatient incidents (falls, medication errors, other). Injuries were minor but affected 2.2% of admissions, a figure which is strikingly similar to studies in other hospitals. There was a statistical trend toward a higher-than-normal risk of hazardous in-hospital incidents for males age 20 to 40 admitted because of injury and for medically ill females over 60 years old.