Hassan Rouhani Research Articles

Asia's Nuclear Conundrum

Asia's Nuclear Conundrum

International trust and public diplomacy

National leaders struggle to communicate in ways that are perceived as trustworthy by citizens of other nations because trust is linked to efficiency, business opportunities, and political influence. In this article, four recent public diplomacy activities are analyzed from a trust-building perspective: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's letter in The Washington Post, The British Council's strategy for trust building in China, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin's letter in The New York Times, and the USA's trust-building effort in Turkey. The analyses are based on already publicized descriptions of public diplomacy activities, public polls, and scholarly literature. Public diplomacy ideas discussed include lightshow, hand-on cooperation, win-win projects, and the creation of frameworks for self-expression. A central concept is international trust as described by Brewer, Gross, Aday, and Willnat. Based on the analysis it is suggested to amend the concept, to distinguish between trust in foreign people and trust in foreign governments.

Iran's Relations with Persian Gulf Arab States—Implications for the United States

12 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXVIII, No.2, Winter 2015 Iran’s Relations with Persian Gulf Arab States—Implications for the United States Gawdat Bahgat* Iran’s Relations with Persian Gulf Arab States—Implications for the United States In his first press conference as the elected president Hassan Rouhani pledged good relations with neighboring countries, which he considered a main priority for his administration. The President stated, “The Persian Gulf has strategic importance both in terms of politics and economy.”1 Rouhani added, “Saudi Arabia is a brother and neighbor with which we have historic, cultural and geopolitical relations.”2 Attending the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York a few months later, Rouhani presented a more moderate approach than his predecessor Ahmadinejad. The visit was followed by a significant interim agreement with global powers on the country’s nuclear program. Continuing this “charm offensive,” Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited four of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Kuwait, *Gawdat Bahgat is a professor of National Security Affairs at the National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study. He is an Egyptian-born specialist in Middle Eastern policy, particularly Egypt, Iran, and the Gulf region. His areas of expertise include energy security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism , Arab-Israeli conflict, North Africa, and American foreign policy in the Middle East. Bahgat’s career blends scholarship with national security practicing. Before joining NESA in December 2009, he taught at different universities. Bahgat published eight books including Energy Security (2011), International Political Economy (2010), Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (2007), Israel and the Persian Gulf (2006), and American Oil Diplomacy (2003). His work has been translated into several foreign languages. Bahgat served as an advisor to several governments and oil companies 1 Press TV, “Rouhani pledges constructive interaction with world via moderate policy,” available at http://www.presstv.com. Accessed June 17, 2013. 2 Alalam, “Rouhani vows confidence-building in foreign affairs,” available at http://en.alalam.ir/news/1485360. Accessed June 17, 2013. 13 Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) in December 2013. It is too early to assess the success or failure of Iran and its Arab neighboring states overcoming the deep-rooted mistrust and instead to engage in confidencebuilding measures. What is clear, however, is that sectarian and ethnic rivalry (and at times open hostility) has been a defining character in recent years of the Gulf region and indeed the broader Middle East. Geography and history have been the driving forces behind these love-hate relations between the Shiite-Persian Iran and its Sunni-Arab GCC neighbors. The following figures underscore the disparity between the two sides. All figures are from Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, available at https://www.cia.gov. Accessed January 4, 2014. Population figures in all GCC states include large expatriate communities. Thus Iran is much larger than all the GCC states. (Saudi Arabia is larger in area and one third the size in population). Iranian population is much bigger than the combined GCC population. These geographical facts mean the mere size and population of Iran have made its Arab neighbors suspicious of its intentions and accuse Tehran under any political regime (Pahlavi or Islamic) of harboring hegemonic ambitions. History has not helped to alleviate this suspicion. Iran is one of the oldest civilizations in the world and despite its multi ethnic population, has developed a strong sense of nationalism combined with a specific interpretation of Shiism. On the other side of the Gulf, with the exception of Oman, the other five GCC states are relatively young states (Saudi Arabia 1932, Kuwait 1961, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE 1971). Arguably, national identity in these GCC states is generally fragile and competes with tribal and sectarian identities (among others). The presence of Shiite majority in Bahrain and sizable minorities in the other GCC states has further complicated relations with Iran. Country Size in square kilometers Rank in the world Population in millions Rank in the world Iran 1,648,195 18 79,853,000 19 Bahrain 760 188 1,281,332 157 Kuwait 17,818 158...

Governmentality and Crises of Representation, Knowledge, and Power in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Since the contested presidential (re)election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, crises of representation, power, and knowledge have destabilized the Islamic Republic of Iran's governmentality notwithstanding a strong Weberian state. When many Iranians demanded a recount, the state rejected allegations of vote‐rigging, purged Reformists from the state, cracked down on their supporters, elicited forced confessions, and staged show trials. This state‐sponsored vigilantism that diminished the Republic's claim of representing the people caused a Reformist retreat from the streets as well as withdrawal from the parliamentary elections of March 2012. Such withdrawal, which threatened the vibrancy of the elections, added to the crises of representation. Moreover, it caused the Principalists to factionalize and radicalize, producing a crisis of power. In addition, divisions within the government and between the government and the populace resulted in the failure of the state to discern friends from foes, causing a crisis of knowledge. The subsequent presidential elections of Hassan Rouhani four years later in 2013, both in terms of the ways in which it unfolded as well as the outcome, was a confirmation and a way out of these challenges.

Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy - The Case of Iranian Nuclear Program

This paper examines the complexity of the Iranian foreign policy through the case of Iranian nuclear program. The paper aims to assess foreign policy orientations and compares actions of the last three Iranian presidents, Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and current Hassan Rouhani in dealing with the international community (IC) in pursuing its nuclear program. This assessment would not be complete without reference to the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei who is actual head of the state and the most powerful political authority. This paper also relates Iranian foreign policy expectation to competing theories of international relations to identify the most dominant or the most consistent policy orientation. Its aim is to strengthen realist and power-based explanations that have dominated the discourse on Middle Eastern in general and Iranian foreign policy in particular. In this context, a number of questions will be addressed here. To what extend was Iranian negotiation with the IC over its nuclear program consistent throughout these three presidencies? What has changed, if anything, from Iranian foreign policy perspective and why? Can Iranian foreign policy behavior on this specific topic and in this specific time be explained through any international relations theory? As there are many other questions, so there are many theories to examine and explain true Iranian intentions, those below the surface of declared goals ( Hadzikadunic, 2014 ). The methods employed in answering these questions are largely structured around a chronological account and comparative approach. It is also based on the analysis of foreign policy discourse and the assessment of key decision makers.

Can Hassan Rouhani Succeed where Muhammad Khatami Failed? Internal and International Politics of Reform in Iran

The election of Hassan Rouhani to Iran’s presidency in June 2013 once more raised the hopes that the Iranian regime could reform itself and improve its relations with the outside world, especially the United States of America. However, to what extent these expectations are justified? Have Iran’s conditions changed sufficiently to enable Rouhani to succeed, while other reformers like Muhammad Khatami, Iran’s president from 1997 to 2005 failed? This article analyzes the causes of the failure of earlier reformers in Iran, notably Khatami, and will distinguish between the more structural barriers to reform in the Islamic Republic and those related to the dynamics of various political groups. It will also assess the impact of external factors, especially the US attitude toward Iran’s reformers on Khatami’s failure. It will then discuss to what extent Iran’s current internal conditions and the dynamics of its external environment will affect Rouhani’s chances of success.

Iran's Reform Movement: The Enduring Relevance of an Alternative Discourse

AbstractGiven the surprise electoral victory in May 2013 of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, which was attained on a recurrent platform of reform and change, this article seeks to investigate Iran's reform discourse by looking at how it systematically developed under President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). Its chief purpose is to delineate the discourse in a retrospective analytical attempt to show why it has proven so resilient and persuasive in theory while briefly explicating the causes of its failure in practice under reformists, which set the stage for the rise to power of populist neo‐conservatives marshaled by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). Divided in two main parts, it thus seeks to tease out the domestic ideology of reform as theorized by Khatami and his men on the one hand, and the foreign policy of détente and dialogue as performed by the reformist administration on the other. In so doing, the article draws primarily on the original Persian sources produced during the respective period and afterward, including Khatami's own writings as well as theoretical formulations and articulations propounded by his political strategists. Finally, it anticipates that Rouhani's “moderation” project can face the same fate as Khatami's “reform” project if the former does not heed the hard‐earned historical lessons of the latter, even though it is operating in a different sociopolitical context.

Why Hassan Rouhani Won Iran's 2013 Presidential Election

Why Hassan Rouhani Won Iran's 2013 Presidential Election

Un-globalised Politics: The Primacy of Domestic Factors in the Downfall of Iran's ‘Theocratic Left’ During Ahmadinejad's Second Term

For a country so important to international affairs, Iran's politics are strikingly misunderstood. In the face of the inadequacy of explanations for the downfall of Iran's former President Ahmadinejad and other members of Iran's ‘Theocratic Left,’ this paper seeks to provide an explanation for this phenomenon that is both coherent and consistent with primary evidence. Global media, especially, has excessively emphasised global and international factors when looking at Ahmadinejad's second term, unable to notice Khamenei's need to compromise at home despite his seemingly total control of Iran's foreign policy and convinced that international sanctions caused Ahmadinejad's downfall. This paper instead places the focus on domestic political factional dynamics that emerged after the 2009 ‘Green Movement’ protests, emphasising how crucial factions and forces in Iran's domestic political landscape came together to check the power of the seemingly ascendant ‘Theocratic Left,’ thereby creating conditions that would eventually favour the victory of Hassan Rouhani in the 2013 election.

Hassan Rouhani's Election and Its Consequences for American Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT Iran is ruled by an oligarchy, thus intra-elite struggles and the evolution of the positions of the supreme leader and the president matter greatly in Iran's foreign policy decision process. This study analyzes the powers of the two decision makers. Then, it presents a detailed analysis of Rouhani's foreign policy orientation. Finally, the article discusses the challenges for American foreign policy presented by Rouhani's election.

Polityka zagraniczna Iranu w Zatoce Perskiej pod rządami prezydenta Rowhaniego: kontynuacja czy zmiana

Although Iran borders with many states and has direct access to the Caspian Sea as well as the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf region seems to be the most vital area to its security and prosperity. Yet since the 70’s Iran’s relations with the Arab states in the region have been rather strained and complex. The main reason for that had been the success of the Islamic revolution in 1979 which later resulted in a new dimension of Sunni-Shia rivalry. Moreover, post-revolutionary Iranian authorities also intended to maintain the regional hegemony from the Imperial State of Iran period. As a result, successive Iranian governments competed for hegemony in the Persian Gulf with the littoral Arab states which consolidated their regional positions due to close links and intensive cooperation with the West especially with the United States. Despite some political and economic initiatives which were undertaken by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, this rivalry was also evident between 2005–2013. The main aim of this article is to find out whether Iranian foreign policy towards the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region has undergone any significant changes since Hassan Rouhani became the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in August 2013. According to Mohammad Reza Deshiri, the Iranian foreign policy after 1979 can be divided into so-called waves of idealism and realism. During dominance of idealism values and spirituality are more important than pragmatism while during the realistic waves political as well as economic interests prevail over spirituality. Iranian idealism is connected with export of revolutionary ideas, Shia dominance as well as the restoration of unity among all muslims (ummah). On this basis both presidential terms of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can be classified as ‘waves of idealism’, albeit some of his ideas were very pragmatic. The question is if Hassan Rouhani’s foreign policy represents a continuity or a change. Is the current Iran’s foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region idealistic or rather realistic? The main assumption is that there will be no Arab-Iranian rapprochement in the Persian Gulf without a prior normalization of political relations between Iran and the West especially the United States.

Iranian Election Results: Change on Horizon?

Hassan Rouhani's victory in the June 14, 2013 presidential elections in Iran—especially with such a substantial margin, and in the very first round of the poll—came as a surprise even for his own t...

Around the World

In science news around the world, health officials suspect a polio outbreak in Syria, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani promises greater freedom in academia, the Reproducibility Initiative scores $1.3 million to revisit landmark cancer research, and more.

Iran's Rouhani: high hopes, narrow remit

Could Hassan Rouhani's presidency be an opportunity for Iran to review its approach to the world? Since he took office in August 2013, the tone of Iranian diplomacy has altered considerably. But he will need to address the country's political and economic problems, deliver on his promise of change, and re-evaluate relations with its neighbours and the West.

Focus: A life or death struggle for trade union rights in Iran

FOCUS ❐ YOUNG WORKERS AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS ment and deadened jobs. The young people of Iran are prevented from the right to organise, therefore are unable to improve their future. Temporary contractual work without any employment protection is rapidly growing. These agreements are known as ’white contracts’ deliberately introduced to eliminate guarantees of employment continuity. Various outsourcing models and white contracts are destabilising permanent employment in all sectors with a devastating impact on young people. The regime’s propaganda provides conflicting and misinterpreted socioeconomic statistical figures. For example from 2006 to 2012, each year on average 783,000 people entered the labour market which clearly does not have the capacity for creating this volume of stable jobs. In other words, during this period 5.5 million new people joined the pool of job-seekers, while according to the regime’s figures the number of unemployed increased by only 300,000 in seven years. On the other hand, according to statistics released by officials, the number of unemployed is only 3 to 4 million. Between 2011 and 2013, 25 percent of Iranian families had no one working. The unemployed and in particular young people take most of the pressure and suffer in many ways. The rate of unemployment in the 15 to 22 age group is 25 percent, which is about twice the national average. The steep rise in mental disorders, various social ills and in particular the huge increase in drug addiction among Iran’s youth is highly visible . However the regime’s policymakers merely pay lip service towards the inhumane socioeconomic conditions inflicted on the young population . This is because the neoliberal economic planners in Iran effectively accept this as a price worth paying for the imposition of market oriented ’economic adjustment’. Young people are trapped between the harsh realities of a cruel economic system and an undemocratic oppressive dictatorship that prevents them from any attempt to change their situation. Labour law and the Islamic Labour Councils The Iranian labour laws are constantly diluted by the ruling regime in favour of the management who routinely manipulate and ignore regulations in the workplace to circumvent their responsibilities . For example the official figure for inflation is more than 40 percent but the ministry of work has set the wage increase for the current year based on an inflation rate of 25 percent. Workplace deaths and injuries due to incidents at the workplaces are common occurrences without serious investigation or compensation. Any serious and organised opposition will be met by dismissal, possible arrest and even risk of being charged as a threat to national A life or death struggle for trade union rights in Iran Unemployment is thought to be ‘double’ the official rate, with young workers the worst affected INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 16 Volume 20 Issue 3 2013 JAMSHID AHMADI is Assistant General Secretary of the Committee for the Defence of the Iranian Peoples’ Rights (CODIR) I ndependent and free trade union activity in Iran is dangerous and illegal. Scores of activists are frequently imprisoned, harassed and persecuted . In prison dungeons trade union activists face harsh treatment and die in suspicious circumstances . A recent example is the tragic death in jail of Afsheen Osanloo, a labour activist aged 42 who was arrested on trumped up charges. The security apparatus and judiciary use all possible means to deter workers from collective activities in defence of jobs and conditions of service and prevent the establishment of unions and the membership of workers in syndicates. In spite of these difficulties, the labour activists and progressive forces continue with the struggle to gain the right for the establishment of free trade unions. For example the Syndicate of Workers of the Tehran and Suburbs Bus Company is an exemplary case where despite harsh treatment of its leaders and members it continues its struggle. Recently they published an open letter addressed to the newly installed president, Hassan Rouhani demanding the release of their jailed leaders, in particular, the critically ill Reza Shahabi. The letter also demanded the reinstatement of bus drivers sacked due to union membership . Another example of the persistent struggle by the labour activists in Iran is the formation of the Syndicate of Metal...