Hanafi Jurists Research Articles

Rule: “The Evidence does not Matter in the Face of the Obvious.”

The current study addressed: 1-Deducing the jurisprudential rule in the chapter on prayer from the book Al-Mustasfa by Abu Al-Barakat 2. Relying on induction and using quite a few important ancient and modern sources that the research needs. 3- Explaining the rule, explaining its general meaning, and defining its vocabulary linguistically and terminologically, using books on language and principles. 4- Mentioning the evidence for rooting the jurisprudential rule from the Gloriuos Qur’an or Sunnah, if any. 5-Applications of the jurisprudential rule were mentioned in this book, and the first application was from Al-Nasafi’s book Al-Mustasfa. 6-Since the jurisprudential rule is derived from the book of the Hanafi school of thought, I, in turn, limited my study of it from the perspective of the Hanafi jurists, may Allah the Almighty have mercy on them. Among the findings: 1-The jurisprudential rules in the book Al-Mustasfa by Al-Nasafi are mostly agreed upon among Hanafi jurists, may Allah the Almighty have mercy on them. 2-The jurisprudential rules in the book Al-Mustasfa are derived from the texts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. 3- Jurisprudential rules are based on removing embarrassment from people.

Proving Forgery from the Point of View of Sharia and the Penal Code of Afghanistan

This article is about the proof of Qazf in a comparative manner between Islamic Sharia and the Afghan Penal Code, which can be summarized as follows: Proving Qazf consists of special methods and tools that distinguish this crime from other limits from the point of view of proof. Another way to prove Qazf is to prove to the judge that a person has accused another person of adultery. Therefore, according to the advanced Hanafi jurists, Qazf is proved in court by the confession of the Qazf (accuser) or the testimony of the Qazf's witnesses (accused) or by the knowledge of the judge, but according to the late Hanafi jurists and the Afghan Penal Code, only by the confession of the Qazf and testimony. It is proved that the witnesses are rejected. The proof of Qazf compared to other limits depends on the demand and filing of a lawsuit, therefore, confession in Qadzf is the same as some cases of confession in other limits, and in some cases, it is different; This kind of testimony in Qazf in some cases will not be the same as testimony in other areas. The jurists disagree about the proof of qadhf through oath; According to the Hanafi jurists, it is not proven, according to the Shafi'is and Hanbalis, Qazf Dariya is proven, but Maliki's scholars. They differ on this matter.

Etiquette of war in Hanafi jurisprudence and international humanitarian law A comparative legal jurisprudential study

This study deals with several etiquettes of war stipulated in Hanafi jurisprudence and international humanitarian law. Moreover, this study aims to show the contribution of Hanafi jurists to jurisprudence related to international humanitarian law, such as provisions related to the protection of civilians, the restriction of the warring parties’ freedom to choose methods of war, and the protection of military victims. As for the approach that was adopted in dealing with the issues of this study, it is represented in the descriptive, deductive, and comparative approaches. In this study, I concluded several results that show the agreement between international humanitarian law and the Hanafi jurists on the need to protect the victims of armed conflicts from the scourge of war, and to restrict the use of war methods in a way that does not contradict with values and morals. One of the recommendations of this study is to invite researchers and those interested in international humanitarian law compared to Islamic law, not to be limited to the generalities of Islamic law, but rather deepen the means of comparison to the level of jurisprudence schools because of the pioneering jurisprudence that it contains.

The Book of theAl-Hajar Stone and the Book of Permission from the Book of Mu’in Al-Mufti on the Answer of the Questioner of Imam Shams Al-Din Muhammad Bin Abdullah Bin Ahmad Bin Muhammad Al-Khatib Al-Tirtashi Al-Ghazzi Al-Ghazzi Al-Hanafi, who died in the


 
 
 
 ABSTRACT
 
 Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon our master Muhammad and his family and companions. And yet:
 Among the blessings of Allah Almighty upon the Muhammadan nation is that he has prepared for the service of this religion secure and honest men who are the predecessors of this nation, they harnessed all their energies to establish the pillars and rules of this religion, so they preserved for us the bond and the text, and a valuable jurisprudential store, through the manuscript books that are the treasury of knowledge and science ,the science of jurisprudence, which is the regulator of all aspects of people's lives. In terms of loyalty to these distinguished men from the righteous predecessors who bequeathed us this valuable scientific wealth, it is necessary for us to perform our religious duty, to manifest this wealth from the folds of oblivion into existence. Among those notable men who preserved our scientific heritage for us (Imam Shams al-Din Muhammad ibn Abdullah ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Khatib al-Tirtashi al-Ghazzi al-Hanafi, died in 1004 AH, through the book Mu’in al-Mufti on the answer of the questioner), which is one of the important books in the jurisprudence of Imam Abu Hanifa (May Allah have mercy on him), and Imam Al-Tirtashi’s compiler has a distinguished scholarly position among the later Hanafi jurists. So I choose to do my best to take up a small but important part, as I choose (the curfew and the Permission) from this book to see the light of an aspect of our jurisprudential heritage. Our last prayer is that praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon our master Muhammad and his family and companions.
 
 
 

Fıkıh Usûlünde İllet Hüküm İlişkisi

In Islamic jurisprudence, the issue of the relationship between the cause and the judgement, which is the main pillar of qiyas, which is accepted as the most common way of extending the ruling of the nass, is a subject that has a theoretical aspect as well as a practical aspect. Since the third century of Hijri, when the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence began to be codified, there have been different considerations regarding the nature of the cause. This issue, which was influenced by theological understandings, was subject to different evaluations from the period of classification to the seventh century of Hijri, the period of tahkik, and four different understandings of the nature of the cause emerged. Three different groups of concepts were used to express these understandings. The first of these is alem, alām, emāra, and muarrif; the second is dāî, muessir, and mūjib; and the third is bāris. There are some differences in the use of the second group. While some of the usul al-usūlīs used the concept of zātī together with the concepts of mūjib and mujtahir, others used the concept of ca'lī. As a result, four different ideas of cause have emerged, namely, the realm/alām/emāra/muarrif, the essential /mūjib, the ca'lī /mūjib, and bāis. The idea of emāra/indication/muarrif illa was defended by most of the mutakallimīn jurists from al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) to al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), as well as by Hanafi jurists except Alauddīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144). According to them, the absence of a judgement despite the existence of a cause before the revelation indicates that the cause does not have any effect on the judgement, but only indicates the existence of the judgement. The idea of emāra/indication/muarrif illa was defended by most of the mutakallimīn jurists from al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) to al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), as well as by Hanafi jurists except Alauddīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144). According to them, the absence of a judgement despite the existence of a cause before the revelation indicates that the cause does not have any effect on the judgement, but only indicates the existence of the judgement. The Ja'lī mūjib cause conception was favoured by jurists such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Samarqandī, al-Usmandī (d. 552/1157) and al-Lāsmihī. They, like the previous ones, defended this view based on the connection of the cause to the judgement, but they argued that the effect of the cause on the judgement was created by God during the existence of the cause. The idea of bāis illaq was defended by al-Sayfuddīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233). Although this concept at first glance means the factor that prompts the Shāri'ī to issue a judgement, al-Āmidī gives it a different meaning as "the attribute that contains wisdom that is suitable for being the Shāri'ī's intention while issuing a judgement". What al-Āmidī takes into consideration in determining the nature of the cause is the main principle of Islamic law, which is maqāṣid al-shari'ah.

The origin is in the jurisprudential deduction A comparative study between Al- Hilla and A-Hanafi jurists

The comparison occupied a wide area in jurisprudence (Al-Hilli), especially the jurisprudence of the scholar Al-Alamah Al-Hilli (d / 726 AH), as it presented the views of the jurists of the four Islamic schools of thought (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali). Based on the comparative solution and on the basis of what the leaders of comparative art decided in this school, we have chosen the jurisprudential origin in deduction. To be a comparative lesson between Al (Hillah) jurists and Al (Hanafi) jurists, and it is worth noting that the opinion of Al Hillah jurists is an extension of the opinion of the Imamate - in the most general terms - while preserving the privacy of Al Hillah school of jurisprudence, and the uniqueness of some of its scholars with some views of their own. And because we have adopted their opinions and documented them from their books on the one hand, and because we want to highlight Al Hillih 's opinion, as it represents the jurisprudential opinion of a school of Imami jurisprudence (the school of Hillah); So we said the jurists of the solution, and did not say the jurists of the Imamate. At the same time, we chose the opinions of Al Hanafi jurists over the opinions of other Islamic jurists. Because Al Hanafi school is the oldest of the Islamic schools that branched from the school of the Companions on the one hand, and because its jurisprudential approach to deduction differs from their curricula, and if all belong to one school; So we introduced the jurists of the solution, including the jurisprudence school to which they belong.

Lost Oral Genesis of Classical Islamic Law


 
 
 This article places the textual production of classical Islamic law in its proper historical context. It does so by examining a transcript of an eleventh-century oral debate, or disputation (munāẓara), between the Shafiʿi and Hanafi jurists Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī (d. 450/1058) and Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ṭāliqānī (fl. fifth/eleventh century) on the subject of the pre-emptive expiation for broken oaths (taqdīm al-kaffāra ʿalā al-ḥinth). The comparison between the disputation transcript and al-Ṭabarī’s lengthy legal manual al-Taʿlīqa al-kubrā reveals that the complexity and argumentative detail of disputations far exceeded jurists’ writings. Even the lengthiest legal manuals of the time are shown to be highly summarized accounts of juristic thought. The article explains how these summaries were essential to the proper training of jurists in the age of ijtihād: jurists were expected to learn these summaries before exploring the law in greater depth through disputations. These disputations were rarely recorded in writing, and few survive. The disparity between the oral and written legal discourse of jurists leads to a disquieting conclusion: much of the thought that produced classical legal opinions is lost to us today. We are therefore left with access to an attenuated version of classical law.
 
 

احکام القرآن للجصاص میں قواعد فقہیہ اور قواعد اصولیہ کا تحقیقی مطالعہ

Imam Abu Bakar AL Jassas Al Razi is one of the Prominent exegetes and legal theorists who occupy a distinguished place among Hanafi jurists. He was born in 305 AH and remained a famous Hanafi Legal expert in Baghdad. He wrote a commentary on the Qur'an entitled Ahkam al-Qur'an (The Legal Rulings of the Qur'an) with emphasis on the verses having legal importance. This commentary deals with the deduction of juristic injunctions and rulings from the noble Qur’an in a systematic and methodical way. This research is basically a discussion on AL-Jassas's methodology of deduction of rulings from the Holy Quran with special reference to the principles of Islamic Jurisprudence he used in his commentary on the Quran. The research is a focused study of some important Qawaed Usooliyyah he has applied during his discussion on the various rulings he derives from the Quranic Verses. This study proceeds with an introduction and short biography of Imam Abubakar Al-Jassas followed by an explanation of the general methodology he adopted in His Tafseer. The second part of the study focuses on some important Qawaed Usooliyyah applied and discussed by the AL-Jassas. The last part of this study consists of the conclusion and findings of this article. The study found that Al-Jassas has discussed most of the Qawaed Usooliyyah either explicitly or explicitly and applied them in the process of deduction of rulings from the Holy Quran. He has also used some Qawaed Usooliyyah which he derives from the different verses of the Quran.

The Issue of Al-Hawaij al-Asliyyah (Basic Needs) and its Implementation on Zakat of Income in Malaysia: A Content Analysis between Mazahib (Muslim Jurist Sects)

The issue of zakat on income has been discussed by scholars since those days of sahabah and tabi’in until today. Among the issues are hawl (lapse of a year), nisab (the capability line for zakat contribution) and al-hawa’ij al-asliyyah (basic needs). For the case of al-hawa’ij al-asliyyah, the practice of zakat institution in Malaysia is to directly convert the exempted amount of personal, spouse and children, which is similarly performed by Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri (LHDN). The practice has raised a question among scholars. They argue whether the exempted amounts are exactly representing the costs of al-hawa’ij al-asliyyah which are required by shariah. Thus, this paper aims to explore the discussion of shariah on al-hawa’ij al-asliyyah with the specific items which has been conferred in classical fiqh and investigate the suitable items which is currently customized in daily life. The study applied a library research methodology by gathering the data from classical fiqh which investigated the opinions of scholars across of four major mazahib. The analysis of the data was done through content analysis and only the selected opinion was considered. The study found that the Hanafi Jurists among those scholars who strongly propagate the inclusion of Hawa’ij al-Asliyyah in zakat calculation. The idea is about to serve the meaning of being wealthy and rich where the group has first to fulfill their basic need before paying the zakat, the study also found that the suitable amount to be exempted for al-hawa’ij al-asliyyah should be referred to the standard used in calculating the CPI (Consumer Price Index) as for the current application in Malaysia. The amount should be flexible in order to cater the unexpected need such as hospitality, education and others.

The Hanafi View of Siyasa and Sharia between Idealism and Realism: Al-Hasiri’s Conception of Temporal and Religious Politics: (Siyasa ad-diniyya al-‘uzma and siyasa al-hissiyya al-‘uzma)

Politics or siyasa as used in classical legal terminology has multiple senses. First, siyasa was understood by the Hanafi and other jurists as an aggravated law (shar‘ mughallaz), usually used in the context of punishment that requires a stronger stance. However, it is well known that this usage was not the only one; in another usage the word denotes rulings issued by the sovereign and his official representatives for the practice of governance or statecraft. From the second use of this term stems yet another, third meaning. This is the more familiar usage in terms of politics more generally or political theory. The use of the term in this sense had already been adopted by al-Farabi and others when translating Greek writings on political theory. It can be argued that ahkam as-sultaniyya or as-siyasa ash-shar‘iyya-type works combine three senses of this term. The Hanafi jurists kept the word siyasa to mean a heavy punishment to be inflicted by the ruler, and they were not greatly interested in developing a political theory. The very absence of political theory in this school seems to be significant, although they naturally had ideas on justice (‘adala) and criticized the rulers on the basis of them. One rare mention of siyasa as politics or political philosophy in the Hanafi legal tradition in the classical period is in one of the authoritative fatawa works of this school: al-Havi of al-Hasiri. The work of Hasiri is very insightful into Hanafi political theory. Hasiri is an exception because his work strangely openly talks about siyasa. Siyasa is legitimized through a state-of-nature/ survival argument, necessary in itself.

الحقوق المجردة بین الفقہ والقانون،دراسۃ مقارنۃ

ALLAH has also determined the rights of different classes of human beings. The term “Huqooq-e-Mujarradah” is a terminology of pure Hanafi jurisprudence, etc., it is frequently mentioned in the books of the Hanafi jurists, but the majority of other Islamic school of thoughts like Malikis, Shafi'is, and Hanbalis have not used this term peculerly. “Huqooq-e-Mujarradah” refers to the rights which are empty and isolated from the country and do not have a fixed relationship with the palace, if these rights are exercised or abandoned, the place will not be affected. There are many types of “Huqooq-e-Mujarradah”. But in this study, two main types are discussed. These are (Huqooq-ul-Irtifaq)Easementrights and (Al huqooq-ul-Fikriyyah) Intellectual property rights. So, what is the Islamic sharia view regarding these two rights, and what are the laws? This study examines and explains the answer to these questions.

Child Custody in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice in Egypt since the Sixteenth Century by Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim

Reviewed by: Child Custody in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice in Egypt since the Sixteenth Century by Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim Gulay Yilmaz Child Custody in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice in Egypt since the Sixteenth Century. By Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. x + 278 pp. Cloth $99.99. There are few works on child custody in Islamic law in the literature. Ibrahim's work fills an important gap in the field, as it is well researched with an impressive bibliography. The book is informative on the theoretical aspects of child custody, discussing the different approaches of the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Maliki legal schools. At the same time, it examines specific cases tried in Ottoman-Egyptian Shari'a courts in premodern and modern times. Ibrahim's attempt to contextualize the concepts of child custody and guardianship enables the reader to trace the historical development of the debates around child custody in modern Egypt. This contextualization is evident in both the periodization of the book and the organization of its chapters. Ibrahim examines approximately 600 cases drawn from eleven courts in Ottoman Egypt from the period 1517-1801. He views the Ottoman Hanafization policy after the French reconquest of Egypt as the first rupture in the application of Shari'a law on child custody cases (1801-1955) and examines hundreds of published Shari'a court records on child custody trials, especially between 1929 and 1954. Finally, the integration of Shari'a courts to the national court system and the incorporation of Islamic family law into a unified judiciary in 1955 marks a second turning point, which the author traces up to 2014. This long-term perspective highlights the complexity of child custody law in Egypt and its legacy in legal equitability in contemporary Egypt. There are six chapters in the book. Chapter 1 discusses the different juristic discourses on child custody. Chapter 2 outlines the approaches of various Islamic schools toward child custody and guardianship rules. These rules are analyzed under categories such as age and gender (the general attitude was to give custody to the mother during infancy and then transfer it to the father or relatives from the male line), remarriage of the mother or marriage of female relatives (the same restrictions did not apply to the father), lifestyle, religion of the parents, visitation rights and joint custody, relocation with the ward (again, only restrictive against the mother), and child maintenance. How jurists incorporated these categories in their custody deliberations in early modern [End Page 159] Ottoman courts in Egypt is examined in chapters 3 and 4. Finally, chapters 5 and 6 focus on the changing interpretations of child custody between the periods 1801–1929 and 1929–2014, respectively. One of the main arguments of the book is that despite the patriarchal nature of the Islamic juristic discourse and a very narrow sense of child welfare that was often associated only with gross abuse, there was flexibility in the application of law in Shari'a courts, attributable to pragmatism and the freedom of judges to adhere to different schools of law during the early modern era. Ibrahim examines private agreement deeds (khul) and argues that some jurists (mostly following the Maliki school of law) accepted them, allowing women to retain custody of their children in case of remarriage or travel with the ward away from their regular residence. This went against the dominant status, which did not consider these agreements binding. The author concludes that during the nineteenth century, the Hanafization of legal codes caused Islamic law to become less flexible. Child welfare ultimately became defined by the dogmatic rules of Hanafi jurists, leaving no room for private deeds or individual judges' interpretations. Ibrahim, however, explains that these private separation deeds (which actually constituted a minority in his sample) had ceased entirely by the 1670s. Therefore, the observed rigidity was not solely related with the Hanafization/codification of Islamic law. Ibrahim also argues that the process of Hanafization of Islamic law in the nineteenth century was highly influenced by European values and the "cult of motherhood," which resulted in a new family ideology. He posits that under this women's rights approach, it was unnecessary...

The derivation of Shariah risk in Islamic finance: a theoretical approach

PurposeThis paper aims to propose a derivation of Shariah risk from both the Islamic finance theory and theory of contracts in Islamic law. Specifically, it deliberates the derivation of Shariah risk following the contracts validity and apprises the readers of the Shariah risk issues currently under debate.Design/methodology/approachThis study reviews the relevant literature and presents an analysis of contract rulings through evidence derived from the Qur’an, Hadith and other secondary sources of Islamic law. Various theories of Islamic finance and Islamic law of contracts are identified, to examine the general principles and essential elements and conditions of a valid contract.FindingsThis analysis asserts that any circumstances that may render invalidity of the contract will trigger Shariah risk. More importantly, this paper highlights the implications of invalid contracts, based on the opinion of Hanafi jurists, who concluded that Shariah risk may be derived from any void or voidable contracts due to the failure of the contractual parties to comply with Shariah contractual obligations.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper emphasises the derivation of Shariah risk over theoretical approaches. It does not include an explanation in the form of any empirical model.Originality/valueThis is the first study that contributes to the field of derivation of Shariah risk, based on the theory from the Islamic law of contracts.

Jual Beli Benda Wakaf Untuk Pembangunan Masjid Istiqlal di Desa Palengaan Daja Pamekasan

Abstract: Muslim jurists agree that selling waqf property is forbidden A case happened when concrete pillars of a waqf mosque was sold in a mosque called Istiqlal in Daja village. The pillars were initially planned to be installed during rebuilding of the mosque. The research discovered that this pillar originated from charity. These pillars were re-sold to collect more fund from community to continue the rebuilding. Majority of sunni schools of law (Shafii, Maliki and Hanbali) view that such transaction is forbidden because there is no valid reason for selling the pillar. In addition, the seller is not the rightful person to do so. Meanwhile, Hanafi jurists allow such practice as long as all requirements are met, especially the availability of replacement property as well as fulfilment of all terms and conditions of selling.
 Key words: Waqf, selling property, mosque

Ottoman Soldiers in the Arabian Peninsula: Fighting Armed Rebellion in the Sacred Mosque of Mecca in the Seventeenth Century

This article investigates how Hanafi jurists responded to armed rebellion against local authorities in Mecca. I examine two understudied legal treatises that have been written about the sack of Mecca by armed rebel groups in 1632. These treatises provide important insights for studying how premodern Islamic legal discourses dealt with the issue of rebellion under Ottoman rule and sovereignty. I contend that it is in this context of rebellion and violence that we can test the contours of Ottoman imperial power and authority. I argue that recurrent defiance to the Ottoman political order compelled Hanafi jurists to revisit the earlier commitments of the school with regard to dissent and political change. In these two treatises, Hanafis insisted that armed rebellion in the Sacred Mosque in Mecca went beyond any valid political grievances – which would have been admitted as a plausible cause for dissent – and justified a swift military intervention.

Evidentiary truth claims, imperial registers, and the Ottoman archive: contending legal views of archival and record-keeping practices in Ottoman Greater Syria (seventeenth–nineteenth centuries)

AbstractThe article reconstructs a debate between Hanafi jurists who operated throughout Ottoman Greater Syria (and beyond) from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries concerning the evidentiary status of the Ottoman imperial registers (defters). At the centre of the jurists’ debate is the permissibility of using imperial registers as independent, uncorroborated evidence. It was a debate about who had the right to regulate and determine what constituted an authentic evidential document: while some jurists argued that it was almost exclusively the privilege of the jurists, others were willing to concede this authority, at least in part, to the Ottoman dynasty and its bureaucracy. Furthermore, the article contends that the debate about the evidentiary validity of the defters captures the complex relationship between Ottoman dynastic law and the Hanafi fiqh discourse. Finally, the debate sheds light on the legal “defterization” of other types of documents and texts, such as a chronicle (taʾrīkh) and court records (sijill).

Defining Village Boundaries at the Time of the Introduction of the <em>Malikane</em> System: The Struggle of the Ottoman State for Reaffirming Ownership of the Land

This article examines four cases in which a need arose to define clearly the boundaries of properties belonging to the endowments of Şeyhulislam Feyzullah Efendi (1695-1703). The process of drawing village boundaries not only served the interests of the Ottoman government and the villagers, but also the interests of a land-owning class enabled by mulk grants. In response to the introduction of the malikane system at the end of the seventeenth century, high-ranking functionaries belonging to the old elites strived to secure rural income by attempting to convert public resources into private property. In this process, the preparation of the demarcation document (hududname) was very important. After receiving the official grant, which only mentioned the names of the mulk objects, the interested dignitary wanted to be certain of the boundaries of the defined properties, so that his rule over these properties would be full and unconditional. The article shows that nevertheless the state always retained ultimate ownership of the land. Since land formed the major economic resource for centuries, providing a large share of people's income and an important part of government's taxes, the Ottoman state and Hanafi jurists had to deal with problems and issues relating to ownership, land management, access to agricultural surplus, and the settlement of disputes. 1 As power relations shifted among various forces―the state, provincial administrators, local notables, owners of “free-hold” properties, waqf founders, peasant cultivators, and so forth―the rules of landed property were occasionally recast by legal thinkers and the central government. 2 After all, as Sabrina Joseph asserts, “the law is a dynamic discourse, an integral part of the historical process, which is responsive to existing reality and actively engaged in shaping and re-shaping this reality. Thus, the law, similar to relations of power, is constantly being renegotiated.” 3  Michael Nizri is a Lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies and Israel Studies, Ariel University, Ariel, Israel; email: michaelniz@ariel.ac.il *I would like to express my deepest thanks both to Kent F. Schull and the article's anonymous reviewers. 1 The Ottomans officially adopted Hanafi jurisprudence. 2 Baber Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent (London: Croom Helm, 1988); Huri Islamoglu-Inan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 56-61; Martha Mundy and Richard Saumarez Smith, Governing Property, Making the Modern State: Law, Administration and Production in Ottoman Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 11-39; Sabrina Joseph, Islamic Law on Peasant Usufruct in Ottoman Syria (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 3 Joseph, Islamic Law, 4. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.4 on Thu, 08 Sep 2016 04:31:28 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Investigating Secondary Source Usage by Hanafi Jurists to Enhance Contemporary Relations in Muslim Minority Societies

This essay advocates the use of secondary sources in Islamic law in order to improve relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in predominantly non-Muslims societies. I focus on the hanafi school of Islamic law and elucidate some classical opinions derived using secondary sources which served at improving relations in previous eras. Using a principled approach from these classical judgments, I make practical suggestions for both factions in the modern era that could serve to remove the ignorance surrounding Islam’s tenets and further integrate Muslims within the communities-at-large. In the final analysis, the doors of co-existence are open granted proactive and innovative steps are taken by both sides.

Is Qisas (Just Retribution) for Intentionally Bodily Harm Entirely Based on Ijma'?

Some contemporary scholars maintain that the rules relating to qisas (just retribution) for bodily harm are based entirely upon ijma'. However, works by the Hanafi jurists seem to suggest that other sources of law are important as well. This article attempts to elaborate the issue by focusing on the discussion by those jurists of the conditions of implementing just retaliation for bodily injuries: equality of injuries, possibility of implementing just retribution, equality of the parties with respect to both being free persons, equality of the parties with respect to both being free persons, equality of the parties with respect to gender, and the determination that the injury suffered by the victim is permanent.

Istisnā` and its Application in Islamic Banking

AbstractNo Abstract