Habeas Corpus Research Articles

Immigration Detention and Habeas Corpus: Positive Developments and Missed Opportunities in Chhina

In Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Chhina (“Chhina”), a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found that immigration detainees in detention of lengthy and uncertain duration may access habeas corpus relief at provincial superior courts. The majority held that the detention review scheme under the governing statute did not accord as broad and advantageous protection as that provided by habeas corpus. The author argues that Chhina is a positive development with missed opportunities. The Supreme Court laudably clarified the case law and narrowed the exception that previously barred immigration detainees from seeking any form of habeas corpus relief. Further, in finding that the governing detention review scheme is not as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus, the majority adopted a pragmatic approach and focused on how detention reviews are conducted, not on how they ought to be performed. Notwithstanding these strengths, the majority missed an opportunity to resolve the conflicting case law on three common issues that arise when detainees in lengthy immigration detention file habeas corpus petitions: (i) determining when a detention becomes unduly lengthy such that it is unlawful; (ii) developing a singular approach to calculating the duration of detention; and (iii) establishing the proper weight that should be ascribed to detainee cooperation in habeas corpus applications. Moreover, in omitting substantive discussions of the broader context surrounding immigration detention, the majority missed a valuable opportunity to fully shine the light on the shortcomings of immigration detention and in the process potentially usher in systemic changes.

Enhanced Rights for Detained Persons

The incorporation of habeas corpus and bail in the Cameroonian Criminal Procedure Code has not only entrenched them in law, but has also widened and deepened their scope, with a view to obtaining, as far as possible, the respect for human rights and the rule of law in order to ensure a more functional criminal justice system in Cameroon. The incorporation of habeas corpus and bail in the Cameroon criminal trial process will restrain the arbitrary and illegal use of the powers of the judicial police officers and ensure respect of human rights. Although there are some challenges in the application of habeas corpus and bail such as misuse of the remedies by some overzealous authorities, defiance of court orders in the enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus by administrative authorities, and erosion of confidence in the Judiciary, there is optimism in the conscious efforts being made to ensure that habeas corpus and bail are properly applied so that the Cameroonian Criminal Procedure Code attains its full potential.

Immigration Detention and Habeas Corpus

In Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Chhina (“Chhina”), a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found that immigration detainees in detention of lengthy and uncertain duration may access habeas corpus relief at provincial superior courts. The majority held that the detention review scheme under the governing statute did not accord as broad and advantageous protection as that provided by habeas corpus. The author argues that Chhina is a positive development with missed opportunities. The Supreme Court laudably clarified the case law and narrowed the exception that previously barred immigration detainees from seeking any form of habeas corpus relief. Further, in finding that the governing detention review scheme is not as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus, the majority adopted a pragmatic approach and focused on how detention reviews are conducted, not on how they ought to be performed. Notwithstanding these strengths, the majority missed an opportunity to resolve the conflicting case law on three common issues that arise when detainees in lengthy immigration detention file habeas corpus petitions: (i) determining when a detention becomes unduly lengthy such that it is unlawful; (ii) developing a singular approach to calculating the duration of detention; and (iii) establishing the proper weight that should be ascribed to detainee cooperation in habeas corpus applications. Moreover, in omitting substantive discussions of the broader context surrounding immigration detention, the majority missed a valuable opportunity to fully shine the light on the shortcomings of immigration detention and in the process potentially usher in systemic changes.

Establishing a constitutional ‘right of asylum’ in early nineteenth-century Britain

ABSTRACT For several generations before the First World War, the idea that the British constitution contained a ‘right of asylum' for foreign nationals was commonplace. Though this belief had profound consequences for Britain's treatment of political and religious exiles, its relations with foreign states, and the drafting of its extradition and immigration laws, there has been little enquiry into its origins. This article delineates the emergence of the idea of a constitutional ‘right of asylum', locating it in a series of political clashes over the ‘Alien Act' that took place during the decade after the Napoleonic Wars. This legislation, which established controls over foreigners during the French Revolution and the quarter-century of war that followed, was increasingly challenged by the Whig and radical oppositions after Waterloo, both for its specific arbitrary provisions and as a more fundamental violation of the rights of aliens guaranteed by key constitutional documents like Magna Carta and the Habeas Corpus Act. By the mid-1820s these objections cohered into a conviction that asylum itself could be claimed as a right. This conviction and the arguments that spawned it were repeated for many subsequent decades, forming the basis of the widespread Victorian belief in the ‘right of asylum’.

The Habeas Petition, And Other Options for Immigrants, in the Federal Courts

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is an important tool in the arsenal of immigration attorneys who seek to fully represent their clients. Going to federal court in an attempt to obtain habeas relief may be the only remaining remedy after all other administrative options have been exhausted. Traditionally, habeas has been used to challenge prolonged detention post-final order of removal, prolonged detention pre-final order, and to challenge unlawful detention, but increasingly it is used to challenge such related issues as unlawful deportations in violation of the statute or regulatory provisions, and/or violations by CBP, USCIS or other agency actions during the expedited removal process under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the federal courts have changed operations to limit the spread of the disease. Also, there have been other significant changes to the operations of USCIS and EOIR, in recent days. The article addresses some of the issues to be considered by the habeas petitioner when going forward in federal court proceedings given the Covid-19 pandemic.

Keeping out of harm’s way? Constitutional due process and state repression

The question concerning a state leader's decision to employ repression against domestic audiences extends beyond a binary choice. Leaders act strategically in choosing among a variety of repressive methods through a cost-benefit analysis largely predicated on whether the state will be held responsible for its actions. The divergent costs of repression, particularly physical integrity repression, vary across two dimensions: whether a particular form of repression is custodial or non-custodial, and whether legal means exist to hold leaders accountable. Non-custodial repression, which occurs in contexts outside direct state detention, is harder to link to the state. Furthermore, a state can employ non-custodial repression while maintaining the façade of abiding by constitutional expectations, particularly promises of pre-trial, due process. I use propensity score matching to identify four separate samples in which states vary on the presence or absence of four types of constitutional provisions: pre-trial release, habeas corpus actions, speedy trials, and the right to counsel. The empirical results support the theoretical expectations that the existence of pre-trial, due process provisions in a state's constitution will increase the likelihood of non-custodial repression (disappearances and extrajudicial killings) and decrease the probability of a state employing custodial repression (political imprisonments).

Habeas corpus como mecanismo de garantía de derechos de las personas privadas de libertad

En Ecuador las personas privadas de libertad que vienen siendo víctimas de tortura, tratos crueles, inhumanos y denigrantes por parte del personal penitenciario han accionado el habeas corpus como medio de defensa para el amparo del derecho a la libertad, en este contexto, el presente estudio delimita como campo de acción dos Centros de Rehabilitación Social: Turi y Latacunga, el análisis de las sentencias emitidas sobre las personas privadas de libertad que accionaron la garantía de habeas corpus permite comparar las resoluciones de los jueces tomando como referencias los mandatos de la Constitución de la República del Ecuador y de la Ley Orgánica de Garantías Constitucionales y Control Constitucional. Los resultados de este análisis denotan la importancia de la protección de los derechos de las personas de manera particular el derecho a la libertad. En el presente trabajo se empleó la perspectiva teórica metodológica con el enfoque cualitativo.

Habeas corpus preventivo como garantía del derecho a la vida, la integridad física y libertad

Se analiza la garantía jurisdiccional del habeas corpus contemplada en el artículo 89 de la Constitución y artículo 43 de la Ley de Garantías Jurisdiccionales y Control Constitucional, pues por parte de los sujetos procesales y de los operadores de justicia existe incertidumbre en cuanto a la aplicación y alcance de esta garantía, toda vez que, por el principio de no regresividad de los derechos, se contempla actualmente a esta garantía no solo en su tradicional aspecto reparador del derecho a la libertad. El objetivo es determinar el accionar de esta garantía en la modalidad preventiva, no vulnera el debido proceso. La metodología empleada para la investigación está sustentada en el análisis bibliográfico, con un enfoque cualitativo, lo que permitió revisar y analizar leyes, doctrinas, sentencias, para en base a ello elaborar significativos aportes teóricos en el tema constitucional.

Article 139: Conferment on the Supreme Court of Powers to Issue Certain Writs

Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court power to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for any purposes other than those mentioned in clause (2) of Article 32.

Overcoming the Labyrinth: A Guide for Immigration Attorneys to Assert Habeas Corpus

Trump’s draconian immigration policies threatened our sense of common decency so fiercely that few Americans noticed that immigrants also lost all their most important cases in the U.S. Supreme Court during the Trump era. Perhaps their worst loss to date was DHS v. Thurassigiam, which was a parade of horrible firsts. For example, Thuraissigiam was the first SCOTUS decision to judicially suspend the writ of habeas corpus to any class of person with no actual insurrection or invasion in the country. Thuraissigiam was also the first U.S. Supreme Court decision to suspend the writ without first attempting to interpret the law to avoid conflict with the Suspension Clause, and it is the first to decide not to overrule such a law as Marbury v. Madison requires. In the habeas context tracing back to 1789, immigrants were never treated this way. One cannot find judicial treatment this bad of any other class of person throughout our history, including African American slaves, women, our enemies in WWII, the insurrectionists of the Civil War, among other likely classes for mistreatment. Calling Thuraissigiam the “Dred Scott” of our day, despite the obvious similarity of degrading the constitutional rights to those the Court decides are not U.S. Citizens, does not capture the size of the Court’s blunder. Dred Scott’s habeas corpus companion Ableman v. Booth preempted State Court habeas for African Americans, but did not consider whether the Fugitive Slaves Law suspended federal judges from hearing the writ. In Thuraissigiam, the Court did not interpret a law external to the Court was a suspension, but rather owned its ruling that certain immigrants have no privilege to assert habeas corpus as a self-imposed, judge made rule. This article was written to help immigration attorneys in perhaps our most shameless era access habeas corpus for their clients. Below are six approaches inspired by Boumediene v. Bush, according to which Thuraissigiam may be objectively distinguished. This article also examines common misconceptions about how Immigration Court should be addressed in a habeas proceeding by petitioners and a description of leading habeas law in support of immigration habeas petitions.

Appealing for Liberty: Freedom Suits in the South by Loren Schweninger

Reviewed by: Appealing for Liberty: Freedom Suits in the South by Loren Schweninger Aston Gonzalez Appealing for Liberty: Freedom Suits in the South. Loren Schweninger. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 978-0-1906-6428-2. 440 pp., cloth, $39.95. Interspersed with provocative and chilling accounts of enslaved people attempting to win their freedom using means of law, Appealing for Liberty offers an outstanding overview of the strategies that secured their freedom. Schweninger's analysis and comparison of more than two thousand freedom suits representing more than fortysix hundred plaintiffs from all of the Southern states and the District of Columbia provide numerous insights into the people, laws, and courts that determined their outcomes. Primarily organized by theme, the work is bookended with chapters on freedom suits that incorporate legal issues that are closely scrutinized within the book. Schweninger follows the legal distinctions that helped determine these cases between the American Revolution and the Civil War by parsing out the importance of how, when, and where people gained or failed in their attempts to win their freedom. Schweninger's book reveals a great deal about the court systems that enslaved people navigated. In pointing out the differences among the state laws and customs that shaped juridical and legal processes, two states—Louisiana and Delaware—receive special attention. All Southern states are represented in the book, but many of the most striking cases come from these two states. A series of laws offered more avenues for freedom that stemmed from nonimportation laws, being hired out, skin color, and Native American heritage. As legal historian Ariela Gross has previously argued, many cases highlight the importance of performing race, specifically whiteness or Indianness and its often attendant freedom, according to phenotype, dress, and comportment in the courts. For example, until the approach of the Civil War Louisiana law presumed skin color to reflect enslaved or free status (53, 120). Other avenues to freedom—such as hearsay evidence permissible in the courts—closed shortly in the decades after the American Revolution. Furthermore, these freedom suits illuminate the procedure of judicial evidence with respect to enslavement and freedom. Lower courts granted freedom to plaintiffs who purchased themselves through self-hire, an often illegal practice, but "the appeals courts would invariably reverse the rulings" (176). [End Page 321] The book provides a rich understanding of those people who helped and hindered enslaved people's claims to freedom. Though enslaved (rarely) and free black people (occasionally) provided testimony to assist in a freedom suit, white community members and lawyers, many of them slaveowners, provided the bulk of the legal support in the examined cases. In an especially revealing chapter, readers discover that white lawyers took on freedom suits not due to financial gain or antislavery beliefs but because they "sought to maintain the integrity of the statutes enacted by state legislatures, to safeguard the sanctity of the legal process, and to defend the rights of slaves or free persons of color who, they deemed, had been unfairly treated" (242). Schweninger's study reveals that "in only a few, isolated cases" did antislavery activists assist African Americans suing for their freedom (187). Later chapters of the book that focus on interpersonal relationships make clear that claimants often benefitted from an extensive support network. Others, like those who initially stood to inherit enslaved people in wills, often turned to deceptive or illegal actions to keep term slaves and manumitted slaves permanently in bondage. Additionally, enslaved people documented how enslavers broke agreements and swindled them in order to derive more labor and financial gain from them despite a promise of freedom. The testimonies of enslaved people reveal a wealth of information about them. They demonstrate their knowledge of the court system, the laws of their states and surrounding states, and to whom they turned for assistance. Some learned that residency in a free state or territory before their return to a slave state could be a path to freedom (145). Their use of legal strategies including injunctions and writs of habeas corpus demonstrated the knowledge they and their legal counsel possessed. Court proceedings recorded their family histories, community ties, and harrowing life experiences. Due to the expansive nature...

Possible Reliance: Protecting Legally Innocent Johnson Claimants

The writ of habeas corpus presents the last chance for innocent defendants to obtain relief from invalid convictions and sentences. The writ constitutes a limited exception to the finality of judgments. Given the role finality plays in conserving judicial resources and deterring criminal conduct, exceptions created by habeas must be principally circumscribed. Since the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause in Johnson v. United States, the federal courts of appeals have attempted to develop a test that protects the writ from abuse by Johnson claimants. This Note first contributes a new understanding of the resulting circuit split. Currently, circuits construe the split to be about a Johnson petitioner’s burden of proof at the jurisdictional stage. However, circuits actually disagree on the standard a petitioner must meet to establish the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. This Note identifies two standards. The sole-reliance standard requires petitioners to show that the sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause, while the possible-reliance standard requires petitioners to show that the court may have relied on the residual clause. Both standards must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. This Note then deploys this reconceptualization of the circuit split to advance new arguments in favor of imposing the possible-reliance standard at the jurisdictional stage. The possible-reliance standard protects the innocent, preserves the finality of judgments, and conforms with Supreme Court habeas jurisprudence and congressional intent expressed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

O CUMPRIMENTO DA PENA APÓS DECISÃO EM SEGUNDA INSTÂNCIA À LUZ DA PONDERAÇÃO DE PRINCÍPIOS DE ROBERT ALEXY

Trata o presente artigo de análise de decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal que fixou entendimento sobre a possibilidade de cumprimento de pena após a confirmação da sentença em segundo grau de jurisdição. O objetivo principal da pesquisa é verificar, à luz da doutrina da ponderação de princípios, exposta por Robert Alexy em sua obra “Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais”, se o entendimento fixado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal ofenderia, em alguma medida, o princípio da presunção de não culpabilidade. Sabe-se que o tema envolve o conflito entre princípios que preveem direitos fundamentais da maior envergadura. O confronto se dá, de um lado, entre o princípio da presunção de não culpabilidade, e, de outro, o princípio da proibição de proteção deficiente que exige um sistema penal eficiente e eficaz. Parte-se da explanação do conteúdo dos princípios em colisão. A seguir expõe-se a doutrina da ponderação de princípios de Robert Alexy e encerra-se com a análise da decisão tomada pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, tomada no habeas corpus126.292/SP. Concluiu-se que, no que pese a importância do princípio da presunção de não culpabilidade como direito fundamental, sua leitura não deve ocorrer de forma literal e absoluta cedendo por meio de ponderação de valores, espaço à exigência de um sistema penal eficiente e efetivo decorrente do princípio da proibição da proteção deficiente.

A EXECUÇÃO PROVISÓRIA DA PENA SOB A ÓTICA DO ATIVISMO JUDICIAL

O presente artigo trata da execução provisória da pena sob a vertente do ativismo judicial, especialmente em razão da decisão proferida pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal no julgamento do Habeas Corpus 126.292/ SP. O tema é abordado sob o prisma doutrinário e jurisprudencial, haja vista a divergência acerca da possibilidade de execução provisória da pena antes do trânsito em julgado da decisão condenatória. O método utilizado na pesquisa é o indutivo-dedutivo, sendo discorrido, primeiramente, acerca da garantia processual penal da presunção de inocência, em seguida sobre os principais motivos expostos no Habeas Corpus 126.292/SP e, ao final, sobre o possível ativismo judicial do Supremo Tribunal Federal no julgamento do referido remédio constitucional. O estudo é concluído com ponderações a respeito da ressignificação do princípio da presunção de inocência sob a ótica do ativismo judicial.

Execução provisória da pena após condenação pelo tribunal do júri segundo os parâmetros do habeas corpus n. 126.292/sp julgado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal

O presente artigo analisa a possibilidade jurídica de decretação da prisão após a condenação pelo Tribunal do Júri, sob a luz do entendimento – resgatado – do Supremo Tribunal Federal acerca da possibilidade de cumprimento imediato da pena após análise pelo colegiado da 2ª instância. Traça um paralelo entre a decisão tomada no HC 126.292/SP e os casos de condenação pelo Tribunal do Júri, e demonstra o limite de discussão sobre a culpabilidade, com a distinção entre a sentença proferida de forma monocrática e o veredicto prolatado pelos jurados, bem assim em relação aos efeitos quando interposto recurso contra eles. O método utilizado foi o dedutivo.

The defence of the democratic constitution in extraordinary circumstances: the law of exception in comparative law and in spanish constitutional history

In this paper we examine the appropriateness and significance of the law of exception in the Spanish constitutional order. For this, we have examined the models of Comparative Law that Spain has followed to restore its disturbed constitutional order. Basically, historically, concern arose at the time of North American and French Revolutions of how to incorporate into the Constitution the institutions related to their protection. British singularity was also manifested in the way of understanding and including specific protection for the defence of the Constitution and the law of exception, with institutions such as martial law or habeas corpus. The suspension of habeas corpus as an extraordinary instrument of protection of the state organization was considered in the American Constitution of 1787, and is thought of as a precedent of Article 55.1 of the current Spanish Constitution of 1978. During the period between 1812 and 1869, the law of exception contemplated in Spanish Historical Constitutions covers only the suspension of guarantees. The republican Constitution of 1931 conserved the outline of the Constitution of 1869, with certain relevant alterations. The most significant normative instruments of this legislation were the Law of Defence of the Republic and the Law of Public Order of 1933. After the publication of this last Law, it became the extraordinary norm that has most deeply and habitually been put into practice, since Spain has experienced practically a permanent situation of "constitutional abnormality". This highlights the fact that a Law of Public Order for the defence of the constitutional regime established by the Second Republic could be transferred in many of its precepts, with very similar contents to the Francoist Law of Public Order that was able to remain in force until much later, being finally repealed by the Organic Law of LO 1/1992, of Protection of Citizen Safety.

Habeas corpus: reflexões teóricas e estratégias para a tradução (espanhol ”“ português) do termo jurídico

Este artigo apresenta reflexões sobre estratégias para a tradução de textos relacionados ao domínio discursivo jurídico. São aqui discutidos alguns usos do termo habeas corpus no par linguístico espanhol ”“ português que, embora eventualmente designados de forma idêntica, têm alcance, efeitos e ritos distintos nos sistemas jurídicos em contato. Considerando habeas corpus um item-cultural-específico, este trabalho aborda a história e o desenvolvimento dessa garantia no Brasil e em alguns países de língua espanhola com o objetivo de refletir sobre as diferenças entre os sistemas jurídicos eventualmente em contato por meio da tradução, chamando atenção para o fato de que dicionários nem sempre preveem a diversidade dos habeas corpus insculpidos no Direito das nações de língua hispânica. A partir disso, são sugeridas estratégias para o tratamento deste termo na tradução do texto jurídico, ressaltando-se a importância da consulta a fontes acuradas e dicionários especializados ””e, preferencialmente, provenientes do país de cuja tradição jurídica se estiver traduzindo ”” de modo a evitar que a tradução desses termos ignore as características que eles apresentam enquanto itens-culturais-específicos. Para tanto, propõe-se uma revisão teórica sobre o habeas corpus como instrumento garantidor de liberdades (tanto de liberdade de locomoção como de liberdades individuais mais amplas), seguida de uma discussão sobre como a tradução de textos jurídicos está ligada aos diferentes ambientes culturais em que esses textos estão colocados. Tomando por base o referencial teórico de Javier Franco Aixelá sobre itens-culturais-específicos, são propostas seis possíveis estratégias para a manipulação do habeas corpus (ou do instrumento que o faça as vezes sob a ótica do Direito Comparado) em tradução do espanhol para o português. Em seguida, analisam-se especificamente as estratégias possíveis para a tradução de termos e são apresentados exemplos de explicação intratextual e de universalização para este termo provenientes do texto jornalístico sobre o Direito. Com essa discussão, este artigo visa a levantar um debate em uma área relativamente pouco trabalhada dentro dos Estudos da Tradução e contribuir para o desenvolvimento do campo com uma pesquisa sobre línguas próximas, como o português e o espanhol.

O julgamento do Habeas Corpus n. 143.641 a partir de uma perspectiva de direitos reprodutivos

Partindo-se da premissa de que os direitos reprodutivos são efetivados a partir do direito à saúde e incluindo-os no âmbito do Direito Sanitário, este comentário de jurisprudência visa a estudar, em uma perspectiva de direitos reprodutivos, o Habeas Corpus n. 143.641, que versa sobre a maternidade e o cárcere. Inicialmente, conceituam-se os direitos reprodutivos com base sua inserção no rol dos direitos humanos. Na segunda parte, busca-se compreender a maternidade e o cárcere a partir da análise de aspectos do Código de Processo Penal e, principalmente, da jurisprudência do Habeas Corpus n. 143.641. Utiliza-se método dedutivo do estudo da doutrina jurídica para o caso. Conclui-se que a pauta dos direitos reprodutivos está presente nas discussões jurídicas brasileiras sobre maternidade e cárcere, mas seu exercício ainda não é pleno.

Civil Liberties on the Homefront: Korematsu and the National Security Justification

Throughout much of American history, the national security justification has been a powerful tool of the government in seizing powers that resulted in the curtailment of civil liberties. During the Quasi-War with France, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts to criminalize speech critical of the government. During the Civil War, President Lincoln unilaterally suspended the writ of habeas corpus and authorized the detention of thousands of political prisoners, including dozens of delegates of the Maryland state legislature and several newspaper publishers. During World War I, Congress enacted several laws that severely restricted civil liberties, including widespread censorship of the press. Perhaps the most notorious example of the use of the national security justification that resulted in the deprivation of civil liberties was the internment of over 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry in concentration camps in the western United States during World War II. The exclusion of these people (nearly two-thirds of which were American citizens) from their homes was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States. By itself, this decision was and is widely regarded as one of the nation’s worst. Yet, the Court’s ruling was just the beginning of the story. Information uncovered in the years since revealed that the government knew its national security justification was lacking and yet still misled the Court by withholding, altering, and destroying key evidence. It would not be until 2011 when the government, through the Solicitor General’s office, would acknowledge this error; and not until 2018 for the Supreme Court to formally acknowledge that Korematsu was wrongly decided. Korematsu’s revealed story provides historians and the public alike with key lessons about the trust its citizens place in the government in times of crisis and how Americans' views have shifted over time. The case also raises important and timely questions about how deferential the courts should be to claims of national security by the executive branch when civil liberties are at stake, and whether the courts can fairly adjudicate such claims.

Taking Liberty Decisions Away from 'Imitation Judges'

Immigration detention is punishment. Therefore, time-honored proposed solutions to fix the immigration adjudication system, such as converting immigration judges (which some have called “imitation judges”) into Administrative Law Judges or even creating an Article I Immigration Court, are insufficient for liberty decisions. This article proposes that Congress strip “imitation judges” of their authority to review decisions about physical liberty. Rather, such decisions should be entrusted to a magistrate judge, with review by an Article III judge. The procedures are already in place; Congress need look no further than the Bail Reform Act, which applies when a person is held awaiting a criminal trial. Federal courts have borrowed heavily from criminal pretrial detention procedures, engaging in piecemeal oversight of the immigration detention system through habeas corpus review. These decisions reflect lower federal courts’ persistence in monitoring the rights of immigration detainees, even in the face of legislation that has aimed to limit their role. The work of these courts has been laudable, but a better solution that reaches every immigration detainee is necessary. The Trump administration has threatened immigration judges’ independence at every turn. Congress, therefore, should prevent such “imitation judges” from wielding the extraordinary governmental power to take away physical liberty.