Guard Corps Research Articles

대한제국기 중앙군 병영 배치와 그 정치적 함의

After the Gabo Reform, the arrangement of modernized military barracks was closely linked to King Gojong's political leadership. As a result of the military reform, which took place amid the shrinking political influence of King Gojong during the Gabo Reform, the newly established Central Army (Hullyeon-dae) placed a barracks around the Jongmyo Shrine, far from Gyeongbok Palace, where King Gojong resided. As King Gojong regained political leadership with escape to Russian embassy, the barracks of the Central Army shifted their focus to Gyeongbok Palace. After returning to Gyeongun Palace, King Gojong established the Siwi-dae as his own guard corps, and along with the declaration of the Korean Empire, he began to increase the Central Army with the Chinwi-dae and the Siwi-dae as its two main axes. In addition, in the process of establishing Emperor Gojong's absolute imperial authority, the Military Headquarters (Wonsubu) were established in the palace, and the barracks of the Central Army were placed around Gyeongun Palace. After the Russo-Japanese War, Emperor Gojong's influence on the military rapidly weakened as Japanese troops were stationed in Seoul and large-scale disarmament of the Korean Imperial Army proceeded. The Japanese military took over the empty barracks due to disarmament, and as a result, the Korean Imperial Army was isolated in the center of the capital. This relocation of military barracks was one of the reasons why the Korean Imperial Army was disbanded so helplessly when the army was disbanded.

ON THE HISTORY OF THE SECRET POLITICAL POLICE OF RUSSIA IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The article is a publication of and extended commentary on Mikhail Kirillovich Gribovsky’s text. He was in charge of the Guards Corps’ secret military police service organized in the early 1820s, after the “Semenovsky history”. In 1822, he compiled a note which is kept in the Russian State Military History Archive. The commentary describes the prehistory of the creation of the secret police: Gribovsky’s activities, his brochure On the State of Landlords’ Peasants in Russia and its perception by contemporaries. The article provides general information about the service created by Gribovsky and peculiarities of its financing. It refers to Gribovsky’s note on the Decembrist Union of Prosperity (thanks to it Alexander I had information about this society) and his three more notes, published in the last decades. The author concludes that Gribovsky writes in his note about the attempts to find the Brief Instructions to Russian Knights by M.A. Dmitriev-Mamonov, which were published in 1816 in limited edition and have not been preserved. He gives a brief history of the organization, the Order of Russian Knights, for which this brochure was compiled, and implies that this Order did not exist. Celebrities involved in the project of the Order of Russian Knights are listed. Despite the fact that the note is not signed, the author attributes it to Gribovsky on the basis of handwriting analysis and identifies the likely person behind the abbreviation. The note shows how political police worked in Russia at the end of Alexander I’s reign. For example, the Gribovsky’s interest in the Order of Russian Knights was caused by the assumption that M.A. Dmitriev-Mamonov’s Brief Instructions to Russian Knights were, in fact, a charter of the Union of Prosperity.

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Use of Diplomats in Its Intelligence and Terrorist Operations against Dissidents: The Case of Assadollah Assadi

The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has two main intelligence organizations: the Ministry of Intelligence (MOI) and the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The two organizations are highly active on foreign soil with malign activities like assassinations. In 2018, the third secretary of the IRI embassy in Austria, Assadollah Assadi, was arrested and later convicted of involvement in terrorism. With the help of three of his assets, they had planned to bomb a gathering in Paris arranged by the Iranian opposition to the IRI. Assadi would later be identified as the principal intelligence officer of the MOI on the European continent. Analyzing the case of Assadi shows that the IRI has the will and resources to conduct significant terrorist operations and that the regime has a vast network of assets throughout Europe. Most significant in the failed Paris plot was that evidently the IRI Intelligence Community is likely compromised and that the regime has considerable problems in trusting its own intelligence officers.

Realization of semantic and lexical instances in online hard news representation: a study through attitude and graduation analysis

The study explores media discourse through the lexical and semantic realization of text. For that, online hard news on the disruption of tension due to targeting Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani as the Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on 3rd January 2020 in Iraq was selected from “Tehran Times” and “USA Today.” The “Appraisal Analysis” of Martin and White under “Attitude” and “Graduation” resources were employed to analyze the lexical strategies. The dataset comprises 322 words from the “Tehran Times” and 1727 words from “USA Today.” The study reveals that both newspapers have presented their views via social actors (Irani President Rouhani & U.S. President Donald Trump) as an external voice. President Rouhani presented in negative invoked instances with determination to respond in “Tehran Times.” At the same time, “USA Today” portrayed Donald Trump on a positive with correct measures as the need of an hour. The findings suggest “USA Today” only had inscribed judgment and invoked stances. Both newspapers had represented “subjectivity” along with “objectivity” by presenting social actors’ positive image in their local newspapers through direct speech that showed the ideological orientation of newspapers.

The EU Terror List and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): About the Law as an Alleged Obstacle to Political Action

This article examines the legal requirements for a listing on the so-called European Union (EU) terror list, an aspect that remains underdeveloped in both legal scholarship and policy debates on counter-terrorism measures. The analysis elucidates the substantive requirements governing listings on the EU terror list and applies them to the case of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It highlights the two-tiered nature of the EU terror listing process, in which an EU terror listing relies on a national authority’s decision regarding the potential target. Furthermore, an analysis of recent Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case-law outlines prospective developments in the Court of Justice’s scrutiny of restrictive measures. It will be shown that the CJEU exercises judicial deference in its examination of restrictive measures adopted by the Council, particularly in cases involving threats to the EU’s legal and democratic order or international security orchestrated by foreign state actors.

The EU Terror List and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): About the Law as an Alleged Obstacle to Political Action

This article examines the legal requirements for a listing on the so-called European Union (EU) terror list, an aspect that remains underdeveloped in both legal scholarship and policy debates on counter-terrorism measures. The analysis elucidates the substantive requirements governing listings on the EU terror list and applies them to the case of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It highlights the two-tiered nature of the EU terror listing process, in which an EU terror listing relies on a national authority’s decision regarding the potential target. Furthermore, an analysis of recent Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case-law outlines prospective developments in the Court of Justice’s scrutiny of restrictive measures. It will be shown that the CJEU exercises judicial deference in its examination of restrictive measures adopted by the Council, particularly in cases involving threats to the EU’s legal and democratic order or international security orchestrated by foreign state actors.

Политическая власть в Иране: особенности влияния неформальных групп

The article studies the features of informal groups’ influence on power relations shaping in Iran. Based on the theory of interest group, the author analyzes the resources of influence of the five most powerful interest groups – the Shiite clergy, marketeers, religious bureaucracy, children of political and religious elite, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The traditional pivotal place of religion in Iranian society renders an influential position to the clergy. The presence of an ideological base, institutional support, material independence from the state throughout history, and closeness to the people are the factors that allow the clergy, often from outside the official system of government, to exert significant influence on its dynamics. The merchant class (bazaari) has historically been an ally of the clergy, together with whom it has repeatedly opposed political and economic decisions of Iranian authorities. This symbiosis is pragmatic: the clergy receives material resources from marketeers, who by supporting the clergy can count on its influence in promoting favorable agendas for them at the highest level. The author has established that the official state bureaucracy in Iran is under the influence of a parallel religious bureaucracy that appeared after the Islamic Revolution for religious and ideological monitoring in state structures. Due to the long coexistence and the general context of Iran’s political culture, in which family ties play an important role in gaining access to power interests, both lines of the country’s bureaucracy today seem entangled. Social capital is also a key resource for the children of Iran’s religious and political elite (aghazadegan). This actor of Iranian politics evolved as an interest group of high-ranking officials’ children whose parents were legally barred from doing business. As a result, a group of interests has emerged that controls large economic resources in Iran and creates potential challenges for the political and ideological foundations of the current regime. Unlike the previous four interest groups, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a purely state structure, which is becoming an informal actor in Iranian politics due to the growing political ambitions. Legally, the Corps should not engage in politics, but, in fact, the military mobilization potential, large-scale economic activity and wide representation of loyal people in all structures of supreme power in Iran make it one of the key actors in Iranian politics. Based on the conducted study, the author concludes that the political life of Iran is difficult to understand only by studying the activities of official structures. There are other actors who, despite legislative restrictions on their powers or scope of activity, are actively involved in shaping the domestic political agenda in Iran.

ACTIVITIES OF TRADING FIRMS OF VOLYN VOIVODSHIP ON THE POLISH-SOVIET BORDER IN THE 1920s

Abstract
 The purpose of the article is to analyze the activities of Polish trading firms of the Volyn Voivodeship on the eastern border of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 1920s.
 The scientific novelty consists in the introduction into circulation of a significant number of hitherto unknown scientific sources regarding the activities of trading firms on the Polish-Soviet border in the specified period.
 Methodology. When writing the article, the basic principles of historical knowledge were used: historicism, scientificity, objectivity. Specific search tasks of the research were solved by problem-chronological means (optimal involvement of the thematic literature and source base); historical-comparative (analysis of various sources and formation of relevant research provisions and conclusions); critical analysis (critical attitude to various sources) methods.
 Conclusions. The first half of the 1920s was a time of intensification of contraband trade on the Volyn section of the Polish-Soviet border, which in turn led to the emergence of a number of trading firms focused on foreign buyers. Their activities were constantly in the field of view of representatives of the Polish state authorities, police bodies, and border guard units. During the first half of the 1920s, the Polish state was looking for an optimal model of organizing the protection of the eastern border of the state. With the transfer of functions for the protection of the Polish-Soviet border to units of the Border Guard Corps, the strengthening of border protection on the Soviet side, the collapse of the NEP led to the gradual collapse of the activities of companies and smugglers. In the early 1930s, most of the firms ceased their activities, and their owners reoriented themselves to trade on the western border of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Discord in the Diaspora: Agonism in the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement for Democracy

The death of the 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022 sparked a movement that immediately captivated the Iranian diaspora around the world. The morality police had detained Amini in Tehran for allegedly improper hijab. Protests began in Iranian Kurdistan, where Amini was from, and spread across the country to regions and sectors of society that have historically been less involved in political protests than major urban centers like Tehran. What began as a street protest became a full-throated rejection of the status quo. Merchants, teachers, and students organized coordinated labor strikes, while protesters and security services clashed in the streets. Additional economic sanctions were implemented against Iran's government by the United States and Europe; the United Nations Human Rights Commission initiated an independent investigation of the government's response to the protests; Iran was expelled from the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women; and the European Parliament cut diplomatic ties with Tehran. The United States has nearly abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) even as it was in the final stages of renegotiation, while calls by activists and the European Parliament to designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a terrorist group are ongoing.1 We also saw significant global solidarity protests in numerous major cities in the United States, Europe, and Australia.

Իսլամական հեղափոխության պահապանների կորպուսի դերն Իրանի քաղաքական համակարգում

The complex political situation created by the Islamic Revolution provided the basis for the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps supplements regular Armed Forces by performing functions outside the traditional role of the army, operating separately, and carrying out various operational tasks. The research into this organization indicates that the IRGC that mainly carried out the security of the Khomeini groups has become a powerful structure. It could be said that today the IRGC functions as a broad socio-political and economic institution whose influence extends to all aspects of Iran's political and social life. Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is also a corporate unit of Iran's military, intelligence, political, political, ideological, as well as financial and economic institutions. It can also be emphasized that this powerful structure is the backbone of the Islamic Republic of Iran today. According to Ayatollah Montazeri, one of Iran's most influential figures, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the child of the revolution and is the only body in its kind that has broad religious, political, and military powers.

Iran Protests and Patterns of State Repression

Over the past four months, the brutal, extralegal, and violent repression of protestors during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in Iran has taken observers and participants by devastating and sometimes fatal surprise. Although not a drastic departure from past practices, the large scale and seemingly random acts of violence, such as the beating of protestors to death on the streets, the shooting of passersby and nonviolent demonstrators point blank, and the fatal torturing of detained protestors and activists, have marked new levels and scales of violence. In what follows I analyze this brutal repression campaign in relation to the institutional history of the Islamic Republic's armed units, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as the most controversial entity among all. I contend that the IRGC's historic endorsement of firing at will as an accepted practice among its ranks has enabled the decentralized radical instances of violence. I will discuss how, despite the continued reliance on decentralized forces, their firing at will is not unanimously endorsed this time around, due to the different nature of the current movement and the deepening uncertainties and schisms in both the forces on the ground and the ruling elite.

NEGOCIERILE BILATERALE ROMÂNO MAGHIAREPRIVIND TRECEREA FRONTIEREI (1945-949)

The Romanian-Hungarian border after the end of the Second World War was one of the priorities of the Petru Groza government at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. The border before the Conference benefited from additional protection from the Romanian authorities to prevent the illegal crossing of the border by the Hungarians. Even after the ratification of the Peace Treaty in 1947, there were incidents on the Romanian-Hungarian border. Due to the fact that at the beginning the Romanian-Hungarian border did not benefit from official recognition by international bodies, surveillance was mainly done through security and defense missions, with the exception of the border with the USSR. In 1944, in Northern Transylvania, the Soviets began an extensive border surveillance activity. Soviet military rule was maintained from November 1944 to March 1945, with the coming to power of a pro-Soviet government led by Dr. Petru Groza. Also, while the Soviet leadership controlled Northern Transylvania, they made provisions for the Border Guard Corps, which was significantly reduced. From a number of 44,000 in 1944 to 12,000 in April 1945. The Frontier Police also underwent permanent restructuring, coming under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission. In order to avoid illegal border crossing, we will see throughout this article that Romania has taken special measures to prevent this. This caused discontent among Hungarian citizens living in Hungary, as they were subjected to a series of bureaucratic procedures that made it difficult for them to come to Romania. In 1946, the Border Troops Command belonging to the Ministry of National Defense was established. The pedantic problems between Romania and Hungary regarding this aspect were dealt with within the Ministry of the Interior. The numerous problems caused by crossing the border determined the creation of a mixed Romanian-Hungarian delegation to discuss and lay the foundations for a convention in order to solve the existing problems. The first convention aimed to settle the points being accepted by both parties. Later, the Hungarian side requested the reinstatement of the Convention for Small Border Traffic with Hungary from 1931, which, however, was not accepted by the Romanian state. On November 25, 1947, with the arrival of the Hungarian delegation in Romania, a Protocol was signed. Point 3 of it referred to the issue of movement of people who have property in both countries. Transit visas were also on the agenda of the discussions. The two delegations held numerous negotiations between 1945-1949, but which did not lead to the definitive stop of the fraudulent crossing of the border with Romania.

The Quds Force and drug trafficking in the world

The Quds Force is one of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's five forces. It is impossible to separate the Quds force and the IRGC from each other. Since its establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has supported terrorist groups in the region and Islamic countries.The "Quds Force," or the "Sepah," took its name from the title given to Jerusalem by the Islamic Republic and was formed based on Article Seven of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps' Statute regarding the support of Islamic movements outside Iran's borders. This duty was first handled by the "Liberation Movements Unit" under the responsibility of Mohammad Montazeri and then by Mehdi Hashemi until the Unit was dissolved by the end of 1981. This Unit was also considered a sub-group of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.The "Islamic liberation movements" was also taken over by the intelligence unit of the IRGC for a while.This force was established during the Iran-Iraq war, and its purpose was to operate on Iraq's soil. Some sources have estimated this force to have up to 50,000 members worldwide.As the head of the Quds Force, Ghassem Soleimani created several other groups, such as the Hosseinioun, the Fatemiyoun, the Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi, Badr Corps, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, "Hezbollah of Iraq, in Yemen, the Quds Force supported the "Ansar Allah" group, all of these groups are politically, financially and militarily supported by the Iranian regime. Considering this organization's vast area of activities in the region, this article seeks to answer the central question of what role the Quds Force of the IRGC of Iran has played in drug trafficking in the Middle East and worldwide.1

Military Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Examination of the IRGC'S Ideological Influence

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) pervades most aspects of life in post-revolutionary Iran. Ostensibly the regime’s security organisation, the IRGC’s political clout and economic heft enable it to extend its influence beyond security and into foreign policy. This study employs a constructivist perspective, casting light on the key elements of the IRGC’s identity, notably its religious discourse. In doing so, it develops our understanding of how the organisation’s beliefs and values affect the foreign policy agenda of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This article draws on IRGC press statements, ideological training materials and its constitutive charter in conjunction with an analysis of the organisation's behaviour to delineate an image of an organisation staunchly loyal to the total imperium of the ‘House of Leader’, and which buttresses the regime with its militant, violent and religiously hardline outlook. Working to promote rather than define Ayatollah Khamenei’s system of Islamic governance, the IRGC’s role is closer to that of enforcer and implementer than of autonomous agent of foreign policy. This article contributes to the wider literature on constructivist idealism by highlighting the importance of ideas as relational and performative elements of foreign policy.

The Recruitment of Elitesto the Cabinets of Iran: a Biographical Analysis (1979–1989)

The article highlights the main patterns of recruiting ministers in the Iranian governments at 1979–1989. The work is based on the theoretical foundation of the study of the elites. Structural biographical analysis is the research method in the article. The paper analyzes the biographies of 183 ministers at the first 7 governments of Iran using aggregated form based on secondary data published by other researchers. The results of the work show that the first 3 years of the existence of the executive branch were the most conflicting: 5 governments existed consequently. 55–65% of all ministers had technical education. At the same time, the share of members of governments with humanitarian specialization decreased; the military and doctors had been replacing them. According to the place of education, the only balanced government was the Bazargan government, later the share of ministers with Iranian education increased, and with Western education decreased. The governments of Bazargan and the Council of the Islamic Revolution were balanced, where bureaucrats, scholars and professionals were relatively evenly represented. The main profession becomes bureaucratic. During this period, new elite groups emerged in governments: Shiite clergy and veterans of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The share of clergy from remains stable and fluctuates in the range of 9–14%. At the same time, the yield of veterans of the IRGC increases with each new government, reaching 21% in the second government of Mousavi. 60–70% of ministers came from regional capitals, and Tehran and Isfahan were the key provinces to recruit ministers.

Iran and the Gulf: The Era of Hassan Rouhani

The paper utilizes the theory of neoclassical realism as its theoretical foundation to understand the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). An insight is provided into defining Rouhani’s foreign policy discourse and slogan, primarily towards the GCC, while addressing the significant shifts in the region, which implicated Iran’s Rouhani stance towards the GCC and its members. The paper concludes with how the recent developments of the Iranian elections and Ebrahim Raisi will impact the future of Iran-GCC relations. From an analytical standpoint, it was found that Rouhani had difficulty engaging with the GCC countries due to impediments by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Similarly, the article highlights Rouhani’s era in Iran’s foreign behavior towards the GCC while exploring whether he achieved his foreign ambitions and provided a vision for the significant challenges awaiting the Raisi presidency.

Zhandarmskij tajnyj nadzor za blagonadezhnost'yu oficerov vnutrennej strazhi Rossijskoj imperii

The article is devoted to the reconstruction of the historical experience of the activities of the tsarist gendarmes, who performed the functions of the “supreme police”, aimed at organizing the secret collection of information about the lifestyle, service and behavior in society of the commanders of garrison battalions of a Separate Internal Guard Corps, endowed with extensive powers to protect order, catch criminals and pacify unlawful acts. The peculiarity of the topic under consideration is the extremely small elaboration of the problems of organizing secret surveillance within the system of police institutions created to protect statehood.

Stakeholders analysis of COVID-19 management and control: a case of Iran

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic is a multi-faceted phenomenon with many political, economic and social consequences. Success in managing and controlling this pandemic depends on the coordinated efforts of many organizations and institutions. Therefore, this study aimed to identify and analyze the actors and stakeholders related to managing and controlling this pandemic in Iran.MethodsThis mix-method stakeholder analysis was conducted in 2021 nationwide as retrospectively. The purposive sampling method was applied when inviting eligible participants to participate in the study. Our study was conducted in two phases. In the qualitative phase, data were collected using a semi-structured interview. An interview guide was developed based on the WHO stakeholder analysis framework. In the quantitative phase, we used a questionnaire developed based on the study framework. Each question was scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with a score greater than 4 was considered as high, 3–4 was considered as moderate, and 1–3 was considered as low. Data were analyzed using framework analysis, WHO stakeholders’ analysis framework and MENDELOW matrix. MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software Version 11 and Policy Maker software (Version. 4) were used for data analysis.ResultsA total of 48 stakeholders were identified. Ministry of Health (MoH), National Headquarters for Coronavirus Control (NHCC) had the highest participation level, high supportive position, and knowledge of the subject. The Parliament of Iran (PoI), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) had the highest power/influence during the Covid-19 epidemic. Only two stakeholders (6.06%) had high participation, and 18.18% had moderate participation. All stakeholders except for the NHCC and the MoH lacked appropriate knowledge of the subject. Furthermore, only three stakeholders (9.09%) had high power/influence.ConclusionGiven the multidimensional nature of Covid-19, most institutions and organizations were involved in managing this pandemic. Stakeholders with high power/authority and resources had a low/moderate participation level and a moderate supportive position. Moreover, organizations with a high supportive position and participation had low power/authority and resources to cope with COVID-19.

Hizballah: Between Iran and Lebanon

Hizballah: Between Iran and Lebanon

ВПЛИВ ПОЛЬСЬКО-РАДЯНСЬКОГО КОРДОНУ НА ЕКОНОМІКУ ВОЛИНСЬКОГО ВОЄВОДСТВА В 1921–1939 РОКАХ

The article attempts to outline the impact of the Polish-Soviet border on the economy of Volyn’ Voivodeship in the interwar twentieth century. The settlement of political and economic relations between Poland and the USSR had a negative impact on the possibility of economic development in the Volyn’ region while focusing on the markets of the USSR. It is established that in the period of 1921-1924 the economy of the region benefited from trade with Soviet Ukraine. During this period, illegal trade flourished in the territories adjacent to the border, which had a positive impact on the economy of the province. However, in the following period of 1925-1939, trade contacts between the Volyn’ Voivodeship and the USSR were reduced to a minimum. The geographical location of the Volyn’ Voivodeship on the border with the USSR and the economic potential of the region remained virtually untapped in favor of economic development. The strengthening of the border by the Border Guard Corps effectively isolated Volhynia from any contact with the Soviet side, thus making it impossible to use the existence of the border for the economic development of Volyn’ Voivodeship. Instead, the second period of 1925-1939 was characterized by the de facto complete elimination of border trade and the closure of the Polish-Soviet border.