Guard Corps Research Articles

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS OF IRAN: A STATE WHITHIN A STATE

The article contains an analysis of the reasons and foundations for the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) appearance in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The author sheds light on the process of the IRGC development and its current state. For almost 40 years of its existence, IRGC has transformed from a set of ill-armed and weak organized groups, functioning mainly as the guarding structures, to a unique governmental structure. For now, the set of IRGC`s functions includes such spheres as military, police and gendarme, and religious sphere (which includes “special operations”). IRGC also bears some political and financial-economic functions, among which ensuring internal security of the Islamic regime in the Islamic republic of Iran by struggling with political opposition; suppression of anti-governmental demonstrations; control for the political, civil and nongovernmental organizations, private companies and firms; defense from political aggression from outside; making reconnaissance and counterespionage; prevention the country from the Western ideological and cultural flows; management of the resistance forces “Basij” and civil defense; monitoring the compliance by citizens the Islamic life and moral norms; implementation of the conception of the “Islamic Revolution export”; fighting drug-related business and banditry; participation in the state borders` defense actions (if required); involvement in large-scale governmental economic projects. In military terms, the IRGC has such military troops as land forces, air and naval forces, resistance forces “Basij” and Special Forces “Qods”. The IRGC is a high-class component of the military forces in the Islamic republic of Iran, which includes an Army itself. However, the range of the IRGC commitments is much broader than standard military ones. Thus, nowadays, the IRGC plays a significant role in politics (both internal and external) and fulfils special tasks outside of the IRI. Having large financial and economic assets, the IRGC controls from 25% to 35% of the Iran`s economics. Today the IRGC exists as a corporate union of the military, intelligence, police and gendarme, political, ideological, economic and financial structures of the modern Iran. In fact, the IRGC is a cross-functional mega holding, leading by the Supreme leader and his surroundings. Modern IRGC is the essential foundation for the IRI`s statehood, it is a state within a state.

How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps

During the first week of September, Iranian speedboats twice harassed U.S. Navy ships in international waters near the Strait of Hormuz. Those boats belonged to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the same week, news emerged that the IRGC had arrested another dual Iranian-American national during a family visit to the country. The commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, meanwhile, was in Aleppo, in the company of Iraqi Shiite militias currently engaged in the siege of Syria’s second-largest city. Indeed, only a few days earlier, the IRGC announced the formation of a Shiite liberation army composed of Shiite militias that Iran has been nurturing across Mesopotamia and the Levant. That did not stop France’s mobile phone giant, Orange, from beginning talks with Iran’s largest mobile phone operator, Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran (MCI), over acquiring a stake in the Iranian company. The IRGC controls MCI through a 50-percent-plus-one stake in its parent company, the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI). In short, whether its internal security, foreign adventures, or large corporate ventures, the IRGC plays an outsized role in Iran’s internal power structure. Established in 1979 to consolidate the Islamic revolution and fight its enemies, the IRGC has evolved over the years into a full-fledged conventional army, conducting and directing terrorist activity abroad. The Guard has also become a political power broker, an economic conglomerate, and an agency in charge of nuclear and ballistic-missile proliferation. The interaction among military, economic, and political power is critical in understanding the centrality of the IRGC to Iran’s current system. The Guard exploits its influence and capabilities in one realm to increase its presence in another. Its growing economic clout is both an end in itself and a tool to advance its other agendas. Thus, IRGC revenues from economic activities yield the necessary resources and political leverage to place its members in positions of power. Conversely, the Guard’s political power serves the economic enterprises it owns, and both its political and economic weight in turn advance its military projects. The IRGC’s wealth serves three important goals. First, it generates revenue to finance the IRGC’s military activities – including the nuclear and ballistic missile programs at home and sponsorship of terrorism abroad. Second, it offers the Guard a network of companies, enterprises, banks, offices, holdings, and joint ventures that can execute the regime’s procurement efforts for advanced weaponry and sensitive technology. Third, it generates personal affluence, which the Guard can translate into political influence. Indeed, the Guard’s growing political and economic influence enables it to bank on public companies’ willingness to lend their services – both at home and abroad – to aid the Guard’s efforts to procure forbidden technologies and raw materials, and to finance their purchases through middlemen in foreign markets. Although the summer 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) lifted significant sanctions on Iran, the risks for foreign investors – risks of exposure to money laundering, corruption, and terror finance or of inadvertently partnering with a still-sanctioned entity – have only increased. The Revolutionary Guard lies at the heart of these risks. The IRGC launders money from its “legitimate” businesses to fund its illicit activities; it finances terrorist groups across the world; and it enriches itself at the expense of the Iranian people through corruption and kleptocracy. It is for this reason, among others, that Transparency International ranks Iran 130 out of 168 counties on its corruption perception index, and the Basel Institute on Governance ranked Iran as worst in the world with regard to risks from money laundering and terrorism financing. This report demonstrates the Revolutionary Guard’s pervasive influence in the Iranian economy and provides an accounting of the IRGC’s nefarious activities. Without a sober understanding of how the IRGC will exploit economic dividends generated by the JCPOA, policymakers and the private sector cannot establish appropriate counter-measures to prevent the enrichment of the most dangerous elements of the Iranian regime.

Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times

ABSTRACT: Force reductions resulting from the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review significantly compromise the US Army's ability to maintain the global commitments and positioning necessary for managing strategic risks arising from multiple, unforeseen sources. In this article, the authors discuss how active duty Army capacity affects America's strategic risk. ********** During the upcoming decade, the United States will be challenged by a new strategic threat or worse, multiple strategic threats. How will the US Army respond if sequestration cuts continue? The near-future Army--for better or worse--will originate in this decade. The size and readiness of the near-future Army will offer one of two options, either reducing America's strategic or increasing it. So what would be the right size of the Army if we want to reduce America's strategic risk? The results of 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) led to reducing the size of the Army to levels unseen since before World War II. Unfortunately, the current force reduction can only produce one result, the weakening of the joint force's ability to deter conflict, which accordingly increases America's strategic risk. Since the publication of the 2014 QDR, numerous new threats have emerged to challenge the Army's reductions. Daesh captured large parts of Iraq and Syria. The Syrian Civil War escalated, causing a Middle East and European refugee crisis. Russia annexed Crimea, invaded Ukraine, and intervened alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to maintain the Assad regime in Syria. North Korea remained bellicose, testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. China continued its territorial expansion in the South China Sea, and the Taliban continued to intensify offensive operations in Afghanistan. All of these events occurred in just the last several years; what might the next few years bring? While acknowledging the indispensable roles of both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as strategic reserves, their roles, missions, and sizing are beyond the scope and length of this article, which focuses on the size of the active duty Army. This discussion considers what the Army brings to the fight in relation to forward presence and deployable capabilities, the current and future demand on land forces, and examines two options for rightsizing the Army to reduce strategic risk. To set the stage for Army force sizing, we discuss the definition of strategic and five troubling assumptions about future war. Strategic Risk How does strategic relate to the size of the current and future US Army? Strategic is the probability of failure to achieve a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The smaller the army, the higher the of failure to obtain a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. (1) Senior US Army leaders view today's Army at high risk in regards to the emerging threats and potential for future great-power conflict. High is the rating in which the Army would not be able to accomplish all its assigned tasks in the allotted time and level of casualties. (2) Five Faulty Assumptions While assessments of strategic risk, acceptable cost, and the size of the Army are complex, several false assumptions about future war and landpower have gained currency in defense circles. These assumptions increase national strategic by failing to appreciate Army capacity-capability with sufficient scale and endurance--as an essential element of national security. The is troubling because it threatens to consign the US military to a repetition of the mistakes of recent wars and the development of joint forces ill-prepared for future threats. Forward-positioned land forces do not prevent conflict. Deterrence depends on the demonstrated ability to prevent the enemy from accomplishing its objectives, and deterrence theory states deterring aggression is most likely to succeed when the potential aggressor believes the threats will be enacted. …

Iran's Ballistic Missile Program And Economic Sanctions

Iran this week engaged in a series of ballistic-missile drills, launching next-generation short-, medium-, and long range missiles from silos and missile bases built deep underground and in mountains. It was the third ballistic missile test since last summer’s nuclear deal. Indeed, the Islamic Republic has the “largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East,” according to the U.S. government’s February 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment. The United States intelligence community further assesses that Iran “would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them. Iran’s ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD.” The development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead is prohibited by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. Iran’s ballistic missile program began under the Shah but was expanded after the 1979 revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. Today, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are responsible for Tehran’s ballistic missile program. Both the United States and European Union have sanctioned these two entities for their roles in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Over the past two decades, the IRGC and MODAFL have expanded their industrial-financial empire. They directly control or indirectly influence many of the largest companies in Iran, especially in those sectors that provide dual-use goods and technology. As explained in this memo, Tehran has used commercial entities as fronts to procure sensitive-technology or to provide goods for military purposes. Today, a wide array of entities and sectors are thus likely involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program. This memo outlines the roles of the metallurgy and mining; chemicals, petrochemicals, and energy; construction; automotive; and electronic, telecommunication, and computer science sectors, as well as that of universities and research institutions. Countering Tehran’s missile program will require a multipronged, U.S. and international effort utilizing diplomatic, military, cyber, covert, and economic tools. Because the development of ballistic missiles requires a wide range of goods, services, and technology, we recommend economic sanctions against all sectors involved in their development.

FORCING EACH OTHER TO MAKE PEACE

FORCING EACH OTHER TO MAKE PEACE

Revolutionary Intelligence: The Expanding Intelligence Role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a military and paramilitary organization that is meant to defend the ideals of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Since its formation, the IRGC has grown in influence and its intelligence role has expanded. This paper examines the role of the IRGC in Iran’s intelligence system through a comprehensive analysis of the organization of the IRGC’s intelligence arm, along with its operations and capabilities. In doing so, the scope, objectives, resources, customers, and sponsors of the IRGC’s intelligence activities are also analyzed. Additionally, this paper explores how the IRGC interacts with the government of Iran, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), other key internal stakeholders, and foreign client organizations. A key focus of this analysis is the evolution of the relationship between the IRGC and the MOIS and the growing influence of the IRGC in Iran’s intelligence community over the last decade. The paper concludes that the IRGC has now eclipsed the MOIS within Iran’s intelligence community and is one of the most powerful institutions in Iranian politics today, using its intelligence activities as its key means of maintaining power and influence within the country. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss3/6

Revolutionary Intelligence: The Expanding Intelligence Role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a military and paramilitary organization that is meant to defend the ideals of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Since its formation, the IRGC has grown in influence and its intelligence role has expanded. This paper examines the role of the IRGC in Iran’s intelligence system through a comprehensive analysis of the organization of the IRGC’s intelligence arm, along with its operations and capabilities. In doing so, the scope, objectives, resources, customers, and sponsors of the IRGC’s intelligence activities are also analyzed. Additionally, this paper explores how the IRGC interacts with the government of Iran, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), other key internal stakeholders, and foreign client organizations. A key focus of this analysis is the evolution of the relationship between the IRGC and the MOIS and the growing influence of the IRGC in Iran’s intelligence community over the last decade. The paper concludes that the IRGC has now eclipsed the MOIS within Iran’s intelligence community and is one of the most powerful institutions in Iranian politics today, using its intelligence activities as its key means of maintaining power and influence within the country.

Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich - the Organizer of Libraries in the Artillery, Corps of Engineers and in the Military-Educational Institutions (second quarter of the 19th century)

N the basis of the archival materials and pre-revolutionary publications there is for the first time comprehensively studied the activities of the son of Emperor Paul I and Maria Feodorovna, Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, being in the capacity of: General-Feldzeugmeister (1819-1849), Inspector General for Engineering (1825-1849), Director-General of Military Educational Institutions (1831-1849), where were laid the foundations of the centralized organization of the officer libraries in the Artillery, Corps of Engineers and in the Military Schools. Under Mikhail Pavlovich, as the Commander of the Guards Corps (1826-1849), the organized officer libraries in the Guards Corps have got its further development. There are presented and analyzed normative legal documents, having made the significant contribution to the history of military librarianship of the Russian Army. Some of them became the basis for the further development of “Statutes”, “Regulations” and “Instructions” of military libraries. There is given comparative characteristics and there are shown some organizational features of the artillery, engineers, combat engineer and regimental guard officer libraries, as well as book collections of the secondary military schools.

Government Surveillance and Counter-Surveillance on Social and Mobile Media: The Case of Iran (2009)

Government Surveillance and Counter-Surveillance on Social and Mobile Media: The Case of Iran (2009)

Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda's organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL's behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

Conventional Wisdom and the Next Unknown

Conventional Wisdom and the Next Unknown

Fighting the "Islamic State" The Case for US Ground Forces

Abstract: This article argues counterinsurgency wars are not analogous the challenges presented by the Islamic State. The United States needs accept the nature of the war it is in, and undertake clear and comprehensive assessment of the necessary for strategic success. Such assessment will make apparent the need commit US ground combat forces. (1) ********** The rise of the Islamic State has forced policy makers confront uncomfortable questions: What will it take defeat the Islamic State? What is the nature of the current conflict against the Islamic State? Can the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), bolstered by US and allied air power, advisers, special forces--almost everything short of ground combat forces--defeat the Islamic State? The difficulty the Iraqis experienced in taking Tikrit and the recent abandonment of Ramadi should be instructive, as was the premature announcement by US Central Command of coming ISF spring 2015 offensive retake Mosul, which was followed by admission that the ISF is not yet ready for the kind of fight Mosul entail. (2) Many have already commented on the need have all US options on the table defeat the Islamic State. Retired Marine Corps General James Mattis recently wrote US strategy should include ground combat forces to achieve our war aims. (3) This article explains why US ground forces are not just better option than the ISF, but absolutely necessary for achieving US policy objectives against the Islamic State. Does Our Strategy Fit the War We Are In? All students of strategy have had the ends-ways-means catechism drummed into them at some point in their education. Assessing the US strategy for the war with the Islamic State from this perspective is useful in reaching understanding of what needs be done defeat the Islamic State. Additionally, it will illustrate the continuing challenges in post-9/11 strategy formulation and, in particular, the chasm between desired and deployed means. President Obama, in his February 11, 2015 letter the Congress requesting Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) fight the Islamic State, set forth clear ends for his strategy: to degrade and defeat ISIL. (4) To this point in the fight against the Islamic State, the US has been limited a systematic campaign of airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and supporting various anti-Islamic State security forces. (5) American means are limited air power, advisers, and US support the Iraqis. The other beyond US supporting forces--the boots on the ground--include the ISF, Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni and Shi'a militias, the latter backed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Indeed, Major General Qasem Soleimaini, commander of the Iranian Quds Force, was at one point directing the offensive retake Tikrit. (6) This is problematic in terms of US strategy in the region, but also creates sectarian tensions with Iranians deeply involved in taking Sunni areas. The AUMF explicitly states it would not authorize long-term, large-scale ground combat operations like those our Nation conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is the fundamental flaw in conceptualizing strategy for defeating the Islamic State in Iraq--seeing this new fight as similar in character the past 14 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Clausewitz is instructive when he stresses that war is an instrument of policy.... This way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise them. (7) Quite simply, the United States needs understand the war it is in and the adversary it faces in the Islamic State. The Islamic State is not insurgency like the United States fought from 2003 until its departure from Iraq. Rather, it is aspiring proto-state bent on taking and holding territory. …

Elecciones legislativas en Irán

The Legislative elections in Iran have been held in a climate of rivalry. The elections had to clarify who had the real political power in Iran, the clerics and the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei or the President of the Republic, the secular Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, supported by the Revolutionary Guard Corps. The reality was that the conservative faction led by the United Principalist Front, supported by the Supreme Leader, has obtained the victory.

Iran's Basij: Membership in a Militant Islamist Organization

The Basij militia is a central component of Iran's clerical regime and a supporter of hard-line conservative interests. It is a security organization that also engages in social and political activism. This study focuses on the group's rank-and-file members and looks at the organization's mechanisms for recruitment, participation, and training. Based in part on interviews with current and former Basij members, the article concludes with general observations about the organization and its internal practices.The Basij militia is an omnipresent feature of life in many Iranian cities. The orga- nization is one of the regime's largest social enterprises, encompassing somewhere between 1.5 to 15 million members, and has steadily evolved over the last two decades into a pillar of Iran's security establishment.1 There are seventeen separate Basij subor- ganizations (e.g., for university students, factory workers, government workers, engi- neers, etc.) and three types of Basij memberships: regular, active, and special. Regular members comprise the vast majority of the organization and are the lowest ranking, having undergone a minimal amount of training. Active members comprise a middle level and receive complete basic ideological coursework, and some military training. Special members are full-time Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) soldiers who have been assigned to Basij units.2Although the Basij has steadily gained the attention of scholars, relatively little has been written about those who join the organization.3 To that end, this article explores general experiences of Basij members and specifically looks at how the organization's rank-and-file (both regular and active) members are recruited, what sort of incentives drive their participation, and what types of training and instruction they receive. The ar- ticle concludes with observations on three issues - the importance of social networks, the role of ideology in recruitment and retention, and the informality in leadership and structure - that give shape to the Basij, its membership, and its operations.This study is primarily based on interviews with former and current Basij mem- bers, conducted mainly in Tehran between November 2009 and July 2010. Due to the acute political tensions in Iran during that period (and since), the researchers and the subjects they interviewed requested to remain anonymous.4 Also for this reason, the in- terviews consciously avoided sensitive political topics (such as opinions on the regime's legitimacy and the Basij's role in suppressing popular unrest following the contested 2009 presidential election), and focused instead on less controversial aspects of general life in the Basij. Each interviewee was asked around fifty questions that covered non- political topics. These questions were divided into several broad categories that were designed to learn more about why individuals joined the Basij, the process of becoming a member, what sort of training they experienced (or were offered), what aspects of being a part of the organization they enjoyed, the types of activities that they took part in, and their general relationship with commanders. Although these interviews form a small data set, they nonetheless provide valuable glimpses into the internal dynamics of the Basij organization and the experiences of its members.SECURITY FORCES AND REGIME LOYALTYThe tsunami of popular unrest that has swept across the Middle East since 2011 has seriously challenged - and perhaps forever altered - some of the region's authoritarian regimes. While this turmoil has amplified the need for political reform in the region, it has also highlighted the risk of deploying security forces against spirited mass dissent. The extent to which governments deploy their security forces against popular protest often de- pends on a government's assessment of a particular force's loyalty to the regime against its members' sympathies for popular grievances. …

THE RISE OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR STATE: POLITICS OF PSEUDO-PRIVATIZATION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

AbstractSince 2009, analyses of Iran have stressed the centralizing takeover of the country's economy by a single state institution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. At the same time, however, Iran's factionalized political elite uniformly advocate for rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises. Underneath this puzzling contradiction is a complex shift of economic ownership away from the state toward a variety of parastatal organizations including banks, cooperatives, pension funds, foundations, and military-linked contractors. The result is not a praetorian monolith but a subcontractor state. This article draws on interviews conducted in Iran during 2009 and 2010, primary data from parliamentary and governmental reports, and secondary sources to show how intraelite conflict and nonelite claims have structured the process of privatization. Framed comparatively with privatization outcomes in other middle-income countries, Iran's subcontractor state can be seen as a consequence of the way in which politics and society shaped the form of capitalism that has taken root in the Islamic Republic.

Analysis on Relationship of the Network centrality and the Degree of Satisfaction for Crime prevention activity in Voluntary Guard Corps

Analysis on Relationship of the Network centrality and the Degree of Satisfaction for Crime prevention activity in Voluntary Guard Corps

Evaluating the Political and Economic Role of the IRGC

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is Iran's most powerful security and military organisation, responsible for the protection and survival of the regime. Over time, the IRGC has attained a position of dominance vis-à-vis the regular army (Artesh). In due course, the Guards have also been transformed into a leading political and economic actor. The major political role of the IRGC started with the election of the reformist presidency. However, the Guards' involvement in the Iranian economy began during Rafsanjani's presidency. In view of the importance of Iran and its military, especially the IRGC, this article seeks to analyse the political and economic roles of the IRGC. The article argues that the IRGC's political and economic role is likely to increase due to its unique relationship with Iranian political elites and in view of the current power struggle between various political factions within Iran. However, any such expansion of the IRGC's role may not go unchallenged. The unintended consequence of this could be the erosion of the IRGC's credibility and people's trust.

The Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Future of Democracy in Iran: Will Oil Income Influence the Process?

Iranians have experienced some democratic movements during the last fifteen years, but they did not succeed in establishing democracy in the country. However, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has increasingly played an undeniable role in different fields of Iran's society, particularly after the war with Iraq in the early 1990s. Additionally, Iran's political economy, based on oil revenue, helped the center of power to support the IRGC and the government. In this article, we discuss about the relationship between the government and IRGC, and moreover we conclude that this condition plays an obstacle role for democracy in Iran.

The management of the effects of navigation on the marine environment: the case of tributyltin (TBT)

The aim of this study is to review the fact-finding and decision-making process of the international community which, via the International Maritime Organization, has led to a ban on the use of antifouling paints containing organotin compounds. This review focuses on the importance of scientific knowledge supporting the sustainable management of the environment and on the centrality of ecotoxicological studies on the effects of human activities on the enviroment. The Italian Coast Guard Corps guarantees compliance with the regulations, through the action of Port State Control carried out in ports and onboard vessels.

The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain

In December 1981, a group baptized al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li Tahrir al-Bahrayn [The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain] unsuccessfully attempted to carry out a coup d'etat in Bahrain. The group published newsletters and books in which it described its attempts to overthrow the Al Khalifa ruling family and install Iranian-style Islamic rule instead. These documents provide evidence for the group's involvement with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and of the support the Iranian regime provided for their activities against the Bahraini government.