Iran Under New Management Jahangir Amuzegar (bio) The stunning upset victory of Mohammad Khatami, a little-known former culture minister, over Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, the powerful speaker of the Majles (parliament), in Iran’s 1997 presidential election was called a turning point in the country’s post-1979 revolution. 1 The triumph of a reputed “moderate, liberal, and reform-minded” candidate over his “hard-liner, fundamentalist, and conservative” rival raised high expectations about the dawn of a new era for Iran. Khatami himself described his victory as a new phase in Iran’s history. Some called it a “second revolution.” 2 Many aspects of this watershed election are worth scrutinizing from different angles and will undoubtedly be taken up by other analysts in the months to come. This review intends to discuss some of the salient features of the election itself, and its likely impact on three crucial areas: domestic politics, the economy, and relations with the West. The Election’s Significance To many observers, the May election was fairer and freer than any held since 1979. Unlike some recent, well-publicized cases in Latin America’s new democracies—notably Peru, Argentina, Brazil—where incumbent presidents changed the constitutional limit on [End Page 73] tenure in order to hold onto power, President Rafsanjani agreed to hand over the presidency to the “people’s choice.” The presidential election also took place in a relatively peaceful atmosphere. In marked contrast to many third world countries, no incidence of major violence or bloodshed was reported by the local or foreign press. The orderly election process proved that domestic political stability could rely on an effective framework for peaceful change and did not require a strong dictatorial hand. More significantly, while the core clerical establishment had near total control over all means of directing, influencing, and even rigging the election, its candidate came out a poor second. Equally noteworthy was the fact that although various opposition groups at home and abroad urged eligible voters to boycott the election and stay away from the polls, the rejectionists’ pleas were largely ignored by the newly energized electorate. Finally, showing true sportsmanship and political maturity, the major defeated candidate, Nateq-Nouri, followed the Western electoral custom of conceding defeat and congratulating the winner instead of employing the traditional non-democratic technique of denouncing the results as rigged, or refusing to address his opponent. Though relatively fair and free, the election process was not strictly democratic in either substance or form. Khatami was pre-selected along with only three other “qualified” candidates by the Council of Guardians from among 238 presidential aspirants. People had no freedom to nominate candidates, and political parties could not organize and compete. Neutral observers were not allowed to monitor polling stations, and some opposition groups questioned the officially reported total number of votes cast. Opposition groups have also found fault with the somewhat compulsory nature of the participation since voting was declared a “religious duty.” Participation was often treated as a prerequisite for receiving welfare privileges such as food and energy coupons, travel passports, and other necessities. Some official agency circulars even bluntly urged employees to vote for a particular candidate. 3 A still more unorthodox aspect of the election, the president-elect was largely an unknown quantity before his decision to run. The overwhelming majority of those who enthusiastically voted for Khatami, and those who cheerfully welcomed his candidacy abroad, knew very little about him and his politics beyond the fact that [End Page 74] his ten-year tenure as culture and guidance minister was marked by a relatively more flexible attitude toward the censorship of books, films, newspapers, and artistic expression. 4 Khatami’s victory was due to a spontaneous coalition of disparate groups—ivory-tower intellectuals, degraded and disenfranchised women, frustrated and restless youth, discontented ethnic minorities, and the urban poor. These groups were convinced that a Nateq-Nouri victory would promise the status quo or worse, and thus opted for his rival. Khatami’s basic platform focused on promises to rewrite the domestic political rulebook, revive the economy, and improve external relations. His 12-point presidential campaign manifesto was rather short on concrete promises, somewhat scholastic, and largely...
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Jun 1, 2006
Mandana Naini 
Open Access