Greek Warfare Research Articles

The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great by Arther Ferrill

136 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE no stretch of the imagination restricted, as he alleges, to “periodi­ cals in the fields of Classics and Archaeology.” A closer scrutiny of this rubric might, indeed, have prevented certain omissions—Ovid’s knowledge of cosmetics, for example, in the AmericanJournal ofPhilol­ ogy 100 (1979): 381—92, cited in APh 50 (1981): 210. But granted its inherent limitations—no scholar is likely to make it a substitute for the indispensable APh—this bibliography remains a useful addi­ tion to technological reference works, which are, as Oleson says, thin on the ground. Peter Green Dr. Green is Dougherty Centennial Professor of Classics at the University of Texas at Austin. His publications include Alexander ofMacedon, 356-323 B.C.: A Histori­ cal Biography (1974), and the forthcoming Alexander to Actium: An Essay on the Histori­ cal Evolution of the Hellenistic Age. The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great. By Arther Ferrill. London and New York: Thames & Hudson, 1985. Pp· 240; illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $19.95. It has long been customary for military historians to treat war­ fare as if it were a Greek invention or, at the very least, to regard it as lacking in both interest and historical value before the develop­ ment of the hoplite phalanx. It is against this attitude that Arther Ferrill consciously pits himself. In this relatively brief survey—three chapters pursue developments in the Near East, two, trends in Greece, with a sixth chapter devoted to the campaigns of Alexan­ der the Great—he argues that a richly innovative military tradition began in the Near East in the Late Paleolithic period that ulti­ mately culminated in the complex and sophisticated military sys­ tems of Assyria and Persia. The most conspicuous flaw in this Near Eastern tradition was its lack of emphasis on heavy infantry, which emerged independently in the Greek world around 700 B.C. The two traditions first clashed in the Persian Wars, where the process of integration also began. “Greece learned much about the use ofcav­ alry, skirmishers, and light infantry from Persia, and Persia learned the use of heavy infantry from Greece, until finally, Philip and Alex­ ander blended the best of the two traditions and carried military strat­ egy and tactics to a point rarely achieved and much less often exceeded by generals down to the time of Napoleon” (p. 8). Histories of Greek warfare abound, and it would be difficult for anyone to breathe new life into such familiar material. Any reader al­ ready versed in the subject will certainly find Ferrill’s treatment of 5th-century hoplite warfare unrewarding, but his thesis does shed new and valuable light on the equally well-known innovations of the 4th century. Even the most jaded student of Alexander the Great, for example, will appreciate Ferrill’s analysis of the battle of TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 137 Issus, a clash of two integrated armies pursuing virtually identical bat­ tle plans that nicely illustrates the fusion of two distinct traditions. Still, laymen and professional historians alike will probably derive greatest benefit from the three chapters given over to Near Eastern warfare. The pace of Neolithic weapons development described at the outset adds a new dimension to our understanding of the “Neo­ lithic revolution,” and the fortification systems employed at such Neo­ lithic sites as Jericho and Qatal Huyiik, in all likelihood a response to this rapidly developing technology, offer a sobering demonstra­ tion of the influence of warfare on cultural development even at this early date. One should, however, approach his correlate argu­ ment that Neolithic warfare was “organized”—that is, made use of formations such as the column and line—with caution. This claim rests on artistic evidence, which is susceptible to more than one inter­ pretation. With their pronounced emphasis on Egyptian, Assyrian, and Per­ sian “grand strategy,” the second and third chapters usefully ex­ tend the conceptual framework of Luttwak’s Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore, 1976) to the ancient Near East, but these chapters would have been considerably more useful if Ferrill had ad­ dressed two glaring deficiencies. Bronze Age warfare in the Near East...

The Dendra charioteer

The heavy metal collar or neck-guard of the Dendra panoply (PL. XXXIIc; Verdelis, 1967; Åström, 1977; also Catling, 1977; Cassola Guida, 1973,52ffr)a ises a simple question which may have important implications for the study of Greek warfare in the Late Bronze Age. Pictorial and verbal representations reveal the neck as a highly vulnerable target in infantry warfare throughout the whole millennium which spans the Late Bronze Age and the classical period. Mycenae’s Shaft Grave warriors of the sixteenth century are frequently shown either aiming sword-thrusts downwards at an enemy’s throat over the top of his body-shield or thrusting upwards at his neck with a lance (e.g. Karo, 1930, Pl. 24, nos, 35, 116, 241; pp. 59, 177, Figs. 14, 87; Lorimer, 1950, 140–4, Figs. 2, 5, 6, 8; Cassola Guida, 1973, pl. I, Figs. 2–5; Furtwangler & Loeschcke, 1886, Pl. E, 30; and even lions get it in the neck: e.g. Evans, 1921–36, IV (2), 575, Fig. 556). The very differently accoutred Mycenaeans of the late thirteenth-century Warrior Vase and Stele march with spears poised for a downward thrust into their enemies’ necks (Furtwangler & Loeschcke, 1886, PI. 43; EA, 1896, P1. I; Lorimer, 1950, Pls. 3.1a; 2.2; Cassola Guida, 1973, Pls. 32,1 and 2; Verdelis, 1967, Beil. 32,2; Astrom, 1977, P1. ‘31,2). And the seventh-century hoplites do exactly the same on the Chigi Vase (CVA, Italy, I, P1. I; ABSA, XLII, 1947, 81, Fig. 2; Snodgrass, 1964, PI. 36).

Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages. P. A. L. Greenhalgh

<i>Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages</i>. P. A. L. Greenhalgh

A bullet of Tissaphernes

A lead sling bullet inscribed with the name of Tissaphernes forms the subject of the present article. Like other such missiles, the bullet is almond-shaped; it is 36 mm. long, 22 mm. thick, and weighs 40·423 g. (Plate Va). It was reportedly found at Julia Gordus (the modern Gördes) in Lydia and is now in a private collection. As far as I can determine, the object is unique. By its inscription, it raises questions of some historical interest and illustrates the major changes in the technology of Greek warfare in the period after the Peloponnesian War.Sling bullets were called in Greekμολυβδίςorμολύβδαιναfrom the material orσφϵνδόνηfrom the weapon. They were projected from a sling,σφϵνδόνη, by a slinger,σφϵνδονήτης. The sling, originally a weapon of hunters and shepherds, has a long history. It was known to the Egyptians, Assyrians, Phoenicians, and Etruscans; everyone is familiar with the story of its use by David against Goliath.

Greek Chariot-Borne and Mounted Infantry

This article attempts to answer criticism of the writer's paper on "Homeric, British and Cyrenaic Chariots," published in AJA 69 (1965) 349-52. It presents at greater length the literary evidence for historic parallels to "Homeric" chariotry—that is, for the use of chariots as transports for heavily armed soldiers who normally fought on foot. The theory that Homer's chariots are a heroic convention, superimposed upon stories that really assume the existence of cavalry or of mounted infantry, is examined and opposed, with special reference to the problems raised by the fortification of the Achaean camp and the episode of the horses of Rhesus. It is argued that the Homeric evidence (including the rare mentions of riding in the epic) is consistent with the actual conditions of Greek warfare during the Geometric period, but (chiefly on the evidence of archaic vase-painting) the view that chariot-borne heroes were replaced during the seventh century B.C. by mounted hoplites is supported. The article discusses the recent literature of the various problems raised, and also examines older discussions to which the writer was unable to do justice in his earlier paper.

Early Greek Warfare. Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages

Early Greek Warfare. Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages

(P. A. L.) Greenhalgh Early Greek warfare: horsemen and chariots in the Homeric and Archaic ages. Cambridge: The University Press. 1973. Pp. xvi + 212. 78 illus. £5·80.

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Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages

Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages

P. A. L. Greenhalgh. &lt;italic&gt;Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages&lt;/italic&gt;. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973. Pp. xvi, 212. $17.50

Journal Article P. A. L. Greenhalgh. Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973. Pp. xvi, 212. $17.50 Get access Greenhalgh P. A. L.. Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973. Pp. xvi, 212. $17.50. Mabel L. Lang Mabel L. Lang Bryn Mawr College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 79, Issue 1, February 1974, Pages 118–119, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/79.1.118 Published: 01 February 1974

Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages

Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages

Classical Greek Warfare - J. K. Anderson: Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon. Pp. x+419; 19 black-and-white plates, 8 line-drawings. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970. Cloth, £5–95.

Classical Greek Warfare - J. K. Anderson: Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon. Pp. x+419; 19 black-and-white plates, 8 line-drawings. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970. Cloth, £5–95. - Volume 22 Issue 2

Cleon's Orders at Amphipolis

How Cleon issued his fatal order to retreat from before Amphipolis does not seem to have been discussed by the commentators. But it would appear that he violated correct military procedure, and that this violation was in itself the cause of much of the subsequent confusion in the Athenian ranks. Thucydides says that both a signal and a verbal command were given—the signal conveying the definite meaning ‘Retire’, while the verbal command explained how it was to be done; and signal and command were issued together.Signals are divided by Arrian into three groups. Verbal orders, being most readily intelligible, are preferable when they can be heard above the din of battle. Visual signals may be obscured in the dust and confusion. Finally, the trumpet is useful in overcoming ‘atmospheric disturbances’ (τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐμπόδια).Visual signals are found in Greek warfare from at least the fifth century B.C. onwards, but they are generally prearranged, either to convey the news that some foreseeable event has actually occurred or to coordinate the operations of two bodies of troops who are widely separated but in sight of each other. Everybody concerned must be instructed in advance that after certain developments a certain signal will be displayed, upon which certain movements will be carried out. In this way Croesus in theCyropaediadirects the evolutions of his vast army, Antigonus plans to coordinate the separate attacks at Sellasia, and Gorgidas ends the feigned retreat of the Sacred Band. But the signals used—the display of a red cloak or a white; the raising of a helmet on a spear—are all obviously arranged for the occasion. There does not seem to have been any code by which the commander of a Greek army, at any rate in the classical period, could convey orders to his men on the spur of the moment by visual signals. In the army described by Arrian each battalion (σύνταξις) had its own standard bearer, and the rank and file could at least have conformed to the movements of the standard.

Homeric, British and Cyrenaic Chariots

It seems to be widely believed at present that Homer's Iliad was composed in an age in which chariots were no longer used in Greek warfare, that the chariot is introduced as something from a heroic past, and that the true manner of its use had been quite forgotten by the poet and by his audience.' assumption is that the only proper use of war-chariots is that made familiar by the Old Testament and by the Egyptian, Hittite and Mesopotamian monuments-as fighting vehicles, preferably arrayed in large, organized masses, from which spearmen or archers fight without dismounting. To quote one of the acutest recent critics, G. S. Kirk: The Iliad has countless descriptions of the use of chariots in war: they convey the chieftains to the battlefield from the camp, or from one part of the battle to another; to fight, the chieftains descend, but they keep their chariots near at hand so that they can retreat if they are wounded or outnumbered. Now not all these uses were impossible or superfluous-but they were not the primary purpose of chariots in other Bronze Age countries of the Near East about which evidence survives, or anywhere else.2 last three words are incorrect. Diodorus notes that the people of Britain use chariots in warfare just as the ancient heroes of the Greeks are related to have used them in the Trojan War.3 We can confirm and expand this statement by referring to the source from which it is no doubt derived, Caesar's Commentaries.4 In his invasions of Britain, Caesar encountered essedarii, charioteers, whose tactics he describes as follows: The manner of fighting from the esseda is this. First they drive about in all quarters and hurl javelins and, by mere terror of their horses and whirling wheels, generally throw the ranks into confusion, and, when they have infiltrated among the cavalry squadrons, they jump down from their chariots (ex essedis) and fight on foot. Meanwhile the charioteers gradually withdraw from the battle and so station their chariots (currus) that if the warriors are overwhelmed by the numbers of the enemy they have a ready means of retreat to their own forces. So they present in action the mobility of cavalry combined with the firmness of infantry, and by daily practice and exercise they reach such a pitch of efficiency that they are accustomed to gallop their horses down steep slopes without falling, and pull them up and turn them in a short space and run out along the pole and establish themselves on the yoke and thence withdraw with great rapidity into their chariots again. In this description, only the running out along the pole is un-Homeric, and, as G. Lafaye pointed out,5 presupposes a chariot more open in front than the Greek type. A further difference between Greek and British

Dogs in Ancient Warfare

This passage has suggested that it might be interesting to collect, as far as possible, the passages dealing with the use of dogs in ancient warfare and make a comparison with modern practice. The references which I have discovered, and which seem mainly to refer to Greek warfare, are numerous, but no doubt there are others which I have failed to trace.

Greek and Roman Naval Warfare. A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 B.C.) to Actium (31 B.C.)

Greek and Roman Naval Warfare. A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 B.C.) to Actium (31 B.C.)

Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 B. C.) to Actium (31 B. C.).

Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 B. C.) to Actium (31 B. C.).

On the Meaning of BaΔhn and ΔpomΩi in Greek Historians of the Fifth Century

Since the English author, who has written in the greatest detail and with most acceptance on Greek warfare in the fifth century, has now declared definitely that δρÓμψ cannot mean ‘at the run,’but should be translated both in Thucydides and Herodotus ‘at the quick step’in contrast to βúδην‘at the slow step,’ it may be worth while to re-examine the evidence, and to give some reasons for maintaining the translation ‘at the double’ at least in the descriptions of battles given us by Thucydides, Xenophon, and Herodotus.