As Bueno de Mesquita notes previously in this symposium, it is not clear whether we can make progress toward a scientific understanding of international politics. Indeed, it is not clear, at least not to me, whether we can make much progress in our discussions of this subject. Interest in it seems to go through cycles. The subject occupied much of our journals-and our PhD examinations-at the end of the 1960s and, after a period in which we tired of examining our epistemological and methodological assumptions, seems to be receiving more attention again. Whether we will do better this time around remains to be seen, but if Bueno de Mesquita's paper and the responses are typical, it does seem that there is now a bit greater convergence of views and a bit more civility in the debate. Thus readers who are anticipating a discussion whose entertainment value will rival that of the (1969) exchange between Levy and Kaplan (1969: 106-109) will be disappointed. Before discussing areas of convergence, let me note a few disagreements. First, the question of the utility of case studies is a large and complex one and I do not think Bueno de Mesquita has done it justice. I briefly refer the reader to the detailed arguments of Campbell (1975), Eckstein (1975), and George and McKeown (1985). First, although this may fall outside of the scope of Lakatos's (1978) criteria, case studies are particularly important in international politics because most of us are keenly interested not only in generalizations, but also in the explanation of particular events. Since large wars kill many people and strongly influence the future, we are concerned about conflicts like World War I or World War II whether or not they are typical of wars in general. (For further discussion, see Jervis, forthcoming.) Second, by dealing with many different aspects of the situation, case studies can meet Lakatos's criterion of accounting for previously unexplained facts and subsuming facts we already have explained. Thus, a study that looks at domestic politics in 1914 might explain both the origins of World War I, the foreign economics policies of European powers, and the domestic policies which were pursued. Alternatively, a study of 1914 in terms of the significance of the prevailing beliefs that the offense would dominate the defense could explain facts relating to preemptive war, alliance structures, crises that were particularly liable to lead to war, and the interplay of bureaucratic and domestic politics (see, for example, Snyder, 1984a, 1984b; Van Evera, 1984). The other side of this coin is that I must admit to being a bit confused by some of Bueno de Mesquita's arguments about the utility of using large ifs. Without passing on the validity of the claim that the Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita theory (1979) can encompass and extend the Organski and Kugler formulation (1980), I do not think
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