Grand Coalition Research Articles

Managing platelets supply chain under uncertainty: A two-stage collaborative robust programming approach

This study investigates the role of horizontal collaboration among blood centers in mitigating the negative impacts of fluctuations in blood platelet supply and demand during normal circumstances and after sudden-onset disasters. Specifically, four scenarios are studied: no collaboration, collaboration among blood centers, collaboration among hospitals, and collaboration among blood centers and hospitals. To formulate these scenarios, we propose a two-stage robust programming model that enables decision-makers to monitor the collaborative behavior of blood centers and hospitals before and after changes in supply and demand occur. In the first stage, a robust optimization approach is developed to cope with supply and demand uncertainties, where collaboration is limited to blood centers. In the second stage, the uncertain parameters (supply and demand) are treated as deterministic. The key decision is how to transfer platelets among hospitals located in a collaborative cluster. This research uses benchmark data from previous studies to test and validate the developed model and solution approach. Comparing the results obtained in different scenarios, we systematically select the most favorable scenario in terms of model performance under normal and emergency situations. The final results indicate that the network achieves the highest performance when blood centers and hospitals participate in the grand coalition.

A partition-graph restricted cooperative game with incomplete information

In a partition-graph restricted cooperative game with incomplete information, it is assumed that a prior coalition takes part in the grand coalition N in form of communication structure. Before the grand coalition is formed, all the players participate in the cooperation just by communication structure. Hence, a new cooperative game with communication structure (a restricted game for short) is formed. In this study, a new value of a restricted game is proposed, which is defined by the Myserson value and the Shapley value. It is proved that the added value of grand coalition is distributed by a certain ratio (i.e., the Shapley value). By generalized the distribution ratio, a further extension of the proposed value is gotten, i.e., the weight extended value. This weight extended value is unique based on restricted component efficiency, weight fairness, weight symmetric across coalitions, null coalition property and restricted linearity.

Cooperative V2G-enabled vehicle-to-vehicle sharing in energy and reserve markets: A coalitional approach

The dynamics of electric vehicles (EVs) charging significantly influence the current power system dynamics. However, with advancements in battery technology and charging infrastructure, EVs can also serve as energy storage systems through vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology. This opens up possibilities for novel approaches, such as a coalition-based V2G-enabled vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) energy and reserve sharing mechanism. Unlike traditional transactive energy models that often under-utilize EVs due to mismatches with smaller renewable outputs and peak loads, the proposed cooperative V2V sharing mechanism aims to maximize the use of EVs’ charging and discharging capabilities. It forms a grand coalition of EV users to optimize energy and reserve market participation. The model introduces mathematical formulations to describe how EVs collaborate in both energy and reserve markets. It ensures fairness and stability in pay allocations among users within the cooperative framework. The theoretical foundation includes proof of balance in the coalition approach and a two-stage imputation method to achieve fair and optimal payoff distribution. This minimizes incentives for users to defect from the coalition, ensuring stability. To address scalability challenges inherent in coalition formation problems, a decomposition algorithm is proposed. This algorithm enhances efficiency in solving problems that grow exponentially with the number of users. The effectiveness and superiority of this approach are validated through applications to various community energy systems of different sizes. The proposed plan can increase 22.21% of the total payoff in 10-users case and 22.39% in 30-users case. The computation time scales near-linearly with the number of users, although the computation scales exponentially with it. These demonstrations highlight its capability in modeling and solving complex energy sharing scenarios.

Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games in partition function form, given an externality scheme $$ f \in \textsf{Ex}(N) $$ f ∈ Ex ( N ) . We extend the notion of convexity to incorporate externality effects. By introducing a new concept of rationality, called collective rationality, we demonstrate the efficiency of the grand coalition $$ N $$ N . We also identify a sufficient condition for the efficiency of the grand coalition using the property of individual superadditivity.

Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games

This paper introduces majority rule into coalitional bargaining games, adapting traditional models that rely on unanimous consent to more accurately mirror decision-making processes in real-world scenarios. We introduce a majority-based coalitional bargaining game (MBCBG), wherein coalitions pass proposals via majority votes. Our analysis of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) not only establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for SSPE strategy profiles but also confirms the existence of no-delay SSPEs in MBCBGs. We further delve into symmetric MBCBGs, delineating conditions that ensure equitable outcomes for homogeneous players. Furthermore, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the formation of the grand coalition under SSPEs. Additionally, we briefly explore how asymmetries in coalition values, proposal probabilities, and voting weights may influence both the dynamics of coalition formation and the expected equilibrium payoffs.

Incentivizing energy and carbon rights transactions among network-constrained energy hubs: Cooperative game with externalities

Joint energy and carbon rights transactions for multiple energy hubs could boost the utilization of renewable distributed energy resources and reduce carbon emissions in energy sectors. The joint transaction mechanism based on the cooperative game is proposed, in which cooperative energy hubs form a grand coalition to share diverse forms of energy and carbon rights in order to maximize their total benefit. Furthermore, the grand coalition-based transaction mechanism is augmented with network constraints to account for the influence of network constraints on the trading behaviors of energy hubs, which is mathematically represented as a cooperative game with externalities. In addition, mathematical proof is provided to demonstrate the stability of the formed network-constrained grand coalition. To determine the trading behaviors and allocate payoff among energy hubs while satisfying both network constraints and coalition stability, a scalable two-stage optimization structure is provided, with the first stage ensuring coalition stability and the second preventing network constraint violations. A solution technique combined with Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and Benders decomposition is proposed to solve the two-stage optimization problem. The effectiveness and scalability of the proposed joint transaction mechanism and the solution technique are supported by numerical results for the 4-EH and 33-EH systems. The introduction of the carbon market leads to a 20.6 % reduction in carbon emissions and a 10.5 % increase in total payoff by facilitating peer-to-peer trading of both energy and carbon rights.

Feudal political economy

AbstractHow is order achieved in a realm in which every elite commands both economic and military resources, and no stable institutions of power exist? We depict coalition formation in the feudal world as a series of non-binding agreements between elites who can move in and out of the coalition, through peaceful and violent means. We derive conditions under which the realm unites under one rule — a grand coalition, or remains fragmented. We motivate our analysis with key historical episodes in medieval Europe, from the Frankish Kingdom in the 5th to 10th centuries and England in the 11th to 15th centuries.

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences

This paper analyses the effects of altruism on the formation of climate coalitions in the standard two-stage game of self-enforcing international environmental agreements with identical countries. Altruism implies that each country values, to some extent, every other country’s welfare when deciding on its coalition membership and emissions policy. In the Nash [Stackelberg] game, the fringe [coalition] countries exploit the altruism of the coalition [fringe] countries so that altruism decreases [increases] the coalition size. In any case, global emissions and global welfare are close to the non-cooperative values. However, altruism narrows the gap between the individually optimal emissions and the socially optimal emissions, so altruism increases global welfare. The effects of altruism on the formation of climate coalitions crucially depends on its modelling: If altruism affects the membership decision but not the policy decision, or if each coalition country is more altruistic toward other coalition countries than toward fringe countries, altruism can stabilise large coalitions up to the grand coalition. Finally, altruism can stabilise small coalitions but destabilises large coalitions with asymmetric countries.

Optimization of Sharpley Value Method of Cost Allocation in a Bimodal Transport- Supply Chain Distribution Via Dynamic Programming

In this paper, we proposed a coalition between two modes of transportation, where one provides cargo train and the other provides trucks of capacity 453 tons respectively for the coalition. We have five grand coalitions and four coalitions. The coalitions were distributed along five paths across Nigeria and specialized in the distribution of agricultural produce from the north to the south. Each of the coalition was made up of four transport providers and composed of four legs. Since this is a cooperative game scenario, Sharpley's value method of cost allocation was used to obtain the gains accrued to the grand coalition. The coalition made a total savings of 1259.6 million naira within the period under study. The researchers further developed and applied a Dynamic programming model to the supply chain distribution and obtained an intelligent result. They discovered that if the five coalitions were distributed among the four legs, in this other (1, 1, 2, 1), the grand coalition would make an additional gain of 377.6 million naira. The distribution means that the allocation of the coalition to the third leg should be doubled while the other legs remain as they were. The introduction of the optimization method into the system brought additional revenue to the coalition and increased the total gain to 1637.3 million naira.

A cooperative game-theory approach for incentive systems in local energy communities

Prosumers have a central role in the context of smart grids, and in particular within local energy communities (LECs), as they are capable of being both energy producers and consumers. In a scenario where peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading is allowed, prosumers can exchange the energy they produce with other prosumers: the primary outcome of this is the improvement of energy self-consumption across the grid, which leads to decreased transmission losses, as well as lower energy costs and diminished long-term damage to the grid itself. Previous work proposed a mechanism to achieve multiple objectives for a cooperative game theory perspective for small coalitions, but its behavior for coalitions of arbitrary size remains unexplored, and it does not consider the objective of peak shaving. This paper aims to (i) design an algorithm for calculating schedules for coalitions of arbitrary size, (ii) analyze the behavior of this mechanism for large coalitions, (iii) create a new incentive mechanism by proposing new selling functions that ensure that the resulting mechanism would optimize for the objective of peak shaving when all the prosumers work together in one large coalition, and (iv) demonstrate the performance of the existing mechanism in terms of peak shaving, by comparing against the mechanism specifically optimized for this objective. Simulations conducted on data from a grid in Cardiff, UK, reveal that the existing mechanism works particularly well for the non-cooperative game, achieving results for cost reduction and self-consumption almost identical to the cooperative game, no matter the size of the coalitions. More precisely, although all mechanisms achieve optimal peak shaving for the grand coalition, the existing mechanism achieves this objective even within the framework of the selfish game, resulting in a reduction of the peak by approximately 29% compared to alternative methods. Furthermore, the mechanism is proven to optimally achieve peak shaving in both cooperative and non-cooperative cases.

Political influence on international climate agreements with border carbon adjustment

We study the influence of industrial lobbying on national climate policies and the formation of an international environmental agreement if the coalition countries use border carbon adjustments to protect domestic producers. We find that the effects of this political influence crucially depend on the distribution of carbon tax revenues. If these are transferred to the households, lobbying distorts carbon taxes downwards to reduce the tax burden and does not affect coalition sizes. This leads to higher emissions and lower welfare. By contrast, if tax revenues are given back to the firms, lobbies in the outsider countries favor carbon taxes, whereas lobbies in the coalition countries favor carbon subsidies to raise the international commodity price. This reduces the tax difference and the welfare difference between the countries, which reduces the free-rider incentives. Then, lobbying stabilizes the grand coalition and reduces global emissions compared to a “perfect” world without lobbying if the political influence is sufficiently strong.

Coordinating to avoid the catastrophe

“Tipping points” for dangerous climate damages can transform climate protection into a coordination problem. If the location of the threshold is known, Nash equilibria exist in which the catastrophe is averted even without a climate agreement. However, there usually exists also an equilibrium in which no country exerts effort to prevent it, and the catastrophe occurs. We model equilibrium selection among non-cooperative countries with the help of an external randomization device, and analyze how it affects coalition formation. We find that results are much more nuanced than in the case where non-cooperative countries always coordinate on preventing the catastrophe. In some cases, a “coalition of free-riders” forms that is detrimental to welfare. In other cases, a “threshold equilibrium” emerges in which coalition members commit to do more than the outsiders, and the coalition is just large enough to become active. The grand coalition is also an equilibrium outcome, but is often unstable towards deviations by groups of countries.

Coalition Stability in International Environmental Matching Agreements

This study presents empirically calibrated simulations of three different variants of environmental matching agreements aimed at reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. We determine whether matching agreements can produce larger stable coalitions and increase abatement contributions and payoffs as compared to standard agreements. The matching agreements we analyze feature uniform matching rates by which coalition members match the unconditional contributions of (i) the other coalition members, (ii) all other players, or (iii) only non-members, while non-members do not commit to any matching and maximize their individual payoffs. The simulation considers twelve asymmetric world regions with linear abatement benefits and quadratic costs, calibrated based on the STACO 3 model, and uses emissions data from the shared socioeconomic pathways database. We find that the first variant of the matching game fails to produce any stable coalitions and thus performs worse than the standard agreement that produces a stable two-player coalition. The second variant produces a stable grand coalition and significantly increases the abatement and payoff levels beyond the non-cooperative Nash baseline. Partial coalitions are unstable in this game. The third variant produces a two-player coalition similar to the standard coalition formation game, but with different members and higher abatement and payoff levels due to the matching mechanism.

Power Interplay Between Executive and Legislative in the Formation of Undang-Undang Nomor. 3 Tahun 2022 Concerning Ibu Kota Negara

The main objective of this research is to discuss the power interplay between the executive and legislature in the formation of Law no. 3 of 2022 concerning Ibu Kota Negara. With a focus on the interaction of power between the two institutions in the process of forming the IKN Law. This research uses qualitative methods and is explained using the power cube theory by John Gaventa. In the formation of this law, most of the factions in the DPR RI out of a total of 9, only one opposition party refused to accept and approve the discussion of the IKN Bill. With the position of the government which has a large coalition (grand coalition) with membership in parliament reaching 74%. It can be seen that the role of the executive is more dominant than the role of the legislature in determining the direction of decisions on this Law, namely by conditioning the decisions taken by party factions that are members of supporting government supporters to fully support them.

북·중·러 연합의 형성과 전망

This study analyzes the North Korea, China, and Russia coalition amidst complex global crises like the US-China strategic competition, the US-Russia crisis, and the North Korean nuclear issue, using coordination games and problems as analytical tools. In the ‘New Cold War’ context, they identify a focal point, form coalitions, and coordinate strategies based on reactive anti-US policies and confrontations with coalitions involving ROK, the US, and Japan. However, differing perspectives on the ‘New Cold War’ and external factors leading to divergent focal points resulted in strategic uncertainty. Forming a stable grand coalition as an institution is challenging, and there is a risk of abandonment when forming a specific coalition based on interests. Moreover, the emergence of spoilers within the coalition breeds apprehension among other nations, rendering the coalition unsustainable. Consequently, the sustainability of the North Korea-China-Russia coalition diminishes, fostering ongoing non-cooperative behavior amidst a temporary phase of adhesion.

Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Operations of a Live-Streaming Supply Chain

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is widely noticed as an essential tool for business operation and sustainable development. Meanwhile, the fiercely competitive external environment and unpredictable events prompt enterprises’ cooperation to prevent supply chain collapse. We investigate the cooperative strategy in a live-streaming supply chain (LSC) consisting of a dominant brand owner, a retailer, and a live streamer, where the brand owner considers CSR by considering the welfare of stakeholders. We construct one non-cooperative and three cooperative Stackelberg game models to explore the impact of CSR on cooperative strategy and LSC operations. The results show the following. (1) When the brand owner considers CSR, LSC members and systems are more profitable in the four models than when the brand owner does not consider CSR. (2) When the flow effect is small, the brand owner tends to cooperate with the retailer; otherwise, the brand owner prefers to cooperate with the live streamer. (3) The grand coalition C (the brand owner cooperates with the retailer and live streamer) is the consistent strategy for the LSC system, consumers, and society. These findings help enterprises recognize the importance of CSR and collaboration, thus further providing reference opinions on engaging in CSR and how to achieve collaboration.

A value for cooperative games on simplicial complexes with a filtration

The classical Shapley value for cooperative games determines a payoff vector considering that the formation of the grand coalition is made by incorporating players one by one. Later, this method was generalized for games with restricted cooperation by several known mathematical structures: partitions, graphs, convex geometries, antimatroids, matroids or simplicial complexes. In this paper we consider games over simplicial complex with an extra information about the relationships of the agents, a filtration of the complex. Filtrations are very known simplicial structures in the social and neuronal networks. We propose a Shapley value for these situations and an axiomatization.

The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements

This paper investigates the impact of the timing of adaptation on the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for different levels of cooperation. This issue is addressed by solving a three-stage coalition formation game in a Nash-Cournot setting. In the first stage, countries decide non-cooperatively on their participation in an IEA. Then, depending on the timing, countries decide on adaptation and emissions in the second and third stage. The game is solved for three levels of cooperation. Countries can either cooperate on emissions (emission agreement), on adaptation (adaptation agreement), or both actions (complete agreement). When emissions are chosen first, this extension to an emission–adaptation game is a generalization of the pure emission game. However, when adaptation is chosen first, the grand coalition is stable, provided that countries sign a complete agreement. With partial cooperation, stable coalitions are small. The results establish a connection between the strategic role of adaptation, the levels of adaptation of non-signatories and signatories for the different types of agreements and the participation in an IEA. Moreover, the results indicate that the grand coalition is stable even when it significantly enhances net benefits.

The veto power of the grand coalition in economies with consumption externalities

The veto power of the grand coalition in economies with consumption externalities

Accountability: A Battleground for Legitimacy – A Case Study of Decision-Making in Germany’s Third Grand Coalition

ABSTRACT New forms of communication, participation and coordination are challenging democratic governments. The growing public demand for throughput legitimacy is changing the way politicians and civil servants find solutions in decision-making processes. The question is whether these changes affect the legitimacy of governments and how they manage the dynamics of accountability. By using process-tracing to examine one of the most critical situations of the third Grand Coalition under Chancellor Angela Merkel this article answers the question of how governments manage legitimacy and accountability in times of internal crisis. First, the article reveals the relationship between the throughput dimension of legitimacy and accountability. Second, both concepts may be useful in understanding current challenges for governments. Third, accountability dynamics lead to institutionalised and unquestioned patterns of government decision-making. From a new-institutionalist perspective, it argues that battles for accountability lead to legitimate decisions.