Somali Government Research Articles

Collective Action, and the Problems of Short-Term Government of Somalia

Since the end of the Said Barre era in Somalia, the country has been in constant political chaos. Among causes of the problems is a draft constitution with ambiguities in its clauses, power struggle between different political and clan leaders, lack of good leadership to steer the country forward and foreign intervention that at most times leads to problems within the government. Given these problems, the country has been operating in a short-term mode. Some of the problems the short-term government faces are high insecurity mainly because of terrorism, corruption fueled by non-accountability, lack of trust amongst the leaders and politicians and an economic recession. At the center of these problems are the President and the Prime Minister. The paper applies the game theory of collective action to solve the problem between “the President” and “the Prime Minister”.

John J. Pitney and John-Clark Levin, Private anti-piracy navies: How warships for hire are changing maritime security

Private Anti-Piracy Navies: How Warships for Hire are Changing Maritime Security is an examination of the private efforts to quell pirate attacks around the Horn of Africa, focusing mainly on these activities since 2008 but also including a historical discussion of pirate activities since the 1991 collapse of Siad Barre’s government in Somalia. The private response to piracy in this region is a recent phenomenon designed to fill the gaps left by large military vessels. These military vessels, the authors describe, are highly effective at deterring piracy in general but, owing to their size and cost, are unable to effectively prevent smaller pirate ships that are widely dispersed. As they put it, “navy warships are like Iker Casillas, the top [soccer] goalkeeper in the world. Although Casillas can block almost any shot he can reach, if a dozen small children are taking shots on goal simultaneously, even Casillas cannot keep all the balls out of the net” (76). This book is primarily targeted towards a more general audience, but academic readers will also find it to be a source of new and engaging questions for future research. It consists of ten chapters, with the first being a brief introductory chapter to the project as a whole and the next two providing a historical background of piracy in general and the specific case of the Somali-pirate epidemic. Chapters four and five provide a description of current and proposed forces to combat and other, what they call “economic,” solutions to the problem of piracy, such as sailing further from shore, at faster speeds, etc. Chapters six and seven detail legal/regulatory issues as well as operations and tactical challenges, which chapter eight then discusses in a familiar cost-benefit analysis. Finally, chapters nine and ten provide policy implications and a conclusion. The introductory chapter opens with a discussion of what the authors mean by “private anti-piracy navies,” which is not a typical navy where there are hundreds if not thousands of ships operating in a centrally coordinated way, but rather as a catchall Rev Austrian Econ (2015) 28:365–369 DOI 10.1007/s11138-014-0272-x

Piracy in Somalia: A Legal Analysis Concerning the Prosecution of Pirate Negotiators and Pirate Facilitators under the Current US and International Framework

Piracy off the coast of Somalia remains an issue with implications for the international community generally and for the Somali government specifically. Regardless of its genesis, piracy off the coast of Somalia “has in essence become an organized, lucrative and attractive criminal activity undertaken for heinous ends.” Although the number of people being held hostage by pirates is in constant flux, the piracy problem implicates several enduring issues: the protection of human lives, the maintenance of channels for international commerce, and continuing respect for Somali territorial waters.

Self-Defence, Intervention by Invitaion, or Proxy War? The Legality of the 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia

In late 2006, heavily armed Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia with tacit support of the United States. Subsequently, Ethiopia used two legal justifications for its military intervention, namely, an inherent right of self-defense and an invitation from the transitional government of Somalia. If nothing else, it appears Ethiopia and the United States wanted to seek a casus belli for military intervention against Union of Islamic Courts. This article examines whether the Ethiopian intervention can be justified as an exception to the general prohibition of the use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter.

The International Community’s Intervention on Ethiopia and Eretria’s Conflict

Border issues are political problems in Africa. The border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was one of the contentious wars faced by the international community. To manage this conflict, the same community established border commission to draw up the boundaries and demarcate the borderline. Ethiopia was however insolent and in effect discarded this demarcation. It also continued to dwell in the territory of Eritrea. This research urges the international community to make border issues in Africa a priority. In fact, one of the reasons why Kenya and Ethiopia are reluctant to participate in the efforts to form tangible Somali government has its origin in border issue. Historically Ethiopia will not forget the damage inflicted upon them by Somali freedom fighters including Imam Ahmad, Sayed Muhammad Abdulle Hassan, and the Somali military. In 1531, Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (1507-1543) launched a campaign against Ethiopia and defeated several Ethiopian emperors, inflicting much dent on the kingdom. This conflict brought three-quarters of Ethiopia under Muslim Somali Sultanate of Adal in the intense Ethiopian Adal War from 1529-43. Similarly, Sayed Muhammad Abdulle Hassan, ONLF, UWSLF and the former Somali National Military have meted out damages on Ethiopia. Similarly Somalia was on the offensive in 1964 to reclaim the Kenyan Northeastern region. The point at hand is that, the history of most conflicts in the region revolves on border related issues. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea the military move by the international community had significantly ended a long held conflict and struggle through peaceful engagement and drafted binding arbitration.

<em>The Human Tradition in Modern Africa</em>, Dennis D. Cordell, ed.

Reviewed by: The Human Tradition in Modern Africa ed. by Dennis D. Cordell Mohamed Haji Ingiriis Cordell, Dennis D. , ed. 2011. The Human Tradition in Modern Africa. London: Rowman and Littlefield. 283 pp. 28.89. The Human Tradition in Modern Africa, edited by Dennis D. Cordell, is a collection of biographical sketches of men and women of varied backgrounds. It consists of four parts: part one, "Encounters: Two Worlds and New Worlds, 1800-1850," presents three wonderful chapters, with one narrating the case of a fair Portuguese colonial official in the tumultuous period of greedy local colonial servants attempting to exploit reconfigurations of imperial power. Part two, "Fashioning African Identities in the Era of European Conquest, 1850-1910," comprises four chapters. Part three, "The Contradictions of Colonialism, 1910-1960: Exploitation and New Rights," has four chapters, which seek to explore a broad theme: from colonial administrator to the offspring of colonial servants. Part four, "Globalization, Family Strategies, and the New Threats in the Era of Independence, 1960-2012," introduces four chapters that concentrate on recent microsocial history. The editor of the volume is cognizant that questions may arise on "how historically accurate a biography may be" while "how accurate or complete a life history may be is also tied to the question of why the biography or life story is recalled at all" (p. 8). Nowhere are his words much more truly revealing than in Lidwien Kapteijns's case study (part three, chapter [End Page 145] nine), the only chapter concerning northeast Africa, published separately elsewhere with no major textual changes (2009). This piece is a history from above, taking a traditional history-writing stance, which emphasizes the lives of those in power, rather than a history from below, which follows the lives of ordinary men and women, those excluded from state power. Here, I am reminded of Michel Foucault (1980), who noted a subtle parallel between power and knowledge. Kapteijns' aim is to "tell the life stories of real women" (p. 192); therefore one has to envisage a differentiation between "real women" and "unreal women" in the presentation of a sugarcoated personal narrative of the early years of Maryan Muuse Boqor, a Somali lady who defied her father to marry a fellow political-party member. It is more than coincidence, though Kapteijns seems oblivious, that one of Maryan's great-grandaunts had similarly defied her elders' wishes (see Collins 1960). Owing to her father's privileged political position in Somalia, before and after the achievement of independence, Maryan was sent to be educated in Egypt and Morocco. This fact indicates that, well before Somalia gained independence, postcolonial politicians were sending their children to private boarding schools abroad. A weakness of individual historical narration is that it can be guided by personal promotion, which seeks to suppress any warts-all narratives. Kapteijns's narrative is no exception, as her approach is uncritical to the narrator. This is not to suggest that personal narratives cannot be used in reconstructing history, but to avoid failing to reach the other side of the story is a problematic aspect of that one-dimensional narrative. This is a clear resonance of why professional historians are often warned by peers not to rely extensively on biographies and hagiographies in understanding the person within the person. Such a method sways historians to put a distinct historical perspective—from that of the protagonist like Maryan Muuse— into a context, stirring debates for and against the mantra of a personalist cult. Kapteijns reminds us more than twice that her narrator is a descendant of clan sultanates in northeast Somalia and that Ambaro, Maryan's grandmother, was the daughter of the sultan of Hobyo. Why Maryan's father, for example, was sacked by the Somali government under the UN trusteeship for which he was serving from 1956 to 1958 is left out. Kapteijns lists bibliographical works about precolonial and postcolonial Somalia. As usual, she takes on board the scholars with whom she shares ideological views and friendship. Though most relevant to her piece, she does not recommend to readers the personal stories of Aman (Barnes and Bodd 1994), Faduma Korn (2006), and Nimo Mahamud-Hassan (2006). After all, her suggestions...

Tackling Somali piracy

The last couple of years has seen a revival of maritime piracy. It spread from the coast of Somalia to nearby waters and further. Somali pirates captured dozens of ships and their crew and demanded large sums of ransom. This in turn has triggered the international community to send an international fleet of marine flotillas to protect the international shipping trade. Furthermore, international shipping companies took target hardening measures through barricading ships and giving the crew access to weapons. Still, piracy attacks are escalating even as we speak. Since stepping up repressive measures does not seem to have solved the problem, the question arises of what other options are available to prevent piracy. Situational crime prevention might not seem the most obvious tool in this case, but it is worth considering. By using the vocabulary of situational crime prevention, a neutral analysis of the situation can be applied and may help to identify possible ways to counter piracy. E.g., we are not interested in the motives of the pirates, but ways to make it unattractive for them to attack passing ships. When we consider that the Somali government is absent because of internal chaos, it becomes obvious that other forms of guardianship must be introduced.

The Making of the 1990 Manifesto: Somalia's Last Chance for State Survival

The Somali elites' attempt in 1990 to save their society from dissolution has been all but forgotten since Somalia's government collapsed in 1991; their failure remains a neglected theme in Somali studies. This study examines an attempt made months before the fall of the Somali military regime in January 1991. The study treats such a community-led endeavor as a missed chance that Somalia could have been prevented from plunging into a complete collapse, the phenomenon of all against all that is yet prevalent in Somalia. It departs the question of what can the history of the final months before the 'civil' war tell us about the alternatives that local actors envisioned? The study argues that to seek a solution to what is currently occurring in Somalia, a glance of history is necessary.

Somalia after the United Nations-led Djibouti peace process

The election of Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed as the transitional president of Somalia was the climax of the United Nations (UN)-led Djibouti peace process. The election, it was hoped, would herald the beginning of the reconstitution of the Somalian state. Unfortunately, nearly three years after the event, that has still not happened. The government of Sheik Sharif has faced a number of challenges which are yet to be resolved. In the end, the Djibouti peace process has not guaranteed a stable and functional national government in Somalia.

Overcoming social/cultural practices and beliefs in setting up a community mental health programme in a complex emergency: reflections arising from the work done by TPO in Somalia

Since the collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991, large parts of the country have been in turmoil. Fighting, poverty, hunger and gender based violence have all contributed to high levels of mental and psychosocial problems. Excessive consumption of khat may also be a major contributor

The fourth point: An examination of the influence of Kenyan Somalis in Somalia

The consequences of insecurity in Somalia to the government of Kenya and its citizens is well documented: massive flows of refugees since the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991; cross-border violence including poaching, cattle-rustling, kidnappings, and trafficking of illegal goods; and, lately, threats of attacks and jihad from al-Shabaab, the terrorist group which is aligned with Osama bin Laden and, therefore, al-Qaeda. The lack of security and a viable government in Somalia continue to threaten the sovereignty and security of Kenya. As policymakers, military officials, and academics attempt to find solutions to the failed state of Somalia, another dimension of the problem (but also a potential avenue for useful exploration) warrants academic attention and insight – namely, examination of the ethnic Somali populations outside of Somalia and their influence on the politics (and lack thereof) within Somalia itself. This article offers an initial analysis of one subset of the Somali people outside Somalia, Kenyan Somalis.

Rethinking State–building in a Failed State

As warships from a dozen nations patrol the waters off Somalia, trying to stem the piratical tide, the international community is once again trying to rebuild a centralized government in Mogadishu ...

See you in Mogadishu

It was the month of November 1991. Mohamed Aden Sheikh, one of the most versatile Somali men and former representative of the Somali government, was publishing his first book in a Western country. “See you in Mogadishu”, a book-interview with Italian journalist Pietro Petrucci, was the story of the state of Somalia since its independence (1960) told by somebody who served its country as a shepherd, doctor, minister and refugee. Siad Barre, was the dictator who first appointed him as Minister of Health and Minister of Culture and Information in the ‘70s and then jailed him from 1982 to 1988; after Barre’s government fell in January 1991, three different self-declared “presidents” started fighting for the control of the territory and the international community was about to intervene.

Rice Meets with Transitional Somali Government; Bush Authorizes Divestment from Sudanese Businesses

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Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse

Could anarchy be good for Somalia's development? If state predation goes unchecked government may not only fail to add to social welfare, but can actually reduce welfare below its level under statelessness. Such was the case with Somalia's government, which did more harm to its citizens than good. The government's collapse and subsequent emergence of statelessness opened the opportunity for Somali progress. This paper investigates the impact of anarchy on Somali development. The data suggest that while the state of this development remains low, on nearly all of 18 key indicators that allow pre- and post-stateless welfare comparisons, Somalis are better off under anarchy than they were under government. Renewed vibrancy in critical sectors of Somalia's economy and public goods in the absence of a predatory state are responsible for this improvement. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 689–710.

II. Ethiopia's Military Action Against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications

Somalia has been without government since 1991. A transitional government was established in 2004 under the presidency of Abdullahi Yusuf, with the backing of the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the Arab League and the Inter-governmental Agency for Development (IGAD). The Government sat in Baidoa in southern Somalia from June 2005 until December 2006. In June 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control of much of southern and central Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu, but not Puntland and Somaliland. They declared and tried to establish an Islamic State. Somalis were told to comply with stringent Islamic rules or face harsh punishment. In the meantime, efforts to achieve national reconciliation were ongoing under the auspices of IGAD, though without much success. It was reported that on 20 July 2006 Ethiopian troops crossed into Somalia. Ethiopia only admitted to having military trainers to help the Somali Government (estimated to be 400 military personnel). On 21 July, the UIC declared a ‘holy war’ against Ethiopia. In September 2006 the Somali interim President survived an assassination attempt in Baidoa. On 25 October 2006 Ethiopia said that it was ‘technically at war’ with the Islamic Courts. After few days the UIC claimed to have ambushed and killed Ethiopian troops near the Ethiopian border.1

Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping

Zones of state failure are assumed to be anarchic. In reality, communities facing the absence of an effective state authority forge systems of governance to provide modest levels of security and rule of law. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in Somalia, where an array of local and regional governance arrangements have emerged since the 1991 collapse of the state. The Somalia case can be used both to document the rise of governance without government in a zone of state collapse and to assess the changing interests of local actors seeking to survive and prosper in a context of state failure. The interests of key actors can and do shift over time as they accrue resources and investments; the shift “from warlord to landlord” gives some actors greater interests in governance and security, but not necessarily in state revival; risk aversion infuses decisionmaking in areas of state failure; and state-building initiatives generally fail to account for the existence of local governance arrangements. The possibilities and problems of the “mediated state model,” in which weak states negotiate political access through existing local authorities, are considerable.

Somalia: Distorting reality?

The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) came into being in 2004 as the result of protracted negotiations conducted under the auspices of the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). In many respects the TFG was the brainchild of Ethiopia, whose government had long decided that a resuscitated state in Somalia, which had been without an effective government since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, would have to be kept weak or dependent in order to prevent it renewing its irredentist claims to the Ogaden regions of Ethiopia. The new president of the TFG was Abdullahi Yusuf, who had previously ruled the autonomous territory of Puntland, in north-east Somalia, with considerable Ethiopian military and fi nancial assistance.

SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND

Not for the first time since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, international mediators are struggling to assist Somalis to rebuild their failed state. If the current round of peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, is successful, then a comprehensive peace agreement should be signed by mid-2004. If not, and the talks succumb to the regional rivalries, parochial disputes, and mediocre leadership that have hamstrung their progress since October 2002, then Somalis must resign themselves to several more years of political disorder and occasional violence. The conclusion of a peace agreement, however, will mean that the real work is just beginning. Somalia’s faction leaders have signed innumerable settlements in the past, only to resume their skirmishing to even more deadly effect. Many observers doubt not only the faction leaders’ collective commitment to peace, but also their capacity to fulfil the fundamental obligations of a transitional government. Such concerns notwithstanding, the implementation of a Somali peace agreement will face formidable challenges. Negotiating the structure and systems of a federal state will be delicate and potentially divisive. Demobilisation and disarmament, as well as the creation of new security forces, will be fraught with mistrust and anxiety. The collection, sharing and distribution of revenues will be fiercely contested; and preparations for a new constitution and national elections will be complex, painstaking and easily derailed. Arguably the thorniest problem facing a new transitional government will be the unity of the Somali Republic. The Republic of Somaliland (northwest Somalia) declared its independence from the rest of the country in 1991. Although it has yet to earn recognition as a single member state in the United Nations (UN), Somaliland, through its relative peace and stability, has earned the support and sympathy of a number of governments inside and outside Africa. A constitutional referendum in 2002 found that a significant majority of Somaliland’s inhabitants approved of the independence platform—an observation confirmed by numerous independent reports and media accounts. But Somaliland’s aspirations to independent statehood are anathema to a significant minority of Somalilanders, and to the vast majority of southern Somalis as well. It may be no exaggeration to state that the question of Somali unity is the most divisive and emotive dimension of the crisis. A transitional Somali government will undoubtedly claim sovereignty over the entire territory of the former Somali Republic, including Somaliland, which might bring matters to a head. Ideally, some solution of the dispute will be found SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND:

Uncertain partners: NGOs and the military

The 1990s witnessed an explosion of Western military involvement in complex emergency operations requiring cooperation with relief agencies. Recent operations include a failed attempt to reconstitute viable central government in Somalia, return of democratically elected government to Haiti, alleviation of human suffering in Rwanda and Zaire, operations to end conflict and to support multi-ethnic government in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and an effort to stop ethnic terror in Kosovo. In these operations US and allied militaries, UN agencies and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have worked together to ameliorate the suffering caused by war and poor governance. Yet, despite this mounting experience, the military has failed to take adequate advantage of the skills and capabilities of relief agencies. As a result, operations are often needlessly chaotic. At best, this chaos leads to a waste of time and effort; at worst, the cost is measured in lives and suffering.