SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND

Abstract

Not for the first time since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, international mediators are struggling to assist Somalis to rebuild their failed state. If the current round of peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, is successful, then a comprehensive peace agreement should be signed by mid-2004. If not, and the talks succumb to the regional rivalries, parochial disputes, and mediocre leadership that have hamstrung their progress since October 2002, then Somalis must resign themselves to several more years of political disorder and occasional violence. The conclusion of a peace agreement, however, will mean that the real work is just beginning. Somalia’s faction leaders have signed innumerable settlements in the past, only to resume their skirmishing to even more deadly effect. Many observers doubt not only the faction leaders’ collective commitment to peace, but also their capacity to fulfil the fundamental obligations of a transitional government. Such concerns notwithstanding, the implementation of a Somali peace agreement will face formidable challenges. Negotiating the structure and systems of a federal state will be delicate and potentially divisive. Demobilisation and disarmament, as well as the creation of new security forces, will be fraught with mistrust and anxiety. The collection, sharing and distribution of revenues will be fiercely contested; and preparations for a new constitution and national elections will be complex, painstaking and easily derailed. Arguably the thorniest problem facing a new transitional government will be the unity of the Somali Republic. The Republic of Somaliland (northwest Somalia) declared its independence from the rest of the country in 1991. Although it has yet to earn recognition as a single member state in the United Nations (UN), Somaliland, through its relative peace and stability, has earned the support and sympathy of a number of governments inside and outside Africa. A constitutional referendum in 2002 found that a significant majority of Somaliland’s inhabitants approved of the independence platform—an observation confirmed by numerous independent reports and media accounts. But Somaliland’s aspirations to independent statehood are anathema to a significant minority of Somalilanders, and to the vast majority of southern Somalis as well. It may be no exaggeration to state that the question of Somali unity is the most divisive and emotive dimension of the crisis. A transitional Somali government will undoubtedly claim sovereignty over the entire territory of the former Somali Republic, including Somaliland, which might bring matters to a head. Ideally, some solution of the dispute will be found SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND: