God Of Theism Research Articles

Can existential psychotherapy be good news? Reflections on existential psychotherapy from a Christian perspective

One of the major difficulties in advocating a positive approach to therapeutic work is that most candidates for psychotherapy are preoccupied with the negative or painful aspects of their lives. However, it is argued that positive clinical practice can be derived from the therapist recognizing a shared human predicament with the client, a recognition which requires a degree of honesty on the part of the therapist. This frank self-reflection is much in evidence in the writings of the existential atheists, largely due to their assertion that there is no observing deity who may judge the faults and weaknesses of human beings. Believers in a theistic God, however, may be more cautious in acknowledging sources of shame or guilt in themselves out of fear of divine disapproval. From a Christian perspective, the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ justify human existence and provide evidence of God's love. Acceptance of this can allow the Christian psychotherapist to be cognizant of potential shortcomings and thereby experience a strong identification with the challenges of living presented by the client. This can enable a positive and non-pathologizing relationship with clients of any religious or ideological persuasion.

Divinity, Incarnation and Intersubjectivity: On Ethical Formation and Spiritual Practice

AbstractIn what sense, if any, does the dominant conception of the traditional theistic God as disembodied inform our embodied experiences? Feminist philosophers of religion have been either explicitly or implicitly preoccupied by a philosophical failure to address such questions concerning embodiment and its relationship to the divine. To redress this failure, certain feminist philosophers have sought to appropriate Luce Irigaray’s argument that embodied divinity depends upon women themselves becoming divine. This article assesses weaknesses in the Irigarayan position, notably the problematic move from a woman’s subjectivity to divinity. In the light of these weaknesses the author looks for a better alternative. Drawing on the work of feminist and non‐feminist philosophers, a feminist‐friendly conception of theism is sketched in terms of incarnation and intersubjectivity. Philosophical accounts of the ethical formation of gendered subjects by way of bodily practices offer new concepts for confronting and transforming the discursive tradition of philosophy of religion. With these concepts, the formation of women’s collective historical experience within a tradition mediated by philosophical texts takes on new significance for feminist philosophy of religion.

Tillich's Appropriation of Meister Eckhart - An Appreciative Critique

Paul Tillich acknowledged the influence of the thought of Jacob Boheme in his theological work much more than the influence of Eckhart. But both are there. In this article the author explores these relationships and the consequences that they would have for a further development of Thillich´s ontotheology if he had had time to overcome the concept of beyond the God of theism.

Divine love and human suffering

In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinarily absurd idea, quite beyond our belief. ... it does seem that we have rational support for atheism, that it is reasonable for us to believe that the theistic God does not exist.1

Taking consciousness seriously: A defense of Cartesian dualism

Most western traditional (theistic) philosophers have argued that the existence of consciousness requires some form of substantial non-material soul or self. Both God and the self are non-material, but the self has a material component that God does not. There have been several varieties of non-material substantial souls among western philosophers past and present. Three prominent conceptions are the Platonic/Cartesian, the Aristotelian/Thomistic, and now “emergent” dualists. All three are thought to be dead by the majority of contemporary philosophers of mind. My purpose in this paper is to defend what is standardly called Cartesian dualism, as it has been modified over time since Descartes. This view of the self is derived from the examination of consciousness as we are aware of it directly, but does have interesting relationships with western theism. It is often claimed that God is needed to explain the existence of souls, and, conversely, that the existence of souls provides important evidence to justify belief in a western theistic God. Descartes was convinced that the present existence of a non-substantial self could not be contradicted, and found other reasons to support his view that this self was not material, persisted in time, was possibly immortal, and had a relation to its body which was merely contingent and with which it interacted frequently. Taking consciousness seriously requires a non-material self. Briefly stated, modern Cartesians have defended the existence of a nonmaterial persisting conscious self, justifying its persistence in order to account for continuity of experience, character and memory, and justifying its non-materiality by the fact that its contents (qualia, feelings, thoughts, etc.) cannot be located in the physical world (inside or outside the self) and that its ways of responding (reasoning, free will, intentionality, etc.) are not ways that material bodies operate. So far I am merely stating the obvious about substance dualism. It is my claim that if we are to take consciousness seriously, take it as we experience it ourselves, a substance view of the self is required. As I have said, there are currently three forms of substance dualism, and I cannot defend and analyze all three. What I have chosen to do is defend the Cartesian view, commenting on some of the reasons why emergent dualist views are not adequate, and ignoring for the present project Aristotelian/Thomistic views, though I think such views share deficiencies with emergent dualism. It is important now to defend substance dualism because there are clear signs that some of the more important defenders of non-substance philosophies of mind have realized that their hopes for doing justice to consciousness and many of the traditional values embedded in our view of the self cannot be worked out

RE-READING ‘THE WILL TO BELIEVE’

Since its first publication one hundred years ago, William James's essay 'The Will to Believe' has been criticized as providing 'an unrestricted license for wishful thinking' in religious matters. The criticism is based on the assumption that James is attempting to justify belief in traditional theism. A careful reading of this essay, and other works by James in which he addresses the issue of religious faith, reveals that the religious question for him is not whether a theistic God exists, but whether the universe offers us possibilities of meaning and fulfilment, whether life is worth living. James's argument is that we have a right to believe that this is so-an argument that is more cogent and convincing than it is often thought to be.

Beckett and Tillich: Courage and Existence in Waiting for Godot

David McCandless BECKETT AND TILLICH: COURAGE AND EXISTENCE IN WAITING FOR GODOT iL I) eckett's strange achievement in Waitingfor Godot is to provide .13us, exploring the rubble, with the most compelling theatrical image of the courage-to-be."' Thus Herbert Blau implies, whether intentionally or not, a possible kinship between Samuel Beckett and Paul Tillich, author of The Courage to Be and other meditations on modern man's existential plight. Similarly, Lance St. John Butler, undertaking a Heideggerian analysis, quotes Tillich's sermon on waiting in order to support an assertion that the tramps' yearning for an absolute corresponds to Dasein's "comportment toward Being."2 These two allusions to Tillich anticipate my two principal objectives in applying his philosophy to Waitingfor Godot: first of all to clarify the specific nature of the tramps' courage—a courage not always acknowledged by commentators inclined to consider the pair as prisoners of habit and delusion; and second, to offer a reading of the play that goes beyond the seeming futility and insignificance of the tramps' emblematic lives and discloses a possible source of the play's paradoxically uplifting effect in performance . Vladimir and Estragon do not end the play submerged in nothingness . Rather, by finally reconciling themselves to nothingness, they begin to make contact with the infinite and so initiate an authentic search for a new version of God. Tillich undertook precisely the same search and the God that he finds bears a striking resemblance to Beckett's adumbration of ultimate being. I do not offer this resemblance as evidence of direct influence.3 My point is simply that the two men assess notions of being, faith, despair, and salvation from seemingly opposite ends and yet arrive at the same point, generating a new spiritual enlightenment from the abyss of existential anguish. Tillich challenged orthodox belief in an attempt to make Christianity 48 David McCandless49 more responsive to the spiritual crises of an existential age. Thus he asserts that the doctrinal symbols of Christianity are "no longer understood in their original power of expressing the human situation and answering existential human questions."4 He goes so far as to declare the traditional theistic God as dead for him as it was for Nietzsche (CTB, p. 185). Such views disposed him to find more religious insight in modern literature than in modern Protestant teaching. He seems almost to have Beckett in mind when protesting the Christian establishment's vilification ofmodern artists: "They attack as a morbid longing for negativity what in reality is courageous acceptance ofthe negative. They call decay what is actually the creative expression of decay. They reject as meaningless the meaningful attempt to reveal the meaninglessness of our situation" (CTB, p. 140). If Tillich evinces a sympathy for apostate writers, so Beckett, despite his well-known break with his Protestant upbringing, seems to share Tillich's radically Protestant mission of debunking doctrinal symbols and orthodox deities. Estragon's bewildered reaction to Vladimir's casual mention of "our savior," for instance, casts doubt on the validity of this conventional expression. "Our what?" Estragon asks, surveying a scene that offers little evidence or hope ofsalvation. The most gruesome indictment of the traditional deity, however, occurs in Lucky's speech: despite being incapable of passion, speech or movement, He is nevertheless a personal God who loves us dearly—with some exceptions for reasons unknown but time will tell. The God alleged to be personal and loving is actually remote and mysteriously capricious. Those whom He favors are saved. Those whom, for reasons unknown, He does not, are "plunged in torment, plunged in fire." This system ofjustice can only leave man torturously uncertain of his prospects for salvation. This torturous uncertainty is the main theme not merely of Lucky's speech but of the entire play. The deity-figure on whom the tramps depend clearly parallels the "God with white beard" of Lucky's speech. Indeed, at the end of the play, the boy tells a trembling Vladimir that Godot's beard is white. "Christ have mercy on us," Vladimir replies. Godot beats the boy who tends the sheep but spares the boy who tends the goats, a choice that seems every bit...

Can Theism Survive Without the Devil?

As the title suggests, the thesis of this essay is that any view which would affirm the orthodox concept of a theistic God and yet deny the existence of a devil is inherently untenable; or, alternatively put, that ‘fundamentalism’ (if it may be so called), which affirms the existence of both God and a devil, and atheism, which denies the existence of both, are the only viable options with respect to the question of the theistic God. The support for this conclusion comes from the problem of evil, together with considerations drawn from common sense.

Rationalistic Theology and Some Principles of Explanation

Rationalistic theology is a view which holds that, given the existence of the physical world, reason can demonstrate the existence of a selfexistent being, a being that cannot not exist and which carries within itself the explanation of its existence. As a subsidiary thesis, rationalistic theology holds that reason can demonstrate that a self-existent being possesses the fundamental attributes of the theistic God. Such a view flourished in the writings of Samuel Clarke and his followers, and has recently found expression in the work of James Ross. In this paper I endeavor to uncover and critically examine the various principles of explantion on which this view is founded. Although several principles are considered, major attention is given to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and to a principle (Principle E) that Ross proposes as a substitute for PSR. Arguments against both of these principles are set forth and claimed to be successful. The appropriate conclusion for the future outlook of rationalistic theology is then drawn.

Rationalistic Theology and some Principles of Explanation

Rationalistic theology is a view which holds that, given the existence of the physical world, reason can demonstrate the existence of a selfexistent being, a being that cannot not exist and which carries within itself the explanation of its existence. As a subsidiary thesis, rationalistic theology holds that reason can demonstrate that a self-existent being possesses the fundamental attributes of the theistic God. Such a view flourished in the writings of Samuel Clarke and his followers, and has recently found expression in the work of James Ross. In this paper I endeavor to uncover and critically examine the various principles of explantion on which this view is founded. Although several principles are considered, major attention is given to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and to a principle (Principle E) that Ross proposes as a substitute for PSR. Arguments against both of these principles are set forth and claimed to be successful. The appropriate conclusion for the future outlook of rationalistic theology is then drawn.

God and other Minds

In my judgment Professor Plantinga's book' is the most important contribution to the philosophy of religion that has appeared in several decades. The book has three main parts: I. Natural Theology-a consideration of the cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments; II. Natural Atheology-a consideration of the problem of evil, verificationism, and other attacks against theism; III. God and Other Minds-a consideration of the problem of our knowledge of other minds and the bearing of this problem on the question of the reasonableness of theistic belief. The central question of the book is whether belief in the existence of the theistic God is rational. Plantinga considers in Part I the arguments by which natural theology endeavors to establish that theistic belief is rationally justified. He concludes that these arguments are unsuccessful and, therefore, fail to provide rational grounds for theistic belief. In Part II Plantinga investigates the major arguments employed to show that we have good reasons for believing that God does not exist. His conclusion is that these arguments, like the arguments of natural theology, are unsuccessful. Plantinga's conclusions about natural theology and atheology are not novel. Other philosophers have reached the same conclusions. But few, in my judgment, have argued for these conclusions with anything like the thoroughness, clarity, and skill that Plantinga brings to the subject. The novelty in Plantinga's study of the rationality of theistic belief is unfolded in Part III. Instead of concluding that agnosticism is the rational view to adopt concerning the existence of the theistic

Modern Science and the Proof from Motion of the Existence of a Theistic God

Modern Science and the Proof from Motion of the Existence of a Theistic God

Tillich on Idolatry

P AUL TILLICH'S concept of idolatry, although it seems clear enough at first sight, presents on closer analysis some puzzling problems. Since this concept is quite central for Tillich's criticism of theologies and religions, examination of these problems is a matter of some importance. Tillich sometimes speaks of idolatry as an identification. All idoltary is nothing else than absolutizing of symbols of Holy, and making them identical with Holy itself (CS, p. 193).t The theologian must resist idolatrous identification of ground of our being with God of ordinary theism Who ... is a for God beyond God of theism ... ground of being and meaning (RS, p. 114). And the vigorous opposition of Reformers to transubstantiation theory was belief that it was a regression into magical identification of with bearer of Divine (RS, pp. 114-15). But what is meant by such an identification of a of ground of being with ground of being itself? It would seem that no one in his right mind could make such an identification. For, in order to identify A and B, I have to have concepts of both; and no one who had both concept of ultimate ground of being, in Tillich's sense of that term, and a concept of a symbol like Jesus Christ or elements of Communion, could possibly identify two. If he did so, that would be a good indication that he did not have concepts in question. Certainly, those who say that consecrated bread and wine is body and blood of Christ make no such identification. In