Global Nuclear Security Research Articles

The transformation of the nuclear law of the Russian Federation into an independent public complex branch of law as a way to strengthen global nuclear security in the world

This article considers the process of transformation of the Russian Federation nuclear law into an independent public complex branch of law and its important role in improving global nuclear safety. Since it is well known that the criteria of distinguishing branches of law are usually the subject and method of legal regulation as well as the existence of their own codification, the authors are confident of such a need. The results of the analysis of the state corporation Rosatom activities serve as the basis for the proposed theses and only confirm this confidence. The main idea of the article is to assert the need for changes in the Russian legal system structure in order to increase the effectiveness of regulation in the field of nuclear safety. The paper examines the evolution of nuclear law in Russia, identifies the basic principles and norms of this area of law as well as the need to make changes to adapt to modern challenges and threats. Supporting its position by analyzing the current state of the Russian nuclear industry and world standards in the field of nuclear safety, the article suggests practical steps to strengthen legal regulation to ensure safety in the nuclear field. Special attention is paid to the importance of strengthening international nuclear safety through the modernization of the national nuclear legal system, its compliance with international norms and standards. The article discusses current issues, including the development of nuclear doctrine, control of nuclear materials, responsibility for violation of international nuclear obligations and other aspects affecting global nuclear security. The study is an important contribution to understanding the problems of nuclear law in the context of global safety, and also substantiates the need for independent development of this branch of law to ensure stability and security on the world stage. The authors of the article offer specific recommendations for improving legislation and practice in the field of nuclear law in order to strengthen global nuclear safety

Legal instruments for deterring nuclear conflict in the current military and political geo-environment

The relevance of this study lies in the need to consider the legal instruments for deterring a nuclear conflict in connection with the crisis of nuclear safety and instability in the current military-political geo-environment. The purpose of this study was to examine international experience in the field of legal consolidation of prohibitive norms of deterrence necessary to prevent nuclear threats. The following general scientific and special methods were employed in the study: analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction, generalisation, as well as formal legal, legal hermeneutics, logical- legal, comparative legal, and historical-legal methods. The study examined the specialised international legal framework of regulatory documents in the field of nuclear safety, safe operation of nuclear facilities and nuclear deterrence, as well as nuclear deterrence strategies and their development depending on the geopolitical situation. Based on the results of the study, it is determined that the legal regulation of nuclear conflict containment is in the form of prohibitory orders consolidated in the relevant international treaties in the field of nuclear and radiation safety. The study highlighted the main international treaties positioned as legal means of nuclear deterrence. The interaction of “soft” and “hard” law in nuclear and radiation safety agreements was considered, as well as the specific features of consolidating such norms in municipal law. The study provided generalising conclusions in terms of nuclear deterrence strategies, specifically, a vision of a new concept in this area, based on technological superiority in non-nuclear means of repelling nuclear strikes and massive precision non-nuclear retaliatory strikes. It was also concluded that attention should be paid to the development of a new international treaty that would combine all the rules prohibiting the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, as well as the rules governing nuclear and radiation safety as integral components of global nuclear security. The practical significance of this study is that its materials can be used for further development of the concepts of non-nuclear or legal nuclear deterrence

Assessment of the behavior of spent nuclear fuel in Ukraine

Abstract. Before June 2023 the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, which is the largest nuclear facility in Europe, had suffered a complete loss of external power seven times since the beginning of the Russian invasion. This forced it to rely on emergency diesel generators to guarantee the safety and security functions of the plant, such as reactor cooling. From that, it appears of meaningful importance to evaluate the performance of all its nuclear facilities, among which the building where the spent fuel storage pool (SFP) is located, to assess what consequences anomalous/abnormal or accident events may determine. Contrary to dry storage, the dry cask/packaging system is stored on open concrete pads within a protected area of the plant site; the wet storage requires a hydraulic environment such as the water pools where SF is safely stored. The hydraulic effluent and the physical containment barriers act as confinement and shielding, guaranteeing safety criteria are fulfilled. In this preliminary study, the attention is thus paid to the SFP; for this reason, a description of its behavior and filling status must be provided. Since 2001, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 6 VVER (water–water energy reactor)-1000 units has been stored in the dry storage facility at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. This means that, despite radioactive decay, the total activity of such inventory may exceed 30 times that of the fourth damaged Chornobyl unit at the time of the accident, and this is due to long-lived actinides (2 × 1019 Bq), 137Cs (1 × 1019 Bq) and 90Sr (9 × 1018 Bq). Continued damage caused by a missile attack on the SFP (e.g., cyclic, dynamic, and thermal loadings) may increase the risk of loss of integrity, because, as it is widely known, concrete has low resistance under tension. In this assessment, an evaluation, therefore, the radiological risk is addressed. For such an evaluation, it is considered that an SFP in VVER-1000 is designed to store 687 fuel assemblies and 670 in VVER-440. When it is half full, which is the case for 15 Ukrainian units, it will store about 2200 t U, containing up to 1 × 1019 Bq of 137Cs, 7 × 1018 Bq of 90Sr and 1 × 1019 Bq of TUE. Moreover, if it is considered that the spent fuel pool represented the Achilles' heel of the nuclear power plant during the 2011 Fukushima accident, it appears quite obvious that there is a need to evaluate the threat associated with the SF storage condition in order to prevent the occurrence of a new severe accident or other challenging situations that the armed conflict has created and may create. The results of the analysis of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant behavior suggest firstly that the plant was/is subjected to high stresses its structures may not withstand for a long time. Secondly, damages may impact SFP instrumentation, which is used for monitoring, for example, radiation or hydrogen formation, leading to loss of control of the SFP facility. Further, it is shown that to prevent the global nuclear threat, nuclear safety and security systems must be maintained and upgraded with at least the introduction of new technical and environmental devices.

GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY: CURRENT POLICY EMPHASIS

The article presents an analysis of the understanding of global nuclear security in terms of political accents. The relevance is explained by the processes that are currently taking place all over the world, taking into account the military operations in Ukraine. In addition, the global nuclear order is changing, the climate is changing, your oil price volatility, and the increasing problem of energy security. This speaks of the relevance and importance of turning to the study of issues of the future use of nuclear energy. The nuclear future requires significant efforts to strengthen international organizations and the regulatory framework that governs global nuclear affairs. It was noted that nuclear security requires global solutions, networks of national measures, international legal agreements and voluntary initiatives that form the basis of a comprehensive and effective global security architecture. Without a comprehensive and effective architecture, the progress made by countries is diminishing and it will be difficult for countries to sustain progress forward. Today, the country's approaches to nuclear security are very different, creating the danger that small links have been created to get rid of terrorists, looking for the easiest route to weapons-grade nuclear material. Only a general system that holds all states accountable to the same standards can ensure this. All countries must effectively exercise their sovereign security over their nuclear materials and facilities to prevent an act of catastrophic nuclear terrorism and thus preserve the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy.

Developing Nuclear Security Capacity of Indonesia’s Police and Security Officer: Lessons from Universitas Gadjah Mada’s Pilot Training

Due to an increase in global nuclear security issues, there need to be improvements in human resources and security measures. The Republic of Indonesia is an archipelago country, which makes surveilling for nuclear security threats complicated. Recent radioactive material smuggling incidents proved that Indonesian police and security officers’ knowledge in nuclear security has been challenged and must be improved. In response, Universitas Gadjah Mada’s Nuclear Engineering Program composed a three-day pilot training program for local police and UGM's security officers in 2018. The objective of the training was to improve their capabilities in dealing with nuclear security issues around where they work and serve. Training materials were designed to introduce nuclear technology and provide the basic skills of handling nuclear security matters. The training was divided into 12 sessions, based on the needs stated by the Special Region of Yogyakarta's police chief. Lessons were delivered through traditional teaching, table-top exercises, exercises, and discussion. Fifteen-question pre-tests and post-tests were conducted to assess the officers’ knowledge of the training materials and the benefits of being trained. Based on the tests, we concluded that the participants’ understanding of nuclear security had improved. This increase in understanding was because the training materials fit their job needs, presented in various methods, and the participants’ awareness grew. It led to an increase in their awareness for securing the facilities utilizing radioactive sources in the Yogyakarta area. They said that the number of trainees in this event still does not meet the number of facilities that have to be secured. Therefore, the training should be carried out again and can be improved based on the participants' feedback. Furthermore, this training could be expanded and applied to the whole country.

Expert assessments of strategies to enhance global nuclear security

Historically, the U.S. has sought to use commercial trade in nuclear technologies to influence international nuclear security standards and promote nonproliferation. Concern has grown that, with a stagnating domestic nuclear industry and declining export industry, the U.S. will lose a significant tool of foreign policy and leverage in maintaining strong international standards. While the issue has been discussed extensively in the policy community and used as a powerful rhetorical tool to motivate tangentially related policies such as subsidizing existing U.S. nuclear plants, no one has systematically assessed the issue, structured the problem and proposed and evaluated potential solutions. Here we briefly analyze the current international state of play, and then outline a set of specific strategies the U.S. might adopt on its own, or promote internationally, to retain its influence. Building on the literature, nuclear security and nuclear power experts assisted us in framing the issues and then, in a participatory workshop, helped us to assess and refine possible strategies. While not all experts agreed that U.S. influence has already declined, most indicated that it likely would decline in the future if present domestic and international trends continue. Although none of the proposed strategies that we advanced or that the experts suggested are likely to be effective in the short term, several warrant ongoing refinements and, if they can be implemented, might have beneficial impacts in coming decades.

WATCHMAN: A Remote Reactor Monitor and Advanced Instrumentation Testbed

The remote detection of undeclared nuclear reactors, which could be used for production of material used to make nuclear weapons, is a key goal for global nuclear security. To address this challenge, WATCHMAN is beginning construction in Boulby Underground Laboratory, in the UK. WATCHMAN aims to demonstrate the ability to monitor nuclear reactors at distances of tens of kilometers or farther, called far-field monitoring. The first phase of the experiment will consist of a kiloton-scale gadolinium-doped water Cherenkov detector to detect anti-neutrinos coming from the Hartlepool Nuclear Power Station, located at a distance of 25 km from Boulby. The predicted dwell time required for determining that one reactor core is turning on-and-off in the presence of another reactor core is about 10 months. In addition to reactor monitoring, WATCHMAN will also act as an Advanced Instrumentation Testbed for next-generation neutrino detectors.

Sherlock Holmes Meets Rube Goldberg: Fixing the Entry-into-Force Provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is widely heralded as the most important international legal instrument for arresting the nuclear arms race and impeding further nuclear proliferation. Concluded in 1996, the treaty has been signed by 183 countries and ratified by 166. But it has not yet entered into force, because of its unique requirement that it will not become operational for any state until it has been ratified by all forty-four countries designated in its Annex 2. Thirty-six of those Annex 2 states have ratified, but there is little prospect that the other eight (including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and others) will do so in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, certain parts of the CTBT are being provisionally applied, but other critical aspects are in abeyance, and the world’s unrequited demand for a fully effective prohibition on nuclear weapons testing has jeopardized the global nuclear security structure. This Article proposes a novel work-around, to achieve early implementation of the CTBT. Interested states should negotiate a second treaty, styled as an Implementing Agreement, through which they could promptly effectuate the CTBT among themselves, even if some Annex 2 states remained outside the regime. This approach would free the CTBT from the tyranny of a “veto power” currently held by each of the Annex 2 states, and would allow the treaty to grow organically, building toward eventual universal acceptance by entering into force now for a sizeable coalition of the willing – as all other important treaties have done. The legal mechanism for creating such an Implementing Agreement is unusual and cumbersome, but it follows an important international law precedent. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention achieved widespread acceptance, but it, too, required substantial modification before its entry into force. There, the participating states successfully fashioned a 1994 Implementing Agreement to revise important elements. That document provides a useful template for the CTBT to emulate. This Article offers a draft of a CTBT Implementing Agreement, explaining how its waiver provisions would operate and how it would provide interested states a variety of alternative mechanisms for establishing a prompt, durable, and legally binding test ban regime.

The future of nuclear security: Commitments and actions – Power generation and stewardship in the 21st century

Since the terrorist events of the 11th September 2001, the world as it was once known was changed forever. It was these catastrophic terrorist actions over fifteen years ago that saw the dawn of a new era with heightened security across many everyday areas of society that had not previously witnessed such scrutiny or control. Coupling this elevated risk of physical and technical aggression with the ever-increasing global per capita energy demand – there has been witnessed a continually growing reliance on nuclear energy for baseline power generation, a form of electricity production that requires both the necessary international safeguards and controls for its safe use. As more and more of the global energy budget is provided by low-carbon sources (over highly-polluting fossil fuels), the volume of nuclear material in existence will grow substantially – requiring considerable attention and policy to ensure its long-term safety and security.This commentary describes the vast range of policy challenges faced by the nuclear industry resulting from the rapid technological advancements being made across society, and how these directly (and indirectly) affect global nuclear security, as well as providing a thorough discussion on how best these challenges may be overcome.

The Protective Effect of Executive Functioning Ability on Stress during a Multiple UAV Control Simulation

Since the terrorist events of the 11th September 2001, the world as it was once known was changed forever. It was these catastrophic terrorist actions over fifteen years ago that saw the dawn of a new era with heightened security across many everyday areas of society that had not previously witnessed such scrutiny or control. Coupling this elevated risk of physical and technical aggression with the ever-increasing global per capita energy demand – there has been witnessed a continually growing reliance on nuclear energy for baseline power generation, a form of electricity production that requires both the necessary international safeguards and controls for its safe use. As more and more of the global energy budget is provided by low-carbon sources (over highly-polluting fossil fuels), the volume of nuclear material in existence will grow substantially – requiring considerable attention and policy to ensure its long-term safety and security.This commentary describes the vast range of policy challenges faced by the nuclear industry resulting from the rapid technological advancements being made across society, and how these directly (and indirectly) affect global nuclear security, as well as providing a thorough discussion on how best these challenges may be overcome.

Questioning the holy trinity: Why the U.S. nuclear triad still makes sense

ABSTRACTDespite renewed enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, a contemporary security environment far removed from that of the Cold War, and increasing budgetary pressures at home, U.S. interests continue to be best served by retaining a triad of nuclear forces. While options for a reduced force structure may appear to offer short-term political and economic expediency, in the long run a three-legged deterrent—possibly consisting of fewer delivery vehicles, operational warheads and even potentially de-alerted forces—represents the best way to balance the competing requirements of contemporary and future U.S. nuclear policy. Indeed, it may be that retaining the triad provides the most realistic method of reestablishing U.S.-Russia strategic stability, and the most credible basis for advancing the drive for global nuclear reductions, strengthening global nuclear security, and even working toward nuclear abolition.

Roadmap for Success of the Nuclear Security Summits and Beyond

The Nuclear Security Summits are at a midway point but have not yet reached their full potential of eliminating weak links in the global nuclear security system. The first two summits, in Washington and Seoul, have had a beneficial impact by identifying common objectives, galvanising international action and reducing stockpiles of vulnerable nuclear materials. However, improving nuclear security governance is an important new issue. It could be introduced at the 2014 summit in The Hague and be a springboard for action at the 2016 summit in the US. This would produce an NSS legacy of an effective, cohesive and durable barrier against nuclear terrorism appropriate for the realities of the 21st century.

The Life-Cycle of International Regimes: Temporality and Exclusive Forms of International Cooperation

In three important areas of international cooperation - global trade, nuclear security, and climate change - states are shifting away from inclusive multilateralism towards more exclusionary forms of interstate cooperation. In this article we offer an historical institutionalist account for the shift towards exclusive forms of international cooperation in these varied issue areas. We develop an analytical model of an institutional regime life-cycle, which proposes that as multilateralism matured in these policy arenas, changes in the payoff structure of regime membership created incentives for states to establish alternative institutions centered on the principles of selective and discriminatory cooperation. We conclude that incremental changes in the nature of international cooperation can transform institutional cooperation, and exclusive forms of cooperation in trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change, should not be considered aberrations but rather part of the process of regime maturation.

グローバル原子力安全・セキュリティ・エージェント養成

グローバル原子力安全・セキュリティ・エージェント養成

Possibility and Limitation of Global Nuclear Security Governance : Focusing on the Korea’s Role in the Second Nuclear Security Summit

Possibility and Limitation of Global Nuclear Security Governance : Focusing on the Korea’s Role in the Second Nuclear Security Summit

How can countries ensure that the Nuclear Security Summit does not lose momentum and become just another gathering?

In 2009, President Barack Obama announced from Prague’s Hradcany square that “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security” was nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, and world leaders listened. A year later, 47 of these leaders responded to Obama’s call “to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” when they gathered in Washington, DC, for the first Nuclear Security Summit. Since then, nearly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been removed from 10 countries. And both Russia and the United States have worked hard on HEU destruction efforts—48 metric tons and 7 metric tons, respectively. In March, 50 nations are taking part in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. But how can these countries ensure that the momentum toward a global nuclear security culture isn’t lost, and the Seoul summit does not devolve into just another gathering? Three authors explore this question: from the United States, Sharon Squassoni; from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (2012); and from India, Rajiv Nayan (2012). The authors are nuclear security experts and members of the Fissile Materials Working Group, which publishes a monthly column at www.thebulletin.org.

How can countries ensure that the Nuclear Security Summit does not lose momentum and become just another gathering?

In 2009, President Barack Obama announced from Prague’s Hradcany square that “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security” was nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, and world leaders listened. A year later, 47 of these leaders responded to Obama’s call “to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” when they gathered in Washington, DC, for the first Nuclear Security Summit. Since then, nearly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been removed from 10 countries. And both Russia and the United States have worked hard on HEU destruction efforts—48 metric tons and 7 metric tons, respectively. In March, 50 nations are taking part in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. But how can these countries ensure that the momentum toward a global nuclear security culture isn’t lost, and the Seoul summit does not devolve into just another gathering? Three authors explore this question: from the United States, Sharon Squassoni (2012); from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (2012); and from India, Rajiv Nayan. The authors are nuclear security experts and members of the Fissile Materials Working Group, which publishes a monthly column at www.thebulletin.org.

How can countries ensure that the Nuclear Security Summit does not lose momentum and become just another gathering?

In 2009, President Barack Obama announced from Prague’s Hradcany square that “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security” was nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, and world leaders listened. A year later, 47 of these leaders responded to Obama’s call “to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” when they gathered in Washington, DC, for the first Nuclear Security Summit. Since then, nearly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been removed from 10 countries. And both Russia and the United States have worked hard on HEU destruction efforts—48 metric tons and 7 metric tons, respectively. In March, 50 nations are taking part in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. But how can these countries ensure that the momentum toward a global nuclear security culture isn’t lost, and the Seoul summit does not devolve into just another gathering? Three authors explore this question: from the United States, Sharon Squassoni (2012); from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu; and from India, Rajiv Nayan (2012). The authors are nuclear security experts and members of the Fissile Materials Working Group, which publishes a monthly column at www.thebulletin.org.

Monte Carlo analysis of thermochromatography as a fast separation method for nuclear forensics

Nuclear forensic science has become increasingly important for global nuclear security, and enhancing the timeliness of forensic analysis has been established as an important objective in the field. New, faster techniques must be developed to meet this objective. Current approaches for the analysis of minor actinides, fission products, and fuel-specific materials require time-consuming chemical separation coupled with measurement through either nuclear counting or mass spectrometry. These very sensitive measurement techniques can be hindered by impurities or incomplete separation in even the most painstaking chemical separations. High-temperature gas-phase separation or thermochromatography has been used in the past for the rapid separations in the study of newly created elements and as a basis for chemical classification of that element. This work examines the potential for rapid separation of gaseous species to be applied in nuclear forensic investigations. Monte Carlo modeling has been used to evaluate the potential utility of the thermochromatographic separation method, albeit this assessment is necessarily limited due to the lack of available experimental data for validation.

Assessing thermochromatography as a separation method for nuclear forensics: current capability vis-à-vis forensic requirements

Nuclear forensic science has become increasingly important for global nuclear security. However, many current laboratory analysis techniques are based on methods developed without the imperative for timely analysis that underlies the post-detonation forensics mission requirements. Current analysis of actinides, fission products, and fuel-specific materials requires time-consuming chemical separation coupled with nuclear counting or mass spectrometry. High-temperature gas-phase separations have been used in the past for the rapid separation of newly created elements/isotopes and as a basis for chemical classification of that element. We are assessing the utility of this method for rapid separation in the gas-phase to accelerate the separations of radioisotopes germane to post-detonation nuclear forensic investigations. The existing state of the art for thermochromatographic separations, and its applicability to nuclear forensics, will be reviewed.