Abstract

In three important areas of international cooperation - global trade, nuclear security, and climate change - states are shifting away from inclusive multilateralism towards more exclusionary forms of interstate cooperation. In this article we offer an historical institutionalist account for the shift towards exclusive forms of international cooperation in these varied issue areas. We develop an analytical model of an institutional regime life-cycle, which proposes that as multilateralism matured in these policy arenas, changes in the payoff structure of regime membership created incentives for states to establish alternative institutions centered on the principles of selective and discriminatory cooperation. We conclude that incremental changes in the nature of international cooperation can transform institutional cooperation, and exclusive forms of cooperation in trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change, should not be considered aberrations but rather part of the process of regime maturation.

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