Abstract
ABSTRACTDespite renewed enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, a contemporary security environment far removed from that of the Cold War, and increasing budgetary pressures at home, U.S. interests continue to be best served by retaining a triad of nuclear forces. While options for a reduced force structure may appear to offer short-term political and economic expediency, in the long run a three-legged deterrent—possibly consisting of fewer delivery vehicles, operational warheads and even potentially de-alerted forces—represents the best way to balance the competing requirements of contemporary and future U.S. nuclear policy. Indeed, it may be that retaining the triad provides the most realistic method of reestablishing U.S.-Russia strategic stability, and the most credible basis for advancing the drive for global nuclear reductions, strengthening global nuclear security, and even working toward nuclear abolition.
Highlights
Despite renewed enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, a contemporary security environment far removed from that of the Cold War, and increasing budgetary pressures at home, US interests continue to be best served by retaining a triad of nuclear forces
In the current geopolitical climate increasingly characterized by shifting and diverse strategic threats, renewed enthusiasm and demand for global nuclear reductions, and evermore influential constraints on defense spending, pressure is mounting on the United States to rethink the basic tenets of nuclear strategy and deterrence
The desire to go beyond the 700 strategic delivery vehicles (SDV) permitted by the 2010 New START Treaty has sparked a serious debate about whether further reductions can still be made while retaining the triad of nuclear forces.[3]
Summary
Despite renewed enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, a contemporary security environment far removed from that of the Cold War, and increasing budgetary pressures at home, US interests continue to be best served by retaining a triad of nuclear forces. The three-legged triad of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles has a long history and tradition in US security thinking and policy, and this has not noticeably diminished despite the end of the Cold War and development of new and more flexible notions of strategic deterrence While this clearly has much to do with the current and possible future nuclear capabilities of peer competitors – Russia – as well as other security challenges, it is perhaps a reflection of the political and bureaucratic stakeholders that have formed behind the triad, and of the natural logic that: “if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it.”. The New START Treaty does not include reserve US warheads, non-strategic forces or those awaiting dismantlement
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
