Global Negotiations Research Articles

Dynamics of National Position in Climate Change Negotiations: An Analysis of Emission, Cost and Regime Support

There has been marked change in recent years in the positions taken by many nation states involved in climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While these changes in position track with shifting priorities of both developing and developed countries, a consensus on how a nation formulates its negotiation policy has not been reached, and therefore understanding these vicissitudes in global climate talks have thus far been difficult.Traditional approaches to explaining a nation’s position on climate change are often rooted in an interest-based methodological framework, such as Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta’s (S&V) well-known cost-benefit model. While the S&V approach offers valuable insight and an intellectual base from which to conduct further study, it fails, as this paper demonstrates, to stand the test of time. That is, a thorough review of the history on global climate change negotiation reveals inaccuracies in the S&V model, particularly with regard to one of its primary variables – ecological vulnerability – which is difficult to measure and the model itself is fails to accurately account for processes of change in strategy formation. In light of these shortcomings, this paper offers an alternative analytical framework to better understand how a nation formulates its climate change negotiation policy and strategy.To this end, a four variable matrix – patterns A, B, C, and D – is developed which keys off of two central inputs affecting climate change negotiations: emission and cost. Emission, a nation’s share of the global greenhouse gas (GHG) portfolio, is representative of a country’s responsibility to actively engage with the global community on climate change. Cost can be understood as the expense incurred by a country that seeks to reduce its GHG emissions, and thus is a means of gauging the rational attractiveness for it to do so. When taken together and viewed under the four variable matrix developed in this paper, one is able to better understand the fundamental features influencing a country’s position on climate change negotiations. In order to analyze changes in national position, the variables of emission and cost are taken alongside a third factor – national support for climate change negotiation regime. This variable explores the motivation and impetus underlying a country’s decision to recalibrate its negotiation strategy, and incorporates such influences as national interest and political factors. In order to test the model formulated in this paper, a case study on China’s position and transition in UN climate change negotiations is undertaken. Major catalysts, stemming from national interests and political factors, are examined as explanatory factors influencing China’s gradual movement from a passive to active attitude toward climate change negotiation regime. This change, exemplified by its increased support for the UNFCCC, is born out in the four variable matrix introduced in this paper.

Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Norm‐ or Interest‐Driven Actor?

AbstractThis contribution examines the driving factors behind the European Union's activism in global climate politics since the mid‐1990s. Two alternatives are considered: norms and interests. Norms underlying the EU's stance include its belief in multilateralism, sustainable development and the precautionary principle. Interests comprise economic opportunities and the climate change–security nexus. It is argued here that the normative orientation has dominated the EU's ‘leading by example’ strategy in global negotiations. In Copenhagen, it yielded little influence as it was insufficiently geared towards the context of the negotiations. This challenges the notion of ‘normative power’ Europe and makes a review of the Union's external climate policy necessary.

China-India Collaboration on Global Economic Issues :

During the last decade, China and India along with other emerging market economies have repeatedly assumed identical postures in international negotiations on major economic issues like trade and climate change. This paper reviews the reasons behind such posturing. Arguing that similar domestic concerns have led to common negotiating agendas, the paper interprets the Sino-Indian collaboration as an example of contemporary South-South cooperation between emerging market economies. While the collaboration is expected to continue in the foreseeable future, the paper warns against possible cracks surfacing within the South from the increasing economic gap between China and India and other developing countries, and distorted domestic perceptions on trade and climate preventing both countries from being more flexible in global negotiations. _____________________________

Governing China’s Energy in the Context of Global Governance

Abstract This article seeks to understand what role China can and will play in global energy governance by examining how its domestic energy context shapes the country’s attitudes toward the multilateral, market and climate change aspects of global energy governance. It finds that China demonstrates a preference for bilateral/regional to multilateral energy institutions, exhibits an inclination to blend state and market when pursuing energy security, and shows a principally consistent but pragmatically flexible approach to global negotiations on climate change. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, China’s engagement with the international energy order suggests that a rising and energy-hungry China has not and is unlikely to upset the very system that has benefited and will continue to benefit the country. Instead, this article argues that China has shown signs and promises of contributing to global energy governance by offering financial, technical solutions and stimulating the world to develop clean energy. However, energy governance in China has experienced considerable capacity decay in the era of reform and globalization. This decay not only bodes ill for the country’s ability to lead in global energy governance but also complicates international attempts to engage China on complex energy and climate challenges. Policy Implications • The fragmentation of the central government in China, together with the rise of substate actors and state-owned flagship energy corporations in the country’s energy governance, means that it is unrealistic to expect China to have a unified view and voice on global energy governance in the near term. • In light of the fundamental interests of China to engage the international system, the country’s absence from the world’s most important multilateral energy institutions says as much about its reluctance to join these restrictive organizations as these organizations’ lack of seriousness to engage China. • The blending of market tools to a state-dominated energy economy characterizes China’s state capitalism approach to addressing complex energy challenges and the country has largely exported this approach when it engages the international energy market. • China’s staunch positions on climate change bespeak its preoccupation with development, but its changing attitudes toward key issues in global climate negotiations reflect its flexible and pragmatic approach to development. • To seek effective participation from China in global energy governance, the international community cannot engage Beijing alone; instead, it must also engage local governments in China that have gained autonomy over energy affairs and those restructured and partially marketized energy SOEs that have exhibited entrepreneurship in shaping and implementing the country’s energy and climate policies.

Global Gradients of Coral Exposure to Environmental Stresses and Implications for Local Management

BackgroundThe decline of coral reefs globally underscores the need for a spatial assessment of their exposure to multiple environmental stressors to estimate vulnerability and evaluate potential counter-measures.Methodology/Principal FindingsThis study combined global spatial gradients of coral exposure to radiation stress factors (temperature, UV light and doldrums), stress-reinforcing factors (sedimentation and eutrophication), and stress-reducing factors (temperature variability and tidal amplitude) to produce a global map of coral exposure and identify areas where exposure depends on factors that can be locally managed. A systems analytical approach was used to define interactions between radiation stress variables, stress reinforcing variables and stress reducing variables. Fuzzy logic and spatial ordinations were employed to quantify coral exposure to these stressors. Globally, corals are exposed to radiation and reinforcing stress, albeit with high spatial variability within regions. Based on ordination of exposure grades, regions group into two clusters. The first cluster was composed of severely exposed regions with high radiation and low reducing stress scores (South East Asia, Micronesia, Eastern Pacific and the central Indian Ocean) or alternatively high reinforcing stress scores (the Middle East and the Western Australia). The second cluster was composed of moderately to highly exposed regions with moderate to high scores in both radiation and reducing factors (Caribbean, Great Barrier Reef (GBR), Central Pacific, Polynesia and the western Indian Ocean) where the GBR was strongly associated with reinforcing stress.Conclusions/SignificanceDespite radiation stress being the most dominant stressor, the exposure of coral reefs could be reduced by locally managing chronic human impacts that act to reinforce radiation stress. Future research and management efforts should focus on incorporating the factors that mitigate the effect of coral stressors until long-term carbon reductions are achieved through global negotiations.

Fair Shares: Crediting Poor Countries for Carbon Mitigation

This paper computes national carbon mitigation costs using two simple principles: (1) Incremental costs for low-carbon energy investments are calculated using the cost of coal-fired power as the benchmark. (2) All low-carbon energy sources are counted, because reducing carbon emissions cannot be separated from other concerns: reducing local air pollution from fossil-fuel combustion; diversifying energy sources to reduce political and economic risks; and building competitive advantage in emerging clean-energy markets. The paper estimates energy growth and incremental costs for biomass, solar, wind, geothermal, hydro, and nuclear in 174 countries from 1990 to 2008. Then it compares national mitigation burdens using per-capita mitigation expenditures as shares of per-capita incomes. The results undermine the conventional view of North-South conflict that has dominated global climate negotiations, because they show that developing countries, whether by intention or not, have been critical participants in carbon mitigation all along. Furthermore, they suggest that developing countries have borne their fair share of global mitigation expenditures. But they also show that expenditures for both developed and developing countries have been so modest that low-carbon energy growth could accelerate greatly without undue strain.

Advancing Sustainable Development in Global Trade and Multilateral Negotiations

Published by Palgrave Macmillan World exports and imports are quickly recovering after the 2008-09 sharp decline in merchandise trade, as illustrated by global trade performances in the first and second quarters of 2010. In spite of this impressive recovery, domestic concerns in OECD countries about employment, competitiveness and China’s exchange rate policy have created a difficult political environment for further liberalisation under the Doha Round. Interestingly, developing countries, which were reluctant to engage in a new round of trade negotiations back in 2001, are now in the vanguard of those that wish for a swift conclusion of the talks, even if consensus on the ambitious ‘development package’ envisaged in Doha remains elusive. At the same time trade has been the subject of unprecedented attention and scrutiny in the climate change talks. In a world where multilateral cooperation is in crisis there is a dire need for the international community to generate new types of arrangements and innovative responses to the imperatives of development and the global transition to a low-carbon economy.

Agricultural trade liberalization under bilateralism: an international network perspective

Global negotiations in agricultural trade have been considered unsuccessful. Given this fact, the paper studies whether bilateral agreements, rather than global agreements, can lead to Agricultural Global Free Trade by means of decoupled and compensatory payments. For this purpose, the new advances of the international trade network literature have been adopted.

Constituting Global Leadership: Which Countries Need to Be Around the Summit Table for Climate Change and Energy Security?

THERE IS GROWING CONSENSUS THAT THE G8 WILL BE REPLACED BY THE G-20 as the key informal body that meets at the leaders' level. Whether it focuses on setting agendas, breaking deadlocks, or being friends of reform, there will continue to be controversy regarding its composition. Why? Because there is no axiomatic or correct way to choose the countries to constitute the summit table for global negotiations. (1) Various criteria provide guidance, such as total population, economic weight and power, leadership in science and technology, cultural reach, the capacity to introduce new ideas, and the desire to lead. Regional weight is a possible factor. Capacity and willingness to burden share are other criteria. Internal national credibility and political will are other measures. Given that battles are first won on the domestic front, can a country arrange its own compliance? Some might argue that agreement is easier with other like-minded countries that have the same values, but legitimacy requires the group to be representational as well as effective. For example, a recent paper (2) examined two variables as a guide to a representational and effective [G-20.sup.3]--GDP and population--listing countries that would have more than 2 percent of either global population or world GDP and arguing that those with the most economic activity and largest populations must be included (Table 1). Table 1 and subsequent tables rank countries by the magnitude of the measure being considered and highlight current membership in the G-20. Table 1 GDP or Population Greater Than 2 Percent of Earth's Total 2008 2020 Bangladesh Bangladesh BRAZIL BRAZIL CANADA CHINA CHINA FRANCE FRANCE GERMANY GERMANY INDIA INDIA INDONESIA INDONESIA ITALY ITALY JAPAN JAPAN Nigeria Nigeria Pakistan Pakistan Russia Russia Spain Spain UNITED KINGDOM UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES UNITED STATES Total: 16 Total: 15 GDP:72% GDP:66% Population:65% Population:63% Source: A Fresh Look Global Governance: Exploring Objective Criteria for Representation. Working Paper, no. 160, 6 February 2009, available at www.cgdv.org/content/publications/detail/ 1421065/. Note: CAPPED country names represent countries in the Group of 20 industrizlized countries. When the representational group consists of countries that are not like-minded, is there any possibility for agreement? If so, which countries need to be around the table? We first assess the potential for agreement among a representational group of countries using results from theories of coalitions, regimes, and consensus. We then review a number of variables that may provide the basis for a country's inclusion in a future G-20 or G-X. The variables selected are indicators or proxies for (1) who caused the climate change/energy security/development problem; (2) who is most affected; and (3) who can do something about it. We conclude with the Chinese concept of comprehensive national power to illustrate one attempt to weight several factors and compute an overall index. Is Meaningful Agreement Possible in a Group of 20? In recent G8 meetings, commitments have been made on issues such as the economic crisis, poverty, climate change, development, Africa, global growth and stability, financial markets, investment, innovation, energy efficiency, energy security, clean energy, corruption, modern education systems, infectious diseases, globalization, and international trade. For a variety of reasons, many of the commitments have not been fulfilled, (4) but it is anticipated that a Leadership of Twenty (L-20) council will be able to break deadlocks on several of these important issues. (5) However, because the challenges of reaching a consensus coalition of agreement will be greater with twenty leaders than with eight, we will consider whether or not a meaningful coalition is possible for the former number. …

Multilateral Environmental Agreements for Wastes and Chemicals: 40 Years of Global Negotiations

The ability of anthropogenic chemicals to spread far and wide beyond their initial release points obligates an international approach to controlling them. However, the jurisdictional differences and spectrum of national priorities makes creation and implementation of international treaties sometimes fraught. A hardly insignificant issue is the burdensome disconnect between developed producers of such agents and developing regions that are historical disposal sites and emergent sources. In this Feature, Koloutsou-Vakakis and Chinta review the history and mechanisms of multilateral environmental agreements and posit on how they may evolve in the near future.

Intertemporal regulatory tasks and responsibilities for greenhouse gas reductions

A number of jurisdictions are in the process of establishing regulatory systems to control greenhouse gas emissions that will include as a major component a cap-and-trade system. Both short-term and long-term emissions reduction goals are often established, as California does for the years 2020 and 2050, but little attention has yet been focused on establishing annual emissions targets for the intervening years. We develop recommendations for how these annual targets—which we collectively term a “compliance pathway”—can be set, as well as what flexibility sources should have to adjust to changing or unexpected circumstances in light of cost uncertainties. Existing cap-and-trade programs provide limited guidance on the choice of compliance pathways or on mechanisms for flexibility along them. We consider environmental effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and adaptability as appropriate criteria by which these intertemporal policy alternatives should be judged. We also consider how the strategic context of global emissions reduction may affect the design. Borrowing constraints that are likely to be present in any regulatory system affect our recommendations. We recommend that some allowances intended for future years be auctioned early, and that sources be allowed to use them early. We also find that a three-year compliance period can have substantial benefit over a one-year period. Furthermore, we find that many sources of cost uncertainty suggest a compliance pathway characterized by increasing emission decrements along it. This can be approximated by discrete linear segments, and the latter may fit better with ongoing global negotiations.

An international instrument for international cultural policy

This article lays out the contexts informing a unique, international instrument for policy and the development of creative works: the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005. It argues that culture needs to be defended against those interested in including cultural services in global trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization, and demonstrates how the Convention may be implemented to give cultural agendas an equal status alongside economic, social and environmental issues that currently determine policy for development. It gives analysis of some of the key articles and suggests that although the instrument will have to be tested legally, it provides the framework for national policy to build sustainable infrastructures in recognition that diversity of cultural expressions is central to the well-being of our societies.

Europe and the new global economic order: internal diversity as liability and asset in managing globalization

The diversity of market economies that constitute the European Union (EU) presents both constraints and opportunities for Europe when it comes to shaping the post-neoliberal global economic order. Diversity is a constraint in that it often prevents strong common positions in global negotiations and thus undermines the ability of Europe to exercise its collective hard power resources. Paradoxically, however, the EU's enduring diversity over time has become the source of a different type of power that also provides Europe with opportunities to shape the nature of global economic governance. By reconciling commitments to greater economic openness and extensive multilateralism with national discretion, the EU enjoys ‘model power’. This type of power is based in specific institutional innovations within the EU that accommodate internal diversity and allow the EU to exercise important, if limited, influence over the substantive content and rules guiding the management of globalization.

Environmental Diplomacy over the Kyoto Protocol ―the Japanese Role in the Global Climate Change Negotiations―

Environmental Diplomacy over the Kyoto Protocol ―the Japanese Role in the Global Climate Change Negotiations―

The Multi-Stakeholder Principle in Asia

In 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) started placing a high emphasis on the private sector-oriented decision-making process. The UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 initially kicked off as a traditional government-oriented decision-making forum in 2003, and it concluded that the future global negotiation will be operated in a multi-stakeholder environment in 2005. However, the nation states from the South failed to understand the emerging rules of the multi-stakeholder principle pushed by the North until now. The culture of working together with non-state actors as decision makers in the South, including many Asian countries, is still foreign to state actors. Consequently, they could not be effectively engaged with the global negotiations on Internet Governance. Those who have adapted to this new global negotiation environment could gain more negotiating power promptly by inviting the private sector and civil society into both national and global regulatory frameworks, while those who have resisted to implementing the multi-stakeholder principle encountered limitations in influencing the multi-layer global negotiation. This results in the reality that the North wins over the South by working with like-minded private sector and civil society actors in establishing an ICT policy regulatory framework that disempowers the South. Participation and observation in the field including ICANN and the UN Internet Governance Forum is the main methodology in conducting this study. The findings of this study will illuminate the lessons the Asia region should learn to become effective negotiators in global negotiations on Internet Governance.

A Theory of Adaptation to Climate Change as a Global Public Good

Policy discussions of climate change have been primarily concerned about mitigating greenhouse gases. However, when adaptation to climate change is a global public good, an efficient allocation cannot be achieved by the imposition of a carbon tax alone to abate greenhouse gases. This paper proposes an alternative policy framework in which a carbon tax is levied globally while adaptation is supported through the recycling of carbon tax revenue. The optimal level of adaptation aid is discussed. In contrast to a single carbon tax approach, it can address climate inequity issues directly by supporting adaptation programs of vulnerable poor regions. Moreover, this approach provides more incentives for developing countries to participate in global climate negotiations.

Intertemporal Regulatory Tasks and Responsibilities for Greenhouse Gas Reductions

Jurisdictions are in the process of establishing regulatory systems to control greenhouse gas emissions. Short-term and sometimes long-term emissions reduction goals are established, as California does for 2020 and 2050, but little attention has yet been focused on annual emissions targets for the intervening years. We develop recommendations for how these annual targets - which we collectively term a “compliance pathway” - can be set, as well as what flexibility sources should have to adjust in light of cost uncertainties. Environmental effectiveness, efficiency, equity, adaptability, and encouraging global participation are appropriate criteria by which these intertemporal policy alternatives should be judged. Limited but useful knowledge about costs leads us to recommend a compliance pathway characterized by increasing incremental reductions along it. This can be approximated by discrete linear segments, which may fit better with global negotiations. While the above conclusion applies to any long-term GHG regulatory program, many jurisdictions will rely heavily on a cap-and-trade system and the same pathway recommendation applies to its time schedule of allowances. Furthermore, borrowing constraints in cap-and-trade systems can impose substantial unnecessary costs. To avoid most of these costs, we recommend that sources be allowed early use of limited percentages of allowances intended for future years. We also find that a three-year compliance period can have substantial benefit over a one-year period. The paper here is the earlier working paper version of the final paper published in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.

Burden-sharing and global climate negotiations: the case of the Kyoto Protocol

International climate agreements are important examples of internationally negotiated distributive politics and the resulting obligations vary considerably across countries. Nevertheless, few studies have empirically examined the determinants of burden sharing in this context. The allocation of emission reductions in the Kyoto protocol is investigated in relation to the different arguments advanced during the Kyoto negotiations. Regression-based evidence suggests that countries were compensated for early action and that affluent countries, states with high GHG emissions, countries with a high projected growth rate as well as potential EU member states undertook to meet the strictest targets. These findings demonstrate that the context in which negotiations are undertaken influences the obligations that countries are willing to accept and they indicate that there may be a potential for reaching a burden sharing agreement even in the context of financial crisis.

Climate Change Policy: Actions and Barriers in New Zealand

The success of global negotiations in structuring a new broadly based agreement towards greenhouse emission reduction will be much influenced by the extent to which developed countries have met their commitments under the current Kyoto agreement. It is apparent however that many developed countries have failed to reduce their emissions, and it is important to understand why this has been so. The paper examines the case of one such developed country, New Zealand, and the factors which have helped shape its climate policy implementation. While New Zealand’s emissions have risen, few substantive steps have been taken to counter them in order to meet Kyoto commitments. Barriers to effective policy action are shown to have been both political and economic, with the latter being reflective of issues in developing countries also.

Common Health Policy Interests and the Shaping of Global Pharmaceutical Policies

In order to achieve more ethical global health outcomes, health policies must be driven by health priorities and should take into account broader health policy requirements, including the needs of specific national health systems. It is thus important to recognize that the division of interests in key policy areas are not necessarily between the priorities of rich and poor countries, but between (1) pharmaceutical industry interests and health policy interests, and (2) national industrial and trade policy interests and public health policies. In this article I will focus on two broad common interests for health policy officials. Both have become important in the context of current global negotiations relating to access to medicines; pandemic influenza; and public health, innovation, and intellectual property rights. These are (1) ensuring access, availability, and the safety of pharmaceuticals, and (2) ensuring that research-and-development efforts respond to public health needs. I argue that these issues are not solely the concern of developing countries because the diminishing national policy space for health in pharmaceutical policies presents a challenge to all governments, including rich ones.