German Troops Research Articles

WAS GUDERIAN RIGHT? TO THE QUESTION OF THE CAUSES OF THE DEFENSE OF THE GERMAN ARMY UNDER MOSCOW

У даній статті розглядаються драматичні події 1941 р. під Москвою, що завершилися розгромом німецьких військ і звільненням радянською армією багатьох окупованих загарбниками територій. Ця тема до сих пір становить науковий і практичний інтерес у зв'язку з численними спробами переглянути причини поразки вермахту і зриву операції «Тайфун», що мала своїм завданням захоплення радянської столиці. У центрі уваги автора – погляди крупного військового діяча гітлерівської Німеччини генерал-полковника танкових військ Гудеріана. Як командувач 2-ї танкової групи (армії), Гудеріан брав активну участь у розгромі Південно-Західного фронту радянських військ і поході на Москву. На думку Гудеріана, німецький наступ на Москву провалився з двох причин: 1) через неправильну стратегію Гітлера і 2) погану погоду. Обидві ці тези, взяті на озброєння західною історіографією, докладно розглядаються у роботі і піддаються критиці на основі наявних джерел і перевірених фактів. З метою відновлення історичної правди, очищення переломних подій 1941 р. від хибних уявлень і невірних трактувань, у статті розглядаються ключові етапи битви під Москвою, а також співвідношення сил на кожному з них. Особливу увагу приділено виявленню причин зриву гітлерівського плану захоплення Москви, в тому числі пов’язаних з природним фактором. На основі вивчених матеріалів і джерел автор дійшов висновку, що поразка німецьких військ під Москвою не була випадковою. Незважаючи на перемоги, досягнуті завдяки раптовості нападу і технічній перевазі, вермахт не зміг у перші місяці війни домогтися вирішального успіху на всіх ділянках Східного фронту. А там, де він був, нападники зазнавали величезних матеріальних і людських втрат. Це залишало радянському командуванню час і свободу для маневру, який підкріплювався наявними стратегічними резервами. Плануючи операцію по захопленню радянської столиці, німецьке командування змушене було виходити з цієї реальності. Тому генеральний наступ на Москву розгорнувся не раніше і не пізніше, ніж він міг відбутися. Радянське Головнокомандування, незважаючи на скрутні обставини, повністю контролювало ситуацію і вживало всіх необхідних заходів для відбиття атаки на столицю. За тих умов крах операції «Тайфун» був об'єктивно неминучим і стався б за будь-якої погоди.

СЛОВАЦЬКА АРТИЛЕРІЯ У БОЙОВИХ ДІЯХ ПОЧАТКОВОГО ЕТАПУ НІМЕЦЬКО-РАДЯНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ (КІНЕЦЬ ЧЕРВНЯ – СЕРЕДИНА СЕРПНЯ 1941 РОКУ)

At the initial stage of the war against the USSR, in addition to German troops, Allied armies, including Slovakia, participated in the fighting on the territory of Ukraine. This country exhibited a relatively small contingent, representing all major arms. A significant role in the fighting played artillery units.On the eve of the war against the USSR, Slovakia had a large, though not too modern, artillery park (the share of modern artillery systems was 16.5%). However, its use in the first weeks of combat was very limited. In fact, only the artillery units of the Mobile Group reorganized into the Mobile Brigade were active in combat, initially one division (9 guns) and later an artillery regiment (36 guns). For this purpose the Slovak command has allocated the most modern artillery systems on mechanical traction –100 mmhowitzer vz. 30 and105 mmguns vz. 35. In addition, infantry guns used a small number of75 mmmountain guns vz. 15. The Mobile Brigade artillery demonstrated high efficiency during the largest fighting in the studied period with the participation of Slovak troops – the battle of Lipovec on July 22-23, 1941.The second component of the Slovak contingent allocated to participate in the war against the USSR, the Army Group, had a significantly stronger artillery component. It initially consisted of four artillery regiments – two in divisions and two separate. However, they did not carry out any combat tasks by their intended purpose. This is compounded by the fact that the Army Group served in the rear area and performed order maintenance activities in the occupied territory.All the artillery pieces used by the Slovak army were manufactured by Skoda. Among them were dominated by100 mmhowitzers of three different models – vz. 14/19, vz. 16/19 and vz. 30. The most modern model of artillery was the105 mmheavy cannon vz. 35. Mountain75 mmguns vz. 15 were used to directly support infantry.

Military interaction of partisan movements of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine in Gomel region (May – November 1942)

For the first time in historiography generalized information based on the analysis of published literature is presented on the joint military operations of the partisan formations of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine on the communications of German troops around the Gomel transport hub during the period of heavy defensive battles of the Red Army on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. The most important joint military partizan operations of neighboring Soviet republics on the rail way, highways and dirt roads are mentioned. The periods of high activity of partisans fighting on the transport com- munications of the Gomel region in the spring – autumn 1942 are identified and marked. The forms of the help a large land of partizan in expanding sabotage on enemy targets in the occupied territory of Belarusian Polesieare shown. The role of special forces sent to the region from the Soviet rear, to intensify the activities of the local partisans is outlined. As a result of analysis of the sources new information is included about the interaction of partizan groups and groups of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine by applying blows to the German troop train with human resources, military equipment, fuel, food. The draw conclusions show the results of the activities of partisans in the spring – autumn 1942, it is stated that the people’s avengers provided real help to the Red Army troops who were engaged in heavy defensive battles against the Nazi invaders in the area of the Volga.

‘The independence of Belgium is forfeited.’ Narratives of legitimation in the annexation debates of the German war public, 1914–1918

ABSTRACT Early in the war, anti-Belgian ideas were already occupying a central place among the German public’s images of the enemy. These were created within a very short time frame and drew upon stories of the alleged bestial expulsions of German nationals by Belgian citizens, supposedly organized by the state authorities and the purportedly cruel warfare conducted by Belgian civilians against German troops. At the same time, the question of Belgian neutrality arose and the German concession that this had been breached out of self-defence was rescinded. Thus emerged discursive images of Belgians and Belgium which depicted new character traits of its western neighbour’s population and which ultimately formed the basis for the entire wartime discussion of potential German control of the country. Based on a broad corpus of sources, this article examines the rhetoric and dynamics of the ‘annexation debates’ in Germany’s public sphere, while focusing on the underlying concepts of order in Belgium and also portrays the critical voices in these debates.

WER IST HIER DER FEIND? VERBÜNDETE UND GEGNER IN ALEXANDER SOLSCHENIZYNS DARSTELLUNG VON DEUTSCHLAND

AbstractThe prominent Russian writer and Nobel Prize Laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008) was known mainly for his work on the Soviet prison camps. In many of his fictional and non‐fiction works, however, Solzhenitsyn dealt with the subject of Germany. This article analyses Solzhenitsyn's depiction of Germany in the works August 1914, The Gulag Archipelago, and shorter non‐fiction texts. The aim is to assess Solzhenitsyn's interpretation of Germany in the context of the two World Wars and the Cold War. Complex opposites and friend‐foe paradigms characterise the portrayal of Germany and its relation to Russia in Solzhenitsyn's work. Solzhenitsyn suggests a bond of fate between Russia and Germany. Yet it was his trivialising discussion of Nazi crimes that became particularly relevant to his German reception, as well as his benevolent interpretation of the denazification process. Solzhenitsyn's admiration for German troops in the First World War and his views on Nazism are examined here in the context of the author's anti‐communism, nationalism, and anti‐Semitism. A discussion of paradigmatic texts from his (West) German reception during the Cold War illustrates the complexity of Solzhenitsyn's historical interpretations and the different responses to them.

Эвакуация военной промышленности в начале Второй мировой и НКВД

A few months after the fascist Germany’s attack on the USSR, under harsh wartime conditions, at the end of 1941 military industry of the Soviet Union began to produce such a quantity of military equipment that subsequently was providing not only replenishment of losses, but also improvement of technical equipment of the Red Army forces . Successful production of military equipment during World War II became one of the main factors in the victory over fascism. One of the unlit pages in affairs of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) is displacement and evacuation of a huge number of enterprises and people to the east, beyond the Urals, which were occupied by German troops at the beginning of the war in the summer of 1941. All this was done according to the plans developed with direct participation of NKVD, which united before the beginning and during the war departments now called the Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, SVR, the Russian Guard, Ministry of Emergency Situations, FAPSI and several smaller ones. And all these NKVD structures during the war were headed by Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

Ciprian Porumbescu, creator and protagonist of the Romanian operetta

Abstract Musical-theatrical pieces of the nineteenth century, propagated by Italian, French and German troops, were an inspiration for Romanian composers. They will create similar fashionable musical theatre genres, in Romanian, for entertainment purposes. Works placed on the border between vaudeville and the lyrical genre can be identified in the creation of the newly emerging genre of operetta: such pieces are the compositions of Alexandru Flechtenmacher, Eduard Wachmann, Eduard Caudella. In the cultural atmosphere of the time, patriotic musician Ciprian Porumbescu (1853-1883) would find the perfect way to put a longstanding artistic wish into practice: to compose an operetta, following the success of his humorous musical-theatre pieces Cisla and Candidatul Linte [Candidate Linte]. A multifarious personality, a lover of folklore and of his nation, Ciprian Porumbescu – one of the founders of the national school of music – contributed to the authenticity and identity of the Romanian musical language through his extensive works; one important contribution is the composition of the first Romanian cultivated operetta Crai Nou [New Moon] (1882). As a tribute to his art, on the centenary of his birth, the creator of the operetta Crai nou becomes the protagonist of the operetta Lăsați-mă să cânt [Let me sing] (1954) by Gherase Dendrino, set during the time of the staging of Porumbescuʼs musical-dramatic work. Crai Nou and Lăsați-mă să cânt are highlights of the Romanian lyrical theatre, from the artistic past and present, and hold their position as musical pieces frequently performed and received with interest and enthusiasm.

The East Prussian operation (1914) coverage in Russian newspapers

The paper deals with the issues of the East Prussian operation (1914) coverage in Russian Newspapers. On the basis of various newspapers the author analyzes the coverage of the Russian and German troops actions in East Prussia in August-September 1914. The author also reveals fundamental themes of Russian newspapers when covering the East Prussian operation. The paper is based on various newspapers of the Russian Empire. The following Russian newspapers were analyzed: Vestnik voyny, Donetskaya zhizn, Mariupolskaya zhizn, Moskovskaya kopeyka, Novoye vremya, Permskaya zemskaya nedelya, Rech, Russkoe slovo, Utro v Kharkiv. The study was focused on Petrograd and Moscow newspapers, as well as regional newspapers that, among other things, reprinted material from other publications on their pages. The study showed that Russian newspapers, when covering the East Prussian operation, were characterized by creating a positive impression among readers, focusing on the successes of the tsarist army. Readers were introduced to victories, both at the level of large military formations and at the level of small military units. The defeats of the Russian troops were presented by the newspapers not as a tragedy, but as a short-term failure, followed by quick victories.

Conflict Archaeology of Tactical Air Power: The Forêt Domaniale de la Londe-Rouvray and the Normandy Campaign of 1944

Over 1,600 extant WW2 impact craters in the Foret Domaniale de la Londe-Rouvray, Lower Seine valley, Normandy, France, have been mapped and analyzed using LiDAR, historic aerial photographs, archive documents, and field survey. Crater densities average 0.26/ha2 with values up to 31/ha2 in clusters around road and railway infrastructure. Some 576 craters can be dated using aerial photographs to intervals between May–August 1944 and are interpreted as bomb craters associated with Allied tactical air strikes on the Seine bridge at Orival (attacked during May in preparation for the D-Day landings) and German troop and vehicle concentrations towards the later stages of the Normandy Campaign.

HISTORY OF ONE CRIME: ANDRIY SPSAY AND THE CRACKS OF THE XX CENTURY

The article deals with the biography of the peasant Andrii Sapsai, whose life came at a time of the great turmoil in the first half of the twentieth century.On the eve of the 1917 revolution his family successfully farmed in the village Pryyut of Katerynoslav province. In the post-revolutionary years they continued to farm: they kept cattle, cultivated land. The turning point for the family was the dislocation and eviction from the village.The whole family was deported to live in the Urals at the Lisna Vovchanka station. There Andrii was sentenced under a political article. On the eve of the German-Soviet war he returned to Ukraine and settled not far from the village Pryyut.With the arrival of German troops he volunteered with the police, moved to the village Pryyut where he settled down in his house. He was responsible for sending local youth to Germany, searching the villages of those in hiding, and sending them to the collection point in the village Friesendorf, and from there escorted to the train station. Aboveall, Andrii Sapsai participated in the execution of the Jews of the village Kamyana in the Berestianabalka.In May 1942, police officers from the area were summoned to the Friesendorf meeting, for a total of 50 men arrived. The police chief Keller ordered everyone to get into two trucks and to go to the village Zlatoustovka.The policemen were brought to the Berestiana balka, which was located near the village, where a hole up to 20 m long, 2 m wide and 2 m deep had already been dug.They were informed that the Jews were going to be brought now and they would have to be shot. Those who would refuse to participate in the shooting would face severe punishment. Following the police the chief of the Friesendorf Gendarmerie, who had organized the whole process, arrived. In 1934 he left the territory of Ukraine together with some German troops, reaching Romania and leaving them there. In the summer of 1944 local authorities gathered those who had retreated with the Germans at the camp and they worked to rebuild the airfield and then they were transferred to the Soviet command. Then Andrii was called to the ranks of the Red Army by the field enlistment office. To the 4th platoon of the 1st military company, 375 special assault battalion 41 rifle regiment of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.He participated in the battles for the liberation of Hungary, in January 1944 became a German prisoner, and in May 1945 in the territory of Austria he was liberated by Soviet troops and again drafted into the army, where he served until 1946.

ЕВАКУАЦІЙНІ ЗАХОДИ НІМЕЦЬКИХ ВІЙСЬК (СИЛ) ТА ЇХ СОЮЗНИКІВ НА СЕРЕДЗЕМНОМУ МОРІ У 1943 РОЦІ

The author analyzes the experience of preparing and conducting the evacuation of German troops (forces) and their allies in the Mediterranean in 1943.The historical analysis of the scientific achievements of leading foreign, Soviet, and contemporary Ukrainian researchers on the subject indicated by the author testifies to its sufficient representativeness for complex elaboration of the chosen topic. At the same time, in spite of the considerable number of works, in their majority they have a distinct fragmentation: the author does not find comprehensive, thorough and objective military-historical researches on this topic. Therefore, there is a need for scientific generalization of the indicated experience of using troops (forces) in the preparation and conduct of evacuation measures at sea and the development of naval art, as a theoretical basis for solving scientific and practical problems.The purpose of the article is to expose and summarize the experience of preparing and conducting the evacuation of German troops (forces) and their allies in the Mediterranean in 1943 for its use in improving the theory and practice of the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, especially in the face of aggression by the Russian Federation Of Ukraine.The article analyzes and explores the main causes and factors that directly affected the preparation and conduct of the evacuation of German troops (forces) and their allies in the Mediterranean Sea in 1943 and, as a result, influenced its final results. The course of events during the preparation and conduct of these evacuation measures was reconstructed, their characteristics and features were outlined, the experience of preparing and conducting the evacuation of German troops (forces) and their allies in the Mediterranean in 1943 was summarized.

Історія куреня імені князя Святослава Української повстанської армії

In this article, the history of the Prince Sviatoslav Battalion which was a part of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Ivan Bogun Detachment of the “Turiv” Group is investigated. For the first time in the historiography the battalion’s organizational structure and its evolution are thoroughly studied, as well as structure of companies, consisted of: “Viter” (later “Orlyk”), “Batko Bogun”, “Zaberezhny” and “Svitlana” NCO School. The battalion’s numerical strength ranged between 425 and 586 men. In addition, warfare waged by companies of the battalion against the German occupiers and Polish partisan units in the modern Volodymyr-Volynsky and Turiysk districts is described. These were numerous clashes with the Nazi occupational units from Volodymyr-Volynsky garrison (German troops and local police), road ambushes, and the massive assaults on the Polish Resistance strongpoint in the town of Kupychiv. Finally, reasons of the battalion disband in the early 1944 are analysed. They include partial demobilization and reorganization of units in order to prepare for future crossing of the German-Soviet frontline. In the middle of January, 1944 two new companies were created on the basis of the Prince Sviatoslav Battalion elements.

MILITARY DISTRICT "HOVERLIA" OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY DURING THE GERMAN OCCUPATION (1943-1944)

For the first time, the article describes the formation and activities of the military district of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA) "Hoverlia" in the territory of the Stanislav region during the German occupation. It is shown that the military district started to be created in December 1943, at the same time Ivan Beleiovych-"Dzvinchuk" was appointed its first commander. The "Hoverlia" military district was formed based on the Ukrainian People's Self-Defense (UNS), which worked in the Stanislav region's territory during 1943, thus showing that it is a continuation of the Ukrainian liberation movement in the Stanislav region. The "Hoverlia" military district was being built on the territory where the underground OUN network operated for a long time. Therefore, the military district could rely on it if necessary. The "Hoverlia" military district was subordinate to the UIA-West General Military District, that is, to execute its orders. It is shown that according to orders and instructions issued by the UIA-West Regional Military Staff, the "Hoverlia" military district had to build its headquarters, set up a printing business, set up lines of communication, prepare reserve camps for UIA departments, and establish lines, delivering insurgent supplies, providing the insurgents with weapons, ammunition, food, and clothes. All the disunited OUN members had to go to the UIA and be trained there; the insurgent ranks had to be cleared of unreliable elements. The UIA divisions had to control the Carpathian and Subcarpathian forests. The formation and number of "sotnias" and "kurins" of the UIA are shown. Particular attention is paid to the UIA officers' and sub-officers' schools where recruits were trained, the programs for ordinary soldiers, and candidates for officers and sub-commanders. Special attention was paid to German and Hungarian occupation forces in the territory of the Stanislav region. The fight of Ukrainian insurgents against German and Hungarian troops, red partisans, and Soviet paratroopers is covered. Keywords: Military district of UIA "Hoverlia", UIA, UNS, German invaders, Hungarian troops, red partisans, Soviet paratroopers, front.

ДМИТРО БІЛІНЧУК-"ХМАРА" – ІСТОРИЧНИЙ ПОРТРЕТ КОМАНДИРА УПА ГУЦУЛЬЩИНИ

The author examined the life military and political activity of Dmytro Bilinchuk, who was the commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA – in Ukrainian) and the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) on the territory of the Carpathian region of Ukraine during the armed activity of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The researcher studied the history of D. Bilinchuk’s service in the «Peremoha» battalion of the Kolomyia Tactical Group of UPA (TV-21 «Hutsulshchyna») and his work in the underground of the OUN. The scientist analyzes the work of D. Bilinchuk in the Security Service of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, his participation in armed actions in the UPA military and combat units against the German and Soviet troops and security forces on the territory of Hutsul region. The author made a study of the Bilinchuk’s family investigated the reasons and prerequisites for D. Bilinchuk’s accedence to the Ukrainian liberation movement. The scientist used in the research a scientific historiographical base, archival published and unpublished materials from the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Kyiv. The basis of this scientific work is the Soviet criminal case No. 9866 (contains interrogation protocols of this UPA commander), which was not studied in the context of the study of the biography of D. Bilinchuk. At the same time, in the article the researcher provides biographical information of others UPA commanders and OUN supporters. In general, the author has studied the biography of D. Bilinchuk in the context of the history of the Second World War and the activities of the Ukrainian liberation movement in the middle of the XX century.

When a Lie is More Believable than the Truth: The Dynamics of Lying and Discourse Analysis

This article describes the preliminary findings of a research project that is investigating whether there are stable and consistent personality traits found in propaganda texts that indicate whether a statement disseminated via a media is truthful or not. It is not often the case that official government sources will clearly state whether a statement previously release was intended to be truthful or not. Even when a statement is shown to be false, the claim is usually made that it was unintentionally wrong or misleading. The project uses the Rumours Broadcasts targeting German troops and civilians in France, created by the British Political Warfare Executive from July 1942 to May 1945, consisting of over 200,000 words, to analyse the personality differences between true and false statements made in those broadcasts. The first question answered in the study is the amount of fictional versus non-fictional material is necessary to make a broadcast believable. This establishes a benchmark for determining consistent differences between true and false statements in a news release or broadcasts. The analysis is done using tools developed by IBM to examine the vast amounts of data created and displayed on various social media platforms in accordance with the Big Five Personality Traits Theory. While most of the personality traits identified by these tools do not reveal any significant differences, there are some, such as a lack of imagination, cautiousness, a lack of willingness to compromise, and worry, that show consistent significant differences between the fictional and non-fictional statements.

BgHSt 20, 22 und die Neubürger-Klausel des deutschen Strafanwendungsrechts – ein deutsch-polnischer Fall schreibt Rechtsgeschichte bis heute

In its judgment of the 4th September 1964 the German Federal Court of Justice had to deal with a German-Polish case of murder. The accused persons were members of the German minority in Poland and lived in the Western part of Poland, when German troops occupied that territory in the autumn of 1939. Short after the invasion they killed the members of a Jewish family living in the same territory. Both, the perpetrators as well as the victims were Polish nationals, when the crime was committed. The perpetrators have got the German nationality in the following. It is not clear, whether they have been naturalized by German authorities during WW II, but if not, they were seen as German nationals with the Getting-into-Force of the German Basic Law (Constitution), because they were refugees from Poland to Germany. Therefore, Article 116 § 1 Basic Law naturalized them as German nationals. For the criminal case it was crucial whether the later naturalization can give the German Justice system jurisdiction over a case which happened before the perpetrator has reached the German nationality, as it was (and still is) stated in section 4 (resp. today section 7) of the German Criminal Code. The paper should deal with the implications of this so-called "New Citizenship Clause" and with the circumstances of the case and the following cases at Western German Courts against German people for committing murder in the occupied Polish territories during WWII. Shortly after the named case, the Auschwitz trial started in Frankfurt. On that background, the paper reflects on the situation between West and East Germany as well.

Науково-педагогічні кадри Уманського учительського інституту у післявоєнні роки (1946-1954 рр.)

У статті показано процес відновлення, розвитку та діяльності Уманського державного учительського інституту після Другої світової війни. Показано стан забезпечення вищого навчального закладу викладацькими кадрами та ставлення до них держави у повоєнний період. Досліджено та проаналізовано динаміку кількісних і якісних характеристик науково-педагогічних кадрів, їх гендерні, національні та партійні особливості.

Miejsca pamięci i mogiły wojskowe. Wybrane zabytkowe nekropolie województwa łódzkiego z okresu I wojny światowej

Okolice Łodzi stały się w początkowej fazie I wojny światowej terenem krwawych walk toczonych w listopadzie i grudniu 1914 roku między wojskami niemieckimi i rosyjskimi, które określa się mianem Operacji łódzkiej. Pozostałością tych krwawych wydarzeń są cmentarze wojenne z mogiłami żołnierzy obu armii, które zostały wybudowane przez władze niemieckie w czasie I wojny światowej, oraz osobne grupy grobów znajdujące się w obrębie innych cmentarzy lub znajdujące się poza cmentarzami. Do dzisiaj na terenie województwa łódzkiego zachowało się 176 cmentarzy i mogił z tego czasu. W okresie PRL groby te i cmentarze niszczały i popadały w zapomnienie. Sytuacja zmieniła się w latach 90. XX wieku, gdy zainicjowane zostały działania renowacyjne i popularyzatorskie mające na celu przypomnienie Operacji łódzkiej. Zabytkowe groby i cmentarze otoczono opieką i stały się one ważnym elementem programów edukacyjnych, a także atrakcją turystyczną. W ramach projektów turystyczno-historycznych opracowano szlaki prowadzące śladami działań I wojny światowej i najciekawszych cmentarzy.

Holocaust in Countryside of Dnipropetrovska Oblast (by Testimony in the Yahad-In Unum Archive)

The aim – an analysis of video evidence from the Yahad-In Unum archive, to reveal the features of the Holocaust in the countryside of the Dnipropetrovsk region.Methods: oral-historical, comparative.Main results. The population of the General district was predominantly Ukrainian but the places of residence of the Jewish population were allocated. One such place was The Stalindorf Jewish district. It was founded in 1930 and originally the center of the Jewish colony was the village Izluchyste. In 1931, the district was enlarged and the new district center became the settlement of Stalindorf. The composition of the consolidation area includes 23 of the village Council, 16 of whom were Jewish. In General, only on the territory of Dnipropetrovsk region according to the census of 1939 lived 129 439 Jews. Until mid-October 1941 this area were occupied by German troops. Initially, power in the region belonged to the German military administration, but later it was passed into the hands of civil administration. However, on the ground, the power remained in the hands of local residents, who were controlled by the Germans. The most sinister of all the power structures that were created by the Germans in the occupied territories were the SS, SD and local formations of German police. The witnesses interviewed by the Yahad-In Unum team talk about the "Holocaust mechanism" in their villages, the perpetrators of this crime, the lives of ghetto Jews and labor camps.Сoncise conclusions: after the occupation of the villages by the Nazis, local Jews or executed immediately, or concentration in a certain home and then shot, sometimes in villages created a ghetto. Exactly in this time, the extermination of the Jews began in the region. The Local Police were also involved in these actions. However, it should be noted that not all people who joined the Police of the region were related to the genocide of Jews. The most of people who were involved in the Holocaust held some command positions in the local Police. As a rule, these people only «organized» mass killings of the Jews, although sometimes they participated directly in the Holocaust. The direct executors, together with the Germans, were ordinary Police officers, who were mainly engaged in the gathering and guard of the Jews before the execution, the escorting of the Jews to the sites of execution, protection these sited, and sometimes personally murdered the Jews.Practical meaning. It is recommended for use by authors of articles in magazines, as well as for teaching relevant courses on the history of Ukraine during the Second World War.Originality: used evidence of Holocaust witnesses stored in the Yahad-In Unum archive.Scientific novelty: for the first time on the basis of video evidence from the Yahad-In Unum archive, features of the Holocaust in the countryside of Dnipropetrovsk region were revealed.Type of article: descriptive.

Херсонська дивізія УНР (грудень 1918 – лютий 1919 рр.)

At the beginning of December 1918, Ataman Grigoriev displaced the Hetman’s troops from Aleksandria and informed the Ataman-in-Chief of the UNR forces Simon Petliura that he recognized the Directorate of the UNR and submitted his detachments to the Army of the UNR. Soon the troops of the Ataman were named the Kherson Division and became a part of the South-Eastern group of the UNR Army. This group was the core part of the Southern Front which was formed as a counteraction to the troops of the Entente and the White Guards, located on the Black Sea Coast of Ukraine. The Kherson Division of the UNR consisted of four infantry and one cavalry regiments and two batteries of the field cannons. On 12 December 1918, the Republican Troops of the Eastern Kherson Region entered Mykolaiv. Ataman Grigoriev issued an order, which restored all the laws of the UNR. However, he did not manage to retain Mykolaiv. In the second half of December, the German troops, at the Entente’s request, attacked unexpectedly and forced the insurgents to evacuate Mykolaiv. On 31 December 1918, Grigoriev’s military units appeared again near the city and forced the Germans to accept the Ataman’s ultimatum. However, at the beginning of January 1919, the UNR lost Mykolaiv again because of the inconsistency of actions between the highest republican command and Grigoriev. The Ataman troops were relocated to the area of Novyi Buh – Snigurivka. On 18 February 1919, in Kharkov, Grigoriev met with Vladimir Antonov-Ovsienko, who informed the Ataman of the Soviet command’s intention to reorganize his troops as a separate Red Army brigade. On 19 February, the 1st Zadniprovska Infantry Division under the command of Dybenko was created by the order of Skachko, who commanded the Group of the Kharkiv Direction Troops. The 26 united insurgent detachments of Grigoriev (formerly, the Kherson Division of the UNR) were renamed into the 1st Zadniprovska Brigade; and the Ataman became the Combrig (i.e. the Brigade Commander).