German Reparations Research Articles

An Unclaimed Arab League Victory: The Foreign Office–Led Cessation of Kuwaiti Oil to Haifa

ABSTRACT In 1952, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Shell were clandestinely shipping Kuwaiti oil to the Haifa refinery (owned by the same companies) to meet Israel’s growing energy needs. Later that year, aided by the advent of German reparations, the companies agreed to further supply Kuwaiti oil to the Israel Fuel Corporation for it to refine. By 1953, Kuwait became the leading source of crude oil to the Haifa refinery. That February, the Arab League publicly stated that it wanted the Gulf countries to join its economic boycott on Israel and, as a result, received a public assurance from the ruler of Kuwait that his country, still a British protectorate, would not be used as a ‘bridge for trade with Israel’. From that moment onwards, and with the shipments under investigation by the Arab League, a monthslong debate emerged between the British government and the oil companies over whether to wait for an Arab League–inspired directive from the ruler forbidding these shipments, which would grant the organisation a moral victory at the expense of British interests, or to anticipate the event by ceasing of their own accord for maximum convenience at the expense of Israel. The Foreign Office, which forcefully pushed for cessation despite resistance from other government bodies and the oil companies, ultimately had its way and managed to pre-empt an Arab League hammer in the making that might have driven a wedge between the United Kingdom and what had become her most prized foreign asset, Kuwait.

Reparations and Oil in the Cold War: British Perspectives on the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952

This article analyses the British perspectives on the Luxembourg Reparations Agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany from 1952. Short-term economic interests were of central importance when it came to assessing the consequences of this deal for the United Kingdom. Her Majesty's Government welcomed West German reparations as a means of securing Israel's ability to pay for oil supplied by British companies, but at the same time saw them as a threat to its economic and political interests in the Middle East. British diplomats underestimated the long-term political value of the Luxembourg Agreement precisely because they read it verbatim. They recognized the reservations on both sides but did not expect that working relations between Israel and the Federal Republic would improve rapidly after the Agreement was ratified, limiting in turn the UK's political and economic room for manoeuvre in the region. By examining a hitherto little-noticed chapter of British foreign policy in the postwar years, the article foregrounds the commercial aspects of diplomacy in the early 1950s and contributes to a better understanding of international relations in the Cold War.

The Promise of Participation: European Reconstruction Work in Early Weimar Germany’s Political Culture

Abstract Material reconstruction after the First World War was closely linked to German reparations, yet it is curiously underrepresented in the historiography of the Treaty of Versailles as well as in studies on interwar Germany. In the Weimar Republic, political leaders, economic actors and large parts of the population supported the idea of sending building material and even labourers to neighbouring countries. This far-reaching planning process began before and continued after the signing of the peace treaty, as the Allies remained hesitant but not fully hostile to the German proposals. Material reparation potentially mobilized a wide range of goods and labour, and it was thus particularly prone to expectation, but also to disappointment in a broad segment of the population. Against the backdrop of war destruction and the international peace negotiations in 1919, this article investigates the way in which European reconstruction was discussed formally and informally in Weimar Germany. By focusing on the communicative channels and media that promoted German participation in building work abroad, it discusses how expectations were raised, managed and disappointed at the intersection of foreign and domestic policies. While there had only been minor destruction in German territory between 1914 and 1918, the republic’s political culture proved to be deeply affected by the material reconstruction on the European continent, even though most of the far-reaching plans did not result in building sites on the ground.

Repressed, Remitted, Rejected: German Reparations Debts to Poland and Greece By Karl Heinz Roth in association with Hartmut Rübner. Translated by Ben Lewis. New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2022. Pp. v + 430. Cloth $179.00. ISBN: 978-800732575.

Repressed, Remitted, Rejected: German Reparations Debts to Poland and Greece By Karl Heinz Roth in association with Hartmut Rübner. Translated by Ben Lewis. New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2022. Pp. v + 430. Cloth $179.00. ISBN: 978-800732575.

Lawyers Writing History: The Politics of the Past of the United Restitution Organisation (URO) from 1948 to the 1980s

This article explores the Geschichts- and Vergangenheitspolitik, or politics of the past, of the United Restitution Office/Organisation (URO) in the post-war years and asks how it impacted on the early historiography of the Holocaust. I demonstrate that the URO leadership took a conscious decision to publicly downplay the role of its organisation in German reparations to maximise its legal and political clout behind closed doors. While this strategy was beneficial for many of URO's clients, above all in the 1950s and 1960s, this self-marginalisation prevented the organisation from becoming a significant voice in the public debates about German moral guilt and its consequences in the 1970s and 1980s. One reason for this development was generational. The URO was an enterprise driven by a particular cohort of German-Jewish lawyers for whom it provided an opportunity to personally ‘come to terms’ with the interruptions of their pre-1933 careers and the persecution during the Third Reich. In the post-war period, their legal expertise as well as their intimate knowledge of the German language and customs allowed them to act as transnational citizen diplomats, successfully mediating between the different parties and interest groups, governments and non-governmental lobby groups. For most of these Jewish jurists, their practical experience with their German peers, politicians and the administrators of the German Wiedergutmachung led to an increasing scepticism and ultimately disappointment – despite the undisputedly impressive results that they obtained for their clients.

Individual Reparations Claims and Holocaust Research: The Forschungsgruppe Berliner Widerstand 1933–1945

The stacks of materials and amount of information collected as part of the individual reparation process since the late 1940s are immense. It is the largest untapped Holocaust-related archive. One might ask, what should we do with this enormous collection of documents? Will these documents provide new insights on the Holocaust? How will they change what we know about post-war societies? This is of course not the first time that such questions have been raised. By looking at the work of a group of historians using compensation claim files as a historical source at the end of 1950s in Berlin, my paper will seek to provide some insight into the compound interplay between individual compensation claims and historical research. The Forschungsgruppe Berliner Widerstand 1933–1945 commenced its work in October 1956. Funded by the Berlin city lottery, with overheads covered by the Berlin Ministry of Interior, this research unit was to conduct a broad-based study of persecution and resistance in Berlin during the Nazi period. Using extensive documentary evidence, the project was supposed to focus on the fate of the victims of Nazi policy and the efforts of individual groups to offer resistance. In terms of its approach and method, the project was ahead of its time. The initial idea of using individual victim experiences as a starting point for the depiction of Nazi crimes and the opposition against it made, even if only for a brief period of time, the compensation claim files into a valuable historical resource. The exploration of this Forschungsgruppe will help us to better understand the challenges of working with personal compensation claims as historical documents and will raise stimulating questions about the place of German reparation in Holocaust studies and commemoration of the Holocaust.

Germany’s Never-Ending Guilt Trip

Nazi Germany and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the future government of Israel and the official representative of the Zionist Organization (ZO), entered a contractual transactional relationship from 1933 to 1939. In 1952 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the State of Israel, on behalf of all Jews, signed an agreement that paved the way for Germany’s unconditional support for Israel. No suggestion is being made here that Nazi Germany and the FRG are the same; the FRG assumed responsibilities for the crimes of the Holocaust. However, both contractual transactional relationships between both countries from 1933 to the present have initiated policies and programs that contributed significantly to the deterioration of German Jewish living conditions in Germany, the transfer of thousands of German Jewish citizens and their assets out of Germany to colonize Palestine, the establishment of Israel in historic Palestine, the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people, the allocation of a significant portion of German reparation money for the benefit of Israel instead of the victims of the Holocaust, the strengthening of the Israeli economy and industrial base, and providing Israel with German military technology and equipment to wage wars in the region. In this article, I will examine and analyze the special, often secret, relationship between Germany and the Zionist mechanization to colonize Palestine, the establishment of Israel in 1948, and the arming of the state with modern weapon platforms that can carry and deliver nuclear weapons. This secret relationship is in clear violation of German law, made possible by creating a universal guilt feeling among Germans for the crime of the Holocaust, and associated with a deliberate lack of public debate and accountability.

The Russian Question at the Entente Conference in Cannes

This article aims to explore the significance of the “Russian question” at the Entente conference in Cannes, putting it into the European political context of October 1921 – January 1922. The author pays special attention to the two important rounds of the international negotiations, i. e., to the Anglo-French discussions in London in December 1921 and to the meeting of the Entente Supreme Council in Cannes itself (6–13 January 1922). The “Russian question” was one of the three key topics of these conferences; however, to the other matters (German reparations and Anglo-French security pact), it is under-researched. Besides the published diplomatic documents, the author refers to new evidence drawn from the national archives of France, Great Britain, and Belgium. The article concludes that the negotiations in London and Cannes mirrored the “Russian question”, as it stood in European politics at the end of 1921 and the beginning of 1922. D. Lloyd George, UK prime minister and initiator of the Genoa conference, was eager to use the “Russian question” as a means to further British interests, transform the Soviet regime, and reconstruct and appease Europe. It involved reducing tensions as a result of a non-aggression pact that did not impose any obligations on the UK in Eastern Europe. From the trade and economic points of view, the emphasis was put on the international consortium aimed at consolidating Western business in Russia, giving German industry leadership in the field. Nevertheless, an important part of eventual German profits in Russia would go to France and the UK as reparations. The development of the Cannes conference, which resulted in the resignation of the French cabinet led by A. Briand, showed that the “Russian question” was not only a topic of high politics, but also directly concerned the wider public and elites. Accelerating Briand’s dismissal, Lloyd George found a more stubborn opponent in his successor, R. Poincaré. As the prologue to Genoa, the Cannes meeting outlined some of its future problems as well.

Alfred Marshall's Last Challenge: His Book on Economic Progress

Alfred Marshall's Last Challenge: His Book on Economic Progress

The Kaiser's lost African empire and the Alternative für Deutschland: Colonial guilt-denial and authoritarian populism in Germany

This article examines the role which the "imaginary" of the empire that Germany lost in 1919 plays in the contemporary German extreme right, and especially its leading expression, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). It focuses on the symbolic importance of the former colonies in South West Africa / Namibia and East Africa / Tanzania and of the less emotionally charged, although also significant, German 'informal empire' connections to South Africa. The article highlights that the AfD draws on a considerable legacy of political activism concerning Africa stretching back through the colonial revanchist nationalism of the Weimar era, the global network of the Nazi Party's "Foreign Organisation", and the post-war populism of Franz Josef Strauß. AfD ideologues glorify the achievements of the Kaiserreich, and emphasise that Germany has nothing to be ashamed of, in relation to its record in the colonial era. With the recent demands from Namibia for the payment of German reparations for the 1904-7 genocide in that country, this past has become a very live issue in German politics, and the AfD has made much of its opposition to any admission of German culpability. The article also shows how the AfD portrays itself as the defender of the German minority in Namibia and of white South Africans, whose position is represented as a warning of what happens when white people allow racial "others" to attain political power. The analysis seeks to avoid simple "culturalist" /historicist explanations of the presence of these issues in contemporary politics, embedding its account in the continuities of significant social, economic and strategic relationships between southern Africa and Germany.

Hyperinflation, depression, and the rise of Adolf Hitler

Hyperinflation, depression, and the rise of Adolf Hitler

Podzielić się nowoczesnością. Reparacje 2.0?

This article embarks on a fresh and pragmatic look at German reparations for Poland. The analysis is based on a historical, neo-institutional and rational theory approach. It covers past and current experiences of the ‘reparations debate’. Then, in the context of Europeanisation processes and the Polish middle-income trap, the authors explain their original concept on how to identify areas of possible technological cooperation and provide recommendations. This strategic attempt to share modernity may enhance Polish economic development and enter the social and political debate as an effective means of Polish-German reconciliation.

Palestine v. US before the International Court of Justice?

In December 2017, the administration of President D. Trump decided to move the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On 28.09.2018, Palestine initiated proceedings against the US in connection with the said transfer. According to the ICJ Statute, only the parties of concern can take part in the case before the Court. However, it does open the way for non-member countries that had presented a declaration of submission to the Court’s jurisdiction, to observe. If there are any doubts as to the validity or effects of the declarations, they are decided by the ICJ. In the present case, doubts are connected, in particular, with the status of Palestine as a State, with the status of Jerusalem and with the participation in the proceedings of all interested parties. It is unclear whether Palestine meets the criteria of statehood under international law,and the nation is far from being universally recognized. Nor may the GA Resolution 67/19 be viewed as sufficient collective recognition. Furthermore, we do have reasonable doubt as to whether this is sufficient collective recognition to be essentially constitutive of Palestine’s statehood. This situation is not changed by the acceptance by Palestine of the jurisdiction of the ICC nor accession to UNESCO and to a number of international treaties. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Israel with respect to East Jerusalem is also disputed. Certain international bodies, including the UNSC, have expressed doubts equally regarding the incorporation of Jerusalem into Israel or that Palestine has claim to the city. The mere submission of a claim by Palestine does not prejudge the existence of a legal title to Jerusalem. The legitimation of Palestine to bring to international court a claim is thus disputable under the law on state responsibility. It is probable that the ICJ would avoid rendering a decision on merits of the dispute, doing so by referring to the principle of Monetary Gold that was formulated by the ICJ in a judgment on 15.06.1954 in a dispute between Italy, on the one hand, and Great Britain, France and the US, on the other. The subject of the dispute was the fate of gold owned by the National Bank of Albania, plundered by Germany in Rome in 1943.In accordance with an arrangement concluded at the Paris Conference on German reparations (14.01.1946), all gold found in Germany that was known to have been plundered was to be returned in proportional shares to the States concerned. In the case of Albania, however, difficulties appeared in connection with two issues: claims by some States (in particular Italy) resulting from nationalisation of the National Bank of Albania, and compensation in favour of the UK due to the ICJ judgement in the Corfu Channel. It was disputable whether the gold belonging formerly to Albania could be redistributed among the unsatisfied claimants without the consent of the Albanian State. The Tribunal avoided the problem and decided that it lacked jurisdiction. It refused to render judgment in a situation in which Albania did not participate in the trial; on the other hand, the ICJ has indicated on what terms Albania could join the proceedings. Albania did not meet the conditions, and the Court decided that it was unable to continue the proceeding.

German Reparation Debts After the Second World War—A Research Summary

Over the past five years, I have been grappling with the fallout from the predatory wars of annihilation waged by the Germans during the Second World War. The history of the Nazi dictatorship and of German-controlled Europe has been one of my most important research topics for decades. But the true extent of the enormous material destruction and humanitarian devastation caused by these wars has only now become apparent to me. Whoever addresses this issue from a contemporary perspective inevitably also comes across the related issue of reparations and compensation that arose from these wars and that still affects Europe today. At the same time, studying this topic involves entering a risky ‘No Go Area’ of historical research, because reparations discourse has certainly not been confined to history: the as-of-yet unpaid debts of the Second World War are grouped together like in a concave mirror. The research findings we have presented so far therefore only represent a beginning. In what follows, I will first present the results of my case studies of Poland and Greece, since they cover the historical framework of German occupation policy during World War II and the current conflicts over reparations. This will be followed by reflections on the economic-historical context of the Cold War and the failure of Allied reparations policy. Finally, I will critically engage with the latest arguments against a final settlement of the reparations problem and present in detail the ambivalence at the heart of the German culture of remembrance.

Patterned Payments: Explaining Victim Group Variation in West German Reparations Policy

Abstract∞ Why, once governments decide to pay reparations, do they fulfill their reparations promises to some groups and not to others? I argue that the organizational capacity of a victim group helps explain which groups receive reparations. I develop this argument through an in-depth case study of the postwar experience of German Sinti and Roma, supported by archival and interview data. I show that organized victim groups received reparations from the West German government in the 1950s, while Romani Germans, who did not organize until the late 1970s, were largely and deliberately excluded from receiving reparations payments until 1981, when the West German government created a reparations fund to benefit Romani German survivors. I show that this policy change cannot be understood without considering the efforts of Romani organizations.

A Review of the Transfer Problem: Keynes, the Versailles Treaty,and the German Reparations

A Review of the Transfer Problem: Keynes, the Versailles Treaty,and the German Reparations

German Reparations after World War II: Political Decisions and Economic Evaluations

In this article, on the basis of declassified archival documents as well as the latest domestic and foreign studies, the authors examine the genesis, development and results of the Allies’ reparation policy towards Germany. The history of the institution of reparations was examined from its very origin during the preparation of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, through the development of expert proposals and political discussions within the “Big Three” period of the Second World War, to formalization in the final documents of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of the 1945. The authors analyze the implementation of the reparation policy by the Soviet Union and the Western powers in the post-war period, identify the differences in practical approaches to the implementation of the Potsdam agreements among them. Economic estimates of the volume of Soviet reparations from East Germany range from 4.3 to 22.1 billion dollars, which can be explained by different calculation methods as well as arbitrary classifications of certain elements of expenditure as reparations. The amount of reparations from West Germany also varies from 4.8 to 16.8 billion dollars, to which Western economists tend to add subsequent compensation payments to Israel and other countries under international treaties as well as individual compensations of the total amount of 17 billion dollars. The authors conclude that while in the Federal Republic of Germany the reparations did not affect the systemically important sectors of the economy and almost did not affect the capital ratio of the industry, in the GDR they struck the basic branches of production. Against this background, the economic recovery of East Germany in the 1950s looks more surprising than the post-war “economic miracle” in Germany.

1922

At the F.O. all the morning and afternoon going over the Agenda for the forthcoming Session of the League of Nations at Geneva. At 6 o'clock to 1 Carlton House Terrace to see Lord Curzon and to discuss with him any points of policy arising out of the Agenda. Lord C. is off to Cannes tomorrow to attend the Inter-Allied Conference that is to discuss the question of German reparations, trade with Russia, etc.

How to Accept German Reparations by Susan Slyomovics

How to Accept German Reparations by Susan Slyomovics

How to Accept German Reparations. Susan Slyomovics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2014. x-373 pp.

How to Accept German Reparations. Susan Slyomovics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2014. x-373 pp.