70 biography Vol. 14, No. 1 thought in the sixties, seventies, and eighties with which her subject does have definite affinities. In fact, such an introductory volume would have been an excellent forum in which to use Weil's less idiosyncratic vocabulary to clarify the ideas of her successors among philosophers, anthropologists, historians and psychologists. Perhaps I am imagining a book which will soon be written. This book is easy to read, physically and intellectually. I occasionally felt as if a step in the editorial/proof-reading process had been skipped. The usually minor grammatical and semantic lapses do not obstruct understanding, however. The print is clear. There were points at which I felt a need for more documentation. When a biographer is obviously working from some detailed account of her subject's daily life and subjective experience, I think the source should be cited. The book is accurate and effective in doing its appointed job. I recommend it. L. W. Riggs University of Hawaii Robert H. Whealey, Hitler and Spain. The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War 19361939 . University Press of Kentucky, 1989. 269 pp. Few historians will dispute that the Spanish Civil War was one of the most bitter and vehemently waged conflicts of the first half of this century. Transcended by both world wars in the sheer number of battlefield casualties, nations involved, and geographical extension, nevertheless the three-year Civil War was regarded by many as the clearest struggle of the Western democratic conscience vis-à -vis the totalitarian fascist powers. As Robert Whealey's book makes clear, the intervention of the Germans and the Italians was a vital element in Franco's eventual victory. Their military contribution in its general outline is well known—Guernica has become a byword for the bombing of defenseless cities—but the background details of economic help and the price exacted, as well as the squabbles between the Axis belligerents themselves and Franco, and the latter's innate distrust, have hitherto been less documented. In its attention to the Nazi role in a wider context, Professor Whealey's study has provided much-needed depth to a complex situation. Contrary to common belief, Hitler's policy toward Spain was far from consistent, nor were his ideological sympathies as clear as might be imagined. The Fuehrer was indifferent to Spain's social and religious structure, and his advisors cynically saw the war as an opportunity to help gain economic advantages for Germany both during and after the war. The German intervention in the Civil War was not preconceived, and indeed it was Mussolini who was the first to perceive the potential for large-scale involvement. Indeed, the Germans would have preferred a quick Nationalist win, as a sound Spanish economy would have helped the Axis cause more than an exhausted nation. The early Operation Feuerzauber (the airlift of Franco's troops from Morocco to the mainland) was a vital factor at the outset of the war, but even here the Italians played the key role. Subsequent German help often fluctuated in accordance with wider international considerations, especially in Central Europe, and in numbers and matériel the Italians were ahead throughout the war. Even so, the German contribution in terms of quality and effectiveness was the decisive element. In a chronicle of this type, a certain ennui is inevitable—statistical tables, lists of exports and imports, technical details, and extensive documentation. The appendices, REVIEWS 71 endnotes, and other supporting material account for nearly half of the text, which is heavily footnoted, sometimes three to a single sentence. The result is that the narrative often lacks depth when further detail would be appreciated (on page 5 General Sanjurjo dies at a critical juncture, but no explanation as to the manner of his death is offered). The style is often pedestrian, e.g. p. 20, "Spain may or may not have been on the verge of social revolution in the months prior to July," and several factual infelicities could surely have been caught by a more vigilant proofreader. Thus on page 42 we read that "In 1937 the effective leader of the Falange became Ramón Serrano Suñer, Franco's brother-in-law...