Game Theory Approach Research Articles

Game Theory and Dual Approach to the Dynamic Programming on the Example of the COVID‐19 Pandemic in Poland Described by Mathematical Model With Three‐Dose Vaccinated

ABSTRACTIn this paper, a new approach to the disease transmission dynamics of the COVID‐19 pandemic is presented, involving the use of game theory and dual dynamic programming. A new compartmental model that describes these dynamics is introduced. New classes have been added to this model to account for the portion of the population vaccinated with one dose, two doses, or three doses. Pandemic costs are also included. Time‐dependent parameters (strategies) are employed, allowing for the consideration of different behavior variants and decisions made by policymakers. Sufficient conditions for a dual ‐closed‐loop Nash equilibrium, are formulated in the form of a verification theorem. A numerical algorithm is constructed, and numerical simulations are performed. A comparison between real pandemic data for Poland and the data obtained from the model is made.

Optimizing Waste Separation in Traditional Minority Communities: A Game Theory Approach for Sustainable Municipal Waste Management

Successful solid-waste management relies heavily on citizen involvement and cooperation, particularly through effective source separation. By ensuring that waste is sorted correctly at source, costs are reduced, the quality of recycled products is improved, and waste handling becomes more efficient—resulting in significant cost savings for municipal authorities (MAs) and mitigating causes of air pollution, water pollution, and soil contamination.This study explores enhancing waste separation in local authorities populated by traditional minority groups through stakeholder cooperation. The aim is to improve economic, social, and environmental utilities while identifying the mechanism that best maximizes the well-being of all players involved.Employing mixed methods and game-theory tools, we conduct twenty-one in-depth interviews with local minority leaders to define the parameters of the service function. The utility functions of all players serve as a basis for game-theory modeling that allow us to identify Nash equilibria, compare their efficiency, and formulate the mechanism optimally.The results of the study show that when an influential local player fosters cooperation and trust among residents, effective waste separation is achieved, enhancing the well-being of all involved.

An Integrated SIMUS–Game Theory Approach for Sustainable Decision Making—An Application for Route and Transport Operator Selection

The choice of management strategy for companies operating in different sectors of the economy is of great importance for their sustainable development. In many cases, companies are in competition within the scope of the same activities, meaning that the profit of one company is at the expense of the other. The choice of strategies for each of the firms in this case can be optimized using game theory for a non-cooperative game case where the two players have antagonistic interests. The aim of this research is to develop a methodology which, in non-cooperative games, accounts for the benefits of different criteria for each of the strategies of the two participants. In this research a new integrated sequential interactive model for urban systems (SIMUS)–game theory technique for decision making in the case of non-cooperative games is proposed. The methodology includes three steps. The first step consists of a determination of the strategies of both players and the selection of criteria for their assessment. In the second step the SIMUS method for multi-criteria analysis is applied to identify the benefits of the strategies for both players according to the criteria. The model formation in game theory is drawn up in the third step. The payoff matrix of the game is formed based on the benefits obtained from the SIMUS method. The strategies of both players are solved by dual linear programming. Finally, to verify the results of the new approach we apply four criteria to make a decision—Laplace’s criterion, the minimax and maximin criteria, Savage’s criterion and Hurwitz’s criterion. The new integrated SIMUS–game theory approach is applied to a real example in the transport sector. The Bulgarian transport network is investigated regarding route and transport type selection for a carriage of containers between a starting point, Sofia, and a destination, Varna, in the case of competition between railway and road operators. Two strategies for a railway operator and three strategies for a road operator are examined. The benefits of the strategies for both operators are determined using the SIMUS method, based on seven criteria representing environmental, technological, infrastructural, economic, security and safety factors. The optimal strategies for both operators are determined using the game model and dual linear programming. It is discovered that the railway operator will apply their first strategy and that the road operator will also apply their first strategy. Both players will obtain a profit if they implement their optimal strategies. The new integrated SIMUS–game theory approach can be used in different areas of research, when the strategies for both players in non-cooperatives games need to be established.

Optimizing environmental regulation policies for digital transformation in energy enterprises in China: An evolutionary game theory approach

In response to the global consensus on achieving carbon reduction, China has introduced a series of policies aimed at accelerating the digital transformation of energy enterprises. However, these policies have revealed shortcomings such as deficiency in regulation methods and insufficient integration of regulation with technologies. This study applies evolutionary game theory (EGT) to evaluate the impacts of different environmental regulatory policies on the digital transformation and verifies the effectiveness of the theory in policy optimization. Utilizing modified real-world data, the study quantitatively examines the effects of alterations in various parameter combinations on players' strategic choices. The results indicate that: (1) increasing the regulatory intensity above 0.8, the carbon tax rate and penalties can promote the digital transformation, stimulating the low-carbon development in energy sector; (2) an interesting finding is that tax incentives such as carbon tax refund ratio can exacerbate enterprises’ reliance on government compensation, thereby slowing down their transition process; (3) this study highlights the optimal service provision intensity for technological service providers (TSP) is 0.9, which can expedite system evolution towards the ideal state and foster the construction of a favorable digital regulatory environment. The study provides valuable references for optimizing regulatory policies and promoting digital transformation to realize the decarbonization goal.

Sustainable digital fashion in a metaverse ecosystem

The fashion industry ranks among the top polluters globally, yet the emergence of virtual worlds offers a chance for brands to switch to digital clothing as a greener option. This research explores whether the metaverse can enhance sustainability in fashion or worsen environmental issues, especially those linked to non-fungible tokens (NFTs). We introduce a game theory model to analyze the strategic dynamics between brand manufacturers and digital fashion platforms, factoring in platforms' abilities to reduce emissions. The model uncovers how these uncertainties influence pricing, investment, and performance outcomes. Our analysis is supported by a case study on DressX, a prominent digital fashion platform, showing that digital fashion brings technological innovation and environmental advantages. Platforms with greater emission reduction capacities and their collaborators witness increased revenues. However, information asymmetry complicates strategic decision-making, and the environmental implications of digital technologies underpinning the metaverse remain a critical concern. Platforms with advanced capabilities gain a competitive edge by managing costs effectively, whereas manufacturers profit at the platforms' expense. However, there is a strategic equilibrium that benefits both sides. Our study indicates that maximizing the environmental benefits of digital fashion demands responsible actions from all stakeholders, including careful technology selection, clear communication of capabilities, cost management, and strategic cooperation. Our game theory approach, combined with a real-world case study, provides a unique perspective on the strategic and environmental dynamics of digital fashion in the metaverse, contributing to the growing body of literature on sustainable fashion and digital ecosystems.

Evolutionary game theoretical approach for reducing carbon emissions in a complex supply chain organization

PurposeOur research explores the intricate behavior of low-carbon supply chain organizations in an ever-evolving landscape, emphasizing the profound implications of government-mandated low-carbon policies and the growing low-carbon market. Central to our exploration is applying a combined game theory model, merging Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) with the Shapley Value Cooperative Game Theory Approach (SVCGTA).Design/methodology/approachWe establish a two-tier supply chain featuring retailers and manufacturers within this novel framework. We leverage an integrated approach, combining strategic Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperative Game Theory, to conduct an in-depth analysis of four distinct low-carbon strategy combinations for retailers and manufacturers.FindingsThe implications of our findings transcend theoretical boundaries and resonate with a trinity of economic, environmental and societal interests. Our research goes beyond theoretical constructs to consider real-world impacts, including the influence of changes in government low-carbon policies, the dynamics of consumer sensitivities and the strategic calibration of retailer carbon financing incentives and subsidies on the identified ESS. Notably, our work highlights that governments can effectively incentivize organizations to reduce carbon emissions by adopting a more flexible approach, such as regulating carbon prices, rather than imposing rigid carbon caps.Originality/valueOur comprehensive analysis reveals the emergence of an Evolutionary Stability Strategy (ESS) that evolves in sync with the phases of low-carbon technology development. During the initial stages, our research suggests that manufacturers or retailers adopt low-carbon behavior as the optimal approach.

A Coupled Game Theory and Lyapunov Optimization Approach to Electric Vehicle Charging at Fast Charging Stations

A Coupled Game Theory and Lyapunov Optimization Approach to Electric Vehicle Charging at Fast Charging Stations

Modelling the Interaction Between Incumbents and New Entrants with a Game Theory Approach: A Case Study of Public Transportation

The transformative influence of new entrants on industries and heightened competition underscores their significance. Mature companies, threatened by their entry, deploy multiple incentives to forestall market penetration. Conversely, consumers embrace fresh participants, creating a dichotomy in reactions. This has spawned escalated conflicts between mature firms and newcomers, rooted in the latter's market entry. This study navigates this landscape by delving into the strategies, preferences, and priorities of these actors, seeking stable equilibrium and reconciliation points for these conflicts. Employing thematic analysis, it distills options, feasible scenarios, and relative preferences of each stakeholder. These insights undergo scrutiny via the GMCR + decision support model. Among 21 conceivable scenarios, the study unveils three equilibria and a semi-stable state, suggesting mature companies recalibrate their stance to explore synergies with new entrants. This research offers a panoramic perspective on the intricate interactions between mature companies and new entrants, transcending the narrow confines of entry barriers.

Is high-intensity conflict escalation inevitable in the future? A two-level game analysis on the causes of US-Iran risky rivalry

In recent years, there appears to be a growing consensus among policymakers in both the East and the West, that the decades of global peace after the Cold War has now come to an end, and that the world is facing mounting security risks to the future of humanity. Among those challenges, the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict poses particularly significant risks to regional and global security, and is closely related to many other contemporary international crises involving European states and their allies, particularly the Russo-Ukrainian War, the nuclear proliferation in Europe, and the military disputes between the Iran-backed Houthis and EU forces. But why has the U.S.-Iran relationship deteriorated so dramatically over the past years, and what are the future risks its presents to the international community? While extensive scholarly works have been conducted to examine the ideological, historical, and geopolitical variables that fuel this observed escalating antagonism, no study to date has formal-modelled the complex interactions between Tehran and Washington into a two-level game. Utilizing an infinitely-repeated game theory approach, this research presents a comprehensive analytical framework that explains how interrelated political factors at both the international and the domestic level jointly shape the dynamic of this bilateral relationship. We contend that the domestic rally effect created by risk-oriented diplomacy, incompatible ideological stances and political values, the increasing polarization within U.S. Congress, and the mounting rivalry between Israel and the Iran-led Axis of Resistance convince policymakers from both sides that their utilities can be maximized in a non-cooperative game. Based on our models, it can be forecasted that there is hardly any chance Washington and Tehran will concede to the other’s security demands in the foreseeable future. Thus, the risks of high-intensity conflict escalation due to miscalculation will continue to upsurge in the future.

Navigating the personal carbon inclusion scheme: An evolutionary game theory approach to low-carbon behaviors among socio-economic groups

In response to the challenges posed by climate change, China has launched the Personal Carbon Inclusion (PCI) scheme to encourage individuals to transition towards low-carbon lifestyles. This study investigates the behaviors of participants within the PCI scheme using a tripartite evolutionary game model, encompassing high-income and low-income individuals, as well as the PCI platform itself. The research analyzes participants' strategies, examines the evolutionary stability of different strategies, and assesses the robustness of equilibrium points within the game dynamics. Key findings reveal: (1) High-income participants tend to be less willing to adopt low-carbon behaviors compared to low-income participants. (2) The PCI platform displays limited proactive engagement in promoting low-carbon policies. (3) Factors, particularly the cost and pricing mechanisms of low-carbon actions, significantly impact the evolutionary progression of the system. Moreover, practical recommendations are provided to enhance the effectiveness of PCI schemes.

Do scarce resource inputs promote or reduce patent values and innovation? A game theory approach

ABSTRACT Both patent price and innovation play crucial roles in the patent market and this article studies patent values under capacity or resource constraints using a game theory approach. First, patent industrialization advances consumer surplus in all situations. Second, under a monopoly, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the patent value and the total amount of a resource. Third, under an oligopoly with nonbinding capacity constraints, the patent value decreases as the total amount of the resource increases. Finally, the overall relationship between the patent value and the total amount of the resource under an oligopoly also has an inverse U-shape.

Potential and challenges of Peer-To-Peer (P2P) electrical energy trading: investigation and case study

This paper explores the potential and challenges associated with Peer-to-Peer (P2P) electrical energy trading, focusing on both theoretical investigation and practical application through a comprehensive case study. By examining the interactions between prosumers (those who both produce and consume energy) and consumers, we employ utility functions to model these interactions. Optimization is achieved using a non-cooperative game theory approach coupled with real-time pricing mechanisms to reflect market dynamics accurately. Our analysis ensures feasibility and reliability by considering crucial factors such as energy balance and grid capacity constraints, which are essential for maintaining system stability. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method. These results highlight the significant potential of P2P trading to enhance overall energy efficiency, promote decentralized energy management, and reduce reliance on traditional energy sources. Furthermore, this study provides detailed insights into maximizing total utility by determining optimal prices and energy trades, ultimately showcasing the transformative impact of P2P trading on real-time energy market operations.

Adjusting Mood in Mandarin Chinese: A Game Theory Approach to Double and Redundant Negation with Entropy

Abstract This study investigates how Mandarin Chinese speakers use double and redundant negations to adjust information entropy and convey the speaker’s mood. Integrating Gricean implicature, signaling game theory, and information entropy, we quantified uncertainty in negation sentences by calculating self-information of negation markers and overall entropy for negations versus affirmatives. Analyzing sentences from the BCC Corpus of Mandarin Chinese newspapers, we extracted double and redundant negation patterns, calculated their frequencies, and compared entropy values in payoff matrices against affirmatives. Contextual analysis of surrounding discourse interpreted pragmatic functions. Our findings reveal that universal double negations reduce sentence entropy, intensifying assertiveness. Modal forms further decrease entropy, amplifying necessity, while conditional patterns strengthen the asserted conditions. Euphemistic double negations increase entropy, weaken assertiveness, and align with Levinson’s Manner Principle. This increase in entropy quantifies pragmatic markedness, allowing tentative critiques. Redundant negations significantly reduce entropy, strengthening negative attitudes. We elucidate how interlocutors navigate cooperative discourse by quantifying uncertainty via entropy measures, making contextually-optimal linguistic choices like assertion, indirectness, and emphasis. These findings impact signaling game theory and pragmatic markedness, with applications in natural language processing, cross-cultural communication, and computational models. Future research could explore other languages and cognitive and social factors in negation use.

As a service or a product? A comparison of electric vehicle battery supply models

In response to the challenges posed by high costs and rapid degradation of electric vehicle (EV) batteries, Battery as a Service (BaaS) is introduced as a new EV battery supply model, alongside the traditional model of Battery as a Product (BaaP). Under this background, how to choose a battery supply model is a major strategic problem. Through game theory approach, we analyze and compare the BaaS and BaaP models under a durable goods framework. Firstly, we find that the BaaS model is more profitable than the BaaP model when battery cost or degradation rate is excessively high. The firm under BaaS can relieve cost pressures by selectively retaining used batteries and reducing the price threshold for consumers to acquire batteries. Secondly, through premature disposal of used batteries, a firm can endogenously determine the quality of battery service, making the BaaS model more profitable when battery cost or degradation rate is excessively low. Thirdly, we show that the firm under BaaS always benefits from the decrease of battery degradation rate. However, a lower battery degradation rate may reduce the firm’s profit under BaaP because of the cannibalization effect from the secondary market.

Cooperative game theory approach towards capital equipment procurement in construction projects: a concrete batch plant case study

This study explores how contractors can benefit from joint resource procurement in construction projects, particularly in case with capital-intensive ones. Capital equipment is costly and has a long beneficial life compared to other resources; hence, minimizing its long-term costs is pivotal. Also, the lack of open dialogue under a legal structure in projects may deprive project participants from many beneficial partnering opportunities. Given this background, a comprehensive framework based on cooperative game theory is introduced to form a systematic partnership among contracting parties to share their capital equipment. Cooperative game theory is suggested as the basis for increase the gains to all parties and fair and efficient allocation of the incremental benefits of cooperation. The proposed flowchart is then applied to a real-world project and various coalitional cooperative game theory solutions for dividing gains equitably, from sharing a site-located concrete batch plant among three contractors are evaluated and the most stable cost allocation is identified. Results reveal that with the application of this cooperative procurement, the three contractors can achieve an average of twenty three percent considerable savings through practical alliance that deliver vast improvements in project productivity and performance.

Optimizing government strategy for deep decarbonization in towns: A game theory approach incorporating energy storage services

Renewable district energy systems present a promising solution for decarbonizing the energy sector. However, optimal strategies to mitigate the financial challenges of deep decarbonization are still underexplored. This study aims to optimize government subsidy strategies and users' system designs to facilitate cost-effective deep decarbonization using game theory. Two indicators, the renewable generation rate (RGR) and the self-sufficiency rate (SSR), are formulated to understand the principles of achieving deep decarbonization. Additionally, the study introduces a new strategy called subsidy plus energy storage service (SUB + ESS), contrasting it with the traditional subsidy-only strategy. Key findings indicate that merely increasing the RGR requirements does not achieve deep decarbonization due to energy mismatches. Restricting the SSR requirements proves effective in achieving deep decarbonization but imposes a significant economic burden on the government. When the SSR requirement is set at 100%, carbon emissions are reduced by 93%, but the government's subsidy expenditure increases nearly fivefold. In contrast to the subsidy-only strategy, the novel SUB + ESS strategy, with a 100% SSR requirement, reduces government expenditure by approximately 52% and lowers total expenditure by 19.7%. A two-stage decarbonization strategy is proposed: initially, offering subsidies is sufficient, but as deeper decarbonization is pursued, establishing energy storage service becomes essential.

Podejście oparte na teorii gier w ekonomicznej współpracy dla zrównoważonego rozwoju: optymizacja South Pars – North Dome Field pomiędzy Iranem a Katarem

Cooperation between countries in the exploitation of common natural resources such as oil and gas contributes to the optimization of resources, prevention of unsustainable extraction, promotion of long-term resource sustainability, strengthening diplomatic relations, and promoting peace, playing a significant role in the economic growth of countries. This research presents a modeling of the extraction of interested countries from a common resource using triangular distribution and game theory approach. The modeling is designed based on the share of the parties in the common resource and the extraction capability (in terms of the sanction factor). The results indicate that the extraction level of each country from the common resource depends on both the share of the interested parties and the level of sanction imposed on them. Moreover, if a sanction is imposed on one or both countries, a portion of the resources will not be extracted. Among the most important results, we can point out that only if the amount of sanctions is very severe, then the extraction of resources for Iran has no economic justification.

Open access publishing and quantum game theory under modified EWL scheme

Game theory deals with the strategies of rational players to obtain the best possible outcomes for a player in a game. Quantum game theory is an extension of classical game theory, where players can adopt quantum strategies to maximize their payoff advantage. In quantum game theory, we have two prominent quantization schemes, namely the Eisert Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) scheme and the Marinatto Weber (MW) scheme. Recently, modified EWL scheme is being used to study the game dynamics. In the era of digital information revolution, scientists have unrestricted access to most of the scientific information. Different scientific disciplines prefer different paths of publication either open access or traditional. Taking this as a framework, we model an open-access game played by scientists with open access and traditional publishing as their strategies. In this work, we study these publication patterns using the quantum game theory approach under the modified EWL quantization scheme. Specifically, we investigate the role of entangling operators and players’ strategies in maximizing the payoff (reputation) for the scientists playing in the open-access game.

Competitive Option Preferences of Daring and Hybrid Course Models In The Faculty Of Engineering: A Game Theory Approach

Competitive Option Preferences of Daring and Hybrid Course Models In The Faculty Of Engineering: A Game Theory Approach

Energy Protectionism: Tren Meningkatnya Kebijakan Proteksionisme Energi di Uni Eropa

This research discusses the impact of EU energy protectionism in the face of global challenges such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the energy crisis due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Those two major events reveal the risks of over-dependence on foreign suppliers and the lack of diversification in the EU supply chain. As a solution, the EU has implemented various policies, including RePowerE, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP), to reduce dependence on energy imports and increase domestic renewable energy production. Through the analysis of neoliberalism and Game Theory approaches, particularly the Prisoner's Dilemma concept, this article explores the implications of protectionist policies on international trade stability. The analysis shows that while protectionist policies can strengthen the EU's energy independence and domestic security, they also have the potential to trigger international trade tensions and protectionist retaliation from other countries.