Podejście oparte na teorii gier w ekonomicznej współpracy dla zrównoważonego rozwoju: optymizacja South Pars – North Dome Field pomiędzy Iranem a Katarem

Abstract

Cooperation between countries in the exploitation of common natural resources such as oil and gas contributes to the optimization of resources, prevention of unsustainable extraction, promotion of long-term resource sustainability, strengthening diplomatic relations, and promoting peace, playing a significant role in the economic growth of countries. This research presents a modeling of the extraction of interested countries from a common resource using triangular distribution and game theory approach. The modeling is designed based on the share of the parties in the common resource and the extraction capability (in terms of the sanction factor). The results indicate that the extraction level of each country from the common resource depends on both the share of the interested parties and the level of sanction imposed on them. Moreover, if a sanction is imposed on one or both countries, a portion of the resources will not be extracted. Among the most important results, we can point out that only if the amount of sanctions is very severe, then the extraction of resources for Iran has no economic justification.