Future Of NATO Research Articles

Will Nato Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance

Seldom has an issue split the Western policy community as dramatically as the debate over NATO enlargement. Not only does the issue bring to the fore much that has been latent in post-Cold War power relationships; the participants in the debate enter with their favourite luggage in hand: forecasts of Russian behaviour, definitions of Europe and its institutions, trans-Atlantic futures, the appropriate role for the United States, and of course one or another sub-text about Germany. This useful collection knows where it stands on NATO enlargement and is perhaps the livelier for its advocacy of scepticism about the merits (contributors from Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest need not have applied), of caution in the process, and of a profound concern for the impact of enlargement on stability in Europe. Although the volume was conceived over two years ago, the papers stand up remarkably well, even in light of recent developments, with the July NATO summit in Madrid just weeks away and ratification procedures (of various kinds) probable during the second half of the year. One of the reasons the debate is so vivid and partisan is the fundamental disagreement which it provokes over basic judgments: enlargement is essential/fatal for the future of NATO; it will promote/undermine the security of central Europe; it will reaffirm/terminate United States engagement in Europe; and it will dampen/inflame irredentist urges in Moscow. Although the essays in this volume consider these and many other elements in play, a common thread is the virtually unanimous view that, throughout the alliance, there has been an unfortunate absence of analysis and debate, particularly among parliamentarians, media, and the public at large. While the arguable premise that underlies this point is that 'greater awareness of the problem's complexities will weaken the public's overall support for the broadening of the alliance' (Wolf, p 215), the authors correctly suggest a certain democratic deficit in the process so far. The volume is structured in two parts: five chapters of broad theoretical and policy papers are followed by four case studies of the issue as seen from the United States, Canada, France, and Germany. David Haglund tests NATO enlargement against certain theoretical concepts of alliances and institutions, while charting in skilful terms the 'evolution of an idea.' David Law and Neil MacFarlane address NATO as a regional security organization, considering linkages with the European Union, the Western European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as the existing functions of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace. …

NATO's Future and Security Cooperation

Journal Article NATO's Future and Security Cooperation Get access After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance. By Chernoff Fred. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995 303 pp., $44.50 (ISBN: 0-4 72-1 0550-7). Stephen J. Cimbala Stephen J. Cimbala Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mershon International Studies Review, Volume 40, Issue Supplement_1, April 1996, Pages 126–128, https://doi.org/10.2307/222651 Published: 01 April 1996

Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance

To expand or not to expand: that is the question confronting the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato). The issue is difficult for the Alliance because it is intimately related to the most fundamental questions facing European security. What kind of security 'system' will emerge on the continent? What are the common threats, and how can they best be met? What is the future shape and role of the Alliance, and what should be its relationship with any emerging European security and foreign policy? How should the West manage its relations with Russia? Any decision on nato expansion will affect the response to these questions and indeed will go a long way toward establishing policy on many of them. Not surprisingly, the expansion debate has been lively, with proponents arguing for new roles and missions if nato is to be relevant in post-Cold War European security while opponents insist that it can be most effective and valuable in its present form.

Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance

Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance

‘Cold war’ continuities: US economic and security strategy towards Europe

(1994). ‘Cold war’ continuities: US economic and security strategy towards Europe. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 17, The Future of NATO, pp. 82-104.

Conflicting agendas and the future of NATO

(1994). Conflicting agendas and the future of NATO. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 17, The Future of NATO, pp. 143-164.

Unified Germany: A normal state?

This paper asks to what extent unification has changed the nature of the German state. In its formal institutions post‐1990 Germany is a larger version of the Federal Republic established in 1949. It has inherited most of its leading characteristics in the form of a liberal, pluralist constitutionalism, a federal structure, a social market economy and the commitment to Western integration. Yet each of these characteristics is under challenge as a result of unification. Political consensus is weaker in a more heterogeneous society; distribution conflicts put a strain on social peace and the structures of federalism; and the commitment to Western integration suffers from wider doubts about the future of NATO and of European institutions. While the present frontiers of a German nation‐state seem to be generally accepted, old disputes about national identity have resurfaced. Nevertheless the factors making for stability and continuity remain strong, as the experience of managing a democratic market economy co...

Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, 31 March–4 April 1992. For their helpful comments and criticism the authors thank in particular Jospeh Grieco, Isabelle Grunberg, Helga Haftendorn, Ingo Heinrich, Otto Keck, Robert Keohane, Peter Mayer, Harald Muller, Ingo Peters, Glenn Snyder, Christian Tuschhoff, Stephen Van Evera, Celeste Wallander, Kenneth Waltz, Richard Weitz, and Michael Zurn. The authors also acknowledge the financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Volkswagenstiftung.

Europe's Nuclear Dominos

As long as the United States continues to play a leading role in NATO, the incentive for European powers to acquire independent nuclear weapons is virtually zero. Most European power, however, have relatively sophisticated nuclear establishments and could easily manufacture nuclear explosives if they judged that their security required an independent capability. They might judge so if the United States pulls out of Europe and out of NATO. It is the opinion of the author that if the United States withdraws, and if France and Britain insist on maintaining their current status as independent nuclear weapons powers, they will encourage proliferation by example. The likelihood of different countries deciding to manufacture nuclear weapons under these cicumstances is evaluated. The future of NATO is assessed. The conclusions of and future structure of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) is discussed. The impact of United Nations involvement in preventing proliferation is evaluated. Recommendations are proposed for the utilization of existing organizations to deter proliferation in Europe.

American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance.

The formation of the alliance, 1948-1949, Robert H. Ferrell NATO and the Korean War - a context, Walter Lafeber the American commitment to Germany, 1949-1955, Ernest R.May Charles de Gaulle and the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated command, Samuel F.Wells, Jr Nixingerism, NATO and detente, Joan Hoff-Wilson the SS-20 challenge and opportunity - the dual-track decision nd its consequences, 1977-1983, Gaddis Smith the INF Treaty and the future of NATO - lessons from the 1960s, Lawrence S.Kaplan.

The future Germany and the future of NATO

The events of 1989 have raised questions about NATO's future and purpose. Two different views are held by Germany and the USA. The Germans seek the political and economic unification of the EC, the construction of a European pillar within a demilitarised NATO, and a pan‐European collective security system. In contrast, the Americans seek to preserve NATO as a military alliance responsible for western European security under American leadership and to equip NATO with competences extending beyond the NA TO area. Whilst insisting on greater western European burden sharing and security coordination, the Americans see the roles of the CSCE and the WEU as complementary to NATO's.

The Third World and the dissolution of the USSR

Union' have been willing to accommodate themselves to an accelerated process of nuclear disarmament. In combination with the East-West rapprochement effected during the years of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership of the Soviet Union (1985 -91) and the altered geopolitical status of the states of East-Central Europe as a consequence of the overthrow of communist regimes there since 1989, these developments amount to a veritable sea change in the global balance of power. Moreover, the expressed commitment of most of the successor states to pursue reforms aimed at the development of market structures has further accelerated the trend initiated in the late 1980s of the former Soviet Union's integration into the world economy.2 These changes have been viewed by Western governments and commentators with a mixture of triumphalism and caution. On the one hand, they are viewed as reflecting the superiority of Western liberal ideals over those of communism and a vindication of the deployment and modernisation of nuclear weapons by NATO during the 1980s, a strategy which is now seen as material in the West's 'victory' in the Cold War. On the other hand, however, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the earlier disbandment of the Warsaw Pact has led to considerable soul searching in Western capitals regarding the future of NATO in the absence of a clear adversary. Moreover, the efthnic and territorial disputes which have accompanied the political transformation of the former communist states have left leaders of the alliance fearful that the previous world of bipolar order may have given way to a new era of localised, yet vicious and contagious conflicts.3 While considerable attention has been paid to what might loosely be termed the 'strategic' aspects of the Soviet breakup, far less consideration has been given to its implications for the Third World, an area which has traditionally been outside the European focus of the central strategic East-West relationship. The paper aims at making a modest contribution to rectifying this neglect.4 As a necessary preliminary, however, it is worth recalling that important changes in Soviet relations with the Third World were already much in evidence prior to 1991. The superpower competition for allies in the region which characterised the 1970s and early 1980s had given way during the latter 1980s to a more cooperative approach. Moscow's unwillingness to continue supporting embattled clients embroiled

NATO's future in a new Europe: an American perspective

The article analyses, from an American perspective, the implications of change in Europe and the Soviet Union for the future of NATO. It observes that US policy and NATO will probably have to accommodate two very different scenarios according to whether reform in the Soviet Union continues. If reform comes to a halt, the West will need to retain mutual defence arrangements-adjusted to reflect the changes in Europe-to balance Soviet military power. But if reform does continue, it may be possible to develop a cooperative security system, a scenario for which Western policy should also be prepared. The article goes on to propose ways in which the CSCEframework could be extended and developed into the basis of a cooperative security system.

The future of NATO and Warsaw Pact strategy: Paper I

The future of NATO and Warsaw Pact strategy: Paper I

The future of NATO and Warsaw Pact strategy: Paper II

The future of NATO and Warsaw Pact strategy: Paper II

Foreword

FOREWORD Understanding the difference between necessity and choice is the first step a new administration must take ifit is to develop a successful foreign policy. In the twilight of a Reagan administration foreign policy that has evolved from the limitations placed on policymakers by their ideological zeal to an unexpectedly pragmatic approach to the Soviet Union, the United States must now come to terms with its own mortality. The 1980s have been relatively stable and prosperous, yet the budget and trade deficits accrued over the past eight years exemplify not only poor management but a primary fault in the composition of the American ethos: the differences between necessity and choice have become increasingly blurred and may no longer be distinguished. Excess government spending reflects an attitude prevalent among a cross section of the U.S. citizenry: the tacit acceptance of living, and in some cases thriving , on borrowed money. The government —reflecting the mind-set of its citizenry—has spent beyond its resources and does not worry about payment. As the Republicans continue to rest on the laurels of the economic expansion that occurred during the Reagan years, the Democrats retort that any administration could achieve such economic growth if it had a one trillion dollar limit on its mythical Visa card. The United States must now construct a fiscally sound and realistic foreign policy agenda. The issue of necessity and choice in U.S. foreign policy has become particularly volatile as a new administration must choose those Reagan policies it wishes to pursue and those it will redirect. The ability to control the temptation of misusing the almost unlimited privilege given to a president to create his own unique chapter in a history book will make the difference between a foreign policy guided by ideological zealotry or rational expectations. Simon Serfaty's "Farewell to Reagan: New vi SAIS REVIEW Beginnings Are Not Needed" illustrates that a more pragmatic and less emotional foreign policy agenda in pursuit ofmoderate goals is the best, and most likely successful, course of action. The 1980s have witnessed fragmentation in the many areas of foreign policy decisionmaking, as the Reagan administration's international agenda has been inconsistent and often contradictory. Defining the foreign policy needs and choices for a new administration will require not only a possible reordering of priorities but also a redefinition of consensual goals. In "Building a New Consensus" a distinguished group of past and present foreign policy luminaries have joined in order to define what U.S. foreign policy goals should be after the conservative and liberal labels are shed and party allegiance is dissolved. From Harold Brown to Brent Scowcroft, the authors of the following two policy consensus reports on "Fiscal Policy and Foreign Policy" and "The Future of NATO" attempt— in their respective policy recommendations and working memorandums— to define a credible set of nonideological and nonpartisan policies that will reinvigorate the united voice of U.S. foreign policy from years past. Senator David L. Boren's article discusses the intragovernmental dynamics necessary to create such a consensus in foreign policy. Furthermore, in "1989: A Truly Presidential Agenda," George Liska writes of bipartisanship as a means of relating and reacting to the reform effort now under way in the Soviet Union: "If he [the new president] is to demonstrate leadership—as opposed to mere competence—he will have to shape a new, bipartisan foreign policy consensus, and he will have to show the will and the ability to break with established practice if the American people — and other concerned peoples—are to have a real opportunity to learn from trying antecedents." Since the Soviet Union has found it necessary (or was it by choice?) to reform temporarily its domestic and foreign policy doctrine, the United States must necessarily react to this challenge of a fundamental change in superpower relations. Although arms control agreements and strategic military policy are rarely, if at all, affected by public consensus in either country, cooperative ties in less life-threatening areas can help only to decrease tensions that have developed from years of propaganda and a lack of individual, day-to-day communication. In Burton I. Edelson and Alan Townsend's article on U...

The Future of NATO

The Future of NATO

Task Force: A Senior Seminar for Undergraduate Majors in International Studies

Task Force is a small group seminar required of all seniors in the Henry M. Jackson School's International Studies Program at the University of Washington. Five or more seminars are offered in the winter quarter, and each focuses on a current policy issue. In recent years, Task Forces have dealt with such topics as strategic arms control, apartheid, United States policy towards Central America, the future of NATO, and United States trade with Japan. The following is an abridged version of the handbook which serves as a general guide for Task Force students, instructors, and evaluators.The International Studies Program at the Jackson School introduces undergraduate students to world affairs through traditional and multidisciplinary coursework. Its curriculum draws on economics, geography, history, political science, sociology, languages and literature, religious studies, and many other disciplines. The program also recognizes that the study of international affairs is rooted in policy issues and processes. It is this notion which underlies the concept of Task Force.The organization and operation of Task Force were inspired by the Policy Conference of Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. The Policy Conference, which was initiated in 1930, consists of 25-30 people and operates much like a Presidential Commission or other investigative group. Its members explore a policy problem through research and discussions with experts; they debate the merits of policy proposals and arrive at a set of policy recommendations.

Europe and the Superpowers: Political, Economic, and Military Policies in the 1980s. Edited by Steven Bethlen and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985. 230 p. $20.00). - Shattering Europe's Defense Consensus: The Antinuclear Protest Movement and the Future of NATO. Edited by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. PfaltzgraffJr. (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985. 224 p. $19.95). - Semialignment

Europe and the Superpowers: Political, Economic, and Military Policies in the 1980s. Edited by Steven Bethlen and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985. 230 p. $20.00). - Shattering Europe's Defense Consensus: The Antinuclear Protest Movement and the Future of NATO. Edited by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. PfaltzgraffJr. (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985. 224 p. $19.95). - Semialignment and Western Security. Edited by Nils Ørvik (New York: St. Martin's, 1986. 286 p. $35.00). - Volume 81 Issue 2

NATO's future: toward a new transatlantic bargain

NATO's future: toward a new transatlantic bargain