Future Of International Order Research Articles

Diasporic geopolitics, rising powers, and the future of international order

AbstractThis article examines ‘diasporic geopolitics’ as a significant factor in the future of global politics. Whereas discussions of global order in IR have been highly spatialised, we instead highlight the extent to which different regions of the world are entangled via ongoing migration processes, and their legacies in the form of global diasporas. We examine the significance of these interconnections by focusing on rising powers and their relations with the existing international order. Major migration-sending states such as China, India, and Turkey are now aspiring great powers that seek to exert global influence in international affairs. In this context, their diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation, with diasporas increasingly understood as important assets for promoting sending states’ geopolitical agendas and great power ambitions. We examine three mechanisms by which such states exert power transnationally via their diaspora engagement policies. States can treat ‘their’ diasporas as economic assets that facilitate trade and foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of ‘civilisational’ politics; and as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed. We conclude by discussing the implications for thinking about the nature of global order and power politics in the coming 50 years.

The Coronavirus Pandemic and the Future of International Order

The global health emergency and the economic crisis it unleashed cried out for international policy coordination. The response was underwhelming.

Russian-American relations in a changing world: A new contribution to the discussion on the future of international order

A steady degradation of Russian-American bilateral relations after the beginning of the socalled New Cold War certainly represents one of the most critical destabilizing factors in the field of international security. At the same time, positions of Russia and the United States on the arrangement of the international order have become increasingly incompatible. In particular, Moscow and Washington do not share a common understanding on both basic principles and their own role in the international order of the 21st century. Not surprisingly, these realities evoke discussions and disputes within and between the academic communities in Russia and in the United States. A reviewed joint volume, published by MGIMO-university in 2019, is dedicated to the examination of a number of important issues, united by the common theme — interaction of the United States and Russia after the end of the Cold War. As a whole, the book represents an endeavor to unveil the sources of contradictions in contemporary Russian-American relations. As a point of departure, the authors accept that the current Russian-American tensions derive not from a misunderstanding by the parties of each other’s motives, or historically established prejudices and stereotypes, but rather stems from a fundamental incompatibility of interests, shaped in turn by various factors. Accordingly, this review aims not just to focus the audience’s attention on this joint volume, but also facilitate its smooth integration into the current academic debates on Russian-American relations and the prospects of the international order.

The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China's Hegemonic Prospects

AbstractExisting theories predict that the rise of China will trigger a hegemonic transition and the current debate centers on whether or not the transition will be violent or peaceful. This debate largely sidesteps two questions that are central to understanding the future of international order: how strong is the current Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counterhegemonic challenge? We argue that the future of international order is shaped not only by material power but also by the distribution of identity across the great powers. We develop a constructivist account of hegemonic transition and stability that theorizes the role of the distribution of identity in international order. In our account, hegemonic orders depend on a legitimating ideology that must be consistent with the distribution of identity at the level of both elites and masses. We map the distribution of identity across nine great powers and assess how this distribution supports the current Western neoliberal democratic hegemony. We conclude that China is unlikely to become the hegemon in the near term.

The Budapest Memorandum and Russia's intervention in Ukraine

Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States extended security assurances to Ukraine in December 1994 in an agreement that became known as the Budapest Memorandum. This agreement was part of a package of arrangements whereby Ukraine transferred the Soviet-made nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS). Russia's violations of the Budapest Memorandum, notably its annexation of Crimea, could have far-reaching implications for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament because of the questions that Russia's behaviour has raised about the reliability of major-power security assurances for NNWS parties to the NPT. Doubts about the reliability of such assurances could create incentives to initiate, retain or accelerate national nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, because the Budapest Memorandum included restatements of UN Charter provisions and principles articulated in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Russia's disregard for the Budapest Memorandum has raised fundamental questions about the future of international order. The Russians have demonstrated that, despite economic sanctions and international condemnation, they are prepared to disregard longstanding legal and political norms, including those expressed in the Budapest Memorandum, in pursuit of strategic and economic advantages and the fulfilment of national identity goals. Unless Russia reverses its dangerous course, the fate of the Budapest Memorandum may in retrospect stand out as a landmark in the breakdown of international order.

F.A. Hayek and the Reinvention of Liberal Internationalism

Between the late 1930s and the mid-1940s, F.A. Hayek became involved in two parallel and partly intertwined debates that shaped the intellectual and political milieu in Britain at the time: one about capitalism and the role of economic planning, the other about the causes of war and the future of international order. This article considers Hayek's international thought as part of his wider effort to provide a comprehensive restatement of nineteenth-century liberalism. It examines the character and development of his conception of international order, and specifically focuses on the ideological and institutional context in which it emerged. Moreover, the article considers the international implications of Hayek's later thought and traces the lineage of his liberal internationalism back to Henry Sidgwick and his justification of liberal imperialism. The article concludes by locating Hayek's liberal economic internationalism within the field of inter-war international thought and by offering a brief assessment of his contributions to international relations.

International Order and Global Swing States

The rise of four powerful democraciesBrazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkeypresents one of the most significant opportunities for U.S. foreign policy in the early 21st century. The democracies that have newly emerged on the global stage collectively possess the capability and the legitimacy to bolster the interlocking web of norms, institutions, rules, and relationships that has for six decades preserved peace among the great powers, fostered economic prosperity, and facilitated the spread of freedom. This global order now confronts numerous challenges, some emanating from China's rise and others from a diverse set of international developments. If these challenges eventually fragment the international order, the United States, its allies, and all other countries that depend upon an open and stable world will suffer the consequences. Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey offer great potential as partners to extend the global order. Though separated by location and historical experience, these countries share not only a common commitment to democratic institutions but also possess large and growing economies while inhabiting strategic locations in their respective regions. And critically, the precise global role of each is in flux. These four rising democracies might be termed ''global swing states.'' 1 In the American political context, swing states are those whose mixed political orientation gives them a greater impact than their population or economic output might warrant. This applies to Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey. The choices they makewhether they take on new responsibilities, free-ride, or obstructwill, in aggregate, decisively influence the trajectory of today's world.