Future Of Germany Research Articles

The Decision to Divide Germany and the Origins of the Cold War

The division of Germany between East and West was in itself a sufficient condition for the emergence of what came to be known as the Cold War in Europe. Most of the literature on the origins of the Cold War regards the division of Germany as the consequence of a deepening conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. This article argues that an inability to agree on the future of Germany was not the consequence of this conflict, but its cause, and that this inability to agree was simply the result of the fact that the four former Allies believed the risks associated with letting go of Germany, once it had been divided among their occupation forces, were greater than the risks associated with nonagreement. This conclusion is supported both by a general analysis of the interdependent choice situation posed by the occupation of Germany and by reference to the published diplomatic record. The article also argues that the diplomatic record has been widely misunderstood in several important respects.

The Soviet World Faces West: 1945–1970

H TISTORY'S wheels have spun round several times since the Potsdam Conference of victorious Powers in 1945.1 The policies of the wartime allies have passed through several major revolutions, with one major factor remaining constant: their inability to come to terms on the future of Germany. Unable to agree on this central problem, the erstwhile allies have created bilateral and then multilateral alliances which have formalised the split between East and West; they have climbed escalation ladders to demonstrate their determination to hold fast in Central and Eastern Europe; and, in so doing, they have jeopardised the internal political stability and economic prosperity of their respective countries. Twenty-five years after the Second World War, however, some hope exists that the belligerents in that conflict and the rival Powers in the ensuing cold war may be groping toward an accommodation, with regard both to Germany and to the existing armed confrontation in Europe. To use the language of model builders, they may be ready to move from a major concentration on maintaining the cold war status quo to a strategy premised on interdependence. If this shift becomes a reality, however, the results will differ profoundly from the post-war arrangements envisaged at Yalta and Potsdam, for Germany will have become a partner and not just an area for the practice of East-West collaboration. Germany provided the raison d'etre of the Second World War alliance. If that coalition were to endure, the Big Three believed that Germany would have to remain its focal point. At Teheran and at Yalta they undertook to keep Germany demilitarised and disarmed, and to keep the peace through an international security organisation. In the months between the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, however, the allies began to fall out over the very principles on which agreement seemed to have been reached at Yalta. As their armies closed in upon the Third Reich, mutual suspicion and distrust mounted. Stalin seemed to fear that the West might use the secret negotiations on the Northern Italian front to obtain a conditional German surrender that would be utilised against Russia. The West objected to Moscow's policies directed towards

Democrat and Diplomat: The Life of William E. Dodd

William Dodd was the U.S. Ambassador to Germany from 1933 to 1937, arriving in Berlin with his wife and daughter just as Hitler assumed the chancellorship. An unlikely candidate for the job-and not FDR's first choice- Dodd quickly came to realize the situation in Germany was far grimmer than the U.S. understood. His original belief that Germany could hardly fail to realize the importance of friendly cooperation with the United States, and likewise that the U.S. would come to see value of social and economic cooperation with the land of Luther, Stein and Bismarck, was soon replaced by his dire reports on the treatment of Jewish citizens and his pessimism about the future of Germany and Europe. Finding unwilling listeners back in the U.S., Dodd clashed repeatedly with the State Department, as well as the Nazis government, during his time as ambassador. He eventually resigned and returned to America despairing and in ill-health. Robert Dallek, a luminary in the field of political biography and author of Pulitzer Prize-nominated Nixon and Kissinger, offers a comprehensive look at Dodd's life, focusing particularly on his ambassadorship and exploring why someone as perceptive about Nazism as Dodd had a reputation as a poor and ineffective diplomat. The paperback includes a new Preface by the author.

The Future of Germany. By KARL JASPERS. Translated by E. B. Ashton. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. xviii + 173 pp. $4.95)

The Future of Germany. By KARL JASPERS. Translated by E. B. Ashton. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. xviii + 173 pp. $4.95)

The Future of Germany. By Karl Jaspers and E. B. Ashton Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945. By Kurt Tauber The Quest for a United Germany. By Ferenc A. Váli

<i>The Future of Germany</i>. By Karl Jaspers and E. B. Ashton <i>Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945</i>. By Kurt Tauber <i>The Quest for a United Germany</i>. By Ferenc A. Váli

The Future of Germany

The Future of Germany

Book reviews

Report from Iron Mountain. With introductory material by Leonard C. Lewin. London: Mac‐Donald. 1968. 18s. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. By Dennis J. Duncanson. London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1968. 63s. Dix mille années pour le Vietnam! By André Tong. Paris: Table Ronde. 1968. No price quoted. The UN Secretary‐General and the Maintenance of Peace. By Leon Gordenker. New York and London: Columbia University Press. 1967. US price not quoted. 63s. Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957–1963. By Jon B. McLin. Baltimore, Md., and London: Johns Hopkins Press and OUP. 1967. $8.50 and 68s. The Quest for a United Germany. By Ferenc A. Vali. Baltimore, Md., and London: Johns Hopkins Press. 1967. $8.50 and 68s. The Future of Germany. By Karl Jaspers. (Translated by E. B. Ash ton.) Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 1967. $4.95. British price not quoted. The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson Subcommittee Hearings and Findings. Edited by Senator Henry M. Jackson. London and New York: Pall Mall and Praeger. 1967.50s and $6.95.

KARL JASPERS. The Future of Germany. Translated and edited by E. B. Ashton. Pp. xviii, 173. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. $4.95

KARL JASPERS. The Future of Germany. Translated and edited by E. B. Ashton. Pp. xviii, 173. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. $4.95

The future of Germany in a changing European context

The future of Germany in a changing European context

The Alliance and the Future of Germany

The Alliance and the Future of Germany

Adenauer and the Future of Germany

KONRAD in history as one of the most important national leaders of the mid twentieth century. He undeniably earned this honour, but the significance of his major accomplishments and how these balance off against his shortcomings and failures will be disputed for many years to come. Adenauer has already been the subject of one series of biographies, with his retirement there will be more, and over the next years historians will be sifting the documentary evidence as it becomes available to piece together better-informed and less passionate accounts. One new source will be Adenauer's memoirs, which he is writing. Like all autobiographies of statesmen, this will probably be a mixture of self -justification the facts selected to induce the public and professional historians to remember and emphasize what the author wants to have remembered and emphasized and fiction in the sense that only part of the story will be told. Another valuable source will be the recollections of Adenauer's associates. Their data could not be tapped during his tenure of office and may not be available until after his death. The fear of reprisal has always been strong in the circle around Adenauer and may linger on. Certainly Adenauer has had a most unusual career. By 1945 he had completed what for most men is a full life's work. Then, seizing an opportunity to resume active public service, he reached new heights of power and creativeness in the post-war period. These aspects of Adenauer's life alone, his longevity coupled with a stringent marshalling of indomitable energies, are fascinating. Even his severest critics must bow before Adenauer's talent for achieving, holding, and wielding power. Remarkable personal qualities have played a role in this and therefore his personal

Adenauer and the Future of Germany

Adenauer and the Future of Germany

The Future of Germany and the European Settlement

The Future of Germany and the European Settlement

The German Problem, 1955

visitor to the quiet Belgian town of Bruges is quickly struck by the interweaving of medieval and modern strands of life. The ties between past and present are everywhere nowhere more clearly perhaps than in the merchants' fair which sprawls over the cobble stones of the market place on a Saturday morning. Their stalls may be trailers drawn by internal combustion engines, but the fair itself perpetuates a characteristic institution in the busy commercial life of the medieval Netherlands. In such an atmosphere, in an historic town whose placid canals reflected the foliage and flowers of spring, representatives from institutes of international affairs in Western Europe, Canada and the United States met between April 21 and 25 to discuss the German problem, 1955. As in the town, the Bruges conference was never free of the past as it considered the present and the future of Germany and Europe. It was a particularly well-organized and instructive conference. In these brief remarks about it, my intention is to convey general and personal impressions rather than to attempt a comprehensive report on such a lengthy and varied discussion. A full report written by M. A. Grosser, the able rapporteur of the conference, will be published shortly.1 If the reunification of Western and Eastern Germany is to be accomplished by the give-and-take of negotiation, what can be the basis of a negotiated settlement? At Bruges, a general assumption was that neither the Western Powers nor the Soviet Union can accept a basic change in the existing balance of power which would threaten their security. For instance, the Western Powers can not permit an extension of Soviet power to the Rhine and the Soviet Union can not be expected to accept the extension of the NATO system to the eastern frontier of an enlarged Germany. Another sina qua non from a western point of view is a democratic Germany, with sufficient stability to resist communist subversion. Equally, from a Soviet viewpoint, the sovietized Eastern Germany can not readily be peacefully

The Ruhr Authority and the German Problem

Not long ago—early in 1954—the world observed a debate at Berlin between diplomats of East and West who offered their alternatives for solving the German problem. The Soviet solution as set forth by Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was to use Germans as pawns in a diplomatic maneuver whose object was clearly to wreck Western European integration and to strengthen the Soviet Union. The solution proposed by the Western diplomats, John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden and George Bidault, was to regard Germans as equals with whom they would negotiate a solution to Germany's problems. The Soviets have used the satellite East German regime to parrot their program and they have groomed it to neutralize Germany or lead it into the Communist camp. The Western diplomats have concluded that in order to obtain a lasting German settlement there must be free elections to establish an all-German government, which would be competent to negotiate about Germany's future and would be free to join the Western Alliance, if it chose to do so.

Max Weber And Russia

When Max Weber published in 1906 two book-length studies of contemporary Russian politics, Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Russland (On the situation of bourgeois democracy in Russia), and Russlands Übergang zum Schein-konstitutionalismus (Russia's transition to pseudo-constitutionalism), he was venturing upon a field of inquiry in which he had previously shown no interest, and which seemingly lay entirely outside the range of his professional qualifications. He was by this time widely known as an economic historian specializing in agrarian and financial problems, and in the methodology of the social sciences. True, two years earlier he had also departed from his specialty by writing on the relationship between capitalism and Protestantism, but in that instance his deviation had not been quite as radical, since these studies had concerned the economic implications of a religious movement. What could have induced him, so shortly after recuperation from a nervous breakdown which had incapacitated him for the better part of five years (1897–1903), to interrupt his academic routine, acquire a reading knowledge of Russian, and devote several months to the tedious perusal of the Russian daily press? Why did he, as his widow and biographer reports, “follow for months in breathless tension the Russian drama” of 1905? Weber's interest in Russian politics, it is obvious, had deeper motives than mere fascination with current events; indeed, it was intimately connected with his two most vital concerns: the future of Germany, and the future of free society.

The Renewal of Multi-Power Diplomacy

W ZHEN WORLD WAR II came to an end one fact of enormous significance in international relations seemed above dispute: that world politics in the coming years would be dominated to an unprecedented extent by two Super-Powers-the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed this proved for some years to be the case. At the same time the overwhelming dominance of these two powers, and the Cold War which was its logical consequence, is already in process of passing away. While no one could reasonably deny that the attitudes and wishes of the Super-Powers remain very important elements in contemporary international relations, both are obviously being forced to modify their policies to suit the national interests of other states far more than was the case a few short years ago. The change between I945 and 1953 is clearly illustrated when we consider, one, that in 1945, in the Potsdam Declaration, Germany's future was prescribed for her without benefit of German advice, and two, in I953, by contrast, President Eisenhower publicly reassured Chancellor Adenauer that no important decision concerning Germany would be taken at the Big Three Bermuda Conference without prior consultation with the Germans. No longer is the world and its destinies mere clay to be molded in the hands of the two power giants. Whether the two Super-Powers fully grasp the implications of the great changes now occurring is open to question, but the I953 riots in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and the sharp British criticism of recent American policy in the Far East are symptomatic of the changes even now taking place. So far has the process already gone that no Super-Power conference

The Future of Germany

Essay| September 01 1952 The Future of Germany Current History (1952) 23 (133): 166–172. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1952.23.133.166 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation The Future of Germany. Current History 1 September 1952; 23 (133): 166–172. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1952.23.133.166 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1952 by The Regents of the University of California1952 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Problem of German Recovery

the interesting experience of making a short visit to Berlin and the American zone of Germany and getting a firsthand glimpse of the problems there and of the splendid manner in which the American Military Government, under General Clay, is working out our Government's policies in the face of many obstacles. United States policy with respect to Germany embraces three broad objectives. In the first place, in keeping with the Potsdam Protocol, this country committed itself to the elimination of German militarism and the warmaking potential of the country. Our second objective is the creation of a truly democratic government in Germany. The third is the restoration of a self-sustaining German economy, able to contribute its appropriate share to the economic recovery of Europe. These constitute our major objectives for the future of Germany. We are determined to achieve them despite Soviet obstruction, which has prevented the four occupying powers from carrying out many of the provisions of the Potsdam Protocol.

One or More Germanies: The Economics of Partition

discussion of the future of Germany may begin with two premises which, at this date, will meet with almost universal acceptance. One is that the German nation must not be permitted to rebuild the military power which has just been destroyed at so staggering a cost. The second is that it would be unwise, inhumane, and probably impossible to achieve this end by attempting to de-industrialize Germany. It is of course evident that the industrial activity which we consider essential to the life of millions of Germans and to the economic health of Europe is also the stuff of which a war machine is made, and it is in seeking a way out of this dilemma that we separate into two camps. In one are to be found those who advocate restoring as much as possible of the former economic and political unity of Germany, believing that a programme of inspection could be relied on to keep German militarism in hand. In the other camp are those /who, not convinced that the American and British publics can be trusted to maintain forty years of vigilance against Germany, would restrain Germany from re-uniting. For the present at least, Germany is very effectively partitioned along the line of the iron curtain. Nevertheless, a long-term policy, looking forward to an ultimate withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany and the reunion of the Western and the Russian zones, should not overlook, as a feasible and efficacious act of partition, the severance of RhinelandWestphalia from the German state. It should be pointed out at once that this is not the same thing as the internationalization of the Ruhr. Rhineland-Westphalia is a well-integrated and well-defined economic province,1 which in 10 per cent of the 1937 area of Germany had 20 per cent of the entire German population, and the same proportion of the people