One or More Germanies: The Economics of Partition

Abstract

discussion of the future of Germany may begin with two premises which, at this date, will meet with almost universal acceptance. One is that the German nation must not be permitted to rebuild the military power which has just been destroyed at so staggering a cost. The second is that it would be unwise, inhumane, and probably impossible to achieve this end by attempting to de-industrialize Germany. It is of course evident that the industrial activity which we consider essential to the life of millions of Germans and to the economic health of Europe is also the stuff of which a war machine is made, and it is in seeking a way out of this dilemma that we separate into two camps. In one are to be found those who advocate restoring as much as possible of the former economic and political unity of Germany, believing that a programme of inspection could be relied on to keep German militarism in hand. In the other camp are those /who, not convinced that the American and British publics can be trusted to maintain forty years of vigilance against Germany, would restrain Germany from re-uniting. For the present at least, Germany is very effectively partitioned along the line of the iron curtain. Nevertheless, a long-term policy, looking forward to an ultimate withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany and the reunion of the Western and the Russian zones, should not overlook, as a feasible and efficacious act of partition, the severance of RhinelandWestphalia from the German state. It should be pointed out at once that this is not the same thing as the internationalization of the Ruhr. Rhineland-Westphalia is a well-integrated and well-defined economic province,1 which in 10 per cent of the 1937 area of Germany had 20 per cent of the entire German population, and the same proportion of the people