Abstract: This article reviews, assesses, and makes recommendations relating to provision and use of intelligence in support of national security policy. It details responses to gaps in intelligence during 2000s, and reinforces importance of intelligence in addressing challenges in emerging operational environment. ********** The March 2005 report of Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (The WMD Commission) concluded that America's inability to discern crucial aspects of Iraq's weapons program stemmed from failures to understand the context of Iraq's overall political, social, cultural, and economic situation. (1) In other words, the Intelligence Community did not sufficiently understand political dynamics of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. (2) Given state of affairs with US policy towards Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and other current and potential points of friction one wonders if we have improved our ability to understand such political, social, and cultural dynamics. The implications for failing to sustain and improve intelligence capabilities are manifold. The failure to understand true nature of Iraqi deception about weapons of mass destruction reinforced biases and misperception, ultimately leading to invasion of Iraq in 2003. The deliberate heightening of Sunni-Shia tensions in Iraq during mid-2000s by Sunni extremists who wanted a sectarian war created conditions for rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Many analysts missed social, economic, and political antecedents to Arab Spring, including relationship between increasing dissatisfaction with government corruption, rising food prices and unemployment, increased religiosity, and emergence of new, organized factions willing to demonstrate against government. It appears analysts also failed to recognize Russia possessed both intentions and capabilities to wage a pseudo-war in Ukraine, and that China would increase its expansionism in South China Sea and escalate its cyber attacks on United States. Throughout 2000s, strategists, planners, and policymakers seeking same socio-political context identified in WMD Commission Report lamented a paucity of capabilities to understand what has been termed socio-cultural intelligence, an area of intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting that atrophied in 1980s and 1990s. (3) As former National Security Advisor Steven Hadley recently observed, whether it's Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, or 2011 Arab Awakening, we are starting from scratch and after kinetic phase against ISIS, there's going to have to be some work done. How are we going to do that? (4) Indeed, post-Cold War intelligence programs undervalued social science disciplines as emphasis was placed on technical collection and reporting disciplines. While 1990s witnessed an increase in open, unclassified resources available to help policymakers understand foreign cultures, movements, and peoples, they were not considered as part of baseline data collected and analyzed for defense, development, and diplomacy missions. Policymakers did not have access to best assessments, data, or experts available to inform intelligence analysis, estimates, or policy formulation. The United States has a long history of collecting and using demographic, cultural, and identity-related information in support of national security policy. But record is mixed. When there is a national security crisis or war, intelligence efforts are funded, social scientists are mobilized, and policymakers have access to key insights into foreign populations. Lacking imperative for such support or direct intervention by senior leaders, however, funding for sociocultural intelligence activities atrophy. …